by Dale Brown
“Can’t I do all that from Air Force One?” the president asked. “You can communicate easily with the E-4 and E-6 aircraft and issue orders to them and to any military command centers and government operations centers; you can also break in on civil television and radio frequencies to speak with the American people,” Venti explained, “but Air Force One was not designed as an airborne military command post, only as an airborne White House. You cannot actually launch a nuclear strike yourself.”
“So do I have control of our nuclear forces or not?” the president asked, struggling to keep his head clear through the enormous jumble of information he was absorbing. “Exactly what am I left with here?”
“You can issue orders to the ballistic nuclear submarine force at any time through coded messages to the E-6A TACAMO aircraft that are airborne over the Atlantic and Pacific Oceans,” chimed in Admiral Charles Andover, Chief of Naval Operations, who was back in the National Military Command Center at the Pentagon. “The E-6A’s job is to talk with the boomers while submerged with extremely low-frequency transmitters, and that network is still in place and operational.”
“We issued a change in posture and DEFCON—”
“So the boomers know that tensions are high,” Andover said. “Under DEFCON One and a Posture Red, the boomers will proceed to their launch positions and wait. After several days, if they don’t receive a ‘withhold’ or ‘termination’ message, they’ll launch.” Andover saw the concern in President Thorn’s face and added quickly, “That is the procedure under these circumstances, sir. In case an attack completely wipes out the leadership, under DEFCON One the subs are authorized to launch if they don’t hear from us again. It ensures maximum stealth and maximum deterrent effect—the subs don’t have to expose themselves to enemy forces just to receive another execution message, and the Russians know they can’t completely destroy our most survivable nuclear forces just by killing the president.”
“What else do we have left?”
“We don’t know how many land-based ICBMs we have left yet,” General Venti responded. “With STRATCOM and Twentieth Air Force headquarters destroyed, the U.S. Space Command will need to hook into alternate communications lines to assess the status of the individual Minuteman launch-control centers and the weapons themselves. That should be done shortly.”
“If any survived, can we control those missiles?”
“The B-model Mercury aircraft should be able to take control of the ICBMs, sir,” Venti said. “Stand by one, sir.” He studied his status-of-forces report for a moment, then said, “The E-6Bs are based at Tinker Air Force Base in Oklahoma City. Normally, they embark a battle staff at Offutt and then disperse to various locations around the United States. The relief aircraft was destroyed at Offutt, but the alert E-6B was dispersed to ground alert at Naval Air Station Dallas, and it launched as soon as the air-defense alert was sounded. They’ll fly to their monitoring-and-control orbit over Wyoming and try to make contact with the launch-control centers to find out how many of our land-based missiles made it.”
Venti nodded to an off-camera screen. “As far as the bomber fleet goes: If you’ll look at the DSP satellite readouts, sir, you’ll see that three very critical bases were destroyed: Minot Air Force Base in North Dakota, Ellsworth Air Force Base in South Dakota, and Whiteman Air Force Base in Missouri,” he went on. “We don’t know how many bombers based at those locations survived. This leaves just one B-52 wing at Barksdale, near Shreveport, Louisiana, capable of executing a nuclear strike.”
“How many bombers are based there?”
“Eighteen, sir.”
“That’s it? That’s all the heavy bombers we have left?”
“Those are all the nuclear-capable bombers we have left, sir,” Venti said. “There may be other surviving bombers that were airborne at the time of the attack. General Kuzner, what other forces do we have available?”
“We have just one base with B-1B Lancer long-range bombers left—Dyess Air Force Base just outside Abilene, Texas,” Kuzner responded. “It has about twenty aircraft, plus their air-refueling tankers. However, we deployed four of Ellsworth’s B-1 bombers to Andersen Air Force Base on Guam and six to Diego Garcia in the Indian Ocean as part of a contingency fast-strike and naval surface action group air support force for the Middle East and Asia. So it appears we have a total of about thirty B-1 bombers left. We also have another twenty to thirty B-1 bombers in flyable storage, which is the most ridiculous oxymoron ever invented—most of those planes would take months to make flyable, and some will never fly again.
