In the story of Néry it is important to try and remember the cavalry units and where they were ordered to spend the night, after another hot and tiring day. The plan was that they were to continue their retreat towards Paris early next morning. The enemy was not thought to be close by, and by this time had completed his westerly movement and was turning south towards the line of Noyon-Compiègne.
Néry today is a very quiet agricultural village with solidly built houses together with small gardens and orchards. The fields yield beet and corn. It is probably not very different from the time of the First World War. On entering the village from the north there is a civilian cemetery, and then two main streets which are roughly parallel to one another, running north to south. The church is in the north-east part of the village.
The most important geographical feature of the village is a ravine which runs parallel to the east side. To the east of it is a plateau. In 1914 the ravine was not only steep but also full of scrub. At the bottom was a stream which had almost dried up during the summer. Prior to the war there had been plans to continue a north-south railway through the ravine bottom.
The commander of 1st Cavalry Brigade was Brig. Gen. Briggs, and under his command were the 2nd Dragoon Guards (Queen’s Bays), 5th Dragoon Guards (Princess Charlotte of Wales’s), 11th Hussars (Prince Albert’s Own) and L Battery with its six 13-pounders. The 5th DG were billeted in and around the northern part of the village close to the church and school area. The 11th Hussars were spread over two farms and some houses on the eastern side of the village and they faced the ravine and plateau. Briggs’ Brigade Headquarters was in a house in the main street which was the western side of the two parallel roads that ran through the village.
A and B Squadrons of the 2nd DG were billeted in buildings opposite and to the south of Brigade HQ and C Squadron was further to the south-west of the village in a small field on the side of a road which formed a deep cutting. They had to picket their horses in orchards and fields close to their billets. L Battery which had already earned its keep in its brief time in Belgium and France at Mons, Audregnies and Le Cateau, was in a position on open ground nearly opposite the 2nd DG. As the battery was at the southern end of the village the men were able to spread themselves and lay down good horse lines. They made their HQ at the local sugar factory which was then a building of some size, with the usual tall chimney. There was a water supply there which was vital to the cavalry as well as to the artillery for watering their horses. The factory’s foundations can still be seen today. The 2nd DG had an advanced post opposite.
On 31 August L Battery was the last unit into billets and on the way they had watered their horses at the river in Verberie. It was harvest time and the corn had been cut and was standing in stooks waiting to be collected. Although their Intelligence showed that the enemy was nowhere close to the village, the various units did send out patrols in the early hours of 1 September but they reported nothing except that it was very misty. At 04.15 hours the 11th Hussars sent out 2nd Lt. Tailby who was relatively inexperienced in patrol work. His small party did, however, include Cpl. Parker who was an experienced hand. Tailby was ordered to take a north-easterly route and then make for the east side of the plateau before taking a southerly sweep. The morning was very misty and the patrol could not see further than 100 yards. At one point the patrol did see a small group of dismounted Uhlans who appeared to be lost, and one of Tailby’s scouts could not resist letting off a rifle shot which, of course, encouraged the Germans to move. The patrol’s way back to Néry was now barred and the Germans charged towards Tailby’s group, who galloped off in a north-easterly direction. Despite having an accident with his horse Tailby and Parker escaped from the German patrol and at the bottom of a hill they came across an estaminet where they discovered a discarded German cloak and rifle. The cloak was draped over the back of a chair. A woman said that three Germans had just run out of her house. Tailby asked for directions to the Néry–Bethisy road as he was by now some way from Néry.
Néry, 1 September
The party returned to base at about 05.30 hours and Tailby ordered Parker to warn the 5th DG while he rushed to see Col. Pitman of the 11th Hussars. His report was received with some scepticism until he produced the German overcoat. Immediately Pitman gave orders to his second in command, Maj. Anderson, to get the men of the 11th Hussars into battle readiness. The cavalrymen and the artillerymen had woken at dawn ready for the early start. They were washing, breakfasting and getting the horses and equipment ready. L Battery was watering its horses at the sugar factory where they may have been joined by some of the cavalry. The battery officers were grouped at two haystacks behind the guns and were shaving.
