by Con Coughlin
For the first time in his career, Saddam was lucratively rewarded, and he soon developed expensive tastes to match his status as the country’s strongman. In common with many wealthy men of peasant origins, his primary interest lay in expensive clothes and cars. He started to frequent one of Baghdad’s most expensive tailors, Haroot, which was located in the city’s Chaakia district and which was well beyond the price range of most Iraqis. Later, once he had become president, Saddam indulged himself by visiting his tailor often, as much as once a week, ordering several suits at a time. His interest in cars was confined to purchasing three or four top-of-the-line Mercedes limousines, which he bought each year in Kuwait—complete with all-important air-conditioning, an essential prerequisite for surviving the heat of a Baghdad summer.
Saddam also had to accommodate his growing family. By 1972 three daughters had been added to his two sons, Uday (1964) and Qusay (1966); Raghad was born in 1967, Rana in 1969, and Hala in 1972. For the first few years after the 1968 revolution, Saddam and his family lived in a large house on the grounds of the Presidential Palace, which, apart from housing the main presidential residence and the National Assembly, was a large, heavily fortified complex that provided accommodation for most leading members of the regime. Saddam’s family lived in some comfort, and most of the houses were equipped with swimming pools and teams of servants. Access to the compound was gained by crossing one of two heavily guarded bridges: the Muallak, or hanging, bridge (because of its proximity to Liberation Square) or the al-Jamhuriyya bridge situated on the Tigris, which were located at either end of the compound.
This was also the period when Saddam began acquiring land to build houses for himself and his family outside Baghdad. Construction began on the first of Saddam’s many houses in 1970, and Saddam exploited his close professional relationship with Bakr to seize key plots of land. In time the houses would become so lavish that they were more like palaces than ordinary family homes, and in later years they would be used for a very different purpose than that for which they were originally intended—storing his illicit arsenal of weapons of mass destruction. There was, of course, a strong whiff of corruption about the personal fortunes being amassed by the new Baathist elite. Saleh Omar al-Ali, who became minister of information after the revolution, claimed he had to deal with a deluge of complaints from party members in the Tikrit region about the amount of land being sequestered by Bakr, Saddam, and Khairallah Tulfah. “It started off on a small scale, but after a time they were just taking what they wanted,” Ali recalled. “People were being thrown off their land and being deprived of their livelihoods. Khairallah Tulfah was the worst offender, but Bakr and Saddam were soon just as bad. They caused a lot of ill feeling among ordinary Baath members.”1
Never one to miss a propaganda opportunity, Saddam was keen to exploit the stability of his family life, which was deliberately portrayed in the government-owned Iraqi media as the model to which the socially mobile Iraqi middle classes should aspire. Saddam placed particular emphasis on the fact that Sajida, his wife, was working as a part-time schoolteacher while raising five children. Pictures began to appear of Saddam and his family in the state-owned Iraqi press, including pictures of him playing in the sea with his children while on vacation. The development of a personality cult around Saddam was to be a key part of his strategy for seizing power and, at this early stage in his career, the propaganda campaign was mainly concentrated on the Hussein family’s contented family life. In the portraits published in the Iraqi press Saddam’s family appears genuinely happy, and it did Saddam no harm at all to be presented as the head of the perfect Iraqi family.
