The American Military - A Narrative History

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The American Military - A Narrative History Page 61

by Brad D. Lookingbill


  Once the aerial bombardment began, village after village fell to the Northern Alliance. U.S. forces on the ground moved southward through the steep mountains and over the winding trails. A handful helicoptered for mobility, while others rode horses into action. On November 9, the capture of Mazar-e-Sharif unhinged the Taliban across the north. Kabul fell without a fight a few days later. Following a brief siege, Kunduz surrendered as well.

  Combat operations continued in southern Afghanistan for weeks, as the Taliban retreated to Kandahar. Hamid Karzai, the exiled chief of the Popalzai tribe, returned from Pakistan and joined the drive against the Taliban stronghold. In the Registan Desert, a Marine expeditionary unit established a forward operating base known as Camp Rhino. After U.S. intelligence located Omar's hideout in an underground tunnel, the Air Force dropped a 5,000-pound bomb called a “bunker buster.” The Taliban leader survived, but the regime collapsed. Fleeing Kandahar on December 6, the remnant headed to the mountains or left for Pakistan.

  Near the border with Pakistan, al-Qaeda took refuge in the White Mountains south of Jalalabad. They stockpiled weapons, ammunition, and supplies inside the cave complex of Tora Bora. U.S. and allied forces initiated the Battle of Tora Bora on December 12. AC-130 Spectre gunships provided close air support, but the caves tended to negate the advantages of firepower. An air raid delivered a 15,000-pound “daisy cutter” bomb, which shook the ground for miles. Afghan militiamen penetrated the bunkers and pockets with the assistance of Special Forces teams. Reaching altitudes exceeding 10,000 feet, they pressed onward for nearly a week. Americans suffered no fatalities, while at least 35 al-Qaeda fighters were killed in action. In all likelihood, bin Laden escaped into Pakistan accompanied by bodyguards and aids. Without sufficient boots on the ground, U.S. commanders counted on armed patrols organized by Pervez Musharraf, the president of Pakistan, to seal the border.

  The short but decisive engagements routed the enemies of the U.S., yet Afghanistan remained an unstable country. Many Afghans took to the streets to celebrate the end of strict sharia laws that forbade women from showing their faces in public. The UN-mandated International Security Assistance Force, or ISAF, arrived to keep peace, while the manhunt for bin Laden continued. In addition to controlling Kandahar International Airport, U.S. forces established Bagram Air Base just north of Kabul. The consolidation of territorial gains in the countryside permitted Karzai to organize an interim government. Under the Bonn Agreement, he became the head of state in Afghanistan.

  The detainment of enemy combatants in Afghanistan raised difficult legal issues for the U.S. International rules regarding prisoners of war presumed the existence of nations, but diehard Taliban and al-Qaeda fighters were stateless belligerents. Although the U.S. commanders turned over detainees to their countries of origin whenever practical, the most dangerous, knowledgeable, and influential remained in military custody. Interrogators attempted to acquire actionable intelligence with enhanced techniques that became controversial. The Bush administration authorized a joint task force in Guantánamo Bay, Cuba, where service members supervised the apprehended terrorists in a secure facility.

  On January 29, 2002, Bush informed Congress that “we are winning the war on terror.” His address noted alarming discoveries made in the sweep of Afghanistan, including diagrams of American nuclear power plants and public water facilities, instructions for making chemical weapons, surveillance maps of U.S. cities, and descriptions of American landmarks. Furthermore, the president denounced three regimes for sponsoring terrorist activities while pursuing nuclear arms: North Korea, Iran, and Iraq. Calling them an “axis of evil,” he warned Americans that they posed a growing danger to national security.

  With thousands of terrorists still at large, the American military attempted to capture or to kill the residuals hiding in Afghanistan. On March 2, Operation Anaconda commenced in the Shah-i-Kot Valley and Arma Mountains to the south of Gardez. General Franklin L. Hagenback steered elements of the 10th Mountain Division, 101st Airborne Division, Special Forces, Afghan militia, and NATO into the rugged highlands. Moving in concert with heavy air strikes and close air support, they set a trap for Taliban and al-Qaeda fighters on the run.

