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© Casemate Publishers 2015
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Originally published as Redd Gullet! by Dinamo Forlag, Norway
© Dinamo Forlag 2010; © Robert Pearson 2010
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To my wife Juliette and our three children,
Matthias, Jared & Enya.
Also, for my family and friends
and those who fought and continue to fight
for freedom, truth and justice.
Contents
Preface
Acknowledgments
Introduction
1 The Sinking of the Blücher April 8–9th
2 The Flight & Fight Begins April 9th
3 The Bank and the Bullion
4 Flight to Lillehammer April 9–10th
5 Allied Help Arrives
6 Move the Bullion!
7 Åndalsnes
8 HMS Galatea
9 The Road to Molde April 24th–29th
10 Molde – Capital of Norway
11 A Daring Rescue April 29th
12 D/S Driva April 30th
13 The Road From Molde
14 Welcome Arrivals
15 HMS Enterprise
16 The ‘Sealed Cargo’ Arrives in the UK
17 Pimpernel Gold
18 Atlantic Sailings
19 The Issue of Gold
Appendix: Per Prag’s Diary
Map Routes of the Gold Transport
Notes
Bibliography
“When bad men combine, the good must associate; else they will fall one by one, an unpitied sacrifice in a contemptible struggle.”
Edmund Burke 1770
A cartoon from the now defunct Daily Sketch by Clive Upton
Preface
The purpose of this book is to document the transportation of Norwegian gold bullion from Norway to the United Kingdom during WWII when Norway was facing the darkest period in her history. Where required, I have given a brief over-view of events peripheral to the transport, but it is not within the domain of this account to go into fine detail the reasons why Norway was invaded during April 1940. For further and more detailed information on books available I refer the reader to the bibliography.
The objective from the outset has been to present the information as a balanced, factual account based on primary evidence from people directly and indirectly involved with the bullion. On occasions I have relied on documented evidence submitted to museums and archives and have used the material as supporting evidence to the story. Where evidence has been presented in Norwegian or German I have sought translation and submitted this evidence without attempting to compromise the original text. Invariably, some words are lost in translation and I apologise for this. All translations into English are my responsibility and mine alone.
The operation of the gold transport and its influence on the Norwegian Government, the armed forces in exile and the Norwegian people has, in my opinion, been overshadowed by the subsequent calamitous events that surrounded the allied attempt to free Norway followed quickly by the Dunkirk evacuation after the fall of France. Yet the movement of almost 50 tons of gold bullion from Oslo to three west coast ports and then in three separate shipments to the UK, one of which included the rescue of King Haakon, Crown Prince Olav, members of the Norwegian Storting and various foreign officials is as astonishing as it is remarkable.
The invasion of Norway was an imperative strategic repositioning by the Germans who were fearful of the Allies outflanking them. It enabled the Germans to break the British blockade of the North Sea, but it was also a strategic encumbrance tying up valuable capital ships, aircraft and troops. The Germans also misunderstood and miscalculated the reaction of the Norwegian mercantile fleet - the third largest and most modern merchant marine fleet, which was promptly given over to the Allies. For Britain, an opportunity to secure vital iron-ore supplies had been lost: the German invasion of Norway was more than just a thorn in the side of the Allies. But as Geirr Haarr observes in his book, ‘The German Invasion of Norway’, the full strategic significance of Norway only emerged after the German invasion of Russia. Later, during the allied invasion of Europe, Norway once again proved to be of strategic importance, but this time to the advantage of the Allies as the Germans, fearful of an allied invasion of Norway, retained nearly 400,000 troops there.
In the UK, the Norwegian Government-in-exile wisely moved the bullion once more, fearing a possible invasion of the UK during 1940, but this time the bullion was transported to the very safe havens of Canada and America, save for a small amount retained in the UK. The significance of the bullion, along with the merchant marine fleet then became fully apparent with the Norwegian Government able to financially administer its part in the war effort on an equal footing with the Allies.
