Antwerp was at last open but no fewer than sixty days after the British first captured its dock facilities. This unnecessary delay, caused by Eisenhower's acquiescence in Montgomery's decision to stage Operation MARKET GARDEN and Montgomery's failure until mid-October to give INFATUATE the priority it needed, destroyed any remaining chance that the war in Western Europe could have been won in 1944.81
SPECTACULAR FAILURES
In Raymond Callahan's judgment, Operation MARKET GARDEN “failed spectacularly.”82 The same can be said of Montgomery's astounding misjudgment in failing to immediately open up the Scheldt Estuary after the capture of Antwerp. (Though Ramsay's Operation INFATUATE succeeded once Eisenhower forced Montgomery to commit adequate forces to this effort.) Unusually for him, Montgomery later did admit that this was an error: “I must admit a bad mistake on my part. I underestimated the difficulties of opening up the approaches to Antwerp so that we could get free use of the port. I reckoned that the Canadian Army could do it while we were going for the Ruhr. I was wrong.”83 These two failures added to an already long list of OVERLORD's strategic blunders, missed opportunities, and tactical errors.
Eisenhower backed the wrong offensive. His failure to support the Bradley/Patton plan gave the Germans an opportunity to regroup their shattered forces in Western Europe. The Allied armies starved of supplies were stalled at the German border because of the unnecessary delay in opening the Port of Antwerp.
The extension of the war produced the abortive US Hurtgen Forest offensive and gave Hitler the opportunity to launch his doomed Ardennes offensive (Battle of the Bulge). Both resulted in major Allied casualties.
OVERLORD failed to achieve its ultimate goals: invading Germany, capturing Berlin, and ending the war in Europe. In our final chapter we will review how national rivalries tested the command structure of the Allied alliance and how the divergent leadership qualities of the principal commanders and personality clashes among them jeopardized the success of the Normandy campaign.
“We are in for an all out struggle with our American colleagues and I am frankly doubtful as to the outcome of it all.”
—Sir Alan Brooke, June 19441
“It is astonishing how petty and small men can be in connection with questions of command.”
—Sir Alan Brooke, June 19452
A SPECIAL RELATIONSHIP BECOMES STRAINED
The special relationship between Great Britain and the United States was key to the development and execution of the Normandy campaign. It began with the close collaboration of Prime Minister Winston Churchill and President Franklin D. Roosevelt even before America's entrance into the war. During 1940 and 1941 the two countries developed very close ties as German victories threatened all of Europe. Their joint military and logistical planning foreshadowed their ultimate alliance.
This influence from the top had a powerful effect on the beginnings of Allied military planning. General Frederick Morgan who had headed COSSAC, the early planning group for the Normandy invasion, and who subsequently was a member of the SHAEF staff gave this firsthand perspective on Anglo-American cooperation: “It is regarded as a delicate hothouse growth that must be carefully tended lest it wither away…. At COSSAC we came to know each other pretty well, and the thought of any significant cleavage between the two nations is to any one of us, I believe, ludicrous.”3
Yet it soon became apparent that the two allies had divergent political aims and strategic objectives. Due to American political exigencies, Roosevelt and the US chiefs of staffs sought to avoid a protracted war in Europe and to pursue a swift victory over Japan. US political and military leaders demanded the quickest and least costly road to victory.4 General George C. Marshall summarized this scenario when he said that “a democracy cannot fight a Seven Years War.”5
By 1943 American troops and equipment began to play a dominant role in European operations. US military and political leaders began to be increasingly insistent on launching a cross-channel invasion. As British power declined, Churchill and Brooke struggled to retain their strategic objectives by keeping operations focused on the Mediterranean theater. The British leaders never seemed able to adjust their perspective to the political reality of these new conditions. Brooke wrote in his diary,
I despair of ever getting our American friends to have any sort of strategic vision. Their drag on us has seriously affected our Mediterranean strategy and the whole conduct of the war…. Instead, to satisfy American shortsightedness we have been led into agreeing to the withdrawal of forces from the Mediterranean for a nebulous 2nd Front [OVERLORD] and have emasculated our offensive strategy.6
General Morgan wrote in his memoirs, “I am left with a clear impression that, with command in the hands of a British leader, the whole affair [i.e., OVERLORD] might have gone very much otherwise. I go so far even to say that it might not have gone at all.”7
The Americans were not naïve. They understood the political reasoning behind Churchill's war policies. But if these did not accomplish America's military interests, the US chiefs of staff would not support them.
