The American Military - A Narrative History

by Brad D. Lookingbill

  After attending the Naval War College, Lieutenant Colonel Holland M. Smith contributed significantly to reworking the plans for landings. By 1932, he served as the fleet Marine officer of the battle force on board the U.S.S. California. During the combined exercises off the coast of Oahu that year, he watched as men scrambled over the coral and waded through the surf. Afterward, he lamented that “the suppositional enemy would have wiped us out in a few minutes.” Like other Marine officers of the interwar generation, he engaged in a long yet successful battle to make innovations in naval tactics for assailing supposedly impregnable beaches. “Howlin' Mad” Smith continued to rise through the ranks, eventually earning accolades as the “father of amphibious warfare.”

  The most visible advance in amphibious warfare occurred in 1933, when the Navy Department recognized the Fleet Marine Force, or FMF. General John H. Russell, who soon became the commandant of the Marine Corps, suggested a plan for a unit that operated under the control of the fleet commander. With approval from the Chief of Naval Operations, the Secretary of the Navy Claude A. Swanson issued General Order 241 to define the FMF. Henceforth, the few but proud Marines comprised an integral component of the fleet operations.

  After more fine-tuning, the concerted effort of the Marines culminated in the promulgation of an amphibious doctrine. At Quantico, the faculty and students synthesized more than a decade's worth of reports into the 1934 publication of the “Tentative Landing Operations Manual.” Four years later, the Navy adopted it as Landing Operations Doctrine, or Fleet Training Publication 167. Whether serving afloat or ashore, members of the armed forces later recognized the text as the military equivalent to Holy Scripture.

  While the doctrine won converts among military leaders, technical difficulties undermined the best-laid plans for landings. The high command touted the key principle of “combat loading,” which required the efficient delivery of all personnel and assets for the ship-to-shore movement on a strict schedule. However, the Marines needed special landing craft as well as new amphibious vehicles to “swim” ashore. Over time, technological changes resulted in the Higgins boat and the “Alligator” tractor. Issues remained in regard to fire support from the air and the sea, which presented quandaries for the Navy. Marine aviators pleaded to form more fighter squadrons to complement the boots on the ground, while Marine infantrymen pressed the battleship gunners to use more bombardment shells with heavier bursting charges. Compounded by a dramatic economic downturn in the U.S., federal parsimony made it difficult for the Navy Department to build a war machine for the Pacific theater.

  During the interwar period, the Navy Department appeared resourceful with every imaginable aspect of fleet operations. In collaboration with crews manning the ships, the Marine Corps experimented with radio communications, day and night landings, smoke-screens and feints, concentrated salvos, dispersed infiltrations, and broad-front maneuvers. All agreed that the crucial elements for victory at sea were aggressive advances, individual initiative, and battle planning, which set the standards in the Navy for decades to come.

  Our Economic Army

  Once the Army demobilized, Americans made few efforts to prepare for another war. The surge of pacifism and the desire for disarmament stalled the strategic initiatives of the War Department for more than a decade. Congress largely ignored the recommendations of the General Staff for arming the forces, which left the rank and file in a poor state of readiness.

  Chartered by Congress in 1919, the American Legion rallied veterans across the U.S. on behalf of military affairs. Becoming the most prominent veterans' organization in the nation, it emerged as a powerful lobby in state and federal politics. Members resolved to foster camaraderie as well as to promote patriotism. Some posts sponsored vigilante measures during the Red Scare, but most focused on school curricula and involved citizenship. Eventually, the American Legion became well known across the country for its baseball program.

  The country also celebrated a civic-minded group of women known as the Gold Star Mothers. Their name derived from the display of a star on the houses of mothers who had lost sons in combat overseas. They served as the inspiration for countless speeches and public commemorations. Voluntary societies lobbied Congress to sponsor pilgrimages to Europe, which enabled grieving mothers to visit the graves of sons buried outside the continental U.S. In early 1929, Coolidge signed a bill that authorized the War Department to aid Gold Star Mothers traveling to American cemeteries in foreign lands.

