The next day, the Marine battalions pivoted toward the enemy stronghold of Belleau Wood. With his men outnumbered four to one, Gunnery Sergeant Dan Daly, who earned two Medals of Honor, urged them forward by asking: “Do you want to live forever?” They captured the village of Bouresches, but most of the dark forest, tangled undergrowth, and scattered ravines belonged to the Germans. Blistered and blinded from gas attacks, the Marines cleared the terrain by June 26 and earned the sobriquet, “Devil Dogs.” The Battle of Belleau Wood largely gave birth to the sense of institutional pride that inspired the Marine Corps for generations.
All across the line near Belleau Wood, the soldiers of the 2nd Division proved their mettle in battle. To the right of the Marines, the 9th and 23rd Infantry Regiments captured Vaux, a village near Château-Thierry. In a month of hard fighting, the entire division suffered 9,777 casualties, including 1,811 dead. With the Americans standing firm between the Germans and Paris, Allied confidence in the AEF soared.
The Germans possessed enough strength for a final attempt to capture Paris by crossing the Marne, where the 3rd Division under General Joseph Dickman waited for them on July 15. The weight of their attack hit the 30th Infantry Regiment under Colonel Edmund Butts and the 38th Infantry Regiment under Colonel Ulysses Grant McAlexander. After French troops fell back, they left McAlexander's right flank exposed. Beset by firing from three directions, two American platoons fought to the last man. Dickman's division held the line for two days, which prompted their enduring nickname, “The Rock of the Marne.”
Pershing continued organizing the AEF for major offensive operations, promoting General Hunter Liggett as well as Bullard, Bundy, and Dickman to corps commands. While Summerall took command of the 1st Division, Harbord moved to the head of the 2nd Division. The latter steered toward Vauxcastille on July 18, as the former drove against Soissons. With Americans to their left and to their right, the French Moroccan Division marched in the center against the German salient. Harbord advanced more than 8 miles in two days and captured 3,000 prisoners, but he lost almost 5,000 men. Summerall kept moving for five days, capturing 3,800 prisoners while absorbing 8,365 losses. Vexed by the aggressiveness of the Americans that summer, one German officer referred to their virulent attacks as “inhuman.”
Thanks to the success of the Allied counterstroke, the British, French, and American divisions began to push the Germans eastward into Belgium. The German high command halted the offensive east of Château-Thierry and withdrew exhausted troops from the Marne. Offering his resignation, Ludendorff called it a “black day” for the German army. With U.S. forces rushing into “no-man's-land,” the balance of power tipped decisively against Germany.
Cult of the Offensive
From the start of the Great War, operations on the Western Front resonated with what came to be known as the “cult of the offensive.” Whatever the importance of logistics, training, and tactics, the initiative in battle belonged to the armed forces able to muster the willpower to attack first. For the human element to stand a chance in the fatal environment, the attackers needed five times as many soldiers as the defenders. Irrespective of the odds, unimaginative commanders often hurled their infantrymen with rifles and bayonets against machine guns and field artillery. Showing disregard for hostile fire, the Americans simply called it “guts.”
By August 10, 1918, Pershing patched together the “American First Army” to pinch out the Saint-Mihiel salient near Verdun. Occupied by the Germans since 1914, it was a 200-square-mile triangle jutting 14 miles into the Allied lines between the Moselle and Meuse Rivers. A network of railways stretched to the town of Saint-Mihiel, while barbed wire girded its perimeter. Foch dubbed it “the hernia.” Calling for Allied armies “to continue the offensive without cessation,” he initially agreed to Pershing's plan for sending his 476,000 men to clear out the 23,000 Germans inside the salient.
After consulting with Haig and Pétain, Foch surprised Pershing with a different plan. Suddenly dismissing the importance of Saint-Mihiel, the supreme commander envisaged a “Grand Offensive” to attack along the whole length of the Western Front. The converging armies sought to envelop the strong defenses and to deprive the entrenched German troops of the ability to shift reserves along their interior lines. Hence, British forces would advance southeasterly from Cambrai, while combined Franco-American forces would press northward through the Champagne and Meuse-Argonne regions. With American columns split on either side of the French, two French generals would “assist” in commanding them. Once again, the autonomy of the AEF appeared in jeopardy.
