The American Military - A Narrative History

Home > Other > The American Military - A Narrative History > Page 6
The American Military - A Narrative History Page 6

by Brad D. Lookingbill


  Elsewhere in New England, the militia assailed Fort Ticonderoga at the juncture of Lake Champlain and Lake George. Colonel Benedict Arnold, a merchant from New Haven, Connecticut, accepted orders from the Massachusetts Committee of Safety to seize artillery from the British garrison. He linked up with Colonel Ethan Allen and his gang of about 100 “Green Mountain Boys” in New York. Even though Arnold and Allen squabbled over command, they captured the key outpost on May 10, 1775.

  Although reconciliation remained a possibility, martial law failed to suppress the resistance movement. The skirmishes between the colonists and the empire indicated that the former would stand defiantly against the latter. When Royal authorities decided to punish Massachusetts, they incited an open and armed rebellion.

  Rebel Forces

  More than 10,000 provincials poured into the militia camps on the outskirts of Boston. Though poorly organized and quarrelsome, they began to construct a ring of siege works from shore to shore. Under the direction of Colonel Artemas Ward, the mob of New England patriots formed an arc around Boston to keep the British regulars at bay.

  While toiling, the mob enjoyed a song native to the colonial era variously titled “A Visit to Camp,” “The Lexington March,” and even “Doodle Dandy.” Certain lines were attributable to Richard Shuckburgh, an army surgeon for a British regiment, which parodied training days and camp life. Moreover, the chorus offered a derisive epithet for the militiamen. “Yankee” probably derived from a Dutch nickname for the provincials, whereas “doodle” in English denoted playful, shiftless, or menial activities. Given a martial beat with fife and drums, the cadences involved dancing, gesturing, mocking, and frolicking. The lyrics questioned authority with a distinguishing mix of satire and irony, which insinuated that the outfitted regulars, not the armed citizenry, were the foolish ones.

  The armed citizenry occupied the Charlestown peninsula, where two heights, Bunker's Hill and Breed's Hill, overlooked Boston from the north. Originally, they intended to fortify the former, which loomed nearest the narrow neck of land connecting the peninsula with the mainland. The latter rose nearer to the shoreline, but the terrain left the defenders exposed to a possible British landing to the rear. Arriving on the night of June 16, 1775, the militia companies dug trenches and erected redoubts across Breed's Hill by mistake.

  Meanwhile, reinforcements to Gage's troops inside Boston raised their numbers to 6,500. The reinforcements included three major generals – William Howe, Henry Clinton, and Johnny Burgoyne. As a public demonstration of military prowess, the “council of war” planned a frontal assault on the high ground. They assumed that the assembled “rabble in arms” would disintegrate in the face of a disciplined attack by British regulars. On June 17, Gage detailed 2,500 soldiers under the command of Howe and ferried them to the Charlestown peninsula under the cover of a Royal Navy bombardment. Convinced that the rebels would retreat from their hillside dispositions, Howe landed his redcoats at the tip of the peninsula and marched them up the slope.

  Figure 1.3 View of the Attack on Bunker's Hill, 1783. Prints and Photographs Division, Library of Congress

  That sunny afternoon, the residents of Boston mounted rooftops to witness what was incorrectly called the Battle of Bunker Hill. Colonel William Prescott, a Massachusetts farmer who once had been offered a commission in the British Army, resolved to make a defiant stand. When a flying cannonball tore off one comrade's head, Prescott stood erect on a parapet to steady the rebel line. They charged their weapons with rusty nails and scrap metal, while their balls were encrusted at times with poisonous mixtures. Brigadier General Israel Putnam of Connecticut told them: “Don't fire until you see the whites of their eyes.” His advice seemed prudent, because they lacked sufficient ammunition for numerous volleys. Their aim proved deadly, as withering fire shattered the first British advance. After a quick regrouping, they repelled the second. Finally, a third attempt pushed them from the hillside. Running out of ammunition, they fell back to Bunker's Hill before withdrawing to Cambridge.