Churchill, on the other hand, sought to maintain Britain's dominant position in Europe, preserve its colonial empire, and contain the menace posed by Soviet expansionism in Eastern Europe. American leaders did not foresee the postwar power struggle in Europe created by the rapid resurgence of the Soviet Union from horrendous war losses and the weakened ability of Britain and its allies to cope with this Communist threat.
The Normandy campaign was conducted during a time when the strategic aims and postwar visions of Britain and the United States increasingly diverged. This helped to further exacerbate the personal rivalries and personality conflicts of the principal Normandy commanders. We now turn to a summary of each commander's personal role in advancing or slowing the progress of the Normandy campaign and the end of the war in Europe.
EISENHOWER: COMMANDER AS ARBITRATOR
“Dwight David Eisenhower was not born great, nor did he achieve greatness. But when greatness was thrust upon him, he met the challenge,” concluded correspondent Don Cook in his summary of the supreme commander.8
Eisenhower was catapulted from an obscure position in a small peacetime army to playing a major role in the gradual shaping of the victorious US citizen army during the campaigns in North Africa, Sicily, and northwestern Europe. Field Marshal Erwin Rommel wrote, “What was astonishing was the speed with which the Americans adapted themselves to modern warfare. In this they were assisted by their extraordinary sense of the practical and material and their complete lack of regard for tradition and worthless theories…. Starting from scratch an army has been created in the very minimum of time, which, in equipment, armaments and organization of all arms, surpasses anything the world has yet seen.”9
Moreover starting with the Mediterranean campaigns, Eisenhower carefully developed his command abilities of tact and diplomacy, and promoted the development of Allied unity. During OVERLORD he mastered the joint operations of land, sea, and air forces on a scale greater than what had ever before been attempted. His integrated Allied army although composed largely of British, Canadian, and US troops also contained contingents from nations overrun by the Germans, including France, Norway, Poland, Belgium, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, and Czechoslovakia. By April 1945 Eisenhower's SHAEF headquarters was huge, with a total staff of 12,028. This included 1,495 American and 1,077 British officers. Here was successful coalition warfare writ large.10
Eisenhower acted more as an arbitrator across the alliance rather than as a soldier. He held the Allies together through moments of great crisis by showing an amazing degree of self-effacement to at times insulting and intimidating leaders, including Churchill, Roosevelt, Marshall, Brooke, and de Gaulle as well as military subordinates. He handled this unwieldy cast of ego-driven leaders using intricate compromises that led to a victorious conclusion in Europe. Ike spent countless hours responding to difficult and emotional arguments using an accommodating manner yet not comprising hi
s own authority.11
Ralph Ingersoll, historian for Bradley's Twelfth Army Group, judged that Eisenhower's leadership hinged on his ability “to conciliate, to see both points of view, to be above national interests—and to be neither bold nor decisive.”12 The truth of this judgment is borne out by Brooke's complaint that the British staff officers at SHAEF were under Eisenhower's domination, while at the same time, Bradley and Patton were openly complaining that Eisenhower was dominated by the British.13
Eisenhower's greatest limitation was his reluctance to exercise his prerogatives as supreme commander in battlefield decisions. Ike's conscientious tolerance at times became a liability. When the battlefield called for a leader with an action plan, he failed to intervene time after time as commander in chief.14 He shunned giving direct orders to Montgomery, Bradley, Patton, and others. Instead he issued vague and verbose instructions that gave them great tactical leeway in picking their own objectives. As we have demonstrated, this resulted in some of the greatest tactical mistakes of the Normandy campaign.15
The obscurity of Eisenhower's “commands” clearly exasperated two of his American commanders. Patton lamented in his diary, “We actually have no Supreme Commander—no one who can take hold and say that this shall be done and that shall not be done. It is a very unfortunate situation to which I see no solution.”16 Walter Bedell Smith, Eisenhower's chief of staff, grew weary over his refusal to assert command and issue direct orders based on strategic objectives rather than issuing conciliatory directives. “The trouble with Ike,” Smith observed, is that “instead of giving direct and clear orders, [he] dresses them up in polite language.”17 Ike continued to use this leadership style to almost the end of the war. Max Hastings succinctly labels the result: Eisenhower's failures during the northern European campaign were more “of omission than commission.”18
