by Eco, Umberto
30. “Neque solum nomen vox significativa est, sed sunt quaedam voces quae significant quidem, sed nomina non sunt, ut ea quae a nobis in aliquibus affectibus proferuntur, ut cum quis gemitum edit, vel cum dolore concitus emittit clamorem. Illud enim doloris animi, illud corporis signum est, et cum sint voces et significent quamdam vel animi vbel corporis passionem, nullus tamen gemitum clamoremque dixerit nomen. Mutorumque quoque animalium sunt quaedam voces quae significant: ut canum latratus iras significant canum, alia vox autem mollior quodam blandimenta XXXX decsignat, quare adjecta differentia separandum erat nomen ab his omnibus quae voces quidem essent et significarent sed nominis vocabulum non tenerentur” (In De Int. Comm. Maj., PL 64, col. 420 C–D).
31. See In l. De Int. Comm. Maj., PL 64, col. 423 A–B: “Nec vero dicitur quod nulla vox naturaliter aliquod designet, sed quod nomina non naturaliter, sed positione significent. Alioqui habent hoc ferarum, mutorumque animalium soni, quorum vox quidem significat aliquid, ut hinnitus equi consueti equi inquisitionem, latratus canum latrantium iracundiam monstrat, et alia huiusmodi. Sed cum voces mutorum animalium propria natura significant, nullis tamen elementorum formulis conscribunt. Nomen vero quamquam subjacet elementis.”
32. Cf. Saint Thomas Aquinas and Tommaso de Vio Cajetan, Aristotle On Interpretation: Commentary by St. Thomas and Cajetan (Peri hermeneias), trans. from the Latin with an introd. by Jean T. Oesterle, Milwaukee, Wis.: Marquette University Press, 1962.
33. See pp. 27–28, n. 15, in Latratus canis (“On Animal Language”), the references to Garlandus Compotista, Dialectica III (ed. De Rijk. Assen: Van Gorcum, 1959, pp. 64, 24–28); in L. M. De Rijk, Logica Modernorum (Assen: Van Gorcum, 1967, II, pt 2, p. 78, 7–16), the Abbreviatio Montana, p. 149, 15–24; the Ars Emmerana, p. 179, 12–19, the Ars Burana, p. 358, 1–7, the Introductiones Parisienses, p. 380, 11–18, the Logica ‘Ut dicit’, p. 418, 5–9, the Logica ‘Cum sit nostra’, p. 463, 7–17, the Dialectica Monanensis. For the thirteenth century, Peter of Spain, Tractatus, called afterwards ‘Summulae Logicales’ (ed. De Rijk. Assen: Van Gorcum, 1972, pp. 1, 23, 2, 9) and Lambert of Auxerre, Logica (ed F. Alessio. Florence, La Nuova Italia, 1971, p. 7).
34. All prior manuals of logic began their treatment with a definition of sonus as a genus of vox. In his commentary on De interpretatione (IV, 38), Thomas will likewise affirm that “vox est sonus ab ore animali prolatus, cum imaginatione quadam.”
35. But see Lo Piparo (2003, IV, 9).
36. Institutiones Grammaticae, I, cap, de ‘voce” (ed. M. Herz, in Grammatici Latini II, Leipsig, 1855, reprint Hildesheim 1961, pp. 5–6).
37. See Latratus canis (“On Animal Language”), p. 29, n. 20. The influence of Priscian’s classification is discernible from the beginning of the eleventhth century onward, when, thanks especially to the influence of the Irish grammarians operating on the continent, in particular in the context of the Carolingian cultural renaissance, his authority begins to supplant that of Donatus in the principal Episcopal schools (see Holz 1981). Analogous positions are to be found in Alcuin’s Grammatica, in the Excerptio de arte grammatica Prisciani of Rabanus Maurus, in Sedulius Scottus’s In Donati artem maiorem, etc. Later the same classification will be borrowed, for example, by Petrus Helias in his Summa super Priscianum maiorem, by Vincent of Beauvais in his Speculum Doctrinale, and eventually by Simon of Dacia in his Domus Gramatice.
