To field forces with better test scores, the American military became increasingly interested in the untapped pool of females. Once male conscription ended, the number of women in uniform grew rapidly. In 1971, women comprised only 1.3 percent of the enlisted ranks. By the end of the decade, the number had risen to 7.6 percent. Furthermore, Congress opened the service academies to women in 1975. Although the Coast Guard Academy admitted women first, the U.S. Military Academy at West Point admitted 119 female cadets for the fall of 1976. By 1978, the Army had eliminated the separate Women's Army Corps and mixed women into non-combat units with males. Reflecting the impact of “women's lib” on civil society, the military establishment took charges of sexual harassment and gender inequity more seriously. The Carter administration requested that Congress require females to register for the Selective Service system in 1980, but his request died in committee.
Carter selected the nation's first African American Secretary of the Army, Clifford Alexander. He feared that the quantitative measures of quality veiled patterns of racial discrimination, although the percentages of racial and ethnic minorities in uniform actually grew. Despite the close relationship in aggregate data between indicators of quality and the completion of enlistment, he intended to keep the Army from discounting the unrecognized potential of those lacking high-school diplomas or hailing from inner-city ghettos. Consequently, the Army instituted policies that ensured equal opportunity across the ranks.
Consistent with the Total Force policy, the National Guard provided key personnel to complete or to “round out” the Army's reduced divisions. By 1979, the Capstone program had identified all units necessary to fulfill wartime missions and aligned them with appropriate Army headquarters for active duty. For most inactive personnel, it allowed detailed preparations for combat in Europe. By design, the Pentagon relied more heavily than ever on the reserve component.
Meanwhile, the Pentagon attempted to revitalize the training of all service members. The Army's Training and Doctrinal Command, or TRADOC, developed a comprehensive and interconnected program to assess not only individual competence but also unit proficiency. Each soldier mastered the skills appropriate to his or her grade, which included ongoing measurements of readiness through a series of tests. Authoritarian forms of discipline and punishment gave way to positive reinforcement, as commanders eased regulations around the barracks. For commissioned and non-commissioned officers, training instilled the Zen-like concept of “Be-Know-Do.”
The AirLand Battle Doctrine influenced the most significant concepts for training. General William E. DePuy, the commander of TRADOC, crafted a new edition of FM 100-5 Operations in 1976. Based upon the lessons learned from World War II, Korea, and Vietnam, the revised Army field manual underscored maneuver warfare in addition to air power. It touted “active defense,” though subsequent revisions accentuated offensive tactics, sophisticated technology, and indirect movements in the theaters of operations. Simply stated, the AirLand Battle Doctrine stressed preparing to win the first battle of the next war.
When General Donn A. Starry assumed command of TRADOC the following year, he improved the AirLand Battle Doctrine with language about the “extended battlefield.” He worked intently with Lieutenant Colonel Huba Wass de Czege, an officer at the Command and General Staff College, on field manual updates that categorized operations as close, deep, and rear. In close operations, large tactical formations fought an enemy using maneuver, direct engagement, and indirect fire support. Moreover, deep operations helped to win the battle by engaging enemy formations through deception, surveillance, and interdiction. Likewise, rear operations assembled and moved reserves into secure areas while continuing the logistical efforts to sustain momentum in campaigns. Victory hinged upon the initiative, agility, and synchronization of all combat arms, which kept the enemy off balance with an edge in lethal weaponry.
Irrespective of the new concepts, the Carter administration made few improvements to U.S. forces. The president canceled the B-1 bomber program, slashed the Navy's shipbuilding plans, and reduced DOD outlays for operations, technology, and maintenance. However, the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan in 1979 indicated that détente had failed to deter communist aggression in the Third World. Light infantry divisions comprised elements of a new Rapid Deployment Force for the Middle East, but critics complained that the “deployability” of 200,000 troops failed to offset their lack of heavy armor. Congress wanted only modest increases in defense spending. While Americans experienced a crisis of confidence, the White House grew more belligerent toward the Kremlin.
