The announcement stunned and shocked many Norwegians, and to some extent the Germans who were apparently unaware of Quisling’s intentions. Herr Bräuer, hearing of the announcement, called Berlin to seek clarification on Quisling and his new self-found role; but Hitler, and despite the diplomatic remonstrations of Bräuer, allowed Quisling to govern, for the time being at least. Hitler had made a serious mistake with lasting consequences. Together with Quisling, he had unwittingly sown the first seeds of Norwegian resistance.
Elverum meanwhile, was becoming a very busy place as foreign embassy personnel arrived in various states of dress seeking shelter. With the government back in session, the King in residence and foreign diplomatic staff in attendance Elverum had, for all intents and purposes, become the capital of Norway and the focal point for the media as the press sought answers to the world’s questions. It was at Elverum that Storting President Carl J Hambro put forward the following motion:
…[to] give the Government an all embracing authority to guard the interests of the kingdom, and, on behalf of the Storting and the Government, to take all the measures that might be found necessary for the security and the future of the country, such authority to be valid until the Government and the Presidential Board agreed to call the Storting to session again.52
By now the Germans, having occupied Oslo, had found to their dismay that their intended prize of King, Government and bullion had already fled the capital. Frantic searching was followed by hurried discussions to try to work out where their prey had flown. They soon formed a plan.
Directed by their Air Attaché, Hauptmann Eberhardt Spiller, who was apparently acting on his own initiative (as later stated by von Falkenhorst in an inquiry held after the war), commandeered a small fleet of buses, cars and a lorry and had set off with some 90 heavily armed parachute troops (fallschirmjägers) possibly in order to make a name for himself in the eyes of his superiors by capturing the Norwegian Government and the Royal party in one lightening attack. The armed convoy made their way slowly north out of Oslo amid a confusion of military and civilian traffic. The Germans were well trained, battle-ready soldiers ably commanded by Hauptmann Erich Walther. Their objective demanded stringent tactics and when the opportunity arose during their journey northwards they captured stray Norwegian officers at gunpoint forcing them to act as guides. Their aggressive activities did not go unnoticed by others who wisely kept their distance and immediately informed their superiors that an armed German column made up of commandeered vehicles was heading north with Norwegian captives onboard. Those at Elverum were notified and warned.
Spiller’s gamble though, did not taken into account the resourcefulness of the Norwegians who were equally determined to stop the Germans in their tracks. Two roadblocks were constructed; one at Midtskogen, a small village mid-way between Hamar and Elverum, and another 3 km further back. The Norwegian barricade was a hurried, improvised affair constructed of timber and motor vehicles requisitioned for the cause. The officer-in-charge, Major Olav Helset had orders to halt the German’s encroachment and come what may the Germans were not to advance beyond his barricade. In the worst case scenario the barricade further back could also be brought in to use.
The Norwegians made the best use of the wooded terrain and set up a field of fire that would be difficult to penetrate, but they were also few in number and were forced to seek volunteers from the local rifle-club to bolster the defences. The Norwegian force then consisted of a mix of Royal Guard regulars, volunteers and recruits supported by officers and NCOs from a winter training school. A regular officer, Kaptein Johan Ingebrigt Rognes manned the main roadblock in the centre of the pincer. At that time Rognes was a small arms instructor and his advice and training to the recruits, some of whom had never fired a shot, was to prove invaluable.53
At around 01:30 on April 10th the German paratroopers and their irregular vehicle convoy suddenly came under sustained fire from two heavy Norwegian machine guns. The paratroopers quickly de-bussed and at once returned fire, but it was clear that the Germans were at a disadvantage. The battle raged to and fro, but the Norwegians held the high ground and the upper hand. The German’s rate of fire was impressive, but above the heads of the defending Norwegians. With the Norwegians retaining their advantage the Germans could see that the engagement was faltering. They were already taking casualties, some of them serious. The attackers reassessed the situation and then tried to close in on one of the Norwegian machine-guns that had been in difficulties, but the strategy failed as soon as it had started. The fire from the Norwegians was relentless and withering. Matters suddenly came to a swift conclusion when Hauptmann Spiller took a bullet and fell, mortally wounded. The battle was over. The Germans knew there was no way forward and with Spiller seriously wounded they sought the only solution possible – to promptly withdraw.
