by Con Coughlin
Most Iraqi technicians and officials involved in the various projects knew that Saddam relied heavily on his security apparatus to keep himself in power. Even so, they were still impressed by his ability to master even the most complicated brief. Salah al-Shaikhly, a first cousin of deposed foreign minister Abdul Karim al-Shaikhly, was a British-educated economist who worked as deputy director of planning for the Baath until he was obliged to flee the country in 1977. For seven years he attended weekly meetings chaired by Saddam and, despite the suffering Saddam has inflicted on his family, he has not wavered from his view that Saddam was a gifted administrator. “He could grasp an argument faster than many technicians,” he said. “He could ask questions that even those who had Ph.D.s could not answer. We could only assume that he spent a lot of time reading up on the briefs. But even so it was an impressive performance.” On those occasions that Saddam did not understand a point, he would ask for it to be repeated “for the benefit of the rest of the group who, like me, I am sure, would appreciate a little clarification.” The meetings were conducted in a businesslike manner and there was no hint of the menace that afflicted so many other areas of Iraqi life. “There was no sense of intimidation,” said Shaikhly. “It was only when people were clearly underperforming that it became a problem.”
The drive to modernize Iraq was undertaken strictly on terms laid down by Saddam. “Mr. Deputy” was under no illusions about the signficance of the potential riches that were about to change the country forever, nor did he underestimate the significance of Iraq’s oil wealth to the outside world. “So long as we have oil we have power,” he was fond of telling his officials. “I want Iraq to have the last barrel of oil in the world. The longer we can make our oil last, the longer we will be recognized as a world power.” It was for this reason that he disdainfully dismissed the suggestion put forward by one of his senior advisers to develop the country’s solar energy resources, a reasonable enough suggestion given the strength of the sun in Iraq’s desert regions. “If we do this, oil will be redundant,” was Saddam’s take on the proposal.
In other areas Saddam was fascinated with science, and was determined to import the latest technologies to Iraq. Rather than follow the other oil-rich Gulf states, and simply import technology, Saddam wanted Iraq to become technologically self-sufficient. Saddam’s enthusiasm was undoubtedly infectious, and the officials and scientists who were invited to participate in this new dawn in Iraq’s development were inspired by Saddam’s leadership. “We all thought it was marvelous,” recalled Shaikhly. “The good things outweighed the bad. We knew there was censorship and we knew unpleasant things happened if you fell foul of the security forces. But for those of us who were given the opportunity to rebuild the country, it was all tremendously exciting.” Saddam was always on the lookout for bright new talent. When he chaired meetings, he would sit attentively when a newcomer was invited to make a presentation. In these circumstances first impressions were crucial. Anyone who made a good first impression could look forward to quick promotion. “Saddam was essentially looking for young people with good qualifications who were intelligent and courageous,” said Shaikhly. “These were the people he wanted to help him modernize the country. As for loyalty, he took that for granted. After all, he had this extensive security apparatus watching everyone all the time. If anyone displayed the slightest hint of disloyalty, Saddam knew precisely how to deal with them.”13
On those occasions when someone annoyed Saddam he had a unique way of demonstrating his displeasure. The back of his left hand is marked by three small dotlike tattoos, the tribal markings of a Tikriti that he had carried since childhood. Saddam would simply wave his hand, displaying the tattoos in the direction of the offending official, signaling that he should leave at once. Later in Saddam’s career, this gesture was taken as a sign for the security forces to arrest the unfortunate official, who would be taken away for interrogation, often never to be seen again.
Agrarian reform was one of the Baath’s first priorities and the party initiated a widespread land redistribution scheme, breaking up the large landholdings and creating a network of small, self-sufficient farms that were required to participate in local cooperatives. No compensation was paid to the landowners. By 1976 more than 71 percent of state-owned land had been given to 222,000 new farmers who were provided with modern agricultural equipment while the number of farm cooperatives rose from 473 in 1968 to 1,852 in 1976. The egalitarian nature of the regime was reflected in education, an issue close to Saddam’s heart, and student enrollment at educational establishments doubled at every level during the 1970s. Saddam’s personal concern was to eradicate adult illiteracy.