The loss of the bullion was a blow to the Germans. They had gained a country, but lost a King, a government, a merchant marine fleet and nearly 50 tons of bullion that would have financed their war machine. That loss is directly attributed to a visionary bank chief, a Colonel, a hastily assembled body of Norwegians and the ships and men of the Royal Navy. Ever resourceful, brave and loyal to their respective countries; this is their story.
Robert Pearson
Acknowledgments
There are many people who have generously, willingly and unselfishly given their time and assistance to help me with my research; I am indebted to their knowledge, support and encouragement throughout. I have not just benefited from their expertise and wisdom, but have also been fortunate in gaining their friendship, which for me is beyond measure. I hope it is not seen as crass and is certainly not intended to be, but without their guidance and comprehension of the subject area, historical corrections, and grammatical amendments as well as their plenteous assistance – and at times going way beyond the boundaries of hope and expectation to contribute, then this book would have been nigh on impossible to research and complete. In particular I would like to mention Geirr Haarr for his consummate comprehension of Norwegian WW2 history, particularly in all matters relating to the period of 1940 as well as for his guidance and direction when I needed it; Arild Bergstrom who
has unstintingly, efficiently and without compromise provided information that has enabled me to further my research when I thought I had reached an impasse. To Juliette, my wife and my family of Matthias, Jared & Enya for their understanding and patience. Also, significant to the research of this book and without whom little would have been achieved are the following:
Hans Olav Henanger, Ivar Kraglund, Roger Tobbell, Professor Dag Tangen, Professor Tore Pryser, Christian Falch, Tor Christian Jevanord, Merry Swan, Gunnar Bolsø, Ian Bowater, the late Edward du Cann, Cato Guhnfeldt, Howard Davies, Unni Dorum, Tore Eggan, Ivar Enoksen, Berit Fougner, Mette Krefting, Ian Foulkes, Frode Sæland, Roald Gjelsten, Steve Griffin, Rob Guyatt, Gunnar Sønsterby, Ragnar Ulstein, William Hakvaag, Ron Hogg, Kai Isaken, Richard Karlsseon, Erling Krange, Magne Lien, Ole-Johan Larsen, Gunnar Arne Løvlund, John Makie, Anita Erin Melkevik, Michael Smith, Sarah Millard, Charles Millnar, Arnfinn Moland, Oddvar Naas, Professor Ole Kristian Grimnes, Oddbjorn Skarbovik, Don Oliver, Per Martinsen, Dag Reppe, Sven Erik Rognes, Rolf Dahlø, Liv Ronneberg, Jostein Saakvitne, Ole Gunnar Sætre, Graham Salt, Øivind Solvik, Tore Tomter, Stian Trovik, Janet Voke, Ove Voldsrud, Inge Voldsrud, Ole Voldsrud, Aksel Melsæter, Anis Bonsor, Asbjørn Nakke, Boutwood family, Dorothy Baden-Powell, Grace Burns, Guttorm Reppe, Hans Olaf Brevig, Horace Grant RN, Jack Hall RN, James Irvine, Jan Reimers MBE, Per Haugerud, Per Åsmundstad, Olaf Hartmann-Johnsen, Joe Kynoch, Doris Kynoch, Lita Deinboll, Jan Tystad, Kjell Thoresen, Liv Karin Lange, Erik Birkeland, Leif Aagard, Reg Samways RN, John Frederick Baker, Martin Carroll, S W. Crabb RM, Donald M. Edwards RN, Harold Hall RN, Alfred Hunt RN, John Kelleher RN, Jack A. Lovelock RN, Alfred A. H. Luke RN, Cyril Kenwyn Milner RN, Thomas W. Morton RN, Leif Arneberg, Peter Bell, Arnfinn Haga, Arvid Witzoe, Christopher Sporborg, the late Joan Bright-Astley, Erling Iversen, Randi Bell, Julia Korner, Mark Florman, the Fougner family (Lillehammer), Barbara Melkavik, Robert Binks, Cath Piddington, Peter Cann, Tracey Bishop, Stian Beinset, the Palmer family, Lene Bøckman-Pedersen, Pat Gruber, Asbjørn Nakken, Heather Johnson, and the Torgersen family (Bergen), Sue Laughlin. Hjemmefrontmuseet – (Oslo Resistance Museum), Romsdalmuseet (Molde), Norges Bank, North Sea Traffic Museum – Shetland Bus (Bergen), RAF Tempsford Museum, Møres Fylkes Rutebåtar (MFR), Rica Hotel (Molde), Riksarkivet (Oslo), The Navy News (UK), Romsdal Budstikke, Per Kåre Tveeikrem, The National Archives, London, E. Birkeland AS (Molde), Gemini Recording Studios (Ipswich), Samlerhuset, Kolbotn, The London Gazette, Royal Naval Museum, Portsmouth, Imperial War Museum, www.godebilder.no, www.nuav.net, www.samlerhuset.no.