“Keep in mind, sir, that B-1s cannot carry nuclear weapons without significant and lengthy work. However, they can now carry cruise missiles—they have always had the capability of carrying cruise missiles but were prevented from doing so by the START treaty. I think it’s safe to say that all treaties with the Russians are null and void at this point.”
“I will inform you about which treaties are in force and which are null and void, General Kuzner,” President Thorn snapped.
“Of course,” Kuzner went on angrily, ignoring the president’s remark, “we’ve converted so many nuclear cruise missiles to conventional-warheads-only that there aren’t enough for the B-1s to carry. Barksdale lost all of their ALCMs and has only enough advanced cruise missiles to equip its own fleet of B-52s—”
“General Kuzner, go get yourself a cup of coffee,” General Venti said, and he reached over and punched a button that deactivated Kuzner’s video-teleconference camera. He turned back to his own camera. “I apologize, Mr. President. He’s a little upset. General Kuzner’s family is from Cheyenne.”
“We’re all a little upset, General,” Thorn said. “Have him resume his duties as soon as he can think and speak clearly. Understood?”
“Perfectly, sir.”
“So what do we have left to retaliate against the Russians with, General?” Vice President Busick asked.
Venti added up the numbers. “At the present time, sir, we have six Ohio-class ballistic-missile submarines on patrol, three each in the Pacific and Atlantic, each loaded with twenty-four D-5 Trident II sea-launched ballistic missiles—SLBMs—each of which has five independently targeted nuclear warheads,” he said. “We have another four subs that can be deployed in a short amount of time.”
“Where are the other subs?”
“Undergoing extensive overhauls, sir. Each overhaul takes about a year.”
“What sort of targets?”
“On day-to-day patrol, each SLBM has target coordinates only for ice packs,” Andover responded. “That’s a safety measure set in case of accidental or terrorist launch. But when we changed the DEFCON level, the crews would have changed to normal SIOP targets—military bases, command-and-control facilities, and major lines of communications.”
“You mean cities?”
“Yes, sir—telephone and data-switching stations, power plants, gas and oil pipelines and distribution systems, highways, railroads, ports—any civilian infrastructure that could support sustained military operations,” Andover said. “The goal is to eliminate Russia’s ability to fight an intercontinental war.”
“Even though it obviously means greater civilian casualties?”
“We don’t specifically target civilians. We don’t attack cities or towns indiscriminately,” Venti said.
“What other nuclear forces do we have left that we know about?” the president asked.
“We have fifteen heavy bombers that can be generated for nuclear strike missions, plus two more undergoing depot-level maintenance and one in extended local-level maintenance status—meaning it’s the ‘hangar queen,’ being used for spare parts until more come in.
“Fifteen bombers? That’s it?” the president exclaimed. “My God!”
“And the thirty surviving B-1s are not nuclear capable,” Venti reminded him. “The only long-range nuclear air-attack forces left are the eighteen B-52s left at Barksdale, plus any other bombers that were airborne or deployed
during the attack. We think only two B-2 stealth bombers survived. That could leave us with about twenty nuclear-capable long-range bombers.
“We do have other forces capable of delivering nuclear weapons, but it will take time to generate those forces, and they’re not as survivable as the heavies,” Venti went on. “As I mentioned, there are about thirty B-1B bombers that can be converted back to carrying nuclear weapons. The Air Force also has about one hundred and seventy-five F-15E Strike Eagle tactical fighter-bombers that are capable of delivering nuclear weapons, based at six locations in the continental U.S. and Alaska—unfortunately, we closed the F-15E base at RAF Lakenheath in England and brought all of the nuclear weapons stored in Europe back to the U.S. Although no warships except the ballistic-missile subs carry nuclear weapons, ships can be quickly supplied with nuclear cruise missiles and gravity bombs—the F/A-18 Hornet carrier-based fighter can deliver nuclear weapons.”
