For years, the strategic concepts of an “Orange war” provided the subtext for most discussions about Japanese aggression. Every conceivable situation was analyzed in the “Orange” variations – including possible surprise attacks. Disagreements arose regarding the Philippines, which the Army wanted to hold. The Navy, however, doubted the prudence of dispatching reinforcements to Manila. Anxious about the great distances between safe harbors, the admirals bargained for ramping up battleship and carrier construction. In accordance with War Plan Orange, the bulk of the battle fleet deployed to the Pacific during the late 1930s.
War Plan Red contemplated the unlikely prospect of an armed conflict between Great Britain and the U.S. Given the prowess of the Royal Navy, planners suggested quick responses to an invasion of the continental U.S. while defending the Panama Canal and bases in the Caribbean and Latin America. One variant outlined scenarios for military action in Canada. In a “Red war,” the major thrusts of U.S. forces occurred in the Atlantic. The plan projected the dispatch of the battle fleet and expeditionary forces to protect the western hemisphere. However remote British antagonism seemed, a strategic defensive promised to frustrate their initial actions and to compel a negotiated settlement.
Though highly theoretical and quite problematic, the specter of a British–Japanese alliance inspired War Plan Red-Orange. Such a coalition threatened the wartime seizure of U.S. bases in the Pacific, a major test of the Monroe Doctrine, and a sustained attack on the Atlantic seaboard. In other words, a “Red-Orange war” forced Americans to face simultaneous offensives across the Atlantic and the Pacific against two powerful enemies.
With the multiple color-coded plans, the War and Navy Departments acknowledged that other enemies threatened national security. In fighting a single foe, Blue offered a generic defense of the continental U.S. Brown planned for the suppression of a Philippine insurrection, while Yellow involved an expedition to China. In general, Violet dealt with armed conflict in Latin America. Whereas Purple covered South America, Gray considered the occupation of Central America and the Caribbean. Tan and Green punctuated military action in Cuba and in Mexico, respectively. White detailed a military response to a domestic uprising in the U.S, especially if communist subversion transpired. With the rise of the Third Reich, War Plan Black revealed the implications of German aggression.
By 1938, the Army and Navy Joint Planning Committee compiled what it dubbed the Rainbow Plan to supersede the existing ones. According to Rainbow 1, the American military accepted responsibility for defending both the continental U.S. and the entire western hemisphere. Rainbow 2 and Rainbow 3 presupposed joint movements across the Pacific to defeat Japan, while France and Great Britain battled Germany. In the absence of allies, Rainbow 4 involved a battle for the Atlantic until improving circumstances permitted redeployments to the Pacific. Finally, Rainbow 5 moved some U.S. forces across the Atlantic to assist allies in Europe or in Africa while sending others to conduct a strategic defensive in the Pacific. Thanks to input from the Army War College and the Navy War College, the unrealistic visions of the joint planners gave way to a sharper focus on fighting the Axis Powers.
Meanwhile, German visions for blitzkrieg, or “lightning war,” kept their opponents off-balance in Europe. After Hitler quickly swept into Poland and invaded Finland, nothing else happened during the “Phony War” of late 1939. The calm ended the next spring, when the Nazi juggernaut assaulted Denmark and Norway. Furthermore, German troops advanced into neutral Holland, Belgium, and Luxembourg without pausing. Once the French army collapsed along the Meuse River, the British ally surrendered to Hitler on June 22, 1940. “We shall never surrender,” vowed British Prime Minister Winston Churchill, “until in God's good time the new world with all its power and might steps forth to the rescue and the liberation of the old.”
Stirred by the incantations of Churchill, Roosevelt moved the U.S. toward participation in the war against Germany. Specifically, he asked for a supplemental defense appropriation of $1.3 billion to build a “two-ocean navy.” While urging additional increases in the production of military airplanes, he secretly gave “first call” for new orders to London. That summer, merchantmen with arms and ammunition left American shores just before the Battle of Britain began. Military leaders posited that U.S. soldiers, sailors, and flyers needed the materials, but the Roosevelt administration rejected their advice.