To keep the AEF in the fore, Pershing made several counterproposals to Foch. While insisting on conducting the Saint-Mihiel operation, Pershing also offered to use the First Army to break through the frontlines between the Argonne Forest and the Meuse River. In other words, he committed at least 14 divisions to two major offensives 60 miles apart within the span of three weeks. In accepting the dual challenge of Saint-Mihiel and Meuse-Argonne, Pershing boasted that no other troops possessed “the offensive spirit” of the Americans.
Beginning on September 12, Pershing ordered the Americans to attack along two flanks of the Saint-Mihiel salient. With almost 3,000 guns blasting German targets, a brief artillery bombardment softened the defensive positions. A ruse by the skeletal VI Corps fooled a handful of enemy officers, who prepared for a strike to the southeast at Belfort. At 5:00 a.m., Liggett drove I Corps and Dickman steered IV Corps northward to Vigneulles. Because the British declined to furnish heavier tanks, Lieutenant Colonel George S. Patton commanded a light tank force in support of the advancing infantry. Three hours later, V Corps under General George H. Cameron penetrated the western flank of the salient and rolled southeasterly. The Germans abandoned guns, wagons, and supplies while fleeing to the north and to the east.
In two days, the First Army captured 15,000 German prisoners at a cost of fewer than 9,000 casualties. However, most German troops escaped to the Hindenburg Line to fight another day. An American brigade commander, General Douglas MacArthur, spied Metz through his binoculars but fumed that he was not permitted to smash the emplacements. Despite rain and fatigue, the Americans raced to their main objectives and sealed off the Saint-Mihiel salient on schedule.
The Americans pivoted to the northwest and began shifting their operations to the western bank of the Meuse River. General Hugh A. Drum, Pershing's Chief of Staff, assigned responsibility for planning to Colonel George C. Marshall, a staff member of the First Army's operations section. In a matter of two weeks, almost 600,000 men, 4,000 guns, 90,000 horses, and a million tons of supplies needed to move 60 miles across three dirt roads and light railways without detection by the Germans. “The only way to begin is to commence,” Marshall sighed while spreading a battlefield map on a table. Ostensibly, the Meuse-Argonne offensive of the First Army constituted the biggest logistical undertaking ever attempted by U.S. forces.
In the coming days, the First Army moved through the cover of darkness. With traffic jams at most intersections, the military police tried to keep the vehicles rolling while breaking up fistfights. Pedestrians slept in roadside tents, as the German shelling grew more intense by the mile. Assembling in the trenches after relieving French troops, units marked their attack lanes with white tape in the mud. Assigned to the 35th Division, Captain Harry Truman with Battery D of the 129th Field Artillery marched 200 men almost 100 miles in one week to his new position. “I'd rather be here,” the bespectacled officer announced before the operation commenced, “than be president of the United States.”
The First Army's area of operations stretched across a frontline nearly 20 miles wide, which placed Americans against an enemy occupying formidable defensive terrain. Four miles into the “outpost zone,” Montfaucon rose 1,122 feet above a series of lateral hills and ridges. In conjunction with their French counterparts to the west, the U.S. commanders of I, III, and V Corps prepared to thrust northward to break through the “in-depth” defenses. They would adv
ance 10 miles in less than two days, or so Pershing predicted with optimism. Outflanking the German troops along the Aisne River, their main objective was the rail line between Carignan, Sedan, and Mézières.
At 5:30 a.m. on September 26, nothing was quiet on the Western Front. Whistles blew in the trenches, as determined officers ordered the rank and file “over the top.” Advancing almost shoulder to shoulder in a dense fog, the American infantry crossed the first line of German defenses behind a deadly artillery barrage. They pressed onward through repeated shelling, barbed wire, machine-gun fire, and aerial strafing. Despite confusion and delay, they assailed the high ground and captured Montfaucon a day later.