During the Iranian hostage crisis of 1980, an American rescue attempt known as Operation Eagle Claw turned into a debacle. With the failure of the rescue mission in mind, military leaders organized the Joint Special Operations Command, or JSOC. They readied elite units to conduct specialized missions for national defense in the future.
Although anti-militarism persisted in the U.S., public support for national defense began to build. For years, the Pentagon attempted to rebrand the military by publicizing the benefits of “buddy” systems, European tours, paid vacations, free housing, and job training. Opinion surveys indicated that Americans shared favorable impressions of the Air Force and the Navy. The former urged service members to “aim high,” while the latter promised that they would “see the world.” With great pride, the Marine Corps boasted about wanting only “a few good men.” Military recruiters abandoned public service announcements while reveling in marketing campaigns featuring catchy slogans and glossy advertisements.
No one did more to upgrade the marketing campaign of the Army than General Maxwell R. Thurman, who earned the nickname “Mad Max” after taking over the Recruiting Command in 1979. Instead of recruiters simply filling boots, he insisted upon the use of metrics to assess the quality of the prospects. Under his command, a computer-based system called Request permitted counselors at Military Entrance Processing Stations, or MEPS, to make “guarantees” about enlistments, training, and jobs. After several “come to Jesus” meetings with the advertising firm N. W. Ayer & Son, he pushed them to craft a clear and coherent message for an “all-recruited Army.” One member of the creative team, Earl Carter, suggested “Be All That You Can Be” for a new slogan, which stirred Thurman to tears. Once the television and radio ads premiered in late 1980, the lyrics for an inspirational jingle resonated with the nation: “I know the world is changing / Changing every day / And you've got to know your way around / If you're going all the way / Be all that you can be / Because we need you / In the Army.”
The launch of the marketing campaign corresponded with the election of Reagan to the U.S. presidency that year. Speaking to the Veterans of Foreign Wars about the “Vietnam syndrome,” he called the last war against communism “a noble cause.” If men and women in uniform were to fight again, he pledged that the nation would muster the means and the determination to prevail whatever the costs. “Above all,” Reagan proclaimed with his first inaugural address, “we must realize that no arsenal or no weapon in the arsenals of the world is so formidable as the will and moral courage of free men and women.”
The Reagan administration intended to secure world peace through military strength. In spite of mounting debt, Secretary of Defense Caspar Weinberger pressed Congress for robust appropriations each year. With annual increases averaging 8 percent, the federal government spent over $2 trillion for national defense on his watch. Larger budgets meant pay raises for service members as well as generous benefits and enlistment bonuses. For a nuclear deterrent, budget lines supported the MX missile, Trident submarine, and B-1 bomber. Taxpayer money also procured equipment such as the M-1 Abrams tank, M-2 Bradley fighting vehicle, AH-64 Apache attack helicopter, and UH-60 Black Hawk utility helicopter. Night-vision devices allowed ground troops to “rule the night.” The Air Force refined its F-15 Eagle and F-16 Falcon fighters and unveiled the B-2 Spirit bomber, while the Navy accumulated almost 600 ships in an expanding fleet that included superc
arriers. Reaffirming the nation's status as a superpower, the U.S. funded the greatest buildup of the armed forces since World War II.
Thanks to the buildup, the all-volunteer forces filled with talented individuals. Although the original GI Bill expired in 1976, Congressman G. V. “Sonny” Montgomery of Mississippi helped to revive America's promise of educational assistance to service members. After the Montgomery GI Bill of 1985, enlistees received partial funding to attend a college or a university upon agreeing to serve for six years. Instead of a civic obligation, military service became a respectable path to a higher education.
The American military experienced a revival during the 1980s. The press circulated sensational stories about the overpriced hammers and toilet seats of the Pentagon, but few questioned the value of what Time magazine called “a corps of Yuppies in uniform.” Strengthening national defense became the hallmark of the Reagan administration, which lifted U.S. forces out of the doldrums.