Bypassing Congress, the Roosevelt administration consummated a “destroyers-for-bases” deal on September 2, 1940. The commander-in-chief sent 50 mothballed destroyers to the Royal Navy in exchange for its bases in Newfoundland and Bermuda. Privately, he worried that he “might get impeached” for making the transfer, which he ordered on his own executive authority. Without officially taking sides, Washington D.C. edged closer to belligerency.
As the prospect of belligerency loomed, Marshall began to forge the Army into a force capable of winning a protracted struggle. The National Guard along with the Organized Reserves activated for federal service. The War Department under Secretary Henry L. Stimson endeavored to outfit the troops. A new organization, the General Headquarters, took charge of training them. Gradual increases in military personnel gave the General Staff time to evaluate weapons, equipment, and tactics. Though falling short of Marshall's call for “complete mobilization,” Congress even approved a peacetime draft on September 16, 1940. Weeks after Roosevelt won re-election to a third term, the Army more than doubled in strength.
On November 12, 1940, Admiral Harold Rainsford Stark, the Chief of Naval Operations, wrote a historic memorandum that reached the desk of Roosevelt. Forwarded by the Joint Planning Committee, it contemplated a global, two-front war against Germany and Italy on the one hand and against Japan on the other. For the benefit of the commander-in-chief and Secretary of the Navy Frank Knox, it described four optional scenarios, lettered A through D. It recommended option D, which took the name “Dog” from the military phonetic alphabet. Derived from Rainbow 5, the recommendation called for defensive measures in the Pacific while giving priority to offensive operations across the Atlantic. Simply stated, Plan “Dog” laid the foundation for U.S. forces fighting in Europe first.
With planning in motion for U.S. forces to enter the fray, high-level talks between American and British leaders occurred in early 1941. Their agreement to fight in Europe first became code-named ABC-1, that is, American–British Conversation Number 1. To buy time for the mobilization plan, Congress passed the Lend-Lease Act on March 11. Accordingly, it authorized the president to provide materials to “any country” deemed “vital to the defense of the United States.” Nearing bankruptcy, Great Britain began purchasing munitions, ships, planes, vehicles, and supplies on credit. Roosevelt predicted with a buoyant slogan that the U.S. would become “the great arsenal of democracy.”
The totalitarians soon controlled most of Europe, where democracy all but vanished. On June 22, 1941, Germany assaulted the Soviet Union in Operation Barbarossa. To divert Nazi strength away from the Atlantic, the U.S. extended Lend-Lease to Stalin's regime. Two months later, Roosevelt and Churchill met near Newfoundland to formulate a set of principles that constituted the Atlantic Charter. Endorsed by 11 nations battling the Axis Powers, the statement of belligerent aims insinuated U.S. involvement without commitment.
That summer, the U.S. began waging an undeclared war against Germany on the Atlantic Ocean. As far east as Iceland, naval patrols escorted convoys threatened by German submarine “wolf packs.” In addition, Americans accepted responsibility for the military air routes across the North Atlantic via Greenland and across the South Atlantic via Brazil. Troops landed in Greenland to protect the island and to build bases for aerial ferrying. Likewise, other units arrived in Iceland. After a German submarine fired upon the U.S.S. Greer, the president gave the Navy a “shoot-on-sight” order. Nazi crews torpedoed the U.S.S. Kearny and the U.S.S. Reuben James. At least 115 sailors died aboard the latter, which was the first Navy ship sunk during the war. Event
ually, Congress repealed the prohibitions against arming the merchantmen and cleared them to enter contested waters.
Unbeknownst to Congress, the War Department crafted the top-secret “Victory Program.” Principally written by Major Albert Wedemeyer in the War Plans Division, it provided estimates about the manpower and material requirements for defeating Germany. The projections called for as many as 215 divisions with some 8.7 million men. More than three-fourths of the Army appeared destined for service overseas.