Even Saddam’s eating habits changed. The poor peasant boy from Al-Ouja, who had been raised on a subsistence diet of rice and beans, now developed a taste for American-style food, which was becoming highly popular among the newly emerging Iraqi bourgeoisie. He was particularly fond of barbecues, and his favorite dish was spare ribs. This he washed down with his favorite drink, Portuguese Mateus rosé wine, a rather saccharin affair and not exactly the most sophisticated choice for a future head of state. As a young man Saddam smoked a pipe, an affectation that appears to date from his sojourn in Cairo. Gradually, however, he switched to cigars, which he continued to smoke throughout his career. When not working hard at his office, Saddam started to frequent some of Baghdad’s smarter restaurants, establishments that would have been well beyond his range before the Baathist takeover. His favorite haunts were Dananir and Matam al-Mataam. For relaxation he liked to go hunting, which in the Arab world consists of shooting game. In the early 1970s his hunting companions were his political associates, such as the head of his Security Police, Saadoun Shakir, and his half brother, Barzan. Their favorite locations were Kut, Swaika, Sammara, al-Dour, and Tikrit, and the hunting expeditions were a weekly fixture in Saddam’s routine. He was usually accompanied by one of his bodyguards and some Baath Party officials. The hunting party would mostly shoot pheasants, which would later be barbecued. Saddam, who enjoyed a reputation as a good shot, would invite his family and friends for an al fresco picnic. An invitation to one of Saddam’s hunting parties, however, did not necessarily mean that the future career of a young Baathist was secure; the event could also be used by Saddam to identify any possible future rivals, or, by taking advantage of the relaxed atmosphere, to bring any ideological differences to the surface. At least two of Saddam’s hunting companions were to regret the experience; Tahir Ahmed Amin was executed for treason in 1969, and Saad al-Sammurai was assassinated in 1982.
When not out hunting, Saddam’s favorite haunt in Baghdad was the Nadi al-Said club, which literally translates as “the hunting club” and is located in the city’s Mansour district. Since the establishment of the monarchy, Baghdad had boasted a number of hunting clubs. The British had socialized at the al-Alwiya club during the heyday of the monarchy, and there were a number of other clubs, most of them located close to the Tigris, that were frequented by different social groups: the Hindya club, for example, was patronized by Christian families, while membership of the newer al-Mansour club was mainly drawn from Baghdad’s newly emerging middle class. From the early 1970s the Nadi al-Said club tended to be associated with the country’s new governing elite. Apart from a comfortable clubhouse, the club’s extensive, and immaculately maintained, grounds contained a swimming pool, tennis courts, and horse-riding facilities. The club would also arrange a variety of activities, such as shooting parties and social functions, for the entertainment of its members. It was a place where the country’s ruling elite could visit during their spare time for much-needed relaxation.
Once he had firmly established himself in power, Saddam used the club almost as his personal fiefdom, so much so that in the early 1970s he authorized a development program to extend the club’s facilities. Saddam took an intense, almost proprietorial, interest in the building project and was often to be found at the construction site inspecting progress on a Friday afternoon, the middle of the Islamic weekend. This was a time when middle-class Iraqis would join senior Baath Party officials for a relaxing lunch at the club with their families. Former club members recall that the most striking aspect of Saddam’s inspection visits was the number of bodyguards he would bring with him. “There would be at least eight armed men with him all the time. Generally there would be two bodyguards on either side and four behind him. No one else in the Baath needed protection like this, and the presence of the bodyguards gave Saddam a rather sinister air.”2
Despite his intimidating air, Saddam nevertheless went out of his way to charm the other members of the club. The shy awkwardness that had afflicted his early attempts at social intercourse in Baghdad appears to have been replaced by an altogether more urbane approach. The hunting club was Saddam’s refuge, the place where he could seek sanctuary at the end of a long working day, or on the weekends. He would usually arrive at the club with some of his close colleagues, such as Abdul Karim al-Shaikhly or Saadoun Shakir, and the ever vigilant b