  American veterans and their families received desultory benefits from Washington D.C., which included programs for disability compensation, rehabilitation for civilian vocations, and insurance for the honorably discharged. Although Congress had maintained the Veterans Bureau since 1921, three different agencies managed the benefit programs and the 54 hospital facilities. Passed on July 3, 1930, the World War Veterans Act authorized President Herbert Hoover to form the Veterans Administration – the VA – in order to “consolidate and coordinate government activities affecting war veterans.” In accord with an executive order, the component agencies consolidated that year. General Frank T. Hines, the director of the Veterans Bureau, became the first administrator of the VA.

  The federal government promised to pay veterans an adjusted compensation pension, but payment of the “bonus” was not scheduled for disbursement until 1945. Suffering from the Great Depression, over 20,000 veterans converged on Washington D.C. to demand early payment in 1932. They called themselves the Bonus Expeditionary Force, which prompted the press to dub them the “Bonus Army.” Among the most popular military figures at the time, retired Marine General Smedley Butler visited the campsites in a show of solidarity. Nevertheless, the Senate refused to pass the “bonus bill” as approved by the House of Representatives. Likewise, Hoover vetoed legislation for unemployment relief. Many “Bonus Marchers” left the capital that summer, even though others remained near Anacostia Flats.

  On July 28, 1932, policemen shot two “Bonus Marchers” while attempting to evict them from a federal building. Fearing an ugly riot, Hoover asked the Army Chief of Staff, General Douglas MacArthur, to restore order. With a force of 600 cavalrymen and infantrymen, he personally secured Pennsylvania Avenue that afternoon. Major George S. Patton drew his saber and helped to direct six tanks against campsites nearby. Furthermore, MacArthur exceeded his orders by proceeding to clear out Anacostia Flats with tear gas. The soldiers burned the shantytown and drove the “hobos and tramps” from the outskirts of Washington D.C. Approximately 100 people suffered injuries. Although the Army quelled the unrest in the capital, the “Battle of Anacostia Flats” tarnished the reputation of the commander-in-chief.

  The nation turned to a new commander-in-chief that year. Franklin D. Roosevelt, who defeated Hoover in the 1932 presidential contest, stated boldly that “we are in the midst of an emergency at least equal to that of war.” He likened the Great Depression to the Great War, declaring his intention to lead “our economic army” in a different kind of campaign. Pledging “a new deal for the American people,” he issued “a call to arms” at the Democratic Party Convention. His first inaugural address expounded upon “the lines of attack” in the days ahead. Summoning a “unity of duty hitherto evoked only in time of armed strife,” he vowed to command “this great army of our people” in a “disciplined attack upon our common problems.” In other words, the new president justified wielding power as “if we were in fact invaded by a foreign foe.”

  Whatever the martial rhetoric of the New Deal, Roosevelt officially opposed reconsideration of the “bonus bill.” When the marchers returned to Washington D.C. to voice their protest, he provided them with sanitary campsites in addition to free meals. His wife, Eleanor, paid them a visit, even joining in a round of camp songs. As tensions abated, Congress overrode the president's veto and authorized the early payment to the veterans.

  Congress in 1933 passed the Emergency Conservation Work Act, which established the Civilian Conservation Corps, or CCC.
The Roosevelt administration planned to take a “vast army of these unemployed” off the streets and to supervise them in building roads, constructing dams, reclaiming farmland, restocking waterways, managing wildlife, renovating parks, and planting trees. Though jointly administered by four cabinet departments, only the Army possessed the logistical capabilities to coordinate the peacetime program.

  In the first year, the Army mobilized 310,000 civilians and organized 1,315 camps. Though limited by law to unmarried men aged 18 to 25, an executive order permitted 25,000 veterans to enroll. Despite opposition from MacArthur, the War Department assigned about 3,000 regular officers and many noncommissioned officers to oversee the civilians. By 1935, close to 9,300 reserve officers performed duties at the CCC camps as well.

  While the Army neglected military exercises, the CCC activities eased the negative effectives of unemployment for some 3 million Americans. Participants in national service activities not only earned a living wage but also contributed to public works. The conditioning regimen involved immunization shots, good food, outdoor recreation, and daily calisthenics. Throughout the Great Depression, junior officers assigned to the CCC acquired valuable leadership experience while handling young men in uniform.