38. “Dupliciter enim ea quae simpliciter voce divisa, videlicet in significativam et non significativam, litteratam et illitteratam, quarum hanc quidem articulatam, hanc autem inarticulatum vocant” (“Let vocal sound simpliciter be divided twice into two, i.e., into significant and meaningless, and into lettered and unlettered, the former of which is called ‘articulate’ and the latter ‘inarticulate’ ”). Ammonius, then, appears to put articulation only among the differences characterizing the voces illitteratae. “Accidet enim hanc quidam esse vocem significativam et litteratam ut homo, hanc autem significativam et illitteratam ut canis latratus, hanc autem non significativam et litteratam ut blituri, hanc autem non significativam et illitteratam ut sibilus quae fit frustra et non gratia significandi aliquid aut vocis alicuius irrationalium animalium repraesentatio, quae fit non gratia repraesentationis (haec enim iam significativa), sed quae fit inordinate et sine intentione finis” (“For there will be vocal sound which is significant and lettered, like ‘human being,’ vocal sound which is significant and unlettered, like the bark of a dog, vocal sound which is meaningless and lettered, like ‘blituri,’ and vocal sound which is meaningless and unlettered, like whistling which is done for no reason and not to signify anything or the imitation [by a man] of some vocal sound made by irrational animals when it happens not in order to mimic (for that would already be significant), but in a random and purposeless manner”). Ammonius, On Aristotle’s On Interpretation 1–8, Translated by David Blank, Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1996, p. 40. (Commentaire sur le Peri Herm., op. cit., pp. 59, 3–60). Thomas was doubtless familiar with Ammonius in William of Moerbeke’s translation. In his commentary on the De Interpretatione (IV, 39) he echoes one of its typical lines of argument: “Sed cum vox sit quedam res naturalis, nomen autem non est aliquid naturale sed ab hominibus institutum, videtur quod non debuit genus nominis ponere vocem, quae est ex natura, sed magis signum, quod est ex institutione, ut diceretur: nomen est signum vocale; sicut enim convenientius definiretur scutella, si quis diceret quod est vas ligneum, quam si quis diceret qupod est lignum formatum in vas.” In his commentary the example Ammonius gave was that of the throne (pp. 76). What is more worthy of note is that, shortly afterward (IV, 40), Thomas appears not to accept Ammonius’s proposal to define nomen by taking signum as its genus. This is why in Figure 4 we preferred to insert sonus as our genus. See in this connection Latratus canis (“On Animal Language”).
39. See Max Pohlenz, Die Stoa. Die Geschichte einer geistigen Bewegung, Göttingen, Vandenhoeck und Ruprecht, 1948–1955 and Pinborg (1962: 155–156).
40. See Latratus canis (“On Animal Language”), p. 31, n. 25. This identification is particularly explicit in John of Dacia’s Summa grammatica, and it appears in the second half of the fourteenth century in a manual of logic like the Summulae Logicales of Richard of Lavenham (see Spade 1980: 380–381), where the pseudo-language of parrots is discussed, citing Isadore and an epigram of Martial’s.
41. The position of the grammarians on the relationship between meaning and articulation would appear less original if we were to accept the reading of De Interpretatione proposed by Lo Piparo (2003) mentioned in Note 27 above. If kata syntheken is not to be interpreted as ad placitum but “by virtue of articulation, by syntactic composition of sounds otherwise deprived of meaning,” we might be entitled to suspect that the grammatical tradition had somehow been influenced by an original reading of Aristotle. And in that case the grammarians would not have considered it implicit that one articulates in order to express something, but rather that a linguistic articulation was necessary if one was to express oneself conceptually. If this was the case it would be more comprehensible why for them articulation was so closely tied to the meaning to be expressed.