“I think it would be wise to disperse those bombers and any other bombers that survived around the country,” Secretary of Defense Goff said, “to make it harder for the Russians to attack them. If they want to go after bomber bases, they’ll be next.”
“I sent a message to Air Combat Command to suggest exactly that,” Venti said. “We can phone or instant-message all the commanders from the NAOC, just as you can from your phones and computers aboard Air Force One. General Muskoka of ACC is on his way back to Langley. He was en route to Offutt Air Force Base for a meeting with STRATCOM, NORAD, Space Command, First Air Force, and Eighth Air Force commanders to discuss reestablishing a tighter air-defense network in the continental U.S. and perhaps putting the bomber force back on twenty-four/seven alert.” He paused, swallowed, then added, “I’ve received no response from General Samson of Eighth Air Force, who is the commander of the bomber forces. His staff thinks he had just arrived at Offutt when the attack took place. Air Force has also not heard from General Shepard of NORAD, General Wollensky of Space Command, General Craig of First Air Force, and General Houser of Air Intelligence Agency. They may have been at Offutt as well.”
“Oh, Christ,” Goff breathed. “That’s most of the Air Force’s senior commanders.”
“We need replacements for the dead and missing generals, and we need them fast,” the president said. “Then I need to talk to them right away. I can’t even begin to try to plan a response to this attack before I know what we have and what they have.”
“My staff is working on all that as we speak, Mr. President,” General Venti said. “I’ve already been in contact with the deputy commander of the Nine-sixty-sixth Information Warfare Wing, Colonel Trevor Griffin. He’s taking a military jet from San Antonio and will be at the Pentagon in a few hours. The STRATCOM ops detachment here at the Pentagon can brief us on the status of strategic forces anytime you’re ready.”
“Have Griffin contact me as soon as he’s briefed, General,” Thorn said. “What about civil defense and securing the blast sites?”
“The governors of each affected state and several of the neighboring states have activated their national guards,” Secretary Goff responded, “and we’re working with the Federal Emergency Management Agency and U.S. Northern Command to secure the impact sites and provide relief services. It’s too early to tell the extent of contamination—the weapons were detonated underground but were extremely small, so the hazard of radioactive fallout might be minimal.”
“Thank God,” the president murmured. He rubbed his eyes wearily. “All right, everyone, my first order of business is to find out what we lost and what we have left. I can’t say much of anything to the American people or to the world right now, except that I’m alive and our capital and government are still functioning. But very soon everyone’s going to wonder what our first move will be. That’s what I need to figure out. We’ll talk again in one hour, or sooner if conditions warrant.” And the connection was broken.
Battle Mountain Air Reserve Base
A short time later
Nice to see you again, Tagger,” Patrick McLanahan said. He was in the Battle Management area of the command center, speaking to Colonel Trevor Griffin at Air Intelligence Agency headquarters via a secure video teleconference. Patrick McLanahan was busily checking the streams of data being fed to Battle Mountain from the Seventieth Intelligence Wing, Fort Meade, Maryland, which had several technicians and experts poring over intelligence-satellite imagery recently received from space. “Glad to have you running the show there now.”
“I just wish it hadn’t happened because of a damned Russian sneak attack,” Griffin said.
“We’ll take care of that problem shortly, Tagger,” Patrick said. “I damned well guarantee it.” There was then a brief moment of silence as they thought about the devastation that had come down on Offutt, Minot, Ellsworth, Whiteman, and all the other targets of Russian cruise missiles. America had suffered its worst-ever attack on its own soil—and now it was their job to find a way to give the president of the United States some options other than initiating a nuclear response.
“The data feed is looking good,” Patrick said to break the reverie.
“This stuff is hot off the presses,” Trevor Griffin said. “The last NIRTSat overflight was just five minutes ago. Man, you guys have the best toys.”