  As helicopters ferried Americans into blocking positions, the Battle of Takur Ghar ensued. Units conducting the assault faced sniper rifles, machine guns, portable air defenses, and rocket-propelled grenades, which knocked out two MH-47 Chinooks near the landing zones. Following their insertion atop Takur Ghar Mountain, two SEAL teams engaged in a day-long firefight with the enemy. Army Rangers stormed the snowy slopes before their exfiltration.

  While achieving a tactical victory, the U.S. and multinational forces cleared the ridgelines and the caves. Nevertheless, the thrust across the frozen, rocky ground required two weeks to complete. The unwillingness to commit more infantry, artillery, and aircraft to the battlefield turned Operation Anaconda into a missed opportunity. Eight Americans were killed in action, while over 80 suffered wounds. Even though the enemy sustained heavy losses, hundreds escaped to Pakistan.

  Thereafter, military operations near the Pakistani border focused upon providing security. Armed patrols and quick strikes kept infiltrators off balance, while U.S. commanders tried to strengthen the Karzai regime. Friendly fire mistakenly killed soldiers such as Corporal Pat Tillman, a professional football player who enlisted in the Army. With only a small footprint in the country, Americans expected NATO to assume primary responsibility for ISAF. Thanks to opium trafficking, however, insurgent groups organized in isolated areas and retained influence outside of Kabul. The Taliban and al-Qaeda established sanctuaries in Pakistan, where they reconstituted their strength for cross-border strikes. They fired rockets at U.S. bases and harassed the convoys of the Afghan National Army troops, Afghan militia forces, and non-governmental organizations. In other words, the war was not over in Afghanistan.

  “Our war on terror is only begun,” Bush told the graduating class at West Point in 2002, “but in Afghanistan it was begun well.” Never again would the U.S. await an attack by terrorist groups before acting. Instead, the commander-in-chief preferred to “take the battle to the enemy, disrupt his plans, and confront the worst threats before they emerge.” According to the Bush Doctrine for preemption, the best path to safety is “the path of action.”

  Iraqi Freedom

  The Bush administration released The National Security Strategy of the United States in 2002, which sounded the alarm about weapons of mass destruction, or WMD. Unnerved by al-Qaeda plots, key advisors worried that the rogue nation of Iraq would give chemical or biological agents to America's enemies. They deemed Saddam Hussein a dire threat worthy of removal from power, as did congressional proponents of regime change. With the affirmation of military strength, American leaders decided to no longer make a distinction “between terrorists and those who knowingly harbor or provide aid to them.”

  Americans over the years expressed wariness about Iraq, whose citizens lived in terror. For almost a decade, economic sanctions, no-fly zones, and weapons inspections failed to force Hussein from power. Iraqi officials were contacted by al-Qaeda, but no terrorist training camps materialized within the country. Nevertheless, the United Nations indicated that the dictator possessed up to 6,000 chemical bombs, 9 surface-to-surface missiles, 26,000 liters of anthrax, and 1.5 tons of VX gas. Although Iraqi research and development programs atrophied, Hussein stymied international efforts to eliminate alleged stockpiles of WMD.

  Throughout 2002, Bush insisted upon Iraqi disarmament. George Tenet, the CIA director, assured him that the WMD evidence was a “slam dunk.” Several officials pointed to examples of Hussein's tyranny, but their primary complaint involved WMD. They worried aloud that he would provide radioactive material to terrorist groups seeking to kill thousands of Americans. Their public references to ominous intelligence later proved inaccurate and exaggerated, because it often came from unreliable sources in the Iraqi exile community. They “cherry-picked” informati
on while making the case for regime change. That October, Congress overwhelmingly passed a resolution authorizing the use of force against Iraq. Secretary of State Powell helped to convince the UN Security Council to approve Resolution 1441, which found Iraq in “material breach” of previous resolutions. It offered Hussein a final opportunity to cooperate with inspections, or else Iraq “will face serious consequences” for defiance.

  Under the pressure of coercive diplomacy, Hussein allowed inspectors to return to Iraq by the end of the year. The scouring of the country unearthed no evidence of a WMD program, though. While France, Germany, China, and Russia refused to support another resolution, Bush opined that Resolution 1441 already gave legal authority for war. The United Nations repeated concerns about hidden stores but wanted to avert hostilities by conducting more inspections. With military action in Iraq all but inevitable, Powell reputedly warned the president: “You break it, you own it.”