A Strategic Defense
The origins of antiballistic missile systems predated the 1980s, but the vision of strategic defense belonged to Reagan. After a 1979 tour of the Colorado facilities for the North American Aerospace Defense, or NORAD, the future commander-in-chief desired “some way of defending ourselves against nuclear missiles.” A year later, the Republican Party platform called for “vigorous research and development of an effective anti-ballistic missile system, such as is already at hand in the Soviet Union, as well as more modern ABM technologies.” After winning the presidential election, Reagan met with physicist Edward Teller, who described the possibility of satellites using futuristic lasers to intercept enemy projectiles. Thus began the Strategic Defense Initiative, or SDI.
Although the Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty of 1972 restricted SDI, the Reagan administration poured money into state-of-the-art countermeasures to nuclear warfare. The president posited that the Soviet Union “can't keep up” with American innovation and prepared to take risks to “roll back” communism. Furthermore, he predicted that a “great revolutionary crisis” would leave Marxist and Leninist regimes “on the ash-heap of history.” National Security Decision Directive 32 outlined global objectives that substantially increased pressure upon the Soviet bloc. The State Department opened the Strategic Arms Reduction Talks, or START, but negotiations stalled following the communist crackdown on Poland. During 1982, the death of Leonid Brezhnev, the Soviet leader, resulted in the brief ascension of hard-liners in Moscow.
NATO prepared to deploy Pershing II and ground-launched cruise missiles as a countervailing force to Soviet SS-20s, but peace activists worldwide shouted “No nukes!” Polls revealed that more than two-thirds of the American people agreed with the “nuclear freeze” movement, which called upon the superpowers to halt the arms race. In fact, an anti-nuclear rally in New York represented the largest political demonstration in American history. Backed by religious bodies and labor unions, a “nuclear freeze” resolution gained endorsements in Congress. However, Reagan's proposal for a “zero option” in intermediate-range nuclear forces received no support from the Kremlin.
In early 1983, the Joint Chiefs of Staff briefed Reagan on options to strengthen national defense. General John W. Vessey, the chairman, reported that “forward strategic defenses” might move a nuclear battleground away from “our shores and skies.” Accordingly, he endorsed defensive systems able to “protect the American people, not just avenge them.” The president asked the Chiefs – one by one – for their views on SDI, and they all agreed with it.
After denouncing the Soviet Union as “an evil empire,” Reagan surprised members of his own administration by touting SDI publicly. During a television address on March 23, 1983, he announced plans to embark on a high-technology program that offered the American people a new hope. While critics dubbed it “Star Wars,” he foresaw the construction of orbiting battle stations able to vaporize intercontinental ballistic missiles. Providing a celestial shield for the continental U.S. and perhaps elsewhere, SDI potentially made nuclear warfare obsolete.
Later that year, the specter of nuclear warfare dominated the news. The Soviets downed a Korean Air Lines jumbo jet, killing 61 Americans on board. Afterward, the U.S. and NATO conducted a “war game” in Europe named Able Archer 83, which simulated a nuclear missile launch. However, the Kremlin suspected that the military exercise foreshadowed an attack and placed its fighters on alert. Robert McFarlane, a former Marine officer and a National Security Advisor, noted that Reagan seemed convinced that the world was “heading toward Armageddon, the final battle between good and evil.”
During the presidential cycle of 1984, Reagan's re-election campaign aired television ads that depicted a fearsome bear in the woods. The narrator reminded audiences that the Soviets remained a threat but the incumbent kept them safe. Whereas the Democratic Party made a “nuclear freeze” part of its platform, Reagan easily won re-election on his record.
Following re-election, the Reagan administration made SDI central to a long-term policy to reduce the risk of nuclear warfare. The Pentagon created the Strategic Defense Initiative Organization, which spent billions of dollars on a collection of research and development programs. Congress held hearings in regard to antiballistic missile systems mounted on ships, aircraft, or other platforms, but the expense appeared stratospheric and the outcome remained unknown. While military experts discussed advances in directed-energy weaponry and high-speed computers, the primary focus of defense laboratories remained land-based kinetic interceptors with upgraded projectiles. Programs for the Patriot missile system and Precision-Guided Munitions, or PGMS, evolved with “smart” technology, although they emerged before the “Star Wars” concepts. Whatever the likelihood of “space weapons,” SDI redefined the arms race into terms that gave the U.S. a comparative advantage over the Soviet Union.
