by Ober, Josiah
8. History of Persia to 334 BCE: Briant 2002; Kuhrt 2007; Llewellyn-Jones 2013.
9. The expedition is described, in first-person detail and with great verve, by Xenophon, Anabasis. See further Lee 2007.
10. Imperial Sparta: Cartledge 1987; Hamilton 1991; Debord 1999: 233–253.
11. Evagoras was later to prove another untrustworthy agent, but for the time being was doing the king’s bidding.
12. Corinthian War: Hamilton 1979; Debord 199: 253–258.
13. Athenian operations in the north Aegean: Badian 1995; Heskell 1997. Taxes: Xenophon Hellenica 4.8.27 and Figueira 2005. The 10% tax is mentioned again in 355 by Demosthenes 20.60.
14. King’s Peace: Ryder 1965.
15. Second Athenian naval league: Cargill 1981. Income from the league ca. 195 talents per annum in the 370s, down to about 66 talents by 346: Brun 1983: 138–141. Costs of warfare in this period: Cook 1990. Harding 1995: 112–119 argues that Athenian foreign policy in the fourth century was consistently defensive, rather than imperialistic.
16. Aristotle, Politics 2.1270a. According to Aristotle, the situation was worsened by inheritance laws that allowed women to gain control over large tracts of real estate, claiming that by his time some two-fifths of Spartan territory was owned by women.
17. Sparta’s succeses and failure in the fourth century: Cartledge 1987. Rise of Thebes and foundation of Messene: Buckler 1980; Buckler and Beck 2008.
18. Quick recovery: French 1991. The Thirty: Krentz 1982, Wolpert 2002; Németh 2006. Amnesty: Carawan 2013; Ober 2005b: ch. 5.
19. Constitutional reforms at Athens: Harrison 1955; Ostwald 1986; Hansen 1999: ch. 7; Carugati forthcoming. Public archive: West 1989; Sickinger 1999.
20. Athenian critics of democratic rhetoric: Ober 1998: esp. chs. 2, 4.
21. Fleck and Hanssen 2012 show how Athenian courtroom procedure provided clear information about collective preferences and thereby allowed for closer alignment of incentives.
22. The previous paragraphs, on democratic discourse as a serious game played by masses and elites, and its social and political effects, draw on Ober 1989. See further Lanni 2009 on the role played by jurors in Athenian law courts in enforcing social norms.
23. Theban league as a koinon unusually dominated by a central state: Mackil 2013; the error of describing fourth century Thebes or the Boeotian League as democratic: Rhodes 2010: 291. History of the Theban attempt at hegemony: Buckler 1980; Buckler and Beck 2008.
24. Persian threat, fourth century Athenian cleruchies, and the “ghost of empire”: Rhodes 2010: 229; Griffith 1978; Cargill 1995; Badian 1995. Special relationship with Samos: Rhodes and Osborne 2003 no. 2.
25. Satraps’ Revolt: Weiskopf 1989 with review of Graf 1994. Origins and growth of the satrapy of Caria in early fourth century: Debord 1999: 357–358. Mausolus: Hornblower 1982. Mausolus and Hellenization: Ma 2014.
26. Theban belligerence and expansionism to 362: Buckler 1980; Philip at Thebes: Aymard 1954; Hammond 1997.
27. The complex international situation of 362–352: Buckler 2003.
28. Descent narrative: Pečírka 1976; descent narrative questioned: Eder 1995. The confusing name “Social War” derives from the Latin term for allies (socii), not from any role played by social class in the conflict.
29. Grain trade and state emergence: Moreno 2008. Imitation owls: van Alfen 2005. Selective Hellenization: Boardman 1994 and further discussion, this chapter and ch. 10.
30. This section draws on Mackil 2013. Focusing on the examples of Boeotia, Achaea, and Aetolia, and with reference to studies of federalism by contemporary institutional economists, Mackil’s book is the best available history of Greek federalism.
31. On the analytic distinction between limited-access “natural states” and open-access orders, and the conditions necessary for moving to and across the “doorstep” of open access, see North, Wallis, and Weingast 2009. This section draws on Carugati, Ober, and Weingast forthcoming, as well as on Ober 2008, 2010c.
32. Banks: Cohen 1992; Shipton 1997. Invisible wealth: Gabrielsen 1986. Lyttkens 1992 and Gabrielsen 2013 are helpful treatments of Athenian taxation and finance.
33. Athenian finances: Ober forthcoming. See further, Pritchard 2012, forthcoming; Lyttkens 2012; Rhodes 2013. Piraeus history: Carugati forthcoming.
34. Isoteleia: Whitehead 1977; enktesis: Pečírka 1966; naturalization: Osborne 1981. On the many variations in legal and social status in Athens, see Kamen 2013. Approvers: Stroud 1974; Ober 2008: 220–240.