42. For a more detailed discussion see Latratus canis (“On Animal Language”), p. 13, n. 16, and p. 17, nn. 29 and 36, where the somewhat anomalous solution of a contemporary of Thomas, the Pseudo-Kilwardby, is also considered. Influenced by Priscian, he is inclined to exclude animal voices from the field of conventional signification, and yet, unlike the other grammarians and Modistae who will come later, he attempts a classification of all signa. In his system, then, animal sounds are indeed excluded from the voces significativae, only to reappear, albeit with some ambiguity, among the signa naturalia. “Ad hoc dicendum quod diversae sunt scientiae de signis. Signorum enim quaedam significant aliquid ex institutione et quaedam significant naturaliter ut effectus generaliter sive sit convertibilis sive non convertibilis cum sua causa est signum suae causae. Quod patet tam in genere naturae quam in genere moris. In genere naturae fumus est signum i
gnis non convertibile et defectus luminis sive eclipsis a corpore luminoso est signum interpositionis tenebrosis corporis. Similiter in genere moris delectatio, quae est in operationibus, est signum habitus voluntarii, sicut dicit Philosophus in secundo Ethicorum ubi dicit quod opportet signa facere habituum delectationem vel tristitiam in operationibus. Et sic patet quod effectus generaliter est signum suae causae. Unde Philosophus primo Posteriorum demonstrationes factas per effectum vocat syllogismos per signa in illa parte: ‘Quoniam autem ex necessitate sunt circa unumquodque.’ Secundum quorundam expositionem signorum vero quae significant ex institutione quaedam sunt instituta ad significandum tantum, quaedam sunt instituta ad significandum et sanctificandum. Signa ultimo modo sunt signa legis divinae de quibus nihil ad praesans. Quae autem sunt instituta ad significandum tantum quaedam sunt voces, de quibus dicit Philosophus quod sunt notae passionum.… Et de talibus signis est scientia rationalis quia rationis est componere partes vocis et ordinare et ad significandum instituere, non naturae vel moris, ut postea patebit. Quaedam autem sunt res ut signa metaphysica (?) sicut sunt gestus et nutus corporei, circuli et imaginationes de quibus nihil ad praesens.” (See “Roberti Kilwardby quod fertur Commenti super Priscianum maiorem Extracta,” ed. K. M. Fredborg et al., Cahiers de l’Inst. du Moyen-Age grec et latin 15, 1975, pp. 3–4). [Translator’s note: In n. 29 to the collaborative essay alluded to at beginning of these notes, “On Animal Language in the Medieval Classification of Signs,” Eco suggests, after citing the same Latin passage by Kilwardby, that, instead of “imaginationes” in the last sentence, the text ought to read “imagines.”]
43. See Latratus canis (“On Animal Language”), n. 30. This theme is developed in the De anima of Avicenna, where the opposition between human language and the voces of the animals is placed in relation with the diversity of ends toward which communication is ordered: among humans these are infinite since they are determined by our social existence, while among animals they are few and dictated by natural instinct (Liber de Anima seu Sextus de Naturalibus V, ed. S. van Riet, Louvain, Leiden, 1968, p. 72, 42–48).
44. “Interiectiones omnes sunt mediae inter istas voces nunc dictas scilicet: significativae naturaliter et inter voces plene significantes ad placitum … Interiectiones enim imperfecte significant ad placitum et parum significant per modum conceptus propter quod vicinantur vocibus illis quae solum per modum affectus subiect isignificant cuiusmodi sunt gemitus et cetera quae facts sunt. Gemitus enim et suspiria et huiusmodi naturaliter et per modum solius affectus excitantis animam intellectivam significant, quae per interiectiones gemendi et dolendi et suspirandi et admirandi et huiusmodi significantur per modum conceptus, licet imperfecti” (De signis, I, 9 in Karin M. Fredborg, Lauge Nielsen and Jan Pinborg, eds., “An Unedited Part of Roger Bacon’s Opus Maius: “De Signis,” Traditio 34 [1978], p. 75–136). In general on the problems raised by the classification of interjections in the medieval grammatical tradition, see Pinborg (1961). And see also Latratus canis (“On Animal Language”).