Two pictures depicting Captain John Rognes (later Lieutenant Colonel): on the left is a drawing by Andreas Hauge, whilst the on the right is a drawing by Lieutenant Øyen. Both drawings are with the kind permission of the Rognes family.
At around 03:00 both sides pulled back with the Germans retreating to Oslo no doubt to answer some serious questions from their senior officers. Unfortunately for the Germans, Hauptmann Spiller succumbed to his wounds the next day in hospital. Allegedly, in one of Spiller’s pockets a wallet was found and inside was a small handwritten note with the following names: ‘King Haakon, Nygaardsvold, Sundby, and Hambro’.54 If this was the case we can clearly deduce from this that Spiller had his objectives, perhaps with orders from above, and that he was determined to achieve and execute them, despite the post-war denials of von Falkenhorst. If Spiller and his paratroopers had managed to accomplish their purpose then the whole course of the Norwegian Campaign may well have taken a different direction and perhaps Nicolai Rygg and his gold bullion would have been under new management. But the assorted motley crew of fighting Norwegians had secured more time for their Government, the Royal Party and nearly 50 tons of gold bullion to continue their escape.
The respite was only temporary however, as the Germans, determined to secure the whole country as quickly as they could, thrust home their superior military advantage in all directions.
The bullion remained in the Lillehammer vaults for ten days. Understandably, the bank staff became extremely anxious that the secret would leak out and that the Germans would just come along and help themselves. The bullion had to be moved again, but it had to be at the right moment and it couldn’t just be moved with nowhere to take it to. Meanwhile, to safeguard the bullion from unwanted attention it was decided to hire marksmen from the Lillehammer Rifle Club. If the bank used soldiers then their very presence could arouse suspicion and highlight the fact that something unusual was going on; it was a clever move.
On April 10th, Rygg returned in haste to Lillehammer to warn Lund that the Germans were closing in on Lillehammer. The bank staff were aghast – would all their hard work go to waste and would the Germans be able to break in to the vaults? Would the Germans use force against the staff to get the gold? There was little they could do except wait for the inevitable. The minutes passed and nothing happened…no Germans, no bombs, no shouting, no guns, no violence, nothing. It became clear after a few anxious hours that the rumour was just that, a rumour, and Rygg realising he had been misled, immediately sent away all descriptions of the vault lock. He also asked Lund to memorise the numbers to the lock. As a further precaution he divided the two keys between two members of the bank staff, Messrs.’ Julius Pettersen and Hans Olsen Skurdal. 55 If the Germans came, then they would have to work hard to get the vault open and it wouldn’t be easy for them. Meanwhile, news of the non-arrival of the Germans spread quickly and a palpable feeling of relief filtered amongst the bank staff. Equally they all knew that it would only be a matter of time before rumour would become a reality and none more so than Rygg and Lund.
5
Allied Help Arrives
The invasion was now in full swing and t
he Germans were making good progress against the small and under equipped Norwegian forces. A cry for help had gone out to Britain and she was responding as fast as she could, but not fast enough. Confusion reigned supreme as the British, caught out by the German invasion, hurriedly assembled troops and equipment and it wasn’t until April 17th (22:00) that the British first set foot on Norwegian soil in large numbers at the ports of Harstad (‘Rupertforce’), Namsos (‘Mauriceforce’), Åndalsnes (‘Sickleforce’) and Namsos (24th Guards Brigade, 146th, 148th and 15th Brigades respectively).56
The landings were not without problems. Equipment had not arrived or had been placed in the wrong ships in the wrong order – it was a logistical disaster of enormous proportions from the outset. Range finders for the AA guns were missing; there was an inadequate supply of field glasses (binoculars) to go round; base plates for the 3inch mortars were missing, rendering the mortars useless. The few mortars that were operational had only smoke shells to fire and not the conventional exploding shell needed to stop the enemy; plus being of the 3inch type they only had a range of 1600 yards. Radio equipment was almost non-existent and therefore runners had to be used to pass messages and to top it all the soldiers had only been issued with a handful of ammunition for their rifles. The soldiers, many of them territorial and without experience of any sort of combat, let alone winter combat, managed to organise themselves into some sort of fighting force and under the command of their officers made the best of an extremely bad situation.
