by Ober, Josiah
Among Persia’s restless governors was Mausolus, who ruled Caria in southwestern Anatolia during the second quarter of the fourth century. Under Mausolus, many cities of Caria became more Hellenized than before; they were becoming poleis and increasingly were viewed as such by their Residents and by other Greek cities. Mausolus not only allowed but actively encouraged the process of Hellenization. He was in the forefront of a group of powerful Persian governors who adapted various aspects of Greek culture to their own purposes—spectacularly so in his great tomb: the original Mausoleum. But Hellenization in Caria went deeper, including the active employment by the dynast himself of standard practices of interpolis Greek diplomacy; in essence in his interactions with Greek poleis, Mausolus acted as if he himself were a polis. Mausolus proved adept at playing the game of Aegean power politics, building diplomatic relations with some of Athens’ key allies and challenging the Athenian navy for supremacy in the Aegean.25
Thebes meanwhile sought to expand its influence into various parts of the Greek mainland. In northern Greece, Theban armies fought on the side of Thessalian cities against Alexander of Pherai, a dynast who, following the lead of his father, Jason, sought to unite Thessaly under his leadership. The king of Macedon got involved, leading ultimately to an imposed settlement according to which, in 368, the Macedonian king was forced to offer hostages to the Thebans. Among the noble Macedonians sent to Thebes was an observant teenager named Philip. After spending several years in the close company of resourceful and experienced Theban military commanders, Philip was allowed to return to Macedon. Years later, as Philip II, King of Macedon, he would radically change the power equation of the Greek world (ch. 10). Meanwhile, in central Greece, the Thebans seized Oropos, a disputed district on the eastern Athenian–Boeotian border that was home to an important sanctuary (map 5). In southern Greece, Thebes extended its zone of influence into Achaea and Arcadia. Pushback by Athens and a coalition of Peloponnesian states set up what could have been a decisive battle near Mantinea in 362. The Thebans came out ahead in the battle, but Epaminondas, their dominant and charismatic leader, was killed.26
In the concluding words of his narrative of this period of Greek history, the Athenian polymath, Xenophon, offered what might be read as an obituary for the dream that a hegemonic polis might impose order on the Greek world:
[After the battle of Mantinea] the opposite of what everyone believed would happen came to pass. For since nearly all the peoples of Greece had foregathered and formed themselves into opposing lines, there was no one who did not suppose that if a battle were fought, those who proved victorious would be the rulers and those who were defeated would be their subjects. Yet the god so ordered it that … neither side was found to be any better off, in regards to territory, or city, or empire … indeed, there was even more confusion and disorder in Greece after the battle than before.
—Hellenica 7.5.26–27, trans. Brownson (Loeb) adapted
The confusion and disorder to which Xenophon alluded included a long drawn-out conflict between Athens and Philip II, who became King of Macedon in 359, initially centered on the control of Amphipolis. We consider Philip’s remarkable rise in the next chapter (ch. 10). Suffice it to say here that he outmaneuvered the Athenians and seized Amphipolis in 358. Athens made up for that defeat with a quick campaign that induced the states of Euboea, divided between pro-Theban and pro-Athenian factions, to rejoin the Athenian alliance. But this success was in turn overbalanced by a costly war (the so-called “Social War”) against a coalition of major Aegean states, including Rhodes (i1000), Chios (i640), Cos (i497), and Byzantion (i674). Athens’ former allies were now allied with Mausolus of Caria. The fighting went against the Athenians; they acknowledged their failure to hold together the league with a truce in 355. The Social War was a wake-up call for any Athenian who might still have dreamed of a restored empire. For his part, Mausolus incorporated a number of former states of Athens’ league into his own sphere. Apparently having realized that strict control of the western governors was impossible, the Great King allowed his ostensible agent to act as a principal in his own interest—so long as those interests remained directed outward, toward the Aegean.