In 1977, for example, when he was becoming frustrated by the inability of his various education proposals to bring down the level of adult illiteracy, he declared a Day of Knowledge to persuade Iraqis to participate in nationwide courses in reading and writing. To make sure that there was full enrollment in the courses, Saddam threatened those who did not take up his offer with prison. The scheme was such a success that UNESCO gave Saddam the Kropeska Award for promoting its campaign to wipe out illiteracy worldwide.14
The country still depended heavily on oil revenues, and Saddam was also involved in the Baath Party’s attempts to diversify the economy and make the country more self-sufficient. From 1975 onward, the government drew up investment budgets that aimed at developing the nucleus of heavy industries, such as coal oil and petrochemical facilities. Saddam’s office was closely involved with the development of the $45 billion fertilizer, steel, and chemical plant at al-Zubair and a massive petrochemical complex at Basra. Saddam claimed credit for construction of a nationwide network of oil pipelines that provided the government with oil terminal outlets in Syria, Turkey, and Basra. As part of the government’s development program, remote villages were connected to the electricity grid. The Baathists gave away free televisions and refrigerators to poor families, especially among the Shiite communities in the south of the country. As part of their policy of social liberalization, the Baathists were committed to the emancipation of women, and passed legislation ensuring equal pay and outlawing job discrimination on the basis of sex. A family law code, known as the Code of Personal Status, was revised, making polygamy more difficult to practice and allowing women to choose their own husbands, rather than having them chosen by their families, and to divorce. At a time when in neighboring Saudi Arabia women were not even allowed out on their own in public, Iraqi women were allowed to enroll in the military and the Popular Army.
This massive development program, which constituted a genuine social and economic revolution in Iraq, naturally focused attention on those responsible for implementing it, and Saddam, who had already appreciated the importance of the personality cult, was the main beneficiary. Pictures of him and his family became an even more familiar fixture in the Iraqi press, and the story of his rise to power from his humble origins in Tikrit became the stuff of legend. Newborn babies were named after him, and it was reported that young party members were emulating his walk, his dress, and even his manner of speech. Saddam appeared constantly on Iraqi television, giving long, rambling monologues, which could last for up to four hours, on a wide range of topics, from education to family planning. The content might not make compelling viewing, but his constant appearance on television strengthened the impression among the populace of who was really running the country. Moreover, Saddam deserved a great deal of the credit for the genuinely progressive changes that were taking place in Iraqi society. To make sure that all the targets he set were being reached he would arrange “productivity meetings” all over the country, and he would make personal visits to make sure that the goals he set in Baghdad were coming to fruition in the country.
The nationalization of the oil industry and the treaty with Moscow provided the Baathists with an enormous confidence boost, and enabled them to tackle the other outstanding political issues of the day, foremost among which was the Kurds and the troublin
g relationship that they were developing with Iran, the Baathists’ perennial bugbear. As part of their cozying up to the Soviets in the early 1970s, Bakr and Saddam had rather cynically brought the remnants of the persecuted Communist Party into the government by forming the Patriotic National Front. Although Bakr and Saddam had no intention of letting Iraqi communist leaders have a say in the running of the country, this gesture at reconciliation nevertheless found favor among the Soviets, who responded by trying to pressure the Kurds into ceasing their agitation against the Baath. Relations between the Kurds and the Baath were already strained following Saddam’s failed assassination attempt on Barzani in 1971, and deteriorated further in the wake of the IPC nationalization, with the Kurds claiming that the Baathists had seized control of the Kirkuk oil fields, which they claimed was a clear breach of the March Manifesto of 1970. To put pressure on the Baathists, Barzani made encouraging noises to the Americans, who were none too pleased about Baghdad’s new strategic alliance with Moscow and were still seething over the loss of the IPC. Barzani made it clear that U.S. firms would be allowed to develop the Kirkuk oil fields if the United States supported the Kurds in their quest for autonomy. The threat posed by the Kurds to the Baathist hegemony was enhanced by the fact that the shah, wary of the new alliance between Baghdad and Moscow and who himself was being armed by the United States, was providing Kurdish leaders with military and logistical support.
