The delegates exchanged familiar pleasantries, but there clearly was an undercurrent of deep distrust. On July 2 Chief Hendrick of the Mohawk spoke.5 He noted DeLancey's opening comments about the threat of French invasion and the British desire for Iroquois help in turning them back. Hendrick pointedly reprimanded the English for taking the Iroquois for granted. With a dramatic flare he threw a stick behind his back and told DeLancey, "You have thus thrown us behind your back, and discarded us, whereas the French are . . . ever using their utmost endeavours to seduce and bring our people over to them." Determined to unbalance the English even farther, Hendrick went to the heart of the matter: "Brethren—The Governor of Virginia, and the Governor of Canada, are both quarrelling about lands which belong to us, and such a quarel [sic] as this may end in our destruction; they fight who shall have the land. The Governor of Virginia and Pensylvania have made paths thro' our Country to Trade and build houses without acquainting us with it, they should have first asked our consent." Hendrick closed his speech with an oratorical flourish. "Look at the French, they are Men, they are fortifying everywhere—but, we are ashamed to say it, you are all like women, bare and open without any fortifications."
Hendrick's fiery speech failed to shame the Albany delegates. Distant rumblings from the Ohio notwithstanding, they were bent on taking more Iroquois land and cared little for the means. As some delegates parleyed for profits, others, more politically motivated, had a grander scheme in mind. Led by Thomas Hutchinson, lieutenant governor of Massachusetts, and Benjamin Franklin, a committee presented a "Plan For a General Cooperation of the North American Colonies." The plan called for the king to appoint a "president general" who would preside over a "grand council" selected by the local assemblies. The council would control Indian affairs, raise and pay soldiers, and collect taxes. The delegates approved the plan and forwarded it to each of the colonies and London for approval. It went nowhere. Not a single colonial assembly endorsed the plan, fearing a loss of local power. In London the Lords of Trade behaved in a similar fashion. They were loath to approve any proposal that would empower the colonies. The plan died, and few grieved.6
In the rising clamor of London politics, reports from Albany were hardly heard. The big news in the capital was that Henry Pelham had died on March 6, having fallen victim to a malady common among the upper class in Georgian London: excessive eating and drinking. Upon hearing the news of Pelham's death, George II exclaimed, "Now I shall have no more peace."7 The king was right. Political orderliness dissolved as Pelham's older brother the duke of Newcastle, Secretary at War Henry Fox, and William Pitt, paymaster of the forces, vied to see who would inherit political leadership. Thanks in part to a deep purse which gave him enormous patronage, Newcastle won, leaving Fox and Pitt to sputter and scheme.
Like his brother, Newcastle was more interested in money than in war. He focused on maintaining low interest rates and containing the national debt rather than rumors of French aggression in the Ohio or negotiations with the Iroquois.8 Halifax and Cumberland's increasingly dire warnings about the French menace had little effect on him. The duke believed, as he told Horace Walpole, that "the French court is pacific," and that the troubles in North America would be resolved by "debate and negotiation." 9 Newcastle was accustomed to endless discussion in Parliament and deals struck behind closed doors. Everything in his world was negotiable. That illusion vanished in August when news of the disaster at Great Meadows reached London. Who could doubt now that the French were intent upon seizing the west in order to trap the British between them and the sea? Having thus far resisted consulting with Cumberland, with whom he had deep political differences, Newcastle decided that he needed to visit the duke.
It was the summertime in London, and the posh set had retired to their country homes. Newcastle was at his estate in Epsom, and the other principles, Cumberland, Lord Halifax, Sir Thomas Robinson, secretary of state for the southern department—the post responsible for colonial affairs—and George Anson, first lord of the Admirality, were on holiday. The king too was away. It took weeks to inform these widely dispersed gentlemen of the developments in the west and even longer to get their advice.