Introduction
The story of the Norwegian gold transport of 1940 is truly an amazing one. In terms of leadership, human endurance, and dogged persistence coupled with a grim determination to deny the invaders of Norway a valuable bonus, it must rank as one of the greatest gold snatches in history. But how was it that Norway, a peaceful nation with absolutely no desire or need to become embroiled in war should become a theatre of hostilities? The answer of course is far from straightforward and it is not the purpose of this book to delve deeply into such reasons. However, there is justification to set the outline context of events that led up to the invasion of Norway.
There were no German plans whatsoever for an attack on Scandinavia in September 1939. The rationale for Hitler to unleash his dogs of war on Norway and Denmark seven months later developed during the winter through a series of intertwined incidents and processes involving the German fear of being outflanked, Norwegian neutrality policy, and Allied aspirations to sever German iron-ore supplies and to establish an alternative front in Scandinavia.1
Events in Europe during the 1930s had deteriorated dramatically. Hitler had become the autocratic leader of Germany in January 1933 having risen to power on a wave of economic discontent. The reasons for this can be levelled at the Versailles Treaty and the depression that followed from World War I. As AJP Taylor states. ‘In his view, [Hitler] the German Depression was the legacy of defeat, and the instruments for overcoming the Depression would also carry Germany to political victory.’2 Taylor comments further that the initial gains by Germany were small and Hitler was gambling upon the World Powers’ reluctance to go to war again. The gamble almost worked. Hitler’s intention was to ‘creep forward, as it were, unobserved or at least unchecked until they emerged as World Powers too strong to be challenged’.3
For many historians the countdown to war began in 1936, although interestingly in 1929 a senior German naval officer, Vizeadmiral Wolfgang Wegener, stated in his book, Die Seestrategie des Weltkriges (The Naval Strategy of the World War) that in the event of a war Germany should invade and occupy Norway so that it had access to the Atlantic for its naval forces.4
By the mid 1930s Italy had invaded Abyssinia, Germany was rearming; Britain and France followed suit. November 1936 saw Germany signing an anti-communist pact with Japan and it was clear that The League of Nations, which had been set up after World War I was now virtually dead.5
The Prime Minister of Great Britain, Neville Chamberlain, viewed Germany’s eastward extensions as a barrier against communism and in 1937 Chamberlain and Lord Halifax made it known to Hitler that Danzig, Austria and Czechoslovakia ‘could be settled in Germany’s favour, provided there were ‘no far-reaching disturbances’. Consequently, Austria was annexed followed quickly by Czechoslovakia; Britain’s policy of appeasement, along with the agreement of France and Italy had very generously favoured Germany.6 Hitler now turned his attentions to Poland whom he believed would agree to becoming a German satellite. The British Government became anxious and yet despite ignoring the appeals of the Chiefs of Staff, who stated that nothing could be done to help Poland, Chamberlain signed a guarantee on 30th March 1939 to come to her aid if she was attacked.7
On September 1st 1939 German forces crossed into Poland in an act of aggression. There had been no declaration of war and Hitler stated that his offer of a settlement with Poland prior to the invasion had been ignored.