35. Dikai emporikai: Cohen 1973, 1992; Lanni 2006: ch. 6 The doubts raised by Todd 1994 do not change the picture substantially.
36. Civil associations: Ismard 2010; Kierstead 2013. Religious association charters: Ober 2008: 252.
37. Philosophical schools as civil associations: Kierstead 2013. Formal bylaws and officials: Lynch 1972. Criticism of democracy by founders of these schools: Ober 1998.
38. Rutishauser 2007, 2012: ch. 6
39. Osborne 2009b: 341, “the Olbians observe practice in another Greek city, see its relevance to their own particular interests and concerns, and adapt it for their own use.” Adoption of Athenian taxation practice in Thespiai: Schachter and Marchand 2013.
40. Aeneas’ text is translated and helpfully annotated by Whitehead 1990.
41. Ephebeia and other changes in Athenian military organization: Ober 1985: ch. 5. Changing roles of politicians and generals: Hansen 1983. Hamel 1998: 194–195 shows that a fifth century BCE Athenian general “in charge of ships” is a fiction of modern scholarship.
42. Disputes over attribution of owls to mints: Ober 2008: 237–238. The reminting of owls in 354: Kroll 2011a and 2011b. The stone on which the law mandating the recall was inscribed is badly damaged and the law still awaits definitive publication. Grain tax law: Stroud 1998, and Ober 2008: 260–263.
43. Merismos, first attested in 386 (Rhodes and Osborne 2003: no. 19): Rhodes 2013; reforms of eisphora rules: Christ 2007.
44. Financial management of Eubulus and Lycurgus: Cawkwell 1963; Lewis 1997; Davies 2004; Burke 2010. Public projects of the 330s and 320s: this book, ch. 11.
45. Rhodes 2010: 299–301. Public slaves: Ismard 2013. Nicomachus: Todd 1996; Eukles: Clinton 2005: no. 159 line 60.
46. Ober forthcoming: 500–505. GDI is, for our purposes, a reasonable proxy for GDP. Other premodern fiscal regimes: Monson and Scheidel forthcoming.
47. Transfers as risk insurance, leading to growth: Ober 2008: 254–258. Transfers in the fifth century BCE: van Wees 2013b: 144–145. Reduced political inequality in the fourth century: Taylor 2007, 2008.
48. Davies 2004, and this book, ch. 11.
49. Syracuse after 413, constitutional change and war: CAH 6 ch. 5 (by D. M. Lewis), 13 (by H. D. Westlake).
50. Reign of Dionysius I: Sanders 1987; Caven 1990. Dionysius’ pay and prize scheme is also credited by Diodorus (14.42.1) with stimulating the development of the first quadrireme and quinquereme warships—the larger and heavier versions of the trireme that became the standard “ships of the line” in the Hellenistic period. Given that there is no reliable account of their use until the second half of the fourth century, this seems unlikely. Pliny (7.207) cites a lost work by Aristotle making the quadrireme a Carthaginian invention.
51. Dionysius II and “the legend of Dion”: Sanders 2008. Dion was Dionysius I’s brother-in-law and son-in-law: Dion’s sister married Dionysius I; Dion in turn married their daughter, his first cousin.
52. Archaeological evidence of economic crisis in Sicily: Talbert 1974: esp. 146. De Angelis’ book in progress on the social and economic history of archaic and classical Sicily is eagerly awaited by historians of Greek antiquity and is likely to nuance the stark picture offered by the literary sources of mid-century crisis and recovery.
53. Warfare and agriculture: Hanson 1983.
54. Mackil 2004. On mobility of Greeks, including laborers: McKechnie 1989; Purcell 1990; Garland 2014.
55. Timoleon’s
life was recorded by Plutarch, Diodorus, and the Roman biographer Cornelius Nepos. While each of these accounts is clearly intended to draw a black and white contrast between a virtuous reformer and wicked tyrants, and while we cannot say whether things would have gone otherwise had Timoleon been in full health in 337 BCE, there is good reason to associate Timoleon’s victories and his reforms with the revival of Greek Sicily: Talbert 1974; Davies 1993: 246–249.
56. Cf. sharp, although temporary (in most areas; Britain and Holland are the exceptions) rise in wages in Europe after the Black Death: Allen 2001.
57. Talbert 1974: ch. 8; cf. Smarczyk 2003. Bronze coinage: data from Inventory Index 26; another 14 Sicilian poleis had first issued bronze coins in the fifth century. By comparison, 31% (64/206) of the western Anatolian poleis and 28% (110/388) of mainland and Aegean Greek poleis began minting bronze coins in the fourth century.
58. Starr 1975: 85–87. Earlier assumption of economic decline: CAH 2, ch. 38 (by J. M. Cook: 1961). Starr was my graduate advisor at the University of Michigan from 1975 to 1980.