General Sir Arnold Alexander well summed up the scope of the challenges that Eisenhower successfully faced as supreme commander:
In warfare today a Supreme Allied Commander has much more responsibility on his shoulders than the straight fighting of battles. He finds himself entangled with strategic and political problems, with international relations, and with many other complicated issues far divorced from the front-line. Judging General Eisenhower against this background I think that his was an excellent appointment and that he carried out his assignment with great distinction.19
MONTGOMERY: THE ROGUE COMMANDER
Before the beginning of World War II General Bernard Law Montgomery was considered an expert planner and strategist who was acknowledged as a master of the set-piece operation. He devoted extraordinary attention to the training and inspiration of his troops. He had a remarkable ability to inspire the trust and confidence of his soldiers. He was superb in selecting subordinate staff and in developing a battlefield organization. Those under his command respected him for his willingness to consult them and his concern for their well-being.
Montgomery's first claim to fame was his victory at El Alamein. This renown largely flowed from self-contrived propaganda picked up and embellished (beret and all) by the British press. At this juncture in the war, British morale was very low as their armed forces had recently suffered a string of defeats. The Battle of El Alamein and the creation of the Monty myth were means to boost public optimism in a war-weary Britain. This victory also helped to solidify the Brooke-Monty grip on the British army until the end of the war.
In his book, The Desert Generals (1960), Correlli Barnett was the first “to puncture the inflated Montgomery myth.” He rated Montgomery an average general, able but not brilliant.20 Barnett found that the Battle of El Alamein that was so one-sided in men and material that Monty or any other general would have had difficulty losing it. The battlefield's location and defenses had all been planned and installed for him by his predecessor Sir Claude Auchinleck, whose removal was for political not military reasons.
Montgomery knew he possessed overwhelming military resources from the day he arrived in North Africa. He was “well aware” from Ultra decrypts that Rommel's forces had been reduced “to a mere handful of tanks…shackled by dearth of fuel.”21 It was one of the most one-sided logistical buildup of military advantages ever seen. Even so the battle actually hung in the balance for some time, although the Afrika Korps’ commander Rommel was absent until almost its very end. Monty then failed to effectively pursue and destroy Rommel's defeated forces.
After the battle Rommel wrote,
The impression was gained of the British Commander, General Montgomery, was that of a very cautious man, who was not prepared to take any sort of risk…. I was quite satisfied that Montgomery would never take the risk of following up boldly and overrunning us [as the Germans retreated to Tunisia]…. Indeed, such a course would have cost him far fewer losses in the long run than his methodical insistence on overwhelming superiority in each tactical action, which he could only obtain at the cost of speed.22
When Barnett's book was published in 1960, some British historians and readers were angered by it. However, attitudes had changed by 1983 when a second edition appeared. By then Barnett found that Montgomery's reputation had been reduced to life-size. Now through the perspective of time he was viewed as an eccentric rather than as a genius.23
Montgomery's caution and failure to pursue the enemy persisted throughout the Normandy campaign. He hesitated in taking the initiative, pressing an advantage, and finishing off an enemy with a knockout blow. He preferred balance over boldness and was uncomfortable in fluid battlefield situations when an action did not follow his carefully laid out plans.24 Perhaps Patton came closest to defining that imaginative quality that Montgomery lacked on the battlefield when he wrote, “One does not plan and then try to make circumstances fit those plans. One tries to make plans fit the circumstances. I think the difference between success and failure depends on the ability, or lack of it, to do just that.”25
Montgomery infrequently went to the front and observed his battles through the eyes of his young liaison officers who reported what they knew Monty wanted to be told. He tended to see only what he wanted to see, hear only what he wanted to hear, and he lived in splendid isolation at his headquarters, blocking out most other things from his mind.
