Empires at War

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by Jr. , William M. Fowler


  By then Mercer knew that the French were advancing on him. He split his twelve hundred men among three positions: Forts Ontario, George, and Oswego. The three strongholds stood within cannon shot of one another and were close enough to be mutually supporting. Each, however, by itself was extraordinarily vulnerable. Ontario, the key position, was located on the north bank of the Oswego River on a seventy-foot bluff overlooking the lake. About a quarter mile away, across the river on the south bank, stood Fort Oswego, a trading house defended by a blockhouse surrounded by a crumbling stone wall. In a desperate attempt to fortify it, Mercer ordered two cannon placed on its roof. He abandoned that plan when the recoil of the cannon threatened to collapse the roof. The third point of this fragile trident was Fort George, about eight hundred feet to the northwest of Fort Oswego. It was a poorly constructed palisade with earthworks on two sides. The militia who garrisoned it thought so little of the structure that they dubbed it Fort Rascal.36

  By August n the French were within sight of the British forts. Fort Ontario was their first target. Rigaud's men, along with several Indians, crept toward the walls and sniped at the defenders. Following standard European-style siegecraft, on the night of the twelfth Montcalm's engineers began digging trenches near the fort. By morning the French were within a few hundred feet of the Ontario's walls, ready to open fire with their artillery. Montcalm, however, failed to extend his siege lines fully around the British. While his heavy guns delivered a furious barrage, Mercer took advantage of the gap in the French lines and in a daring daylight operation evacuated his entire garrison across the river to Fort Oswego.

  Once he occupied Ontario, Montcalm brought his guns to bear on Fort Oswego. As the bombardment opened, Rigaud (according to his proud brother's account) "plunged" into the river with his men, "some swimming, others in the water up to the waist or neck," and throwing themselves on the opposite shore came around on the southern side of both Fort George and Fort Oswego, cuttingboth off from any hope of help or escape.37 In the hail of lead Mercer was killed. Lieutenant Colonel John Littlehales took command and ordered Fort George evacuated. With infantry closing in on three sides, and cannon dropping shot from across the river, Oswego's situation was hopeless. Littlehales surrendered on August 14. Montcalm., despising their pitiful defense, insulted the garrison. He accepted their surrender but refused to offer them the traditional "honors of war"—they would not be allowed to march out of the fort to lay down their arms in a ceremonial fashion.

  As the Union Jack came fluttering down less than a hundred miles away, a relief force was struggling up Wood Creek. Loudoun, alarmed at the news from Oswego, had sent General Webb with the Forty-fourth Regiment to relieve Mercer. When news of the surrender reached them, they made a hasty return to Albany.

  Montcalm had triumphed at the trifling cost of three men dead and twenty wounded. The booty was impressive: more than 1,000 prisoners (150 men dead), 7 armed vessels, 300 bateaux, 55 cannon, 14 mortars, 5 howitzers, 47 swivels, along with hundreds of barrels of powder and provisions. These were public stores, the sort of prizes deemed legitimate by Europeans. They were not, however, the personal spoils that Montcalm's Indian allies desired. They wanted such items as clothes, watches, and boots, which by European tradition were generally exempt from seizure. When French troops stood between them and the chance to strip prisoners, they grew incensed. Some invaded the hospital, killed the wounded, and took their belongings. Others harassed the prisoners under French guard. Montcalm's dismissal of their claims left them embittered. In his reports to Paris Montcalm was careful to spare his superiors these gruesome details, admitting only to "a little plunder which it was necessary to tolerate" since his troops were not in Europe.38

  Montcalm understood that permanent occupation of Oswego was unnecessary. It was too far to the south and east to be of any use to the French. Keeping it would only mean stretching his defensive perimeter beyond reasonable bounds. It was best to leave it in the hands of the Iroquois, who in turn were grateful to him for returning to them a place they had long desired. What the French could not carry away they burned. By August 22 Montcalm was leading the regular regiments back to Ticonderoga while "the Canadians went to save their harvests and the Indians returned to their villages, as is their custom when they have struck a blow. "39

  *Near present-day Rome, New York.