They did indeed, Patrick thought. The four-satellite NIRTSat—“Need It Right This Second” satellite—constellation launched just a few hours ago by Jon Masters was speeding over southern Siberia, photographing hundreds of thousands of square miles of territory with ultrabroadband radar and high-resolution imaging infrared cameras every twenty minutes, then instantly beaming any returns back to Battle Mountain. The images were analyzed by comparing their size, density, and heat signatures to a catalog of known military objects.
“Okay, guys, here’s what we got,” Tagger began. “Let’s start with the bombers. The Russians took some serious hits with their bomber fleet on their attack, but they were very effective and bit a big chunk out of our asses. They easily have over a hundred and fifty or so planes left, spread out across ten bases. They lost about a quarter of their fleet in the initial attack, but it’s not slowing them down one bit. It definitely looks like they’re reloading and rearming and getting ready for another swipe—and this time they’ll have an easier time of it. Their next attack could well reach every base and every government office in North America.
“Their tanker tactics are very impressive—they’re using a level of organization and sophistication that equals ours,” Tagger observed. “They launch the bombers with maximum ordnance and minimal fuel, refuel them with unit tankers as they cruise-climb to altitude, then top them off with task-force tankers from Yakutsk before they begin their launch run. They’re tanking all the way to feet-dry, and they have a huge reserve. By the time the bombers return to Siberia, the tankers have loaded up at Yakutsk, and they go out and meet the bombers and just repeat the whole process back to landing. Questions?”
Patrick said nothing, but he nodded slowly as he studied the satellite imagery of the bases Griffin had just briefed.
“Let’s take a look at the Russian land-based missiles now,” Tagger went on. “The SS-18s at Aleysk and Uzhur are definitely warmed up and ready to go. Uzhur has the largest deployment, with four launch-control centers each controlling twelve silos. Aleysk has just two launch-control centers.
“Patrick, you asked about the composition of the launch-control centers. The Russians did away with modernizing their SS-18 LCCs in favor of improving their mobile-missile survivability. They assumed we were going to smack their LCCs hard, so they emphasized fast-reaction silo launches versus the idea of riding out an attack and then launching. So the answer is, yes, a weapon like a Longhorn with bunker-busting technology—a hardened penetrating nose cap, delayed fuze, and booster motor—along with an enhanced-yield but nonnuclear payload such as a thermium-nitrate warhead can, we believe, take out a SS-18 launch-control center. We just have to be sure that we get to them before they launch.
“The real trick has been the SS-25s,” Trevor Griffin went on. “Those bastards are road-mobile, and they’ve had plenty of time to deploy. We took a chance and started checking out every known garrison location for the SS-25s, and I think we’ve hit pay dirt.
“The largest missile wing, Kansk, has forty-six units, but all of them relocated to their garrisons. Although they can still launch from a garrisoned position, we’re hoping that’s a sign of either equipment malfunctions or crew disillusionment. The smallest wing, Drovyanaya, hasn’t even moved their missiles off the base yet—they’re all in their security garages. Both of these wings are the most geographically isolated, so I think without a lot of adult supervision, the local commanders decide on their own whether to deploy their rovers or not. Looks like in these two cases they decided on very limited deployments.
“The other three missile wings are more difficult to surveille,” Tagger admitted. “They dispersed their units quickly, and they’re not using their garrisons as much—perhaps only a quarter of the units are in garrison locations. Barnaul, Novosibirsk, and Irkutsk’s missiles are likely to escape. We can get the ones in the garrisons, but that still leaves over seventy units unaccounted for.”
“We’ll target the ones in the garrisons and hope we catch a break on the rest,” Patrick said.
“We’ve got the garrisons covered,” David said. “The SS-25s may be mobile, but in their garrisons they’re detectable and stoppable, and out in the open they’re still detectable and as vulnerable as a tree. StealthHawks fitted with ultrawideband sensors can look inside the garrison shelters easily, and millimeter-wave radar and imaging infrared sensors can spot transporter-erector-launchers under foliage and hidden by camouflage.”