  To the detriment of modernization schemes, the Great Depression foisted even more economy upon the War Department. The Industrial Mobilization Plan outlined steps to create a wartime system of mass production, but implementation depended upon robust appropriations. By 1934, the General Staff had established priorities for weapons upgrades pending congressional funding. For example, the M-1 Garand semiautomatic rifle gradually replaced the bolt-action rifles of the infantry. The Air Corps soon placed orders for the four-engine B-17 bomber with a 2,000-mile range. Even if the Army boasted about “rolling along,” the troops were not battle ready. The motorization program redefined horsepower on military installations, but soldiers grew frustrated with vehicle repair and maintenance. Although the Army fielded a wide variety of units, most trained without access to state-of-the-art technology.

  Inspired by observing British armored forces, the Army began to experiment with new concepts for combining firepower with mobility. Shifting from larger “square” to smaller “triangular” divisions, the combat arms employed motorized transportation for greater agility and speed. Mechanization spawned faster tanks as well as self-propelled howitzers and combat cars. Senior officers continued making improvements to armored vehicles, suggesting innovations in radio communications and tank mounts. However, the doctrines for offensive maneuvers remained tethered to infantry assaults. Due to the high price of procurement, few exulted about mechanized warfare until the late 1930s. Consequently, General Adna R. Chaffee, Jr., took command of the Army's first armored force, the 7th Cavalry Brigade.

  Another rising officer was General George C. Marshall, who earned his star in 1936. He oversaw CCC camps and trained National Guard units, but his talent seemed to shine most brightly inside the War Department. Staff officers referred to him as “a genius.” In Washington D.C., he developed a strong relationship with the New Dealer, Harry Hopkins. Before “Dr. New Deal” gave way to “Dr. Win-the-War,” Roosevelt anointed Marshall as the Army Chief of Staff.

  Neutrality

  War clouds appeared across the vast oceans, while the U.S. attempted to retain access to profitable offshore markets. The Roosevelt administration formally recognized the Soviet Union to encourage reciprocal trade. The State Department promoted the Good Neighbor Policy in the western hemisphere, which promised non-intervention by the American military. Because the dangers abroad seemed distant, Washington D.C. adhered to the notion of “Fortress America.”

  Undeterred by the scolding of Washington D.C., Japan occupied Manchuria in 1931. Next, the Japanese Navy attacked Shanghai, China's great port city. Their indiscriminate bombing of civilians sparked international protests, but the Great Powers did nothing to stop the violence. After overrunning Nanking, Japanese soldiers massacred as many as 300,000 Chinese. As militarists gained prominence in the Japanese government, they withdrew from the League of Nations and renounced previous disarmament treaties.

  While Japan remained unchecked in Asia, the economic collapse of Europe helped to vault totalitarians into positions of authority. In Italy, Benito Mussolini's Fascist government blended socialism with nationalism ostensibly to revive the Roman Empire. Adolf Hitler championed the Nazi Party and became the German chancellor by 1933. After receiving the title of Reichsführer, or “national leader,” he defied the Versailles Treaty by calling for German rearmament. Moreover, a civil war in Spain bolstered the regime of General Francisco Franco. While Fascist Italy invaded Ethiopia in 1935, Nazi Germany occupied the demilitarized Rhineland the following year. Hitler consummated a strategic alliance with Mussolini under the Rome–Berlin Axis Agreement and reached out to Tokyo through the Anti-Comintern Pact. An international system based upon the rule of law appeared all but doomed.

  Whereas the international system faltered, Americans urged policymakers to eschew Europe and Asia. A number of congressmen rallied behind a proposed constitutional amendment, which stipulated a public referendum on a war declaration unless the nation suffered a direct attack. According to the Senate hearings of the Nye Committee, international bankers and arms exporters dragged the U.S. into World War I for the sake of profits. Decrying the “merchants of death,” isolationists in Congress demanded peace at almost any price.