Everyone seems to have agreed that troops had to be sent to Virginia. The question was how many and from where should they be taken. The king urged raising men in the Highlands. Cumberland disagreed, arguing that it would take too long to recruit and train new men. He pointed out that two regiments on the Irish establishment, Colonel Thomas Dunbar's Forty-eighth foot and Sir Peter Halkett's Forty-fourth foot, were available and could be moved quickly. He admitted that, as was usually the case with Irish regiments, both were under strength, but he assured his colleagues that the ranks could be filled quickly by drafts from other regiments or with men to be recruited in America.
Newcastle, wary of Cumberland's belligerency, and concerned about unnerving his European partners, still needed coaxing, and so it was not until early October that he approved the plan. The Irish regiments were to be sent, and two new regiments would be raised in America. The king gave overall command of the forces in America to Major General Edward Braddock.10 Braddock belonged to a distinguished military family.11 His father had risen to the rank of major general in the elite Coldstream Guards. In the common practice of the day he had purchased a commission for his son in his own regiment. Although the guards saw considerable action in the War of Austrian Succession, the younger Braddock seems not to have participated in any of the battles. Despite his lack of front-line experience, he earned a keen reputation as an administrator and logistician. In February 1753 the king appointed him colonel of the Fifteenth Regiment of Foot and posted him to Gibraltar as governor. In March of the following year he was promoted to major general. Given his background, both personal and professional, Braddock was a logical choice for the American command.
London was abuzz with news of the growing American crisis. Soldiers were gathering in Ireland, warrants for supplies were being issued to the arsenals and supply depots, and the Admiralty was taking up transports for hire and pressing sailors to man them. In Paris the French foreign minister invited Lord Albemarle to explain Braddock's appointment and the purpose of the expedition. Albemarle assured him that England was simply following the French lead and defending its possessions. Albemarle's reply was less than heartening to the French; nonetheless, they saw no reason for immediate alarm. After all, French Canada and the British colonies had long been sniping at each other. That on this occasion French and Englishmen had died at each other's hands rather than by Indian assault was different, but it hardly seemed a cause for general war. Even as war whoops were echoing in the west, Sir Thomas Robinson, and the duke de Mirepoix, the French ambassador in London, were exchanging proposals for peace in America. But it was already too late. While Braddock hurried home from Gibraltar, orders went out from Paris to the naval authorities at Toulon and Brest to prepare ships and men for Canada. What the British could do the French would match.12
While the French prepared, the British sailed to North America. On December 22, 1754, HMS Norwich and Centurion slipped their moorings at Spithead and tacked west for Virginia. Braddock, his secretary William Shirley Jr. (the governor's son), his personal aide Captain William Orme, his body servant Thomas Bishop, and his personal cook Francis Delboux were aboard Norwich. Ahead of them plowed Centurion, carrying Commodore Augustus Keppel, the commander of the naval escort.
Predictably for the time of year, the crossing was boisterous and miserable. Braddock knew the risks of a winter passage, but he had decided to leave ahead of his regiments, who were still assembling in Cork, in order to arrive in Virginia with enough time to prepare the campaign. Time was his ally. Even if the French managed to assemble reinforcements, Canada's long winter and its ice-clogged ports would prevent them from arriving until early spring. By that time the general planned to be closing in on his objectives.