The Army swelled in late 1941, especially after Congress approved an $8 billion supplemental spending bill for national defense. One line item authorized $35 million for the construction of a single building to house the War Department. After selecting a location near the Potomac River, Lieutenant Colonel Brehon B. Somervell, who commanded the Construction Division of the Army Quartermaster Corps, oversaw the project. His design for the structure called for a five-sided ring that evoked an old fortress – a pentagon.
Long before workers erected the Pentagon, staff officers in Washington D.C. grappled with a series of critical strategic decisions. They confronted inter-service rivalries in addition to opportunity costs while planning for war. Working the problems year after year, they shared an awareness of military power, a preference for direct solutions, and a concern about prolonged conflict. In spite of false starts and dead ends, the joint efforts enabled the armed forces to imagine the trouble ahead.
Pearl Harbor
As Americans braced for war against Germany, U.S. policy toward Japan stiffened. The Roosevelt administration announced embargoes on aviation gas, scrap iron, and other supplies to Tokyo. Envisioning a Greater East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere, Japanese leaders countered by preparing to seize oil, rubber, and resources beyond the home islands. They assessed the Dutch and British colonies in the Pacific and planned to take them. In the summer of 1941, Japanese forces moved into French Indochina.
While continuing to aid China, the Roosevelt administration hoped to deter any further aggression by Japan. The president froze Japanese financial assets in the U.S. and expanded the embargo to include oil. Since almost 90 percent of Japan's oil supply came from American producers, the sanctions backed their leaders into a corner. To frustrate their imperial strategy to “go south,” the War Department placed MacArthur in command of U.S. forces defending the Philippines. Secretary of State Cordell Hull offered to renew American trade in exchange for a Japanese withdrawal from China and Southeast Asia. However, Japan decided to wait two months before acting. General Hideki Tojo, the War Minister, lobbied the cabinet for a preemptive strike, but Prime Minister Fumimaro Konoe wanted to negotiate a settlement. When the latter resigned in mid-October, the former replaced him. As envoys conferred, Washington D.C. expected Tokyo to make concessions.
That fall, Tokyo desired to immobilize U.S. forces on the flank in order to open a lifeline through the South China Sea. Admiral Isoroku Yamamoto, who commanded Japan's largest force of warships and aircraft, agreed to knock out the American battle fleet. He entrusted Commander Minoru Genda with the details for military action. The war plan involved an initial air and sea strike against Hawaii, even as Tojo made another offer to Hull on November 20. If the U.S. abandoned China and restored all trade relations, then Japanese imperialists would occupy no additional territory in Asia.
The U.S. refused Tojo's offer, while the Japanese fleet steamed ahead. Reports of its movements in the Pacific prompted several warnings to U.S. commanders. In fact, Secretary of the Navy Knox noted earlier in the year that “it is believed easily possible” for Japan to initiate hostilities with “a surprise attack” at Pearl Harbor. “The question,” Secretary of War Stimson wrote, “was how we should maneuver them into the position of firing the first shot without allowing too much danger to ourselves.” Admiral Husband E. Kimmel, the Pacific fleet commander, decided to forgo long-range air patrols near Hawaii. Instead, he sent the carrier U.S.S. Lexington to Midway Island and the carrier U.S.S. Enterprise to Wake Island. The carrier U.S.S. Saratoga remained in San Diego, California. Even though U.S. intelligence officers intercepted Japanese messages about an imminent war, the commander-in-chief did not know what was about to happen at Pearl Harbor.
Figure 11.2 Pearl Harbor Naval Base and U.S.S. Shaw aflame, 1941. Prints and Photographs Division, Library of Congress
At dawn on December 7, 1941, Japan launched a surprise attack at Pearl Harbor. Six Japanese carriers operated without detection only 200 miles away from Hawaii. Hundreds of planes roared down the western coast and the central valley of Oahu. For two hours, they bombed eight U.S. battleships at anchor. Three sank, one grounded, one capsized, and one received heavy damage. In sum, 19 vessels sank or were disabled.
In a daring tactical feat, Japanese aircraft pummeled and strafed other military targets that morning. At Hickam and Wheeler Fields, they found U.S. airplanes parked wing to wing. Altogether, the raid destroyed almost 180 aircraft and damaged around 100 more.