  Beginning in 1935, Congress passed a series of Neutrality Acts to avoid entanglements in foreign affairs. The first one banned the shipment of arms to all belligerents, thereby renouncing the uncertain principle of “neutral rights” to world trade. An extension prohibited making loans or giving credit to belligerents. The bloodshed in Spain compelled the enlargement of the U.S. “moral embargo” to cover civil wars. Another update made American travel on board belligerent vessels illegal. A “cash-and-carry” stricture also hampered exports of nonmilitary goods. With the president's endorsement, Congress fashioned a legal straitjacket to ensure American neutrality in armed conflicts.

  Meanwhile, Nazi Germany demanded Lebensraum, or “living space,” in Europe. In early 1938, Hitler successfully pressed for the annexation of Austria. After threatening to seize the Sudetenland from Czechoslovakia, he met with British and French leaders for the Munich Conference on September 29, 1938. In a policy later denounced as appeasement, they agreed to give him what he wanted in order to achieve “peace in our time.” Irrespective of the Munich agreement, German forces seized all of Czechoslovakia early the next year. On the heels of renewed Japanese aggression in China, Italian troops conquered Albania. Joseph Stalin, the Soviet premier, soon signed a mutual non-aggression pact with Hitler. Accordingly, they planned to carve up the Polish Corridor and the Baltic states between them. “Because of its neutrality,” Hitler snarled, “America is not dangerous to us.” On September 1, 1939, he marched into Poland. Great Britain and France declared war on Germany two days later.

  Roosevelt proclaimed official U.S. neutrality in World War II, although he summoned the Senate and the House of Representatives to amend the latest Neutrality Act. “I regret the Congress passed the Act,” he told them, adding that he also regretted “that I signed the Act.” A new law in 1939 did not incorporate all of his requested changes but nonetheless offered “cash-and-carry” terms for Great Britain and France to acquire war materials. The revision lifted the arms embargo, although it forbade American ships from transiting into a “danger zone.” While public support for neutrality remained solid, the Roosevelt administration intended to utilize every measure “short of war” against the Axis Powers.

  The Roosevelt administration championed rearmament while pushing stimulus measures through Congress. Owing to the efforts of Congressman Carl Vinson, the Naval Act of 1938 expanded the battle fleet beyond the earlier treaty limits. Furthermore, naval aviation received a boost with the near-doubling of aircraft acquisitions. The next year, Congress authorized $300 mill
ion to help grow the Army Air Corps to 5,500 airplanes and 3,000 airmen. The fixation on trans-Atlantic flight and the fascination with strategic bombing underwrote most of the military calculations. In addition, anti-aircraft artillery moved to the top of the annual appropriations list. Federal expenditures supported the purchase of military assets under the guise of hemispheric security while underscoring American resolve in the face of gathering threats. Nevertheless, the commander-in-chief insisted to the War Department that “we won't send troops abroad,” telling staff officers to “only think of defending this hemisphere.” As weaponry flowed from factories, the American military attempted to assemble a balanced force with ground, sea, and air armaments disbursed in a proportional way.

  At the beginning of World War II, the American military posed almost no immediate threat to the armed might of the Axis Powers in Europe and Asia. Japan, Italy, and Germany even pledged to defend one another if an uncommitted nation went to war against any of them. The U.S. lacked the will and the strength to ever fight a global, two-front war, or so the totalitarians presumed.

  Under the Rainbow

  With the U.S. and the Axis Powers on a collision course, Army and Navy planners touted no grand strategy for military action other than enforcing the Monroe Doctrine. The Joint Board of the War and Navy Departments recognized potential manpower and industrial advantages for America, yet the logistical challenges appeared daunting. During the 1920s and 1930s, a cadre of officers composed a series of color-coded plans for almost every military contingency.

  While the war plans examined prospective adversaries in the interwar period, the power surge of Japan shaped War Plan Orange. Hence, the Army and the Navy predicted a Japanese–American conflict with initial holding actions by U.S. garrisons on Pacific islands. Thereafter, the battle fleet would fight its way across the blue waters to relieve the beleaguered bases in what amounted to the greatest maritime effort in military history. The eventual blockade of the Japanese home islands culminated with a climactic battle between capital ships. Even with joint operations in the offing, no one foresaw a landing to capture Tokyo. Whatever the flaws of the plan, an “Orange war” anticipated the mobilization of the military to retake American possessions and to defeat Japanese forces.