Braddock's orders were specific. He was to drive the French from the Ohio, take Fort N
iagara, seize Crown Point, and destroy Fort Beausejour. He carried the high-sounding title commander in chief, which meant that he held command over all military units, colonial and regular, in North America.13 To pay for these forces, Parliament expected the colonies to contribute to a common fund "to be employed for the general service in North America." Privately, the ministry conceded that the colonies were unlikely to raise this money, so in secret instructions they told Braddock that he could forward his bills to the paymaster general in London. True to form, the colonies found a variety of ways to dodge their responsibilities, and Braddock's bills went home. Braddock learned quickly about the realities of politics in America.14
Closeted in an aft cabin with Orme and young Shirley, Braddock spent the days at sea formulating his plan.15 He had seven regular regiments, seven independent companies, and a detachment of royal artillery at his disposal. Of the seven regiments, three were quartered in Nova Scotia and two were to be raised in America. The remaining two were from the Irish establishment. The seven independent companies were part of the permanent garrisons in New York and South Carolina. Since two of the regiments were still being raised and the rest were undermanned, Braddock's force was more impressive on paper than in fact. Only with strong support from colonial authorities would he be able to recruit enough men to bring his anemic force to full strength. Braddock's ambitious agenda was constructed on a pitiful foundation. Cumberland's bellicosity was still a hostage to Newcastle's parsimony.16
On February 19 Norwich passed the Virginia Capes and came to anchor in Hampton Roads. Three days later Centurion joined it. The following morning Braddock and Keppel rode to Williamsburg to meet with Dinwiddie.
It was evening when the general and commodore arrived at the governor's palace. Dinwiddie wasted no time before he launched into a litany of complaints, focused mostly on the "obstinacy" of his fellow governors in neglecting to provide support for Virginia's efforts to defend the king's western territory. The next day Braddock's deputy quartermaster general, Sir John St. Clair, joined them. He had arrived several weeks before Braddock and had been busy trying to secure provisions, medical support, and transportation for the expedition. He had already developed a festering resentment toward the "inhabitants," exclaiming to the general that "their Sloth and Ignorance is not to be described."17 St. Clair was among the first of Braddock's officers to sense the difficulties ahead, particularly local inertia and the logistical nightmare of crossing the mountains with an army and its support train.
Supply and troop ships began to arrive by early March. The convoy had enjoyed an easy crossing; not a single man was sick, and only one had been lost overboard. On the other hand, the cargo had been stowed in such a careless fashion that off-loading took far longer than anyone expected. The governor supplied recruits, but they were hardly what the general expected; indeed, they resembled the motley crew that had gone west with Washington the year before: idle, drunken fellows, some nearly sixty or seventy years of age. Mixing these men in with his own regulars seemed unwise, so Braddock ordered the new recruits to muster separately as carpenters and rangers. Although this arrangement maintained the integrity of his regular regiments, it did nothing to augment their numbers.
From his temporary headquarters at Williamsburg, Braddock summoned the American governors to meet with him at Annapolis in early April. As a professional soldier, Braddock was accustomed to issuing orders and having them obeyed. Increasingly, however, he realized that in the colonies bickering, prevarication, and petty jealousies were the norm, and obedience was rare. Money promised him never materialized. Wagons and teams that had been slated for transport never appeared. Provisions arrived late and short. Quartermaster St. Clair flew between rage and despondency.
When Braddock traveled to Annapolis, he couldn't meet with the governors because a snowstorm had prevented their arrival.18 The general, restless and agitated at the delay, returned to Alexandria, where at mid-month the governors finally presented themselves. Aside from Braddock and his staff, Dinwiddie, Horatio Sharpe of Maryland, William Shirley, Robert Hunter Morris of Pennsylvania, and James DeLancey of New York were present at the meeting. Also in attendance were Commodore Keppel and Colonel William Johnson.
The participants believed the meeting was a great success, but that was only because each of them got what he wanted. In reality it was a failure. Politics rather than good military sense prevailed, creating a preposterous scheme that set the stage for a series of military disasters unparalleled in the history of the empire. Braddock's lack of major command experience, ignorance of geography, and political ineptness told dearly. In accordance with his instructions, he proposed four major campaigns, to be conducted simultaneously. Some of the governors winced at the grand scale of operations, but since each stood to gain from the military operation assigned to his area (e.g., supply contracts, command, patronage), they muffled their concerns and sang like a choir.