Meanwhile, in central Greece, war broke out between Thebes and the loosely confederated poleis of Phocis (region 9: map 9). The Phocians, who controlled the territory around the Panhellenic sanctuary of Delphi, had neither the capital nor the population (ca. 85,000 among some 26 poleis: appendix I) to take on Thebes with their own resources. They resorted, however, to taking treasure (characterized as loans) from the rich store of dedications at Delphi. This enabled the Phocians to hire enough mercenaries to fight the Thebans to a virtual standstill. The war expanded into Thessaly, with Athens coming in on the side of the Phocians and Philip II against them. Philip won a major victory in Thessaly at the Battle of the Crocus Field in 352, but the Athenians held the pass of Thermopylae against him. Once again, what might have been a decisive battle appeared only to add to disorder and confusion.27
EXPANSION AND INTEGRATION
As the quote from Xenophon in the previous section suggests, it is easy to regard the postimperial fourth century as a descent into chaos, a sad failure after the high hopes of the golden age of empire. Descent was no doubt a possible historical trajectory, as is evident from the section of this chapter that traces the fall and rise of Syracuse and Greek Sicily. Historians of classical Greece once embraced a descent narrative for fourth century Hellas as a whole. But a general decline is sharply at odds with the evidence, reviewed in chapter 4, demonstrating that the fourth century saw the acme of the classical-era Greek efflorescence.
When we look beyond the roiling surface of battles and personalities, we can see that there were, in the fourth century, several important and related developments that promoted flourishing: The ongoing expansion of the Greek culture zone, institutionalization of productive interdependence among states, opening access to institutions, and expanded employment of experts to further public purposes. While these developments had quite uneven effects across the Greek world, taken together they conduced to promote the conditions of specialization and human capital investment, productive competition, low-cost emulation, and growth of social capital—all in a context of lower transaction costs. Those conditions in turn sustained and enhanced the classical efflorescence.28
First, and at the most general level, the Greek decentralized ecology of states was growing—due not only to natural demographic increase but also to the embrace of salient elements of Greek culture by societies at the expanding frontiers of the Greek world. In the far west, the colony of Massalia was the conduit for Greek exports, especially wine, into what is now southern France. In Italy, the Etruscans had long been eager importers of Greek art and other artifacts of Greek culture; now that taste was extending to the Romans, who would prove, over the next centuries, to be ardent (if often conflicted) consumers of Greek culture. In Macedonia, the royal family, and the elite generally, were increasingly culturally Hellenized. Further to the north and east, fourth century Greek coins and artifacts have been found in substantial numbers in hoards in Bulgaria, Romania, and Ukraine. The Greek cities on the coasts of the Black Sea promoted a taste for Greek goods among populations in what is now south Russia and Georgia. That taste could be satisfied by production and sale of grain for the Greek market: Around the Black Sea, new states were emerging, at least in part as a result of the potential opened up by a lucrative exchange of grain (among other products, including slaves) for Greek goods and services. The rulers of some of these emerging states were deeply involved in diplomacy with the Greek poleis—notably with Athens.
In Anatolia, Greek culture was likewise moving inland and down the coast. Syria and Egypt (still in revolt from Persia) were increasingly drawn into a Greek sphere of exchange—local Egyptian and Syrian dynasts minted massive numbers of imitation Athenian owls, many of which circulated in Aegean markets—including Athens. Carthage, while often at war with Greeks in t
he fourth century, was considered by Aristotle to be sufficiently Greeklike to be discussed in his Politics and included in his survey of polis constitutional histories. As we have seen, at the margins of the Greek world, Hellenization proceeded far enough for the editors of the Inventory to regard a number of “barbarian” cities as properly reclassified as Greek poleis.