Rommel observed, “Montgomery was undoubtedly more of a strategist than a tactician. Command of a force in mobile battle was not his strong point…. As a result [he] made the error of planning operations according to what was strategically desirable, rather than what was tactically attainable.”26 German staff reports on British tactics during OVERLORD remarked, “A successful break in by the enemy is almost never exploited to pursuit…. Whenever the enemy infantry is energetically engaged they mostly retreat or surrender.”27
Some of this reluctance to press home attacks came from instructions given by the government to conserve Britain's rapidly dwindling supply of manpower. Montgomery thus developed the “colossal cracks” operational approach that used massive firepower to capture enemy positions. He resisted all-out attacks after D-Day and reverted to the attritional siege-warfare tactics of World War I.
In the final analysis, his “colossal cracks” strategy was self-defeating. His series of restrained attacks and unaggressive leadership at Caen, Falaise, and elsewhere failed to win battles or save lives. On the other hand, Patton's strategy of “an all-out effort” actually resulted in fewer casualties compared to those experienced by other Allied armies.28
Montgomery's inflexibility also was apparent in his relations with fellow commanders. In his infrequent conversations with other senior officers, he relentlessly asserted his own ideas and failed to consider the arguments of his own military equals or superiors. He failed to undertake any kind of real dialogue. His mentor Alan Brooke noted in his memoirs that he had to haul him over the coals for his usual lack of tact and egotistical outlook, which prevented him from appreciating other peoples’ feelings.
In point of fact, Montgomery was extremely self-centered. Alun Chalf
ont stated, “His vanity was monumental…. Montgomery was guilty of hubris squared, he was cocky when things were going well, badly or hardly at all. In fact he was cocky all the time.” A reporter asked him to name “the three greatest commanders in history.” Monty replied, “The other two were Alexander and Napoleon.”29 This was not intended as a joke. Major General de Guingand, Montgomery's chief of staff, offered this assessment: “Montgomery is a showman. He likes to be the principal figure on the stage…. He preferred to be the only speaker.”30 William Weidner found that Montgomery's obsession with control, punctuality, neatness, and excessive planning was apparent in both his military and private life.31
In view of his personality, it is not surprising he did well in Egypt, Libya, Tunisia, Sicily, and even Italy. There he commanded British and Commonwealth forces under his firm control. In Italy his Eighth Army was virtually an independent command. But Martin Blumenson reminds us, “Coalition warfare was never Montgomery's strong suit.” He never was able to reconcile himself to Eisenhower's decision to assume the ground command on September 1, 1944, as he viewed this as a demotion. His insulting behavior toward Eisenhower as depicted in the previous chapter continued. “He became overwrought,” states Carlo D’Este. “Montgomery could not find it in himself to accept Eisenhower's way of warfare on his authority.” Eisenhower was “too inexperienced” and “ill-prepared.”32
Brooke and Montgomery also seemed unable to reconcile themselves to the fact that American dominance in troops bolstered Eisenhower's command position. By early 1945 the United States fielded seventy-one divisions in northern Europe, while the British now deployed only thirteen.33 In a November 24, 1944, letter, Brooke reinforced Monty's insubordinate behavior by saying, “Ike was no commander, that he had no strategic vision, was incapable of making a plan or of running operations when started.”34 Montgomery added to this by saying on a trip to London, “Eisenhower is quite useless…. He is completely and utterly useless.”35
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