  (6)

  A Failure and a "Massacre"

  I make no doubt that you will soon send us a Reinforcement.

  —Lieutenant Colonel George Monro to Major General Daniel Webb, Fort William Henry, August 3, 1758

  From Jumonville Glen to the fall of Oswego affairs had not gone well for the British in North America. An ill wind blew on the other side of the Atlantic as well, where a major war was developing in Europe. After weeks of secret negotiations, in January 1756 England and Prussia signed the Treaty of Westminster, pledging to defend each other's German territory. Maria Theresa howled at the betrayal of Austria by her former ally. English "perfidy" in the form of the Prussian alliance drove the empress into the arms of France, with whom she signed a treaty in May. Meanwhile Frederick readied his Prussian battalions.1

  The French counted on the Austrian army to check Frederick in Germany, so they turned their attention in the opposite direction. Using as an excuse the British attacks on the merchant marine, the king ordered Admiral Galissonière (formerly governor of New France) to prepare the Toulon fleet for a descent upon the British at Port Mahon on Minorca. On April 18 the French landed an army of fourteen thousand men under the command of the due de Richelieu. When news of the attack reached the British authorities, they ordered a weak relief force under Admiral John Byng to get under way from Gibraltar. Byng failed to drive Galissonière off, and on May 2$ the British garrison surrendered. Thrashing around to find a scapegoat for the defeat, the lords of Admiralty hauled the feckless Byng before a court-martial. The court found him guilty of cowardice and condemned him to be shot on the quarterdeck of his flagship. It was, according to Alexander Pope, an act of judicial murder. In a bit of wry humor Voltaire's Candide later remarked that Byng's execution was necessary "pour encourager lesautres."

  In May and June the pretense of peace collapsed; general war erupted in Europe as well as in North America. By early October Frederick had crossed the border into Saxony and was slicing toward Dresden. Austria, Russia, Sweden, and Saxony mobilized against him. When the Austrians under Marshal Maximilian U. von Browne marched to assist the Saxons, Frederick drove at them with unwonted speed and defeated them at Lo-bositz. Saxony surrendered. Europe was ablaze. England was in a major world war.2

  The British government nervously anticipated a French invasion of England. The regular British army was unready, and so deplorable was the state of the militia that Newcastle imported thousands of German mercenaries to defend English soil. The financial cost was huge and the political humiliation even greater. Newcastle's opponents assailed the government for its incompetence and pusillanimity.3 As the nation "slithered" into war, Newcastle's government slowly broke apart. No one, not even the king or Parliament, had faith in the minister. The duke was groaning under the weight of criticism, and he yearned to be free of his burden. He wrote to his ally Lord Hardwicke, "Pity me; alone as I am in my present distress."4 But who would replace him? In the hurly-burly world of British politics two candidates stepped forward: Henry Fox and William Pitt.5

  Although he came from a well-to-do family, William Pitt was not born into England's titled aristocracy. He attended Eton and Trinity College, Oxford, but was forced by ill health to leave before he received a degree. In need of a profession, in 1781 he entered the army as an officer in the cavalry. Four years later in a by-election he ran for Parliament from Old Sarum. Since this was a notorious "rotten borough" in which virtually all the votes were held by Pitt's family, there was no doubt of the outcome. Pitt quickly found he preferred politics over the military. He left the army and devoted himself to Parliament, earning a reputation as a brillia
nt orator who spoke "very well but very abusively." Pitt could always draw a crowd in the House of Commons with his acerbic wit and biting satire. In the early 1740s Pitt allied himself with Henry Pelham, and in 1746 he received his reward when he was appointed to his first important government post: paymaster general. The king was not among Pitt's admirers because the latter was fiercely opposed to subsidizing Hanover. With his characteristic satire he once exploded in Commons that Hanover was nothing more than "a despicable electorate." Pitt towered over the other specimens in the garden of Whig politics. As a faction (party is too strong a term), the Whigs sought to limit royal prerogative, advance their personal ambition, and satisfy their lust for patronage. By dint of his electric personality, intellect, and an advantageous marriage into the wealthy and influential Temple family, Pitt came to dominate the Whigs and Commons.