At about 05.45 hours the first shell, which came as a complete surprise to the billeted troops, was followed by hundreds more, many of which fell among the Bays’ horses and L Battery’s positions. The shelling was accompanied by shrapnel and rifle and machine-gun fire, which resulted in total destruction. The horses from the Bays were terrified and stampeded down the main street. The men in that confined space suffered badly; L Battery and 2nd DG were especially vulnerable. Those cavalrymen billeted on the eastern side and north of the village had considerable protection. Such was the accuracy of the German artillery, or maybe it was luck, that a shell dropped on the roof of the building in which Cavalry HQ was housed. Brigadier General Briggs, Brigade Maj. Cawley and Battery Commander Sclater-Booth were all in residence at the time, along with Col. Pitman of the 11th Hussars. Briggs retrieved the timer belonging to the shell and this recorded the distance of fire as being about 550 yards. Col. Pitman had only just made his report. A few minutes earlier Col. Wilberforce (Commanding Officer of the Bays) had been walking up the street on his way to HQ to find out if there was any prospect of an immediate move. He then heard the first gun report and hurried back to organize his defence positions. This was at about 05.40–05.45 hours.
Maj. Sclater-Booth, in command of L Battery, hurried out of Brigade HQ and was on his way to L Battery. On crossing a field, before reaching their positions, a shell exploded near him and he fell unconscious and was also blinded. He was not picked up for five hours. The story of what follows might have been very different had Tailby been able to re-enter the village from a southerly direction and give more warning.
The positions of what turned out to be twelve German guns, consisting of three batteries of four guns each, could only be guessed at in the morning mist by the gun flashes. Fire was being concentrated on the positions occupied by the 2nd DG and L Battery. The enemy was to the south-east of the village and south-west of Feu Farm. This farm, the German battery site, and the sugar factory formed an arc. The German range of fire was about 400 yards, accompanied by Maxim guns alongside. Early in the action one German battery firing from the east had been brought round from a position facing the village in the west across the plateau to be in line with the other guns to the south-east.
The German cavalrymen had been as exhausted as their British counterparts the previous day, and they, together with their artillery, had been attempting to meet up with the left flank of the French Army. Instead, by a quirk of fate they now faced a whole British cavalry brigade.
There was continuous mayhem in the L Battery and 2nd DG positions. Initially the battery horses of the rear left section of the guns were taking water at the sugar factory and when the shelling began the battery was caught in a hailstorm of shells, shrapnel and bullets. It quickly tried to get at least some of its guns into action from B and D sub-sections. Some horses had been secured to the gun limber wheels and other animals became wild and terrified. Simultaneously machine guns had quickly been set up by the Bays and the 11th Hussars in their positions in order to return fire. Individual dismounted cavalrymen also joined in with accurate rifle fire. The L Battery guns were in columns of sections and three guns had been quickly brought into action, with officers and men frantically working alongside one another. The other three guns were already damaged by the s
helling and out of action. Capt. Bradbury was second in command of the battery after Maj. Sclater-Booth and had been standing about 50 yards north of the guns with brother officers when the first shell had burst. He had called out, ‘Who’s for the guns?’ He and Sgt. Nelson took over one gun and Lt. Giffard another and Lts. Campbell and Mundy the third. This third gun was soon silenced when it received a direct hit. Lt. Giffard was then severely wounded and his detachment either killed or wounded too. This left only Bradbury’s gun in action and Campbell and Mundy went to assist him. Gunner Darbyshire and Driver Osborne served the gun with ammunition from a wagon 20 yards distant, continuously crossing the shell-torn ground. Campbell was killed after only firing a couple of rounds and the duties were then shared out between Capt. Bradbury as layer, Sgt. Nelson as range setter and Lt. Mundy as observer. By 06.30 hours Lt. Mundy was mortally wounded (he died two days later) and Sgt. Nelson was hit. At about 07.15 hours BSM Dorrell reached the gun but then Bradbury himself was hit and had both his legs taken off by a shell. He had himself propped up against a gun and continued to give orders. He had been hit when he had left the gun to seek ammunition. When he was carried off he is reported to have said to Lt. Col. Wilberforce of the 2nd DG, ‘Hullo Colonel, they’ve hotted us up a bit, haven’t they?’