For Saddam, the threat posed by the Kurds was seen as nothing more than an attempt by “the agents of imperialism” to destroy all the achievements of the Baathist revolution.15 Saddam was concerned that, far from seeking an autonomy solution, Barzani would stop at nothing less than full independence, and that an independent Kurdistan would then ally itself with countries that were hostile to Iraq, such as Iran, Israel, and the United States. With the positions of both sides so entrenched, it was inevitable that the conflict would escalate, and hostilities finally commenced in the spring of 1974 when the Kurds rebelled against an attempt by Baghdad to impose Saddam’s autonomy plan, which had been rejected by Barzani. Initially the Iraqi armed forces acquitted themselves well, but by late 1974 they were forced on the defensive as they struggled to contend with the guerrilla tactics of the well-armed and ruthless Kurdish fighters. The Iraqi effort was further hindered by the refusal of the Soviets, their main arms suppliers, to provide fresh arms and ammunition. Moscow saw an opportunity to punish the Baathists for their purges against Iraqi Communists. With the Americans backing Barzani, and the Soviets deciding to aid Iraq, an unlikely U.S-Soviet cold war alliance threatened the Baath government. The Iraqi position further deteriorated in January 1975, when the Iranian army entered the fray on the side of the Kurds, even deploying two regiments inside Iraq.
After the diplomatic triumphs of 1972, the war in Kurdistan was rapidly turning into the deadliest challenge the Baathists had faced since seizing power in 1968. Saddam, as the architect of the deal that was supposed to resolve the perennial Kurdish problem, was vulnerable, particularly as the Iraqi losses continued to mount without any sign of a breakthrough being achieved. Saddam tried to put a brave face on the party’s fortunes in February 1975 when he declared that “the political and military situation in the northern area has never been so good.”16 But with casualties in excess of sixty thousand and the cost of the conflict threatening to bankrupt the Iraqi economy, drastic measures were needed if the Baathists were not to be driven from power.
Saddam’s solution was to open a dialogue with the shah; if he could somehow persuade the Iranians to disengage from the conflict, he was confident that his forces would be able to suppress the Kurdish resistance. Opening a dialogue with the shah, however, was not a foregone conclusion. The authorities in Teheran were well aware of the brutal tactics the Baathists employed to keep themselves in power, and the shah had gone on the record as denouncing the Baghdad regime as “a group of crazy, bloodthirsty savages.” The shah, moreover, was fully appreciative of the powerful position in which he found himself, and was determined to strike a hard bargain. He had long coveted an agreement whereby Iraq formally acknowledged Iran’s claim to control the Shatt al-Arab, the strategically important waterway at the head of the Gulf. Iraq had vigorously resisted the Iranian claim on the grounds that such a concession would jeopardize Iraq’s ability to export oil. It is an indication of the perilous position in which Saddam found himself in early 1975 that he agreed to enter into negotiations with the shah over the Shatt al-Arab and other disputed territories during a meeting of oil ministers in Algiers in early 1975. The negotiations were a success, certainly from the shah’s point of view, and on March 6, 1975, Saddam and the shah concluded the Algiers Agreement. In return for Iraq conceding Iran control over the Shatt al-Arab, the Iranians agreed to withdraw their support from the Kurds.