On that infamous, yet memorable Sunday morning of September 3rd 1939, Prime Minister Chamberlain spoke to the nation via the radio at 9am.8 His tone was understandably dour and despondent as he presented to the listening nation the consequences of Germany’s action against Poland.
I am speaking to you from the cabinet room of 10 Downing Street. This morning the British Ambassador in Berlin handed the German Government a final note stating that, unless we heard from them by 11 o’clock that they were prepared at once to withdraw their troops from Poland, a state of war would exist between us. I have to tell you now that no such undertaking has been received, and that consequently this country is at war with Germany…
Chamberlain, perhaps realising the irony in its content, concluded the broadcast with this pronouncement.
…we have a clear conscience, we have done all that any country could do to establish peace, but a situation in which no word given by Germany’s ruler could be trusted, and no people or country could feel itself safe, had become intolerable. And now that we have resolved to finish it, I know that you will all play your parts with calmness and courage.
A French ultimatum delivered to Germany the same day was ignored and so Britain’s ally was also dragged into war. Ironically, no aid of consequence to Poland from her Allies was forthcoming and Germany’s subsequent victory in Poland was decisive. Britain’s response was to pour troops into France to support her ally who was strengthening the Maginot Line against invasion by the Germans. Thus British troops were initially stationed along the Belgian frontier and placed under French control.9 Battle with the Germans had not yet materialised and although Hitler had instigated plans as early as October 1939 to attack the west circumstances had intervened to postpone this. The so-called ‘phoney war’ had begun.
When Britain declared war on Germany, Neville Chamberlain quickly formed his War Cabinet. There were few surprises except for one; Winston Churchill, who was re-appointed as First Lord of the Admiralty.10 On that fateful day the Prime Minister called for Winston
Churchill to attend 10 Downing Street.11 Accompanied by Mrs Churchill he took the short drive from the House of Commons to the residence of the PM. A short time later he emerged from his meeting with Chamberlain declaring to his wife, ‘it’s the Admiralty, adding with a chuckle, that’s a lot better than I thought’. Churchill was back in government and, more importantly, in Chamberlain’s war cabinet. That evening an Admiralty signal was flashed across the free world …‘WINSTON IS BACK.’ Once again, Churchill was First Lord of the Admiralty, a position he had previously held during the First World War. Patrick Beesly, in his excellent book, ‘Very Special Admiral – The Life of J H Godfrey C.B’ ponders if that famous signal was in fact a warning to senior RN officers ‘to keep a weather eye open for unusual squalls?’ However, many at that time saw it as a prodigious move. Churchill had long been a thorn to many in the government and it was seen as advantageous to have Churchill ‘pissing out from inside the tent rather than pissing in’. Ironically, prior to Churchill coming back into Government, Lieutenant Colonel Count von Schwerin, head of the British Section of German Military Intelligence, who was a trusted representative of Admiral Canaris and seen as an honourable German, was on a mission to Britain to determine whether Britain would come to Poland’s aid if she was attacked. At one particular meeting with Gladwyn Jebb of the Foreign Office, it was stated by Schwerin that Hitler thought Britain would easily surrender Central and Eastern Europe to Germany. Schwerin perhaps in an attempt to counter Hitler’s thoughts and so avert war, proffered a suggestion that Britain should ‘take Winston Churchill into the cabinet’, but the suggestion was ignored until war had been declared.
Churchill long remembered the importance of Norway during WW1, as he was instrumental in attempting to persuade Norway to mine her Inner Leads so that the mine barrage laid by the British across the North Sea could be completed. This would then deny sea passage to the Germans, but Norway’s undertaking was not needed as the war came to an end. Churchill, somewhat prophetically, realised that the Inner Leads and ports of Western Norway would once again be very important to Britain, although the War Cabinet was reluctant to sanction any action that would violate Norwegian neutrality.
Gold Run: The Rescue of Norway’s Gold Bullion from the Nazis, 1940 Page 1