59. Prosperity, pro-Persian oligarchies, institutional innovations and civic population growth: Debord 1999: 397–399, 495–498. Kyme: Hamon 2008. Evidence for democracy in Anatolian Greek cities in the fourth century: Robinson 2011: ch. 3. Hellenization and its effect on Greek as well as non-Greek peoples; Ma 2014.
60. Adoption of Chian weight standard: Meadows 2011.
61. Exceptions to the fortified large-polis rule: Zeleia (i764: size 4), Prokonessos (i759: size 3), and Adramyttion (i800: size 4).
62. Diplomatic language: Ma 1999, and this book, ch. 11.
CHAPTER 10 Political Fall
1. Contrast the meteor strike that many scientists believe ended the Cretaceous period with a mass extinction of nonavian dinosaurs, among other species: Alvarez 1997.
2. Davies 1993.
3. Biographies of Philip: Cawkwell 1978; Hammond 1994; Worthington 2008. detailed histories of the era: Ellis 1976; Hammond and Griffith 1979; Buckler 1989.
4. The role of “mobile experts” in the rise of Macedon is thoroughly documented and analyzed in Pyzyk forthcoming.
5. On Macedonian resources and history before the reign of Philip II, see Hammond and Walbank 1972; Borza 1990; Hatzopoulos 1996; Roisman and Worthington 2010: chs. 4, 7, 8. Timber: Meiggs 1982; Bissa 2009: chs. 4, 5.
6. The fraught question of “how Greek were the Macedonians” in language, ethnicity, social structures, and culture is reviewed, with somewhat different conclusions, by Borza 1990 and Haztopoulos 2011. Cf. Roisman and Worthington 2010: chs. 5, 6. Elite Macedonian society: Roisman and Worthington 2010: ch. 19.
7. Pella, Aegeai, and royal burials: Lane Fox 2011a: introduction and chs. 15, 18. On the “constitutionality” of the Macedonian kingship, I follow Borza 1990 against Hammond and Walbank 1972 and earlier scholars who tended to see Philip as a constitutional monarch. Full discussion in Hatzopoulos 1996; cf. Roisman and Worthington 2010: ch. 18.
8. On Macedonian kings and the Greeks in the fifth and early fourth century, see Lane Fox 2011a: chs. 4, 10, 13.
9. On the career of Philip, his impact on the development of Macedonia, and relations with the Greek world, see works cited in n. 2; Roisman and Worthington 2010: ch. 9; Lane Fox 2011b.
10. Land grants to soldier families and logic of continuous expansionism: Samuel 1988; Borza 1990: 239. Macedonian army: Roisman and Worthington 2010: ch. 22. Millett 2010 emphasizes the driving role of the army, imperial expansion, and plunder in the Macedonian economy under Philip.
11. Philip’s wives; Satyrus apud Athenaeus 3.557b–e. Borza 1990: 206–208.
12. The standard works on Philip’s coinage and mints is Le Rider 1977, with update in 1996. See also Borza 1990: 214; Worthington 2008: 197; Kremydi 2011; Millett 2010: 492–496.
13. Philip and Chalkidike: Lane Fox 2011a: chs. 7, 8. Excavations at Olynthos: Robinson and Mylonas 1929. Architecture, town planning, houeholds: Cahill 2002.
14. Athenian–Macedonian relations to 346, and the Peace of Philocrates: Montgomery 1983; Harris 1995; Hunt 2010.
15. Montgomery 1983 remains a good introduction to the main events, although Harding 1995 correctly points out that he underestimates the consistency and coherence of Athenian foreign policy. My lower bound for the empire’s population is established by the aggregate population of the poleis of regions 24 and 26–31 (Thessaly, Macedonia, Thrace) = ca. 1.25 million; (appendix I). I assume that many people in the empire lived outside poleis. Note that this estimate includes Thessaly (ca. 320,000) but excludes Epirus (ca. 230,000). The upward bound is set by extrapolating from early twentieth century census figures. In 1917, some 2 million people lived in the regions encompassed by Greater Macedonia (Lane Fox 2011b, citing Hammond and Griffith 1972: 16). In 1913 (before the incorporation of Macedonia), the population of the modern Greek state reached ca. 2.75 million, a number that matches the estimated population of the same region in the later fourth century (figure 4.1). I assume that, in contrast to central Greece, Macedonia and Thrace were somewhat less densely populated in the fourth century BCE than in the early twentieth century.
16. Philip’s Greek policy: Ellis 1976 argued for the “secure peace” interpretation; Worthington 2008, among others, against it. Demosthenes and his policies: Mossé 1994; Worthington 2012.
17. The estimated population of the entirety of regions 6, 10–12, 20, and 21 comes to just over 1 million (appendix I), but the alliance did not include all of the poleis of regions 6, 11, or 21.