Another account which appeared in the contemporary Great Deeds of the War states that Bradbury had asked the Medical Officer for heaps of morphia in order that the men should not hear him screaming and that he should be quickly taken to the rear. This left Dorrell and the wounded Sgt. Nelson to fire the last round, the gun having in all accounted for three of the German guns.
In a lurid diary account Sgt. Nelson wrote:
During the awful carnage the moaning of dying men and horses audible amidst the terrific thundering of cannon; the scenes in most cases beyond description. One man in full view of me had his head cut clean off his body. Another was literally blown to pieces, another was practically severed at the breast, loins, knees and ankles. One horse had its head and neck completely severed from the shoulders.
Though wounded himself, Sgt. Nelson, after a brief visit to a dressing station, still had a role to play and as the L Battery guns no longer existed he decided to help the Bays with refilling their ammunition belts for their machine guns. Earlier an order had been issued to send despatch riders to inform Allenby of what was happening and to ask for reinforcements as soon as possible. The positions of the 5th DG near the church and the 11th Hussars were not too precarious as much of the shelling passed over their heads, and as a result the two units hardly suffered. The 5th DG was also slightly protected by its position in the village which gave extra cover. The dragoons also managed to prevent their horses from stampeding. There was a feeble attempt by the German cavalry to attack the village from the north-east but it came to nothing. A lot of rifle and machine-gun fire was built up along the eastern side of the village. Gen. Briggs had quickly made a plan of a counter-attack and had sent one squadron of the Hussars into Brigade Reserve and 5th DG to make a turning movement. A large number of their horses were collected and Col. Ansell organized two fairly strong squadrons: one to the north of the village and one to make contact to the south-east with the right of the German lines. It was during this fighting that he was to lose his life. Two other squadrons of the Hussars were used to barricade the southern edge of the village and to help the 2nd DG in the vicinity of L Battery who had been even more exposed than the artillery. The Bays had been employed in ‘loop-holing’ the village walls on the western side. A squadron led by Maj. Ing did excellent work at the sugar factory. One troop under Lt. de Crespigny reached a position to the east of the factory, almost on the German flank but he was mortally wounded. He was buried in France but was later exhumed and taken home for burial in Maldon in Essex. The machine guns under the Bays and 11th Hussars had fired effectively at the German batteries.
One man in the 11th Hussars kept a diary and his picture often appears in current histories of the period. His name was Lt. ‘Deafy’ Arkwright. He was apparently so deaf that he did not even hear the first shells – it is hard to believe this as he would not have passed a medical. Nevertheless he had rushed out to help and in a gap on a bank on the side of the road he found Maj. Cawley who was mortally wounded. On the other side of the road was a gunner corporal firing away, quite regardless of bullets all about him.
The ravine worked in the Allies’ favour for it would have been very difficult for the German cavalry to cross it without being ‘picked off’. During a temporary break in the mist the Uhlans were seen briefly massing on the plateau opposite the Hussars’ position but a French liaison officer identified them as French so the opportunity to fire was lost.
