The Royal Navy hurriedly abandoned its Plan R4, the somewhat vague military objective of taking Narvik and securing the iron ore routes in the event of a German invasion of Norway.23 The troops that had already embarked at Rosyth were taken quickly off, along with their kit, and on April 8th the 1st Cruiser Squadron put to sea to join up with the Home Fleet. Meanwhile, alarming news was filtering through to the Admiralty that a procession of German warships was sailing northwards and was passing through the Kattegat. Few at the Admiralty actually believed that Norway and Demark were the targets thinking instead that the German naval force was preparing to breakout into the Atlantic; the stable door was open. The confused state of affairs continued, and it was only the beginning. A few days later the Royal Navy later scored a tremendous victory at Narvik with the sinking of a number of enemy destroyers, but at some cost to their own.
In the UK the reaction to the German invasion was one of complete surprise. The War Cabinet met immediately to discuss the response, but it wasn’t until April 13/14th that the Allies took part in the first operation to land troops on Norwegian soil at Namsos with ‘Operation Henry’, the landing of 350 Royal Marines and soldiers. Subsequent landing operations followed with allied troops pouring in, yet the whole process was hamstrung with virtually no air support or artillery, poor communications, changes of leadership and inadequate war kit complete with confused, countermanded and perplexing orders that merely added to the disorder and turmoil.
From the German perspective, the invasion of Norway had been largely very successful, save for the sinking of the Blücher in Oslofjord. All objectives had been met and generally Operation Weserűbung (Weser Exercise), the code name for the simultaneous invasion plan of Denmark and Norway, had been effective.24 The plan to ensure a fait accompli was that all the designated targets of Oslo, Bergen, Stavanger, Trondheim, Narvik and Tromsø were to be occupied concurrently. This would ensure resistance was kept to an absolute minimum. If the Norwegian Royal Family, government and media were captured then complete capitulation would inevitably follow. With the capture of Norway would also come the resources for extended warfare against the Allies, in particular Britain. Airfields and naval bases would permit the Germans to control the north Atlantic with their U-boats able to freely attack allied shipping as well as secure virtually unhindered supplies of iron-ore for their war machine. Norway was also seen as a very useful embarkation point for a proposed invasion of Britain.
German troops landing at Fornebu – Oslo. Picture credit: Tore G Eggen
However, the loss of the Blücher was a significant blow to the invasion plans of the Germans; the Norwegian capital of Oslo was vitally important for the invaders and an unopposed occupation sweeping up all in their path including capturing the country’s gold bullion would have enabled the Germans to control a whole nation; to determine, force and administer laws; to engage a work force for the good of the Fatherland, and to strip a sovereign nation of its moral, mineral and monetary resources so that the Germans could construct an even bigger empire. Far more important to Hitler though, was the securing of the ports and airfields that would allow Germany to be within striking distance of Britain. Conversely, the invaders had also stopped Britain from possibly taking Norway for her own purposes. But in their eagerness to conquer they made mistakes, the biggest of which was to underestimate the gritty determination of a few Norwegians to protect their country as best they could, albeit with very limited means.
The Germans for their part had captured yet another country enslaving its people and securing material resources to feed their war machine, but the cost was not insignificant. They lost three cruisers and ten destroyers as well as various other ships during the campaign and nearly all of the surface fleet had been damaged in some way. If there had been thoughts of using Norway as a stepping-stone to the invasion of Britain then this was put on hold. The Kriegsmarine were far from ready.
The Allied response to the German invasion was muddled at best and by late May it was clear that the campaign to oust the Germans had failed dismally, though in many minds it had finished long before then. Evacuation quickly followed and by June 8th 1940 the Allies had completely withdrawn from Norway. Two days later on June 10th Norway capitulated. The Norwegian Campaign was over and it would be five long years before Norway was once again free of tyranny.
Headline from the Evening Standard of April 9th 1940
Perhaps the words of General Archibald Wavell, written as an introduction to Dudley Clarke’s superb account of his time in the British Army ‘Seven Assignments’, best sum up the debacle that was the Norwegian Campaign:
The beginnings of any war by the British are always marked by improvidence, improvisations, and too often, alas, impossibilities being asked of the troops.