  British casualties totaled a staggering 1,054 – almost half of the force engaged – compared with rebel losses of 411. Shaken by the carnage of the battle, the British regulars never forgot the costly assault. Clearly, Royal authorities miscalculated the challenges that they faced in New England.

  To the south, the Royal governor of Virginia faced challenges of his own. John Murray, the Earl of Dunmore, received word that a renewed cycle of Indian raids threatened backcountry settlements. Unrest spread throughout the countryside during 1774, particularly in the insular communities distant from the capital at Williamsburg. The Mingo and the Shawnee, who lived west of the Royal Proclamation line, began attacking provincials entering their hunting grounds. At Dunmore's request, Virginia's House of Burgesses authorized funding for a volunteer militia expedition against the gathering threats. At the junction of the Ohio and Kanawha Rivers, Dunmore's forces defeated Shawnee and Mingo warriors in the Battle of Point Pleasant on October 10, 1774. The governor returned to the capital to declare victory in his war.

  Irrespective of his military leadership, Dunmore confronted political opposition in the House of Burgesses. Patrick Henry, a combative member of the House, called for the permanent organization of a volunteer company of cavalry or infantry within every county. In an expression of solidarity with Massachusetts, he encouraged the House to pass a resolution in 1774 declaring a day of fasting and prayer. In response, Dunmore dissolved the House.

  The next year, local officials across Virginia readied the militia for an emergency. At the behest of the Virginia Convention meeting in Richmond, they stockpiled weapons, ammunition, and gunpowder. After the clashes at Lexington and Concord in Massachusetts, Dunmore sought to deprive a potential insurrection of logistical capabilities. He ordered the Royal marines to empty the arsenal and to disable the muskets stored in Williamsburg. On the night of April 20, 1775, Lieutenant Henry Collins arrived in the capital with a squad from H.M.S. Magdalen, which anchored on the James River. Afterwards, they fled in the dark with 15 half-barrels of powder for delivery to H.M.S. Fowey on the York River.

  Rumors about additional operations by the Royal marines brought out the Virginia militia. Led by Henry, the Hanover County militia voted on May 2 to march on Williamsburg. They stopped outside the capital, because Henry received a bill of exchange as payment for the powder. Nevertheless, Dunmore felt so imperiled that he briefly armed a group of black slaves and Shawnee Indians to guard the Governor's Palace. On June 8, he fled from the capital to H.M.S. Fowey. On November 17, he issued a shocking proclamation, which promised freedom to chattel in the Old Dominion if they joined an “Ethiopian Regiment.” He also dispatched an emissary to recruit Indian warriors to “march forth to conquer the Virginia rebels.” After a decisive defeat in the Battle of the Great Bridge that December, he resorted to sporadic raiding the next year. The Virginia gentry decided that British rule had lost legitimacy.

  By the end of 1775, British hopes for colonial reconciliation had all but disappeared. The Crown began recruiting new regiments of provincial loyalists and soliciting armed auxiliaries from Indian tribes. In addition, the home government hired 30,000 Hessian mercenaries for deployment to North America. “Well, the die is now cast,” King George III responded when told of rebel forces. The king concluded forthrightly: “Now, blows must decide whether they're to be our subjects or independent.”

  Conclusion

  The American military originated in the violent interactions of diverse people, who armed themselves for survival in the woodlands. Beginning in 1607, the English colonies organized militia units to conduct operations from their coastal bases. Their acts of war included frequent skirmishes with the Indians as well as occasional patrolling in the interior. Taking advantage of their assets, they pushed Indian tribes from the perimeters of provincial towns. At the same time, they relied upon the Royal Army and Navy to battle against rival empires. Eventually, the population of North America became involved in a
series of global wars between Great Britain and France. The fighting culminated with the French and Indian War, which exposed thousands of locals to arduous campaigning. Governmental disputes with London produced an imperial crisis, when the British placed the colony of Massachusetts under martial law. Soon, the militia and the regulars came to blows. By 1775, revolting Americans defied the military power of Great Britain.