The 4th Cavalry Brigade at Verberie and Gen. Allenby, the divisional commander at St Vaast, had received news of the trouble in Néry from Gen. Briggs. Parties of a composite battalion consisting of men from the Royal Dublin Fusiliers, Royal Warwickshire Regiment and Middlesex Regiment (Duke of Cambridge’s Own) quickly marched off to assist the cavalrymen at Néry. In addition, a squadron of the composite regiment of the Household Cavalry was to work its way further round towards the sugar factory from the south-west. Lt. Billy Heath of the Royal Horse Guards who was in front of the leading troop was killed charging the German guns. At about 07.00 hours Cavalry Division HQ had been established about three quarters of a mile to the west of the sugar factory and just before 08.00 hours two German machine guns began to fire from the factory but were soon silenced. At about the same time the 4th Cavalry Brigade had reached La Bardé Farm to the west of the village and reinforcements arrived from the south-west and the north-east simultaneously. The Germans were in danger of being surrounded. In addition the artillerymen of I Battery were arriving from St Vaast and entered the village over rising ground from the south-west of the village to set up their gun positions. Initially they began to fire at the flank of the German artillery by ‘lining up’ with the tall chimney of the sugar factory. The mist began to clear and the Germans became visible. One battery of the German guns was turned round towards I Battery but they lined up against a cultivator pole and never got their range accurately gauged. Some of the enemy had reached the sugar factory at some point and had captured a few civilians who were later set free. The sight of the British reserves beginning to swarm encouraged the Germans to return to their colleagues. Even the ravine had been tried as a way in to capture the village but all the German Uhlans fell and the mere sight of a battery limbering up on the horizon discouraged any further such attempts. The enemy withdrew after about 20 minutes at around 09.00 hours. They were pursued vigorously by parties of the Hussars as far as the village of Le Plessis Chatelain, to the east of Néry.
The Allies took about a hundred prisoners, and the enemy left eight guns behind, five of which were useless. The four guns that they did manage to make off with were found next day in the forest in Ermenonville. Their total force with the three batteries consisted of a cavalry division of six regiments with machine guns. With hindsight the cavalry brigade should have been more alert with their picketing arrangements and generally quicker but it seems that the Germans were just as surprised to see the British as they were to see them. The enemy subsequently came into action in a somewhat haphazard fashion, but then they had no idea of the real strength of the force they had stumbled upon. They were also worn out themselves. They could, I suppose, have carried out a stronger frontal attack and smashed their way through the Bays and L Battery lines.
The Affair of Néry had lasted barely four hours but the heroism of the British horse battery had saved the lives and equipment of a whole cavalry brigade. Their action will be forever remembered in the annals of the Royal Artillery.
The scene in Néry after the short but bloody battle was chaotic with guns destroyed, the wounded to attend to, and the dead to bury, including 300 or 400 dead horses. One of L Battery’s horses, No. 53, was tied to a gunwheel with eight wounds in his side and yet was still enjoying his nose bag.
Many of the carcasses were subsequently buried by the villagers. In this they were not hindered by the Germans who entered the village the same evening and who treated the inhabitants well. The wounded had all been collected up before the British left. Those casualties too ill to move were cared for in neighbouring farms. The French Army returned to Néry a few days later to reclaim it.
Casualty figures vary, but the British lost about 135 officers and men of whom five were officers from L Battery along with forty-two men from the same unit. The proposed attack of the German 4th Cavalry Division had been covered by their twelve artillery guns along with the Guard Machine Gun Battery on their left. Under this cover of fire the 3rd Cavalry Brigade was to advance from the Bethisy direction to attack the British left. The other flank was to be taken care of by the 17th Cavalry Brigade. In this attack the 18th Dragoons were to be used while leaving the 17th Dragoons in reserve at Le Plessis Chatelain. The 18th Cavalry Brigade was kept back as part of divisional reserve. However, the firing from L Battery combined with a stubborn defence of the village slowly brought the German advance to a standstill. German ammunition was in short supply as well because an ammunition column had been left behind in the forest at Laigue. In addition, the attacking force knew that British reinforcements might arrive at any time. The Germans were to suffer roughly the same number of casualties as the British.
There are two other incidents during the action worth noting. Prior to the war Feu Farm had been bought by a German but at the time of the Affair it was empty. A French girl on holiday from Paris in the village was caught up in the battle and had helped out with the wounded, in particular with Maurice Hill of the 5th DG whose body had been laid next to that of Lt. Col. Ansell. Hill was seen to have life in him still but his identity disc had been removed. He was treated for wounds as well as for loss of memory and a brother officer had to travel from Paris in order to identify him.
VCs of the First World War 1914 Page 10