odyguards. He would take a corner table and sit quietly talking with his circle of friends while drinking Johnnie Walker Black Label whiskey. Most of the time Saddam would prefer to keep his own company, and did not socialize much with the other club members. Unlike most of the other male members, however, who were often accompanied by their wives for lunch or dinner, Saddam was never accompanied by Sajida, even when the club had laid on evening social functions, such as a dinner dance or a cabaret. The only members of Saddam’s family who came to the club were his children, particularly his sons, Uday and Qusay, who, when they were older, were brought to the club on weekends, and would play with the other children. But Sajida, who would have had her hands full with five children, was hardly ever seen in public, apart from her occasional appearances in the Baghdad press. Despite his reticence, Saddam knew most of the club members, and would engage them in polite conversation if the necessity arose. As most of them by the early 1970s were well aware of the activities of Saddam’s security forces, even Saddam’s attempts at making a joke could easily be misconstrued. One former club member, who was married to a British woman, recalled how one day he was at the club with his two young daughters, and was talking to them in English. Saddam overheard them, and came up to the member and remarked: “I think it is high time you spoke to them in Arabic.” Saddam was smiling at the little girl as he made the remark, but the member, who held a senior position in the Baath government, was not convinced Saddam had made the comment in jest, and resolved in future to converse with his daughters in Arabic when in public.3
The early 1970s was a period when Saddam sought to cultivate a favorable public image, and many Iraqis were the recipients of impromptu acts of “generosity” on the part of “Mr. Deputy.” Located close to the Presidential Palace in the middle of the Tigris is a small island known locally as “Pig’s Island,” which in the summer is a popular picnic spot for Baghdad families. Because of its proximity to the palace, however, the island was kept under constant surveillance in case opponents of the regime might try to use it as a staging post for an attack on the regime’s nerve center. There were several occasions when Iraqi families who were picnicking on the island on public holidays had their festivities interrupted by Saddam, who would make his way to the island with his bodyguards from the Presidential Palace in a motorboat. Saddam would go from one family to another, making their acquaintance and inquiring as to their general well-being. Although the main purpose of his visit was to check that the island was not being used for any subversive activity, he would nevertheless attempt to make a favorable impression. When, for example, he saw that the men at one picnic party were drinking whiskey, he sent one of his bodyguards back to the boat to fetch a case of liquor, which was promptly delivered to the picnickers. Farther along the island he came across another party that was drinking wine, and so he sent his bodyguards to bring a case from the boat. These might have been token gestures on Saddam’s part, but they nevertheless had the effect of winning him a reputation among the residents of Baghdad as someone who cared for ordinary Iraqis.
Somehow this opulent lifestyle had to be paid for, and Saddam proved himself to be adept at exploiting unconventional revenue streams to pay both for his own expanding needs and those of his security forces. One of the first such ventures initiated by Saddam was the reintroduction of horse racing. During the monarchy, horse racing had been a national sport and, even though betting is regarded as un-Islamic, gambling had generated a healthy income for the government. The puritanical President Qassem had banned horse racing, but once the Baathists were established in power Saddam lifted the ban. Gambling on horse races was tolerated, and the canny Saddam set up a system whereby some of the profits from the new gambling syndicates were channeled into his own accounts, thereby affording him the means to finance his own requirements and those of his security services.
The most significant development, however, in the attempts by Saddam and the Baathists to finance their grandiose plans for modernizing Iraq was the nationalization of the Iraqi oil industry. Iraq contains the world’s second largest oil reserves after Saudi Arabia—in the 1970s Iraq was estimated to have known reserves of 130 billion barrels, compared with 150 billion barrels in Saudi Arabia. With the right market conditions, it was estimated that Iraq could be capable of producing 11 million barrels a day. Iraqi oil, moreover, is very cheap to extract—roughly six cents per barrel compared with eight cents per barrel in Saudi Arabia. Since the creation of modern Iraq, control of the country’s oil industry had resided in the Iraqi Petroleum Company (IPC), which by the 1970s was in effect a consortium comprising five of the world’s largest oil companies—BP, Shell, Esso, Mobil, and Compagnie Française des Pétroles (CFP). Foreign ownership of Iraq’s key resource had long been an affront to generations of Iraqi nationalists, and many of the coups had been motivated by the desire that the government should have ultimate control over the country’s fabulous oil wealth. Certain efforts had been made by various Iraqi administrations to rein in IPC’s dominance over the industry, most notably when in 1961 President Qassem wrested control of 99.5 percent of the land from IPC, which was refusing to develop it. In 1964 President Arif set up the Iraqi National Oil Company (INOC) to develop the country’s oil reserves and sell it on the open market, but this was thwarted by the international oil companies, which, among other retaliatory measures, refused to sell oil to countries that dealt directly with the Iraqi government. This was essentially the situation inherited by the Baathists after they seized power in 1968, and Saddam, with Bakr’s backing, resolved to settle an issue that was widely regarded as a national disgrace.