  Long before Americans revolted, trans-Atlantic colonization gave credence to the myth that the frontiersmen stood ready to provide an effective defense against all enemies. That is because the conquerors of North America resorted to the inherited traditions of classical republicanism for their notions of security. In the life-and-death struggle for control of the continent, the militia system reflected a kind of reversed self-image of what English colonists associated with imperial might. Armed citizens led the way for the American military, first against the spirited resistance of Indian tribes and later against the standing armies and navies of European monarchs. Generally, they did not perform well on expeditions outside the vicinity of their homes and communities. Many deserted their posts, especially if the logistics for conducting operations in faraway places faltered. Clinging to their colonial institutions, Americans assumed that amateurs could stand toe-to-toe with professionals in war.

  In the wars of the colonial era, Americans experienced an evolution of military affairs. Though slow to change in many respects, European approaches to combat were not completely abandoned by the armed forces. Nevertheless, imperial warfare waged by regulars gave way to military actions that entailed a great deal of innovation. On the one hand, troops possessing organization, discipline, and firepower remained necessary to clear and to hold objectives for decisive results. On the other hand, they needed to travel faster and lighter to take advantage of cover, concealment, and surprise in the marshy woods. In other words, combatants on both sides of the Atlantic learned from each other while reinventing their systems of defense. Because American warriors adapted their strategies, tactics, and logistics to the threat environment, their fighting styles revealed a number of lessons learned from Indian people.

  Fighting in the colonial era broadly reinforced the warrior attributes not always evident in the rank and file of the standing military. Regardless of the force structure, soldiers and sailors in North America tended to act in highly competitive ways. They preferred to serve and to sacrifice for their friends and their families rather than for the objectives of distant authorities. Drawn from a dynamic population, they grew united in their desire to overcome adversaries with strenuous work and dauntless courage. They seemed to resent the discipline and the punishments associated with His Majesty's service, even though they battled against long odds with prodigious bursts of energy. Eager to return from the theater of operations as soon as possible, they often fought with their passion for liberty uppermost in mind. Time and again, the strengths and weaknesses of the American military manifested under the stress of a long war.

  Essential Questions

  1 How did the technology and tactics of the Native Americans differ from those employed by European forces?

  2 What were the chief features of the colonial militia system?

  3 Why did the colonists revolt against a standing military after the French and Indian War?

  Suggested Readings

  Allison, William T., Jeffrey Grey, and Janet G. Valentine. American Military History: A Survey from Colonial Times to the Present. Upper Saddle River, NJ: Prentice Hall, 2007.

  Anderson, Fred. Crucible of War: The Seven Years War and the Fate of Empire in British North America, 1754–1766. New York: Knopf, 2000.

  Archer, Richard. As If an Enemy's Country: The British Occupation of Boston and the Origins of Revolution. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2010.

  Cave, Alfred A. The Pequot War. Amherst: University of Massachusetts Press, 1996.

  Doubler, Michael D. Civilian in Peace, Soldier in War: The Army National Guard, 1636– 2000. Lawrence: University Press of Kansas, 2003.

  Ferling, John E. Struggle for a Continent: The Wars of Early America. Arlington Heights, IL: Harlan Davidson, 1993.

  Grenier, John. The First Way of War: American War Making on the Frontier, 1607–1814. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2005.

  Keegan, John. Fields of Battle: The Wars for North America. New York: Knopf, 1996.

  Leach, Douglas Edward. Arms for Empire: A Military History of the British Colonies in North America, 1607–1763. New York: Macmillan, 1973.

  Lepore, Jill. The Name of War: King Philip's War and the Origins of American Identity. New York: Random House, 1998.

  Malone, Patrick M. The Skulking Way of War: Technology and Tactics Among New England Indians. Lanham, MD: Madison Books, 2000.

  Millett, Allan R., and Peter Maslowski. For the Common Defense: A Military History of the United States of America. Revised edition. New York: Free Press, 1994.

  Peckham, Howard H. The Colonial Wars, 1689–1762. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1964.

  Ross, John F. War on the Run: The Epic Story of Robert Rogers and the Conquest of America's First Frontier. New York: Bantam Books, 2009.

  Shea, William L. The Virginia Militia in the Seventeenth Century. Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University Press, 1983.