The adoption of Greek culture by non-Greek peoples tended to be, at least at first, at the elite level. Even among the most ardently philhellenic elites, Greek culture was never simply taken up wholesale: Hellenization was a process of selective adaptation rather than wholesale cultural adoption. And it is important to remember that influence went both ways—Greeks were well aware that they themselves had borrowed and adapted many aspects of non-Greek culture. Yet, while “Hellenization” is inevitably a subjective judgment resting on imperfect evidence, it captures something very real and historically important about the Mediterranean world of the fourth century BCE. For our purposes, the main point is that markets for Greek goods and services were expanding more quickly than was the core Greek population itself. To the extent that these expanded markets enabled Greeks to intensify specialization and exploit relative advantages, the expansion of the ecology favored continued growth of the Greek economy—as well as, at least potentially, increasing the wealth of non-Greek elites.29
Next, states within several regions of the Greek world developed more sophisticated forms of federalism that both emerged from and promoted deeper intraregional economic integration. The poleis of Boeotia had been early movers in creating a federal league (koinon). A united Boeotia, with a total population that probably exceeded 200,000 (appendix I: region 10) was a formidable power, economically and militarily. The first Boeotian League had dissolved after the Persian Wars; the second was dissolved by the King’s Peace in 387. In its fourth century iteration, as we have seen, the presence of Thebes as a would-be superpolis had tilted the balance toward centralization and thus coerced, rather than voluntary, cooperation. Thebes’ willingness to use deadly force within Boeotia was demonstrated by the destruction of the poleis of Plataea in 372 and Orchomenos (i213) in 364 (the men killed; women and children enslaved).30
The coercion-intensive Boeotian League was, however, aberrant among fourth century Greek federal leagues. Federations that emerged in the fifth century and reached early maturity in the fourth century in Achaea (region 12) and Aetolia (region 7) were better balanced. Both regions were characterized by a number of relatively small poleis and considerable geographic diversity. Achaea had 16 poleis and a total fourth century population of ca. 70,000. Aetolia had 15 poleis with a total population of perhaps 60,000 (appendix I). Considered as a single polis, neither Achaea nor Aetolia would reach the level of superpolis, but each would be in the same category (size 6) as a handful of great poleis, for example, Argos or Eretria. There was no plausible way to unify either region into a single polis. Instead, the poleis of each region developed deeper intraregional social relations and new political institutions.
Federal leagues remained citizen-centered, but rights of citizenship were effectively doubled. A citizen of the Achaean polis of Dyme (i234), for example, would retain special participation rights within Dyme but would also have participation rights, via representation, in the Achaean koinon and civil rights in Pellene (i240), Patrai (i239), and the 13 other Achaean poleis. Federalism allowed small states to retain the advantages arising from subsidiarity: That is, many decisions could be addressed at a local level by those most directly affected. But at the same time, the members of a federal state gained the security and welfare advantages of “getting big.” In each case, the intensification of political relations among states in a region built upon, and subsequently fostered, productive intraregional economic relations, for example, between upland and coastal towns. Some degree of economic cooperation had long existed in each region, arising from shared interests and a sense of regional identity encouraged by attending religious ceremonies at regional sanctuaries. In the fourth century, and continuing through the third and into the second centuries, the federal leagues became increasingly capable of acting as political entities, diplomatically and militarily.
By credibly committing the member states to cooperative trade relations and by increasing security, the leagues were incubators of productive economic specialization. Pastoralists in upland poleis could, for example, plan to raise more sheep whose wool could be exported through coastal ports, without worrying about restrictions on movement across polis borders, or extortionate taxes. The leagues also helped to provide for better regional security, as potential counterweights to the hegemonic ambitions of their larger neighbors. The Achaean and Aetolian leagues seem to have been especially well managed and are relatively well documented, but the idea of Federalism spread across much of the polis ecology in the course of the fourth and subsequent centuries. By the later fourth century, half of mainland Greek poleis were organized in federal leagues (table 2.3).