From 1971 Saddam assumed responsibility for dealing with the oil consortium, together with Murtada al-Hadithi, the oil minister. Saddam’s opportunity to engage in the confrontation the Baathists had been waiting for came soon afterward when the IPC decided to slow down oil production in Iraq in favor of that in other countries. The IPC decision meant that, in effect, foreign companies were dictating the earning power of the Iraqi government, an intolerable position for any self-respecting government and one that smacked of neoimperialism. It was a provocation that the nationalist wing of the Baath, as represented by Bakr and Saddam, could not let pass without a challenge. The manner in which Saddam engineered the course of events that would result in the nationalization of the Iraqi industry is an instructive case study in Saddam’s ability, even at this relatively early stage in his political career, to manipulate circumstances to suit his own ends.
The Baath Party had, for some time, given consideration to forming an alliance with a “nonimperialist” power, the most likely candidate being the Soviet Union, which, perversely, was not deemed by the Baathists to nurture imperial ambitions. Although Saddam and Bakr were anticommunist, they realized that an alliance with Moscow would enable them to withstand any pressure that Washington might bring to bear on Baghdad. Although Bakr and Saddam had little sympathy with communism and had spent most of the past decade viciously persecuting members of the Iraqi Communist Party, an alliance with Moscow made good diplomatic sense for the Baathists. The centuries-old ambition of generations of Russians of reaching the warm southern seas was a constant source of consternation for the shah of Iran, with whom Iraq shared a one-thousand-mile border. An alliance with Moscow would help to curb any aggressive instincts the shah might nurture toward Iraq, particularly over sensitive issues like the Shatt al-Arab waterway, Iraq’s only access to the Gulf which was crucial for its oil exports. Developing good relations with the Soviets would also give Iraq the opportunity to make massive arms purchases and build up the strength of its armed forces. This was a top priority for the Baathists, who were aware that they needed to strengthen their military position to defend themselves against the belligerence of the Iranians, to participate fully in any future war against Israel and to deal with any internal conflicts, such as the constant threat of the Kurds to declare autonomy. The foundations of an alliance with the Soviets had been laid during Saddam’s 1970 v
isit to Moscow to sort out the Kurdish problem, and in February 1972 Saddam returned to Moscow as Bakr’s personal emissary for a series of meetings with Soviet prime minister Alexei Kosygin. Saddam’s mission must have been a success for, despite Soviet reservations about the Baathists’ treatment of Iraqi communists, it was reciprocated the following April when Kosygin flew to Baghdad and signed a bilateral Treaty of Friendship and Cooperation. After the formalities had been concluded, Kosygin was given a conducted tour of the marble halls of the Presidential Palace, accompanied by a handsome blonde who had been provided by Saddam.
Saddam was forced to make many unpalatable concessions to the Soviets. The treaty guaranteed Soviet access to Iraqi air bases. By way of compensation the Soviets agreed to provide training of thousands of Iraqi officers at Soviet military academies. It also referred to the “harmonization” of Soviet and Iraqi foreign policy, a polite way of saying that the Baathists would take orders from Moscow on issues such as Iraq’s votes at the United Nations. In return the Soviets agreed to help keep the Baathists in power, and to help them with their nationalization plans. Commenting on the deal years later, Saddam was quite pragmatic about the concessions he had made to Moscow. “We never expected that the Soviets would support us without guarantees that our friendship would serve their strategic interests.”4 Saddam did not enjoy being beholden to a superpower, and the terms imposed on him by the Soviets were to have an important bearing on his future dealings with Moscow.