Worried about the militarization of space, the Soviets agreed to discuss arms control with Secretary of State George Shultz. Privately, McFarlane likened the negotiations to a “sting operation.” Beginning in 1985, Mikhail Gorbachev, the new Soviet leader, met face-to-face with Reagan in a series of summits. While the latter bargained from a position of strength, the former feared that keeping up with SDI might “wear out” the Soviet economy.
During a one-day meeting in Reykjavik, Iceland, the two sides nearly reached a deal to abolish nuclear arms. Gorbachev would not agree unless Reagan abandoned SDI, though. “Let's go, George,” the president said to Shultz and donned his raincoat. Stunned by the move, Gorbachev asked what more he could do. “You could have said yes,” Reagan replied while leaving in a huff. A few months later, Reagan visited the Brandenburg Gate in Berlin, Germany, and shouted a challenge: “Mr. Gorbachev, tear down this wall!”
Eventually, the superpowers agreed to the “zero option” for intermediate-range nuclear forces. In late 1987, Gorbachev came to Washington D.C. to sign the INF treaty, which removed all cruise, Pershing II, and SS-20 nuclear missiles from Europe. Before signing, Reagan repeated a Russian proverb that stated “trust but verify.” The following year, he flew to Moscow for a capstone summit. Strolling through Red Square with his former rival, he remarked that the Cold War belonged to “another time, another era.”
Use of Force
Throughout the 1980s, the U.S. responded to geopolitical crises in a forceful way. The Reagan administration called for the active support of anti-communist movements wherever they emerged. Without officially promulgating a Reagan Doctrine, the commander-in-chief opined that “support for freedom fighters is self-defense.” Although the operations remained limited, the American military gained valuable insights into small wars around the globe.
Given the signs of Soviet vulnerability, American policymakers abandoned the notion of détente outside the European theater. The Mujahideen, a group of Islamic fundamentalists fighting against the Red Army in Afghanistan, accepted aid from U.S. operatives. For example, they received Stinger missiles to wield against Soviet helicopters. Arms flowed to Ango
lan groups in Africa as well. For years, U.S. bases in Honduras channeled money and weapons to paramilitary forces in El Salvador and in Nicaragua. While the CIA directed the covert operations, military advisors played key roles in frustrating communist activities in Central America, Africa, and Southwest Asia.
In addition to the covert operations, the U.S. contributed forces to international peacekeeping missions. In 1982, an American task force arrived in the Sinai Desert, where it served as a buffer between Israel and Egypt. Likewise, Marine units entered Lebanon to enforce a ceasefire agreement. Druze and Shi'ite militia fired upon them, while U.S. warships and planes responded with a series of bombardments. On October 23, 1983, a truck-bomb exploded underneath the Marines' barracks at the Beirut International Airport. As a result of the terrorist act, 241 Americans died and 60 were injured. It marked the deadliest single attack on the American military since World War II. The next year, Reagan ordered the Marines to withdraw from Lebanon.
After a communist coup seized control of Grenada in 1983, Reagan ordered an invasion of the small Caribbean island. Beginning on October 25, Operation Urgent Fury involved elements of the Army, Air Force, Navy, and Marine Corps. Fighting ensued for six days, as the total number deployed to the island reached 7,000. Unfortunately, the uncoordinated use of radio frequencies undermined communications between Marines in the northern sector and Army Rangers in the southern sector. In fact, one soldier placed a long-distance telephone call to Fort Bragg, North Carolina, to request C-130 gunship support for his unit. Despite poor planning and flawed intelligence, U.S. forces overwhelmed the Grenadan military and the Cuban troops. While occupying the island, Americans sustained 19 dead and 116 wounded. Consequently, the military action restored the legitimate government and rescued American medical students.
The American Military - A Narrative History Page 57