Brigadier Harald de Reimer Morgan, commanding officer of ‘Sickleforce’, had been given orders to occupy Dombås and then move on to Trondheim, but because of the fluid nature of the British landing and the rapid progress of the Germans the orders changed so many times as to become virtually useless in the almost hourly shifting situation in Norway.
General Ruge, recently appointed Commander-in-Chief of Norwegian forces, having replaced General Laake, was defending the area south of Lillehammer. Requesting British assistance he dispatched two British officers, Lieutenant Colonel E. J. C. King-Salter (British Military Attaché to the Norwegian Government and recently returned from Finland) and Captain Francis Foley (British Intelligence) to make contact with Morgan at Dombås. They duly obliged and having travelled to Dombås convinced Morgan that taking Trondheim would be disastrous. If the Norwegian line broke at Lillehammer the Germans would then be free to progress almost unopposed up the Gudbrandsdal valley. Morgan agreed with Ruge’s advice, stating to the Norwegian Commander that he had been sent to help Norway – Trondheim would have to wait.
Back at Lillehammer Bank, the staff were kept busy as military personnel and civilians requested money and securities for various reasons; the demands were great on all. Bombing raids were frequent and the staff had to contend with closing the bank and then re-opening as soon as the last planes had disappeared into the distance. Lund realised that the unique and dire circumstances they were living under could not be endured much longer and that soon the Germans would over-run the country and that would almost certainly include helping themselves to the contents of the bank. The British were poorly equipped and though like the Norwegians they fought hard and tenaciously, it was not enough, not nearly enough. Lund knew that the gold would have to be moved again, but it could only be under orders from Norges Bank.
Late one evening on April 13th, the bank received an unusual request. A Norwegian naval officer, Lieutenant Diesen called the bank and made arrangements for Andreas Lund to meet Commanding Admiral Henry Diesen at the Grande Hotel in Lillehammer.57 Lund was suspicious and quite rightly saw this as an unusual demand. He sought the advice of the Lillehammer Chief of Police to see if Admiral Diesen was who he said he was and if he was actually in Lillehammer. After all, the Commanding Admiral was geographically very far away from the sea and what was his interest in the bullion? During those dark days rumours of Fifth columnists and Quislings were reverberating around Norway and risks could not be taken on the say-so of a junior officer. The police later confirmed Admiral Diesen’s identity and presence in the town. This assurance satisfied Lund that all was well and he agreed to meet.
At an arranged time, Andreas Lund and Julius Pettersen met with the Commanding Admiral at the Grande Hotel. Diesen requested Lund move the bullion as soon as possible because the Germans were not far away. Lund listened intently to the demands of Diesen, but disagreed with the idea and insisted that it was Norges Bank who was the authority in this case and that he would wait for orders from the Bank before proceeding. Diesen protested forcefully but Lund again remained steadfast in his position and insisted that he could only operate under the auspices of Norges Bank. The meeting concluded with Lund and Pettersen re-iterating that they had no authority to move the gold despite the protestations of the Admiral. However Lund and Pettersen left the hotel concerned that Diesen was perhaps correct that the bullion should be transported somewhere away from the front line. Lund’s mind was in turmoil. The situation was becoming perilous and he thought that it would not be long before the German troops would arrive and close in on their quarry. What Lund did not know at that time was that the Germans still had no clear idea where the gold was and that their primary target was the King and the Norwegian Government.