Yet it would be wrong to completely harangue everything that surrounded this calamitous debacle. There are many accounts of immense bravery; outstanding leadership, seamanship, airmanship and remarkable soldiering that lay incongruous with the campaign, but arguably none more deserving of being retold than the story of the Norwegian gold transport. Taking place at the very beginning of the invasion it resulted in muted success for the Norwegian Government and its people when the prospect of occupation was devastating and overwhelming. Yet, this story could not have been told without the intervention of one man, Colonel Eriksen, a Norwegian officer, who if he had not taken upon himself to give the order to fire upon invaders and defend his country’s neutrality at Oscarsborg Fort then a Royal family, a government and 50 tons of gold would have been lost to the invaders. This man, along with notables such as Nicolai Rygg, Fredrik Haslund, Nordahl Grieg, and ably supported by many other loyal Norwegians as well as the men of the Royal Navy, performed a duty whose legacy can still be seen today.
1
The Sinking of the Blücher
April 8–9th
During the night of April 8th 1940, a procession of blackedout warships from gruppe (group) V (also known as Gruppe Oldenburg) entered Norwegian waters intent on taking Oslo. Other gruppes were attacking Norwegian ports simultaneously: Narvik (gruppe I), Trondheim (gruppe II), Bergen (gruppe III), Kristiansand and Arendal (gruppe IV) and Egersund (gruppe VI). Norway was being invaded.
Oslo – the prized capital city of Norway was within a few hours of being taken by the Germans, but events were not to prove straightforward for the invaders. It could be argued that it was sheer arrogance that was to prove their downfall at such a crucial moment of the invasion or at the very least pure misfortune. Leading the invasion force was the brand new 18,000-ton Hipper-class cruiser Blücher, Flagship of Konteradmiral Oskar Kummetz and commanded by 47-year-old Kapitän zur See Heinrich Woldag. Blücher was named after the Großer Kreuzer Blücher (1908–1915), which was sunk during the ‘Battle of the Doggerbank’. Laid down at the Kiel Works in August 1935, she was commissioned in September 1939 at a cost of around 87 million Reichmarks. Blücher had had only just enough time to ‘work up’ sufficiently before she was sent to Norway with a novice crew. Sea trials are crucial to the ‘working up’ of any ship prior to becoming fully operational and Blücher had spent a mere 20 days in total at sea accompanied by Emden, an ageing light cruiser, in preparation for Operation Weserűbung. Weather conditions in the Baltic at that time were nothing short of atrocious and coupled with the restrictions of limited sea-trials meant that there had simply not been enough time to test fire her 20.3cm guns, or her torpedo batteries; damage control training and action station drills were also inadequate…a deficiency that would later contribute to a tragic outcome for many of the German crew.
The crew assigned to the Blücher assembled whilst the ship was being completed in the yard allowing the crew to become familiar with each other. This was one encouraging point in what was otherwise a very hurried affair. Only a few of the sailors had previously been drafted to other ships and to hinder matters further many of the officers were also inexperienced, with only a handful having previous battle experience of some d
escription. On April 6th Blücher docked at Swineműnde and once darkness had fallen crews immediately started the process of embarkation of troops, propaganda, war material, civilian and administrative staff. Secrecy was of the essence and only Kummetz, Woldag and their senior staff officers had been briefed of their task. Soldiers were quartered below decks and ordered to remain there whilst their equipment was stowed atop. Rumours of their destination were rife amongst those not senior enough to be informed, but the rumours remained just that; the destination would remain a secret until orders permitted otherwise.
The loading of war material began in earnest, but due to the urgency of the operation, and also for security reasons, training ammunition was not removed from Blücher’s magazines to dockside to prevent any hint of what Blücher was preparing for; live ammunition was merely stowed on top of the practice rounds. To compound matters further, and due to the severe lack of space below decks, the soldiers stowed their ammunition in the Torpedo Room and in the aircraft hangar. Lifejackets for the soldiers were not issued, but strapped to the guardrails along the superstructure: crucial decisions that would later have far reaching consequences.