The raid left Americans reeling. At least 2,402 died while another 1,178 suffered wounds. The fatalities included 1,103 entombed in the sunken U.S.S. Arizona. In contrast, the Japanese military lost a few dozen aircraft during the aerial operation and only a handful of tiny submarines maneuvering in the harbor.
Irrespective of a surprise attack, Japan failed to achieve a decisive victory. The bombers ignored the oil tanks, extensive pipelines, and onshore facilities of Hawaii that supported U.S. fleet operations. Moreover, they missed the opportunity to harm U.S. aircraft carriers and their escorts, which left port a few days earlier. Tactically successful but strategically flawed, Japan conducted simultaneous strikes against the Philippines, Guam, Midway, Wake, Hong Kong, and Malaya that day.
The following day, Roosevelt addressed both houses of Congress about “a date which will live in infamy.” For many years, he had spoken directly to the American people during “fireside chats” in a calm, steady voice. Broadcast by radio across the nation, the brief speech that he delivered represented one of his most memorable. Because of the onslaught by “the Empire of Japan,” he called for a declaration of war to ensure that “this form of treachery shall never endanger us again.” His words encapsulated the public outrage and general resolve in the wake of a surprise attack. Members of Congress voted for war in unanimity, save one pacifist.
Within days, Germany and Italy declared war on the U.S. Their declarations prompted another message on December 11 from Roosevelt. “The forces endeavoring to enslave the entire world now are moving towards this hemisphere,” he announced. Thus, Congress declared war on all of the Axis Powers and cast aside the nation's reluctance to fight.
Conclusion
Americans after World War I looked forward to everlasting peace, yet men and women in the military never said farewell to arms. Congress attempted to provide uniformity and structure to the Regular Army, National Guard, and Organized Reserves. The “treaty Navy” limited armaments and tonnage while incorporating aerial assets into fleet operations. Experimenting with ship-to-shore movements, Marine officers determined the steps necessary for undertaking amphibious assaults. Other than performing constabulary duties and special assignments, though, the armed forces saw little action during the interwar period. The onset of the Great Depression made military interventions infeasible. Furthermore, the U.S. refused to assert the right or the responsibility to preserve the rule of law beyond its borders. With the world engulfed in another wave of belligerence, advocates for national defense assumed that a war across the Atlantic or the Pacific would require primarily the application of sea power.
The declarations of war on the Axis Powers dramatically ended the policy debates that divided Americans before 1941. Although isolationists recoiled from the prospect of foreign entanglements, a growing number of citizens recognized that totalitarianism endangered a free-trading, open-door world. Abandoning any pretense of arms control, aggressive nations in Europe and Asia became less civil and more ruthless. In fact, the Munich agreement cam
e to symbolize the failure of appeasement to prevent the outbreak of hostilities. While acknowledging the military potential of the U.S., the regimes of Germany, Italy, and Japan scorned the principles of liberal democracy espoused by the Atlantic Charter. A global economic disaster heightened international tensions, to be sure, but the Third Reich, the New Roman Empire, and the Greater East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere turned geopolitical contests into another world war.
World War II erupted with the catastrophic chain of events that unfolded throughout the late 1930s, even though a few Americans began preparing for it earlier. Military personnel prepared for action while focusing largely on the defense of “Fortress America” and the western hemisphere. Innovators learned key lessons about cutting-edge technologies, which they applied to the development of weapons programs and operational concepts. In particular, strategic and tactical considerations underscored the importance of aviation. Unfortunately, almost two decades of federal thrift placed the armed forces at a disadvantage. Washington D.C. restrained military spending, while Berlin, Rome, and Tokyo did not. Although military cultures tended to reinforce rigidity and to retard creativity, the Army, Navy, and Marine Corps anticipated many of the imperatives for fighting the next war. Even if service members stood more or less ready to fight, the U.S. did not predict the conflagration to come the way it did.
The American Military - A Narrative History Page 43