Slowed by congested roads and mechanical breakdowns, the First Army slogged through the mud but made little progress. Holding strong positions south of Cunel and Romagne, German machine guns mauled the American divisions at every turn. In addition, German artillery poured enfilading fire onto them from the heights of the Meuse and the Argonne Forest. As the bodies hit the ground, sinister puffs of yellow smoke announced the onset of a gas attack. The living and the dead remained motionless in ditches, craters, foxholes, and dugouts, while the stragglers streamed to the rear in search of food, water, and shelter. “Hell can hold no terrors for me after this,” one “doughboy” scribbled in his diary. Unable to advance any more than 8 miles in the onslaught, Pershing reluctantly suspended operations on the battlefield.
Elsewhere on the Western Front, the European armies of Foch's “Grand Offensive” also slowed. The French troops in Flanders stalled in stormy weather, while others in the center of the Allied formation tarried before attacking. Along the Somme, British forces penetrated the Hindenburg Line with the help of two American divisions. Their penetration cut a deep gap in the German defenses, but they paused to improve their interior lines of communication and supply. Logistical chaos not only denied advancing units the support necessary to push forward but also rendered many divisions vulnerable to German counterattacks.
Pershing assigned the 369th Infantry Regiment, the first African American unit of the AEF, to the French Army. Known as the “Harlem Hellfighters,” they attained a distinguished record in a number of sharp engagements. They spent more days in combat than any other regiment from the U.S. Within the Meuse-Argonne region, they outpaced the French troops on their flanks. In late September, they captured the town of Séchault.
While Pershing tended to the chaos in the First Army, the 77th “Liberty” Division from New York remained on the attack in the Argonne Forest. Mostly composed of urban conscripts without experience fighting in the woodlands, they endeavored to gain ground on September 28. Major Charles W. Whittlesey led the 1st Battalion of the 308th Regiment, which German infiltrators isolated and besieged for 72 hours. Rescued and resupplied by a relief party, he pushed ahead with 700 men through a ravine the next day. Once again, enemy forces closed the gap in their advance pocket and separated them from their divisional command. “Our mission is to hold this position at all costs,” Whittlesey announced to the “lost battalion.” Sending out carrier pigeons, he communicated day after day with other battalions trying to locate them. German artillery, mortars, grenades, rifles, and flamethrowers took a toll, winnowing them down to 231 men. On October 7, the 77th Division finally pressed forward and found the “lost battalion” still holding their position.
With growing acrimony among the Allied commanders, Pershing rotated his divisions and renewed the Meuse-Argonne offensive in early October. He ordered officers to cease frontal assaults against machine guns while directing them to seek flanks wherever possible. His staff resolved a number of supply and communication problems, but the lack of training and equipment continued to undermine operations. While Liggett's I Corps faced the Argonne bluffs near Exermont, Cameron's V Corps and Bullard's III Corps confronted the heights of Romagne and Cunel, respectively. By the time Pershing restarted the offensive, the German high command had successfully reinforced their principle defensive line at the Kriemhilde Position.
To silence the guns of the Argonne, Pershing expected a miracle from the First Army. At Liggett's behest, Summerall's 1st Division edged past Exermont and proceeded along the Aire River. In a daring maneuver, the 82nd Division moved behind them to storm the heights across the waterway. The hapless defenders encountered an “All-American” named York, while Summerall's troops continued to roll northward. In six days, the 1st Division gained 4.5 miles of ground previously held by eight German divisions.
On the western flank, American divisions provided crucial assistance to the French Fourth Army. Under the command of Marine Corps General John A. Lejeune, the 2nd Division reached the slopes of Blanc Mont ridge just south of the Aisne River. With the timely arrival of the 36th Division, the ridge fell on October 10. Consequently, the First Army helped to clear the loop while driving the outflanked Germans from the Argonne Forest.