On April 7th, Blücher departed Swineműnde for Kiel with Emden and two torpedo boats – Albatros and Kondor as escorts. At Kiel, Blücher anchored beside Lűtzow, a so-called ‘Pocket Battle-ship’. She was originally destined for Trondheim, but re-ordered to sail with Blücher. This however, was initially against the wishes of Admiral Raeder who wanted her to begin distant ocean raiding.
With the group assembled, Rear Admiral Kummetz convened a conference aboard Blücher with captains, army commanders and navigational officers invited to attend. Finalised details of the invasion plans were discussed and for many this was the first indication of their intended operation.
German troops of 183th Mountain Regiment and 83rd Pioneer Unit embarking Admiral Hipper on the afternoon of April 6th at Cuxhaven, Germany. Meanwhile, a similar scenario was being played out on the Blücher.
Men of the Kriegsmarine look on whilst troops board the Admiral Hipper.
It was during the early hours of April 8th 1940 that Blücher, Lűtzow, Emden, Albatros, and Kondor raised anchor and sailed north; with torpedo boat Möwe joining the convoy. Their destination: neutral Norway.
Timing was fundamental to the success of the operation and there was no doubt as to what was required of the invasion force with the following Decree for the Execution of Operation Weserűbung:25
The operation in itself is contrary to all the principles in the theory of naval warfare. According to this theory, it could be carried out by us only if we had naval supremacy. We do not have this; on the contrary, we are carrying out the operations in the face of a vastly superior British fleet. In spite of this the C-in-C Navy believes that, provided surprise is complete, our troops can and will successfully be transported to Norway. On many occasions in the history of war those very operations have been successful which went against all the principles of warfare, provided they were carried out by surprise.
The critical moment is the penetration of the harbours while passing the coastal fortifications. It is expected that this will succeed if carried out by surprise, and that the Norwegians will not make the decision to fire quickly enough, if they decide to do so at all.
Report of the Commander-in-Chief of the Navy to the Führer, 9 March 1940
The following is an unconfirmed decree from Grand Admiral Raeder supposedly issued to the combined German force prior to the invasion.
The Fűhrer and Supreme Commander, in order to ensure vital German interests, has imposed upon the Wehrmacht a task, the success of which is of decisive importance to the war.
The execution and protection of the landing operations by the Kriegsmarine will take place mainly in an area in which not Germany, but England with her superior naval forces, is able to exercise control of the sea. In spite of this we must succeed, and we will, if every leader is conscious of the greatness of the task and makes a supreme effort to reach the objective assigned to him. It is impossible to anticipate the course of events and the situations that may arise locally. Experience shows that luck and success are on the side of him who is eager to discharge his responsibilities with boldness, tenacity and skill.
The pre-requisite for the success of the operation are surprise and rapid action. I expect the senior officer of every group and every commanding officer to be governed by an inflexible determination to reach the port assigned to him in the face of any difficulty that may arise. I expect them to enter the ports of disembarkation with the utmost resolution, not allowing themselves to be deterred by the holding and defence measures of the local commanders, nor by guard ships and coastal fortifications.
Any attempt to check or hinder the advance of our forces must be repulsed. Resistance is to be broken ruthlessly in accordance with the directives in the operational orders.
Gruppe V sailed through a flat-calm Kattegat sea during the early hours of April 8th unmolested by the Royal Navy, and by 06:00 (German Time) had passed the Danish minefield in the Great Belt – the tensions high and palpable to the invaders. At 12:00 restrictions were lifted and soldiers and sailors paraded on deck to be informed of their target. Excitement and apprehension engulfed the ranks of the servicemen as the reality of their mission enveloped them. British submarines were known to be nearby, but how near nobody knew, but they would attack if they were in a position to do so. Were the Norwegians on alert? Would they bring their coastal guns to bear on the armada?