  Henry Fox sat in the benches with Pitt. The two had entered politics at almost the same time, and although they agreed on most political points they were personal rivals. For the most part, however, tension between them remained out of the public eye until early 1755. In that session of Parliament Pitt stood to attack the duke of Newcastle. He assumed that Fox supported him and was taken aback when Fox joined Newcastle's government to lead the duke's forces in Commons. Pitt assailed him mercilessly for crossing over. In 1756 the "gales of national misfortune" ripped through Newcastle's administration; Fox resigned in October, and shortly thereafter Newcastle followed suit. The king summoned Fox and asked him to form a government, begrudgingly admitting that Pitt might have to be in the cabinet. Fox approached Pitt, only to be rejected. Sensing the moment, however, Pitt, via the king's mistress, Lady Yarmouth, made it known that while he would not serve under Fox he would be willing to accept a leadership post in a new government.6

  George II would have done nearly anything to keep Pitt out of the government. He and Newcastle "knocked on every door" trying to find someone other than Pitt to lead.7 No one answered. Finally, in November, persuaded by Lady Yarmouth and pressed by his political allies to end the impasse, the king summoned the duke of Devonshire, a middling man of little weight, unthreatening, and of modest abilities, to form a caretaker government. Too weak to stand on his own, the duke accepted the post as first lord of the Treasury and offered Pitt the office of secretary of state for the Southern Department. Although the duke ostensibly stood at the head of the government, in fact Pitt led the nation from his seat in Commons. Pitt assured Devonshire, "I can save this country."8

  William Pitt

  While Devonshire and Pitt struggled to form a government from the remnants left by Newcastle and Fox, in America Loudoun, having concentrated his efforts on administration since arriving at his new command, was focusing on campaign plans for 1757. The earl was the highest-ranking peer ever to take station in America. As both a notable lord and commander in chief he expected, as did those who sent him, that the colonials would treat him with deference and unquestioning obedience. This was not to be the case.9

  North of Albany nearly six thousand provincial troops from New York and New England guarded the frontier. Most of the force was divided between Fort Edward on the Hudson and the newly established Fort William Henry rising at the south end of Lake George. Shirley's friend Major General John Winslow of Massachusetts commanded the provincials under commissions issued to him by the governors of New Y°rk, Massachusetts, and Connecticut. In his rush to raise and equip this force, Shirley had failed to make clear to the assemblies that Winslow's army was under his own authority as the king's commander in chief. So some local officials assumed that the northern army was under their authority (although they still expected London to pay for it). When Loudoun took command from Shirley, he had no idea that his authority over these forces was anything but absolute.10

  Loudouns views on military authority were at odds with the colonial experience. From the very first days of settlement in Virginia, Massachusetts, and the other colonies, defense had been a local responsibility. With very few exceptions, for more than a century the colonists had taken nearly complete responsibility for their own defense. They raised and paid their own militia, selected their officers, often through elections, and determined how they would be used. Militia mustered periodically (more often in times of war, less so in peace), to drill and exercise their weapons. Unless called to active duty, however, militia units rarely trained more than a few times a year. Since they were formed for local defense, their lack of formal military training was of little consequence. They generally stayed close to home, manning strong points or mounting short-range patrols. Most of the men in the ranks had not seen combat, and they thought of themselves as serving only to protect these people and places close to them. The militia tended to be undisciplined, decentralized, and independent.