In the immediate context of the Kurdish conflict, Saddam’s gamble paid off. Within forty-eight hours of the signing of the Algiers Agreement, Iran had withdrawn its forces and its support for the Kurds, and within two weeks the Kurdish rebellion had effectively been suppressed. Saddam even found himself being singled out for praise by the shah, who, after the negotiations had been concluded, remarked, “Saddam Hussein has favourably impressed me. He is young and has courageous ideas.”17 In every other respect, however, the Algiers Agreement constituted a national humiliation for Saddam and the Baathists, as it effectively gave Iran control over Iraq’s miniscule coastline at the head of the Gulf, the nation’s only sea access. It was clearly an untenable position for Iraq, and one that would ultimately result in the bloodiest conflict the Middle East has seen. Iraq’s foreign minister, Saadoun Hammadi, accurately summed up Baghdad’s real feelings about the sellout over the Shatt al-Arab. “It was either that or lose the north of the country.” But so far as Saddam was concerned, the agreement was essential because, apart from ending the Kurdish rebellion, it salvaged his political career. It was well known in Baghdad that Saddam had assumed personal responsibility for resolving the Kurdish question, and failure to do so, particularly after the 1974 rebellion, would have destroyed him. So faced with the choice of sacrificing the national interest or sacrificing his own career, Saddam took the option that guaranteed his survival.
For all its faults, Saddam managed to turn the deal with the shah into a personal triumph, another garland to be added to those acquired through the nationalization of the IPC and the groundbreaking cooperation pact with Moscow. In many respects, 1975 is the moment that Saddam’s inexorable march on the Presidential Palace can really be said to have begun in earnest. Apart from being able to boast these diplomatic triumphs, his known enemies in the military and the civilian wing of the Baath had been culled and his security apparatus was all-pervasive. As Bakr’s official deputy, he was consulted on all policy matters, both domestic and foreign. Even so Saddam calculated that it was still too early for him to make his move on the Presidential Palace.
That is not to say that the idea had not entered his thoughts. As he later explained to one his official biographers: “It is certain that matters would have been accomplished faster had I become the Republic’s President five years earlier,” he confided. “That was also President Bakr’s conviction. But I used to contradict him because I did not want him to leave his post as President.”18 Saddam’s argument for not ousting Bakr in 1975 was that such a move might be regarded as cynical opportunism, even though he himself believed it would have been the correct course of action. “If I had not behaved in this moral way, what would I have told the people? My situation would have been exactly like any other revolutionary situation in the world or in the Arab nation, with no clear-cut moral difference. If the one who is better takes over his friend’s place and seeks only the reward, then we would be like so many other revolutionary movements, whereas this is far from the truth.”19 These comments, made soon after his inauguration as president, can hardly be taken at face value in view of his subsequent treatment of Bakr. The simple truth of the matter was that at this juncture
in his meteoric career Saddam did not feel sufficiently confident in his position to conduct a putsch against Bakr. An inherent cautiousness is one of Saddam’s more surprising character traits.
The gradual rise in Saddam’s fortunes during the mid-1970s was accompanied by a parallel increase in the fortunes of the Baath Party. The Popular Army, the Baath Party militia that was controlled by Izzat Douri, Saddam’s deputy at the RCC and one of his most devoted followers, increased its membership to an estimated 150,000 followers. The Baath Party, which had numbered just 5,000 members when it seized power in 1968, was attracting record numbers of new recruits, ordinary citizens who saw membership of the Baath as a means of improving their lot. By the late 1970s it is estimated that membership of the Iraqi Baath passed the 1 million mark, an impressive landmark in a country with a population of just 12 million.20
Having strengthened his position in the party and the military, Saddam was well aware that if he were to fulfill his ultimate ambition of becoming president he needed to cultivate genuine support among the Iraqi public at large. An intriguing insight into how Saddam was thinking at this juncture in his career is provided by a British journalist who visited Baghdad in 1975 and was told by his government interpreter that “Saddam’s half brother and Head of Intelligence, Barzan al-Tikriti, had asked him to procure books on Nazi Germany. He believed that Saddam himself was interested in this subject, not for any reason to do with racism and anti-Semitism…but as an example of the successful organization of an entire society by the state for the achievement of national goals.”21 Having drawn on Stalin’s example to create a totalitarian regime, Saddam was now looking to Hitler for clues on how to improve his popularity.