At around 19:00 an alarm from Albatros warned the invading convoy of a confirmed submarine contact and almost immediately torpedo tracks were sighted heading for Lűtzow. The ships breathed a sigh of relief as they all passed harmlessly by the cruiser, which was already operating a standard zigzag manoeuvre. Albatros broke off from the convoy and followed the tracks in an attempt to engage the submarine with depth charges, but the submarine, HMS Triton, somehow evaded the onslaught and escaped.
The convoy continued unabated with Albatros rejoining as darkness descended. The night began cold and clear with sea conditions ideal for the group, but as the evening wore on a mist developed. Blücher, as Flagship, ordered ‘Action Stations!’, a total blackout, battle ensigns lowered and distance between the larger ships reduced to 600 metres with all ships in standard line astern. Shrouded aft lamps were the only means of ensuring that ships remained on station with each other.
The approach to Oslo necessitated a long, slow passage up the Oslofjord. Rain showers and occasional fog hindered visibility. At 23:25 on April 8th (Norwegian time) the Norwegians became alert to unnamed ships entering the fjord. One by one the warning beacons of the lighthouses were extinguished and it was now clear to Kummetz that the Norwegians knew of their presence. The convoy edged forward ever closer to their intended target. A request from Captain Thiele of the Lűtzow to increase speed was summarily rejected by an irritated Kummetz. Thiele’s judgement was that an increase in speed would greatly reduce the readiness of the Drøbak Battery to engage the invaders, but Kummetz’s thinking opposed Thiele’s – that the Norwegians would not attack. If Kummetz harboured any vestiges of hope for an unopposed invasion then he was sadly mistaken when at around midnight the port side of Blücher was illuminated by a single searchlight.
The converted Norwegian whaler, Pol III, a 214-ton patrol vessel armed only with a single 76 mm gun and a searchlight, had received orders to be at readiness. Manned by 15 sailors called up for the duration of the Neutrality Watch and commanded by Captain Leif Welding-Olsen, a reserve naval officer from Horten, it became clear to all that something was up, but they knew no more than that. Consequently, Welding-Olsen ordered his men to keep a sharp lookout for anything out of the ordinary. The captain’s suspicions were confirmed when at 22:00 the lights from the lighthouses were extinguished.26 A few minutes later at 23:06 (Norwegian time), and to the utter amazement of Pol III’s crew, a procession of large warships emerged from the misty haze that had cloaked
Oslofjord. Pol III immediately focused her searchlight upon the lead ship.
The torpedo boat Albatros abandoned her station and turned menacingly towards Pol III countering the whaler with her searchlight. Albatros signalled and ordered Pol III to stop engines and not transmit from her radio, but the small Norwegian auxiliary fired off a warning signal to Horten naval base – ‘Alien ships incoming at high speed’. The German radio operator onboard Albatros vainly attempted to jam the signal, but more was to come from Pol III as she then bravely attempted to ram Albatros, holing the torpedo boat, although not enough to disable and sink her. The action took the Germans totally by surprise, though they soon recovered their senses as during the ramming two Norwegian sailors either jumped or were thrown onto Albatros due to the impact of ramming and were immediately captured and arrested. At the same time coloured flares were fired from Pol III in an attempt to warn Norwegian naval auxiliaries upstream and the coastal forts that ‘Enemy ships are forcing the line’. In response the Germans fired twice upon the small boat with their 105mm gun and raked the whaler with small calibre machine gun fire mortally injuring Captain Welding-Olsen. Pol III did not return fire as by now she was stricken. Welding-Olsen was carried and placed in the lifeboat, which was then lowered into the water, but as the Norwegians sailors clambered into the boat it capsized throwing all into the icy cold water. The majority of the sailors managed to climb back on to Pol III, but Welding-Olsen was by this time too weak through blood loss; succumbing to his injuries he let go of the upturned hull of the lifeboat and drifted away to his death.
Gold Run: The Rescue of Norway’s Gold Bullion from the Nazis, 1940 Page 3