OPENING ACCESS TO INSTITUTIONS AT ATHENS
A third development that, along with continued expansion of the Greek world and federalism, helped to maintain economic growth in the face of the apparent disorderly struggles for supremacy among great poleis and Persian dynasts was a trend toward more open access to institutions. That trend can be traced in detail only at Athens, where it can be seen as a logical outgrowth of the political reforms discussed above. Constitutional changes clarifying the law and establishing a distinction between fundamental law and day-today legislation, along with the productive equilibrium struck between elites and masses through the elaboration of a political language of mutual accommodation, produced a social order that was robust enough for the Athenians to begin opening access to legal and other institutions to noncitizens.
Access was never opened unilaterally: Political participation rights (voting in the assembly, serving as a judge or magistrate) remained, for the most part, a monopoly of native-born adult males. Where we see access opening to a wider body of people is in the realms of civil law and civil association. In the course of the fourth century, the Athenians introduced a degree of status-blind impartiality in certain categories of legal judgment, expanded the right to initiate litigation, and granted authority to create perpetual organizations to groups with no connection to the state.31
Various open-access reforms may be explained, at least in part, by reference to the financial challenge that confronted Athens after the loss of the empire. As we have seen (ch. 8), for much of the fifth century Athens had used superior military power to extract rents, in the form of tribute and other remunerative taxes and imposts, from an extensive Aegean empire. After losing their empire and regaining their democracy, the Athenians confronted the difficult question of how to pay for citizen self-government, state defense, and social welfare. That Athens succeeded in doing so is evident. The democratic government continued to function throughout the period in question; fortifications, dockyards, and warships were built; important new public buildings were erected for a variety of civic purposes; the safety net of governmentsupported social welfare was expanded. The total cost of state expenditures was considerable (table 9.1). Where, in the absence of imperial rents, did the money come from to pay for it all?
Wealthy Athenians were taxed through the eisphora (occasional levies on large properties) and the system of liturgies, whereby the wealthiest residents paid for the outfitting of a warship or the financing of some aspect of a religious festival. But there were limits to how much the wealthy could be asked to pay before they would defect—if not by attempting violent regime change, then by hiding their wealth. The growth of Athenian trade, especially in grain, had led to the development of increasingly sophisticated forms of credit, managed by family-run companies that functioned as banks. This was very good news for the liquidity of Athenian markets, but on the other hand it meant that wealth could become “invisible”—existing in the elusive form of credit instruments rather than in the highly visible form of landed prop
erty. If taxes on locally owned wealth were set too high, the Athenians faced the prospect of driving money underground, and, in a worst-case scenario, crashing the essential grain market. As in the case of the legal reforms of the early fourth century, the financial needs of the state imposed certain limits on government. The challenge was how to acknowledge those limits without fatally undermining democratic authority.32
The solution was to increase revenues from indirect taxes. The fourth century Athenian state raised revenues from various sources, but indirect taxes on trade were, by all accounts, especially important. This taxation meant, however, that Athens had to find ways to attract more traders to its markets. Institutional innovations aimed at opening access appear to be essential in ensuring that trade remained robust and thus that taxes on trade could sustain essential state services: Athens would be a magnet for trade only if Athens provided a superior environment for traders. Athens certainly benefited from natural advantages: its location and an exceptionally fine natural harbor at Piraeus. But the long history of Piraeus from the archaic period through early modernity shows that the harbor was often a backwater. Clearly a good location alone was insufficient to generate flourishing trade. If Piraeus were to be a center of Aegean trade in the postimperial era, the state would need to intervene in ways that would lower transaction costs.33
TABLE 9.1 Estimated Athenian State Spending and Income
NOTES: Source data: Ober forthcoming. All dates are BCE. General income is as reported in ancient sources except for ca. 370, which is a guess. Mine leases are included in General Income, but minting fees are not. One-time windfall minting profit from coinage recall in 355 (Kroll 2011b) is included in 354. Pritchard 2012 estimate for ca. 425 military expenses is adopted here. Prichard 2012 estimate for 370s–360s “public and private” expenses is reduced to reflect public only. Hansen 1999 estimate for 330s government expense increased by 20–30 T (Gabrielsen 2013; Pritchard 2014). Substate (deme, tribe) spending and income are excluded.