Goaded by Foch, Pershing sent the First Army against the main line of the Kriemhilde Position on October 14. On the far left, the 77th Division reached the outskirts of Grandpré in two days. Weeks later, the 78th Division finished the job and captured the town. Three divisions sliced into the hills and forests of Romagne, which fell to the Americans four days later. On the western edge, the 42nd “Rainbow” Division hurled unsupported infantry against intimidating fortifications near Côte de Châtillon. “If this brigade does not capture Châtillon,” bellowed MacArthur, commander of the 84th Brigade, “you can publish a casualty list of the entire brigade with the brigade commander's name on top.” While eventually successful in capturing the hill, his battalions suffered 80 percent casualties. General William G. Haan, commander of the 32nd Division, sent National Guardsmen from Wisconsin and Michigan to the top of Côte Dame-Marie. In fact, a patrol of seven men used rifle grenades to knock 10 machine guns out of action. After weeks of hammering the German lines, the Americans breached the most critical point on the Kriemhilde Position.
With more than a million Americans in action along an 83-mile front, Pershing sensed that victory was within their grasp. Because the AEF grew unwieldy and uncoordinated, he created the Second Army under the command of Bullard to conduct operations east of the Meuse Heights near Toul. While making himself the “group commander,” he relinquished control of the First Army to Liggett. Furthermore, he elevated Dickman to command I Corps and Summerall to command V Corps. To replace Bullard at III Corps, he tapped General John Leonard Hines. Approaching the last phase of the Meuse-Argonne offensive, Pershing handed over operations to his best generals in the theater.
The Armistice
As the American generals endeavored to punch through the Kriemhilde Position, the commander-in-chief remained preoccupied with “the only possible program” for ending the Great War. Based upon the counsel of Colonel Edward House, his key advisor, Wilson presented the Fourteen Points for lasting peace to Congress on January 8, 1918. Most dealt with terms for open diplomacy, freedom of the seas, removal of trade barriers, reduction of armaments, adjustments of territory, and self-determination for various nationalities. The last point called again for a “general association of nations,” which promised to replace the old system of power balances in Europe. If the world embraced his vision, Wilson concluded, then the “culminating and final war for human liberty has come.”
In a series of notes with the Wilson administration that October, the German chancellor offered his “unqualified acceptance” of the Fourteen Points as a basis for negotiating peace. While threatening to pursue separate negotiations with Germany, Wilson sent House to meet with British and French officials. The Allied governments accepted the Fourteen Points in general, albeit with caveats.
In response to a request from the Allied governments, Wilson decided to deploy American troops to Russia. Beginning in the fall of 1918, they secured stockpiles of Russian supplies at Arctic ports and rescued the Czechoslovak Legion on the trans-Siberian railroad. They also assisted the “White” Russians, who continued to oppose the revoluti
onary government of the “Red” Bolsheviks. The 339th Infantry Regiment and supporting units of the 85th Division – about 5,000 men in total – served as the American North Russian Expeditionary Force. To thwart Japanese ambitions to expand into eastern Siberia, the 27th and 31st Infantry Regiments of the 8th Division arrived in Vladivostok with 8,000 men. By 1920, all U.S. forces had withdrawn from Russian soil.
Freed from directing U.S. forces in the Meuse-Argonne offensive, Pershing focused on the coalition strategy for defeating the Central Powers. On October 25, 1918, he met with French and British commanders to discuss the terms for a possible armistice. Foch and Pétain wanted to punish Germany, but Haig preferred a lenient settlement. Speaking last, Pershing indicated that “there should be no tendency toward leniency” and insisted upon the surrender of German U-boats and bases to the Allies. A few days later, Pershing extended his remarks in a note to the Supreme War Council. Rather than granting any terms, he preferred “continuing the war until we force unconditional surrender from Germany.” Because only the U.S. possessed enough reserves and resources to reach Berlin, he expected the First Army to gain “the full measure of victory.”
A “big man” in every sense of the phrase, Liggett found the First Army in deplorable shape after weeks of combat. While providing replacements for decimated divisions, he insisted upon the return of the stragglers to their units. He built up stocks of ammunition and other supplies, although deficiencies in tanks and trucks remained. Aerial photographs enhanced the detail of battlefield maps, which revealed the locations of enemy dumps, batteries, nests, trenches, and roads. While limiting the number of hasty attacks, he reshuffled the lines of soldiers to concentrate their mass and firepower on the German center. Thanks to the strategic pause in the Meuse-Argonne offensive, he retooled the First Army in order to release “our full weight” in a concerted blow.
The American Military - A Narrative History Page 39