  During early 2003, Bush ordered American troops to begin deploying to the Persian Gulf. U.S. fighters struck Iraqi artillery and gathered tactical intelligence while patrolling the no-fly zones. General Franks crafted a war plan named Cobra II, which calculated that smaller, faster forces with superior technology overcame conventional ones on the battlefield. Even though the Joint Chiefs of Staff approved it, Army Chief of Staff General Eric K. Shinseki admitted to the Senate that “several hundred thousand soldiers” would be necessary to stabilize a post-invasion Iraq. Rumsfeld ridiculed the general's projections, however, and predicted that Iraqis would be “waving American flags” following their swift liberation. Along with “a coalition of the willing” that included Great Britain, Australia, and Poland, the U.S. prepared to conduct an offensive campaign that spring.

  On March 17, Bush issued a final ultimatum to Iraq. He called upon Hussein and his sons Uday and Qusay to leave the country within 48 hours. Instead of accepting exile to another nation, the dictator remained defiant until the deadline lapsed. He dismissed the warnings as nothing if not a bluff while discounting the capabilities of the American military. “Mr. President, this force is ready,” Franks told the commander-in-chief over a secure video conference. Bush gave the order to execute Operation Iraqi Freedom, which he expected to disarm Iraq, to free its people, and to defend the world from grave danger.

  The Iraq War commenced with a “decapitation strike” from the air that targeted Hussein and his sons. Guided by U.S. intelligence, F-117 stealth bombers delivered four “bunker busters” to a secret compound in Baghdad. Dozens of Tomahawk land attack missiles hit the three-building target as well. Although the U.S. hoped to knock out the dictator with a single blow, he appeared afterward on Iraqi television unharmed.

  A few days later, U.S. and allied forces advanced from Kuwait into Iraq. With Franks commanding the theater of operations, General David D. McKiernan steered 65,000 Army personnel and 60,000 Marines across the Euphrates River. Close to 20,000 British troops swarmed the city of Basra, as air and naval assets provided cover for the ground invasion. To secure Bashur Airfield in addition to Kurdish areas, the 173rd Airborne Brigade parachuted into northern Iraq. Furthermore, Special Forces assumed blocking positions in the west to halt border crossings and to prevent Scud launches. Some 500 U.S. tanks and armored vehicles faced more than 4,000 Iraqi tanks and close to a half-million Iraqi troops. Despite the enemy's superiority in numbers, U.S. fighters, bombers, and cruise missiles rapidly degraded the defensive systems with a bombardment dubbed “shock and awe.”

  With a quickening tempo, Americans bypassed towns and drove toward Baghdad along two axes. The heavy armor of the 3rd Infantry Division moved westward and then northward over the hinterlands toward the capital. At the same time, the 1st Marine Expeditionary Force moved easterly along Highway 1 through the center of the country. Though slowed by a blinding sandstorm, the 101st and the 82nd Airborne Divisions mopped up the resistance while pressing northward to Najaf and Karbala. Even when Iraqi lines stiffened near the capital, U.S. forces devastated them with lethal weaponry.

  Only three days after the ground invasion began, a convoy that included the Army's 507th Maintenance Company made a wrong turn in the desert. A Humvee driven by Private Lori Piestewa was ambushed near Nasiriyah, a major crossing point over the Euphrates. Though 11 Americans died during the ambush, Private Jessica Lynch, a supply clerk riding in the Humvee, survived. Severely injured, she became a prisoner of war. Soon, Special Forces launched a nighttime raid that rescued her from an Iraqi hospital. Thanks to sensational media coverage, she represented a popular symbol of American heroism.

  American troops stood on the cusp of victory, prompting U.S. commanders to direct “thunder runs.” Rather than besieging Baghdad for months, armored vehicles sped straight into the enemy's dispositions before quickly withdrawing. The confused Iraqi soldiers dispersed, although hundreds lined the route to die as martyrs. More often than not, U.S. soldiers granted them their wishes. After a bold dash left Iraqi units in disarray, Colonel David Perkins, commander of the 2nd Brigade in the 3rd Infantry Division, decided to remain downtown. Consequently, the “thunder runs” shortened the siege by weeks.