45. “Si vero obiciatur in contrarium quod Aristoteles in librum Perihermeneias dicit voces significare passiones in anima, ut Boethius exponat de speciebus et in libro illo loquitur de partibus enuntiationis vel enuntiatione, quae significant ad placitum et tunc partes orationis sive voces impositae rebus significabunt ut videtur species ad placitum, dicendum est quod Aristotele a principio capituli de nomine intendit loqui de vocibus, ut sunt signa ad placitum, sed ante illud capitulum loquitur in universali de signis sive ad placitum sive naturaliter, quamvis ascendat in particulari ad illa signa, quae intendit, scilicet ad nomen et verbum prout significant res ad placitum. Et quod loquitur in universali de signis, manifestum est per hoc, quod dicit quod intellectus sunt signa rerum et voces signa intellectuum ety scriptura est signum vocis, certe intellectus non est signum rei ad placitum, sed naturale, ut dicit Boethius in Commento, quoniam eundem intellectum habet Graecus de re, quam habet Latinus, et tamen diversas voces proferunt ad rem intellectam designandam. Voces autem et scriptura possunt ad placitum significare aliqua, et alia ut signa naturalia. Unde vox imposita rei extra animam, si comparetur ad ipsam rem, est vox significativa ad placitum, quia ei imposita est. Si vero ad speciem propriam ipsius vocis, tunc est signum naturale in triplici modo signi naturalis, ut habitum est prius. Si vero ad speciem rei nec antequam cognoscetur res per eam, quia opportet quod actu intelligatur res per speciem et habitum nominata et vocata et repraesentata per vocem, antequam vox sit signum speciei ipsius rei” (De signis V, 166, op. cit., p. 134.).
46. Augustine was far more subtle in his De doctrina Christiana II, xxv, 38–39, where he recognized the largely conventional nature of images and mimic representations.
47. “Vocem alia significativa, alia non, significativa. Non significativa est per quam nichil auditui representatur, ut ‘bubo’ etc.; vox significativa est per quam omne animal interpretatur aliquid omni vel alicui sue speciei—omne vero animal potest hoc facere, quia natura non dedit ei vocem ociosam. Et hoc possumus videre manifeste, quai gallina aliter garrit cum pullis suis quando invitat eos ad escam et quando docet eos cavere a milvo. Bruta autem animalia interpretantur omni individuo sue speciei, ut asinus omni asino, leo omni leoni, sed homo non interpretatur omni homini, set SED alicui, quia Gallicus Gallico, Graecus Graeco, Latinus Latino et hec solum. Nullum eciam animal interpretatur alicui individuo alterius speciei nisi inproprie adminus per suam vocem propriam nichil interpretatur nisi eis qui sunt de sua specie, tamen si ex industria et assuetudine posit aliquod animal uti voce alteriius, ut pica voce hominis, potest aliquo modo inproprie et non naturaliter significare alii quam sue speciei ut homini; et forte quamvis homo posit aliquid comprehendere per vocem pice, non tamen est illa vox proprie significativa, cum non fit a pica sub intentione significandi, et quamvis homo possit aliquid apprehendere per talem vocem , pica tamen pice nihil significat per illam. Similiter cantus galli nichil proprie nobis significat tamen vox significativa, set SED gallum cantare significat nobis horas, sicut rubor in mane significant nobis pluviam. Vocum significativarum alia significativa ad placitum, alia naturaliter. Vox significativa naturaliter est que ordinatur ad significandum, ut gemitus infirmorum et omnis vox ferarum vel sonus. Vox significativa ad placitum est que ex institucione humana aliquid significant” (Opera hactenus inedita Rogeri Baconi, fasc. XV, ed. R. Steele. Oxonii, Clarendon Press, 1940, p. 233, 20 234, 13).