  Silver, Peter. Our Savage Neighbors: How Indian War Transformed Early America. New York: W. W. Norton, 2008.

  Starkey, Armstrong. European and Native American Warfare, 1675–1815. Norman: University of Oklahoma Press, 1998.

  Steele, Ian K. Warpaths: Invasions of North America. New York: Oxford University Press, 1994.

  2

  War for Independence (1775–1787)

  Introduction

  In the last days of a long war, an anonymous letter circulated among the American soldiers encamped at Newburgh, New York. Composed without attribution by Major John Armstrong, an officer loyal to General Horatio Gates, it expressed outrage over the failure of Congress to fund the salaries, bounties, and pensions of the officer corps. It complained bitterly about the ingratitude of civilian leaders toward members of the armed forces. Anticipating a special meeting in the days ahead, the military camp buzzed with speculation about the Newburgh conspiracy.

  General George Washington issued an order for a regular officers' meeting on the Ides of March, 1783. The commander-in-chief reported in advance that he would not attend, thus leaving the chair in the meeting to Gates. Another anonymous letter circulated, which suggested widespread agreement among the malcontents about a course of action. In all likelihood, a mutiny was in the offing.

  The meeting came to pass in a building known as the Temple. Washington unexpectedly entered the hall, as Gates sat perplexed. The commander-in-chief asked the audience to remain patient, to remember posterity, and to save the republic. Speaking of the anonymous letters, he denounced the author for sowing seeds of discord among Americans. “My God!” he declared in exasperation before raising the rhetorical question: “What can this writer have in view?”

  Washington paused, reached into his coat pocket, and took out a letter from a congressional delegate. With his eyes squinting, he stared intently at the lines on the paper. Suddenly, he stopped reading. Then he reached into his coat pocket again and took out a pair of reading glasses. “Gentlemen,” he stated, “you must pardon me.” He gestured to the audience: “I have grown gray in your service, and now find myself going blind.”

  The sight of an aging, bespectacled warrior caught many off guard. The feelings of anger dissipated, while a sense of shame swept through the hall. The officers began to weep. After Washington exited the Temple, the Newburgh conspiracy came to an end.

  Figure 2.1 Alexander H. Ritchie, Washington and His Generals, 1870. Prints and Photographs Division, Library of Congress

  Refusing to become an American Caesar, the commander-in-chief resigned his commission on December 23, 1783. His leadership forged a “patriotic band of brothers” during the War for Independence, but the milit
ary almost turned against Congress in the end. With the new government bankrupt, the unfunded liabilities to veterans amounted to as much as $6 million. Auction houses soon sold off naval warships to the wealthiest merchants. Service members pondered what happened yet clung to their concepts of republican virtue, which imparted meaning to their longsuffering. While an embattled populace decided who should rule at home, the American Revolution reaffirmed the principle of civilian authority over the armed forces.

  The American Revolution commenced over eight years earlier, when the British Empire attempted to smash the colonial rebellion. As the Second Continental Congress gathered during 1775, military escorts accompanied the delegates to the Pennsylvania State House in Philadelphia. Following the bloodshed at Lexington and Concord, Congress assumed the functions of an inter-colonial legislative body. Though refusing to declare independence that spring, a committee sought to procure military supplies. The delegates voted to borrow money for the purchase of gunpowder and passed resolutions that urged citizens to arm themselves. They opened a public debate on war and peace, while Massachusetts officials beseeched them to create a “powerful army.”

  “Oh, that I was a soldier,” sighed the Massachusetts delegate John Adams, who encouraged Congress to take action. While several delegates already held military commissions from their assemblies, the 13 colonies possessed the potential to amass as many as 500,000 combatants through the enrolled militia system. However, at least one-third of the colonists remained loyal to the Crown. Many of the rest stayed uncommitted. Only individuals known as patriots volunteered to confront the armed might of His Majesty. If acts of violence gave birth to the United States, then the sacrifices of ordinary men and women nurtured a republican form of government. Their quest for home rule profoundly affected a Virginia delegate named Washington, who wore his buff and blue militia uniform to Congress in 1775.

 

‹ Prev