The Germans for their part realised that Dombås and its rail junction was a major strategic position and that if they could capture it quickly with a detachment of Fallschirmjägers (parachute troops), secure the junction and destroy railway lines from Åndalsnes, then British troops being transported out of the west coast port rail towards the Gudbrandsdal region in support of Norwegian troops, would be halted. Without British support the Norwegian resistance would collapse allowing German troops to push up from the south to Dombås.
There is no evidence of operational orders being issued to the German paratroopers to capture the King or the gold. Nonetheless, the German High Command must have been aware that securing the Dombås railhead could also net them further prizes.
At approximately 17:00 on the evening of April 14th, fifteen Ju 52 transport aircraft from 1./FJR1, each loaded with approximately twelve lightly armed Fallschirmjägers, lumbered slowly into the air from Fornebu airdrome, Oslo.58 En route, one aircraft was lost to Norwegian ground fire near Lillehammer, but the others successfully reached Dombås. Arriving over the target area at about 18:30, streams of German paratroops left their aircraft. The drop, though, was not particularly successful and paratroops were scattered over a wide area. One aircraft was shot down over Dombås, whilst the Norwegians shot some of the troops as they parachuted down. The defenders quickly captured a few Germans who had fallen away from the target area. Nevertheless, the Fallschirmjägers, although lightly equipped, were a potent force and clearly this was a very dangerous development for the Norwegians. Drastic action had to be taken to eliminate the problem.
The German paratroopers fought tenaciously against the Norwegians, but took casualties quickly. Mortars and heavy machine guns were brought up to try and remove the stubborn resistance.
Officer of Marines, Lieutenant Colonel Simpson later described the situation is his report to the Admiralty:59
German parachute troops were reported near Dovre and a few others near Lesja to the Northwest of Dombås. I had dispatched by train one 3.7” Howitzer under the command of a sub Lieutenant D.C. Salter, R.N. to Dombås in order to assist in clearing out the German parachute troops reported in that area… We had a conference in my H.Q. during which I explained the situation as I knew it, and I got through on the telephone to the Military Attaché, Lieutenant Colonel King-Slater at G.H.Q., who said that the situation in front of Lillehammer was critical and unless reinforcements came within 24 hours it was possible that a debacle would ensue…Brigadier Morgan then decided himself to go forward to Dombås to clear up the situation there, and to return to Åndalsnes as soon as possible to make his final plan. He left at about 0100 hours on 19/4 and was back again by about 0900 hours the same morning, having given orders for the mopping up of the
German parachutists.
It had taken five days to clear the German parachutists, although the situation could well have radically altered had the Germans reinforced the landing with further troops. It had been a close-run thing, but with the Germans in the area either killed or captured, there was now a window of opportunity to get the bullion railed out of Lillehammer.
With Norwegian forces back in control of Dombås and the surrounding area by April 19th, the railway lines to the north and the west coast remained free for the transportation of allied troops.
Torp shared Lund’s worries and knew that the safekeeping of gold at the Lillehammer bank was no longer an option. The bullion had to be moved and it had to happen quickly. Torp needed someone with sound leadership qualities to take on the immense task of seeing the gold removed to safety and considered that Fredrik Haslund, Secretary of the Labour Party, was the man to do it. Haslund was well qualified to handle the situation as he had already engineered the safe movement of the Royal Family and Members of Parliament from Hamar to Elverum. Earlier, Haslund had followed the Royal party and Norwegian government out of Oslo, becoming a driver and messenger for the King during the journey. Torp had identified Haslund as a man who he could trust and who possessed an organisational aptitude and an ability to be a decision maker without recourse to others; all essential qualities for what Torp had in mind and as such no one else was considered for the job.
Gold Run: The Rescue of Norway’s Gold Bullion from the Nazis, 1940 Page 8