18. The course of events leading up to Chaeronea: Montgomery 1983.
19. Krentz 1985 offers the basis for estimating (albeit roughly) the total combatants in major “Greek vs. Greek” infantry/cavalry battles of the fifth and early fourth centuries: Akragas (472 BCE), 40,000; Tanagra (457), 25,500; Delium (424), 14,000; Mantinea (418), 17,000; Nemea (394), 46,500; Coronea (394), 40,000; Leuctra (371), 17,000.
20. The battle of Chaeronea: Ma 2008 with full bibliography of earlier literature.
21. Alexander’s expeditionary force in 334 was of similar size. See Engels 1978 for discussion. Athens refortifies after Chaeronea: Habicht 1997: 10–12, noting (p. 11) that Philip was “wise enough not to seek further hostilities” with Athens.
22. League of Corinth: Ryder 1965; Habicht 1997: 12.
23. Allen 2003 points to the emptiness of the vengeance rhetoric.
24. Events of 337–334 BCE: Worthington 2008: 152–193. Habicht 1997: 14–15 notes that Athens came close to joining Thebes in revolt.
25. Estimated by aggregating the estimated populations of regions 4, 7, 8, 13–19, 22, 23, and 25. See appendix I.
26. Philippopolis (i655) lay 138 km (straight line) north of the site of Abdera (i640: on the south Thracian coast); Kabyle (i654) was 222 km north of Kardia (i655: northern Chersonese). Alexandropolis (i652)—reputedly founded in interior Thrace by Alexander in 34 BCE remains unlocated.
27. Philip’s advantages in warfare: Demosthenes 11.47–50. The literature on the degree to which Philip sought to portray himself as a godlike king is reviewed by Borza 1990: 248–51; Worthington 2008: 194–203.
28. Davies 2004. On the role of imported experts in the political economy of Macedonia, especially in the age of Philip, see the informative discussion by Millet 2010, esp. 479 with n. 24.
29. Career of Eumenes of Kardia: Anson 2004.
30. On possible Aristotelian, and other fourth century Greek, influences on Alexander’s demonstrated talent as a decision-maker, see Ma 2013b. Aristotle’s tracts directed to Alexander: Ober 1998: 347–3 50.
31. Pyzyk forthcoming provides a full assessment of Greek experts in Philip’s employ. Among earlier studies, see Berve 1926.
32. Isocrates’ and Speusippos’ letters: Markle 1976.
33. Lane Fox 2011b: 367–368 argues that, contrary to Theopompus (FGrH no. 115 F 224), Philip must be regarded as a very good manager of finances.
34. Debt and borrowing: Millett 2010: 495–496, with references c
ited. See further, Hammond and Griffith 1979 442–443, on budgeting. The problem of sovereign debt in fourth century Greek state finance: Ober forthcoming.
35. Career of Callistratus: Sealey 1956.
36. Athenian state regulation of mining, evolution of mining technology, and state minting policy: Bissa 2008; 2009: ch. 2.
37. Best 1969.
38. Markle 1977, 1978 discusses the evidence for the form and the early use of the sarissa, arguing that Philip armed cavalry with the sarissa, and that infantry sarissas were a later development. But the scholarly communis opinion is that Diodorus 16.3.2 ([Philip] “devised the compact order and equipment of the phalanx in imitation of the close-order fighting of the heroes at Troy, and he was the first to establish the Macedonian phalanx”) is evidence for Philip’s sarissa-armed infantry. See Rahe 1981 for discussion of the infantry sarissa and its relationship to fourth century Greek military developments.
39. Athenian shipbuilders sent to Macedonia to build triremes on the spot: Meiggs and Lewis 1988: no. 91. Philip’s navy: Hauben 1975, arguing that the ships were built in Macedonian shipyards. We have the names of two of Philip’s admirals: Alkimos and Demetrios, but their origins and backgrounds are unknown.
40. Philip’s artillery, siege towers, Greek experts: Marsden 1977; CAH 6, ch. 12e (by Y. Garlan).
41. Nagle 1996 suggests, reasonably, that the speech is based on Macedonian court propaganda. But the sentiments it expresses were a matter of rhetorically colored exaggeration, not simple invention.
CHAPTER 11 Creative Destruction and Immortality
1. Goldstone 2002.
2. Hellenistic literature, Second Sophistic, and preservation of classical culture: Goldhill 2001; Whitmarsh 2005; Clauss and Cuypers 2010.
3. Hellenistic polis independence: Ma 1999, 2014, both building on Gauthier 1985, 1993; Fröhlich 2010.
4. Democracy in Hellenistic poleis: Dmitriev 2005; Grieb 2008; Carlsson 2010; Mann and Scholz 2012 with Ma 2013c; Teegarden 2014a. Literature review with critical discussion: Hamon 2010.