  As embedded journalists bore witness to the American assault, the Iraqi regime fell apart with breathtaking speed. The Army rolled into the capital from the west while seizing Saddam International Airport and the presidential palaces. Marines secured the Rumaylah oil fields before reaching Baghdad's eastern defenses. Special Forces and Army paratroopers occupied Kirkuk in the north after smashing the terrorist group, Ansar al-Islam. Because Iraqi forces disintegrated, conscripted soldiers surrendered in droves. Iraqi officers and government officials melted into the civilian population. Only the Fedayeen and the Republican Guard offered strong resistance. Foreign fighters also filtered into the country and joined suicide attacks. Pick-up trucks with machine guns and grenade launchers raced forward, but M-1 Abrams tanks and M-2 Bradley fighting vehicles pulverized them. On April 9, the towering statue of the dictator came crashing down in Firdos Square. With his 24-year rule coming to a dramatic end, Hussein fled Baghdad in the company of his minions.

  Hussein lost the Iraq War after only 21 days of fighting. Over 2,000 Iraqi soldiers were killed in the fast but furious action. While the British counted 33 deaths, the U.S. suffered 139 fatalities. Sporadic clashes continued for weeks, especially in the Sunni strongholds such as Fallujah. Standing on the landing deck of the U.S.S. Abraham Lincoln, Bush on May 1 announced the end of major combat operations in Iraq.

  Though Operation Iraqi Freedom accomplished an important mission, the aftermath seriously damaged America's reputation around the world. Arab voices decried a war for oil – a charge that Washington D.C. vehemently denied. The DOD sought to avoid an extended military occupation, which became one of the worst miscalculations of an otherwise successful plan. In particular, Rumsfeld downplayed the recommendations of the State Department, CIA, and allies about the “day after” in Iraq. U.S. commanders expected assistance from a welcoming populace, but sectarian and ethnic conflicts engulfed the war-torn country. Looting and lawlessness within communities left civil society in complete disarray. Moreover, the effort to track down WMD caches misallocated the limited number of American troops policing towns and neighborhoods. Prewar assertions notwithstanding, no one found evidence of an Iraqi program to make chemical, biological, or nuclear weaponry. In other words, the primary rationale for military action by the U.S. proved unfounded.

  After committing blood and treasure to the Global War on Terror, the U.S. maintained military units in Iraq indefinitely. During the summer of 2003, soldiers from the 101st Airborne Division killed Uday and Qusay during a shootout in Mosul. However, several Iraqi officials escaped to Syria with funds, documents, and arms. While conducting Operation Red Dawn that December, a combat team from the 4th Infantry Division found Hussein. He was hiding in a crude cellar near Tikrit, his hometown. “I am the president of Iraq,” he said while lifting his hands in the air, “and I am ready to negotiate.” U
.S. forces handed the dictator over to Iraqi authorities, who tried and executed him three years later.

  Green Zone

  Prior to 2003, the Pentagon invested little strategic thought in planning for post-invasion Iraq. Rumsfeld tapped retired General Jay Garner to head the Office of Humanitarian and Reconstruction Assistance that spring. His team grappled with the problems of electrical outages, fuel shortages, non-potable water, and civil unrest in Baghdad and beyond. With Americans eager to leave the country as soon as possible, he scrambled to organize a transitional government. He told McKiernan that “there was no doubt we would win the war, but there can be doubt we will win the peace.”

  Washington D.C. underestimated the difficulty of stabilizing Iraq. While the Kurds exercised semi-autonomous authority in the north, sectarian leaders among the Sunnis and the Shi'ites remained dominant elsewhere. The last of these sects amounted to more than half of the population. Former loyalists to Hussein's Baath Party stirred anti-American animosity inside Baghdad. Jihadists, warlords, and criminals also rushed into the void left by the deposed regime. With a propensity for asymmetrical tactics, veterans of the defeated army participated in sniping, bombings, sabotage, abductions, and assassinations. The euphoria of the American victory soon faded with the rise of an Iraqi insurgency.

  After pilfering unsecured caches of weaponry around Iraq, insurgents shifted away from small-arms fire toward the use of improvised explosive devices, or IEDs. Adapted from conventional munitions or mines, the homemade bombs often appeared on or near roadways. When placed in corpses, boxes, cans, and rubble, they were detonated with remote controls, cell phones, or slight pressure. They disrupted security patrols and traffic flows with a sudden blast. The crude weapons of terror required minimal skill to manufacture, but they killed and injured bystanders without discrimination. Approximately two-thirds of subsequent American deaths in Iraq occurred due to IEDs.

 

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