48. “Est tamen sciendum quod ad cuiuslibet vocis prolationem prencipalitur duo instrumenta naturalia sunt necessaria, scilicet pulmo et vocalis arteria. Ex isto patet quod latratus canum etiam est sonus vox et quando arguitur ‘tamen non fit cum intentione aliquid significandi’ respondetur negando assumptum. Neque oportet quod omnes intelligent illum latratum, sed sufficit quod illi intelligant qui sciunt proprietatem et habitudinem canum. Nam latratus canum uni significat gaudium, alteri autem iram.” (Commentum emendatum et correctum in primum et quartum tractatus Petri Hyspani Et super tractatibus Marsilij de Suppositionibus, ampliationibus, appellationibus et consequentiis (Hangenau, 1495, s. p.; reprint Frankfurt, Minerva, 1967 with title Commentum in primum et quartum tractatum Petri Hispani.) See Latratus canis (“On Animal Language”).
49. We might add to the list a number of marginal phenomena (mentioned in Latratus canis, “On Animal Language”). Take, for example, Thomas’s observations on the miraculous or magical instances of talking animals reported by Scripture (Quaestiones disputatae de potentia Dei, VI, 5): “Ad tertium dicendum, quod locutio canum, et alia huiusmodi quae Simon Magus faciebat, potuerunt fieri per illusionem, et non per effectus veritatem. Si tamen per effectus veritatem hoc fierent, nullum sequitur inconveniens, quia non dabat ani daemon virtutem loquendi, sicut datur mutis per miraculum, sed ipsemet per aliquem motum localem sonum formabat, litteratae et articulatae vocis similitudinem et modum habentem; per hunc autem modum etiam asina Balaam intelligitur fuisse locuta (Numbers XXII, 28), Angelo tamen bono operante, (“Reply to the Third Objection. Speaking dogs and like works of Simon the magician were quite possibly
done by trickery and not in very truth. If, however, they were genuine, it matters not: since the demon did not give a dog the power of speech miraculously as when it is given to the dumb; but by some kind of local movement he made sounds to be heard like words composed of letters and syllables. It is thus that we may understand Balaam’s ass to have spoken [Numbers, XXII, 28], although in this case it was by the action of a good angel”). On the power of God (Quæstiones disputatæ de potentia Dei) by Saint Thomas Aquinas. Literally translated by the English Dominican fathers. Three books in one. Westminster, Md.: Newman Press, 1952, p. 186. Dante too deals with talking animals in the Convivio (III, vii, 8–10), where he cites the magpie and the parrot, and in the De vulgari eloquentia (I, ii, 6–8), where he cites the examples de serpente loquente ad priumum mulierem, de asina Balaam, de piscis loquentibus.
50. It is a slow process. If, as late as 1603, Fabrici d’Acquapendente can compose a treatise De brutorum loqui in which he takes up once again the classical arguments concerning communication among animals and their passions, in 1650, Athanasius Kircher, in his Musurgia Universalis (I, 14–15), is interested in the sounds uttered by the various animals and makes an accurate study of the syntax, if not the semantics, of the monkeys of the Americas, of cicadas, grasshoppers, frogs, and various types of birds, with accurate pentagrammatical transcriptions that take into account different structures, including the pigolismus, the glazismus, and the teretismus, distinguishing the sounds made by the mother hen when laying and those with which she calls her chicks—and revealing himself to have been an expert pioneer bird watcher. His was no longer a philosophical reflection on the possibility of animal language, such as occurred in the Middle Ages: Kircher devoted a vast portion of his treatise to the examination of the various phonatory organs of the animals in order to explain the possibility or impossibility of their “languages.”