  Only July 31, 1756, Loudoun had written to Winslow, "inviting" him to meet with him in Albany.11 The invitation stirred concern among Winslow's officers. They suspected that Loudoun intended to integrate their army into his own. Since royal commissions always ranked over provincial ones, Winslow's officers stood to lose considerable status. The rank and file were also concerned. Militia much preferred to serve under the soft hand of their own officers, many of them friends and neighbors, rather than the brutal discipline likely to be imposed by army regulars. Winslow declined the "invitation."

  Loudoun was enraged at Winslow's impertinence. He shot back to him, "As you choose to have the words in direct terms, it is my orders that you repair immediately to Albany."12 A chastened Winslow hurried to Albany, but even a personal meeting with the commander in chief did not resolve the issue. Winslow was evasive and danced around questions of rank and command. Loudoun's fury rose. The "intractable disposition" of the provincials was beyond his comprehension.13 The next day, still steaming from the encounter, his lordship wrote to Winslow and "put the question" directly whether Winslow would place himself under his command. A cornered Winslow responded that his forces would "act in conjunction with His Majesty's troops and put themselves under the command of your Lordship who is commander in chief."14 In the matter of rank Loudoun made a small concession. He permitted provincial generals and field officers (that is, colonels and majors) to hold the rank of senior captain when they served with regulars. The concession was too small to please the proud colonials, and rank in the army remained a festering sore.

  Although a good soldier, by temperament and experience Loudoun was ill suited to deal with the hectoring ambiguities of America. When he asked governors for men, they often sent him excuses rather than militia. He had little tolerance for vacillating officials who were more anxious to please obstreperous assemblies than to answer the needs of the commander in chief. "In this country," he wrote Fox, "everything is a matter of dispute."

  Loudoun had even less use for his Indian allies. To him they were an expensive nuisance. And while he maintained a cordial relationship with their vocal champion, William Johnson, he never shared the colonel's opinion that the Iroquois were a powerful and reliable ally. Indians "we call friends are no more than Neutrals," he remarked.15 Whatever reservations the general harbored privately, his official communications with Johnson were always cordial, for he considered anyone who was an enemy of Shirley to be a friend. In September 1756, for example, when he learned that Lieutenant Governor William Denny of Pennsylvania and other governors were striking special deals with the Iroquois and their allies, he made it perfectly clear that Johnson was in charge: "I must tell you once for all; That His Majesty having entirely taken out of the Hands of the Governments and Governors all right to Treat with, Confer or make War or Peace, with the [Iroquois] or any of their Allies or Dependents-, and having reposed this Trust wholly and solely in the Hands of Sir William Johnson, his sole agent for these affairs under my direction; I do hereby, for the future, forbid you or your Government from Confering or Treating with these Indians in any shape, or on any account whatsoever."16

  From his Albany headquarters Loudoun set out to bring order to what he
viewed as chaos. Camp hygiene and discipline improved. The water route to Fort Edward was made more secure, and his engineers improved the road to William Henry. His strategy was to hold a strong defensive position, stock his warehouses, and prepare for a spring offensive against Ticonderoga. He was determined to go it alone, placing little reliance on Indians or provincials. As he told his patron, Cumberland, "I am convinced [that we must carry] on the War here, within ourselves."17

  As winter approached, most of the provincials, according to their enlistment agreement, returned home. Albany, Fort Edward, and William Henry kept sizable garrisons, while elsewhere along the Connecticut River and southern New Hampshire small detachments of fewer than twenty men stood watch in isolated posts.18 Security against a sudden winter attack was a concern. From bitter experience the British knew that cold, snow, and ice were not impenetrable barriers to the French. The best defense was good reconnaissance, and for that service the general reluctantly relied heavily upon Indians and provincials, though he believed that the Indians lied and the provincials were incompetent. About colonial rangers, however, he was more ambivalent. He told Cumberland, "It is impossible for an Army to Act in this Country without Rangers."19 By this, he meant rangers under the command of Robert Rogers.

 

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