Shirley left with orders to assemble at Albany and march against Fort Niagara with the two American-raised regiments. No one seemed to give much thought to the fact that Niagara was more than three hundred miles from Albany via an upstream route that required long portages and overland marches across tough terrain as well as a lake crossing. Even if he could manage the arduous trek, once at Niagara's gates Shirley would face a substantial enemy garrison that enjoyed secure lines to the rear via Lake Ontario and the St. Lawrence River, over which they could resupply or retreat. Shirley, whose own field experience did not go beyond reviewing colonial militia on muster day, faced a logistical nightmare.19
Colonel William Johnson, the only man present with experience coping with the French and Indians, took on a mission to his friends the Iroquois. His task was to ensure Iroquois cooperation along the critical northern border. If these warriors stood by their side, the British would be able to move quickly and safely through the wilderness without worrying about their rear areas and logistical lines. After the colonel finished his diplomatic mission, he was to return to Albany and raise a provincial army to move against Crown Point on Lake Champlain. The fort was well manned and formidable. Johnson would need all the help he could get, including aid from his Iroquois brothers.
The third line of attack in this complicated weave belonged to Governor Charles Lawrence of Nova Scotia. Lawrence did not attend the Alexandria meeting, but his interests were well represented by Shirley, for both men shared a lust for Acadian land. Liquidating Fort Beausejour was part of their plan to expel Acadian farmers from their homes. Although Beausejour was in pitiful condition and ill manned, the English suspected that the fort was a nest of Acadian and Indian vipers who hid behind its walls by daylight and sortied at night to commit mayhem and murder. Eliminating Beausejour would give Shirley and Lawrence free reign against the Acadians and their Micmac allies. Beausejour was, all agreed, a minor operation that Lawrence could handle with forces already at hand in Nova Scotia and Massachusetts. Attacking it would have no bearing on the main theaters in western Pennsylvania and New York.
Major General Edward Braddock
Braddock took command of the key campaign: the assault on Fort Duquesne.
The four commanders faced an immense challenge as they committed their forces across eastern North America. Yet rivers, dense forests, and mountains seemed to make no impression on them. They refused to consider that campaigns in North America were nothing like those in Europe, where supplies could be bought or pillaged from locals. In North America, once the armies moved a few miles inland, local supplies were nonexistent and the roads quickly trailed off into wilderness paths. The more distant the objective, the longer the supply line, and with every mile the line stretched thinner and became more difficult to maintain.
Even as the governors were meeting, Braddock's army began to move. Advance elements traveled via Frederick and Winchester to establish a forward base at Wills Creek.20 On April 16 St. Clair arrived at the fort in a foul mood. He had just ridden over a road that was barely fit for packhorses.
Braddock's train included four eight-inch brass howitzers, four light twelve-pound guns, four light six-pound guns, and fifteen small cohorns. By European standards, the artillery train was small for the size of the force; nonetheless, to pull the guns and their support elements, he needed nearly two hundred horses.21 St. Clair railed about the problems he faced. He vented particular bitterness toward colonial sutlers, whose empty promises of supplies, wagons, and horses left soldiers subsisting on salt pork and hard tack while too few overworked horses labored to haul the guns.
At Frederick, Maryland, George Washington joined Braddock. Washington arrived under special circumstances. Two weeks before, he and the general had enjoyed dinner together at the Raleigh Tavern in Williamsburg. Their conversation had centered on the issue that tormented Washington and every other officer in the colonial militia: rank. As commander in chief, Braddock had the king's authority to grant royal commissions, but only up to captain. The previous October Lieutenant Governor Dinwiddie had increased the Virginia militia to ten companies, but instead of forming them into a regiment with a colonel in command (the post Washington desired), he ordered that they take the field as independent companies, with a captain in command of each. Washington refused his captaincy as beneath his dignity, resigned, and returned to Mount Vernon. At the Raleigh Tavern dinner Braddock could offer him no better deal. Washington reacted to the general as he had to the governor: He withdrew to Mount Vernon.
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