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Augmenting India’s Soft Power: Modi and Beyond
The landmark electoral victory of the Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP), in 2014, opened a new era for India’s soft power. Contrary to some concerns that the new government under Prime Minister Narendra Modi will revert to a hard power approach, he has, rather, become a main promoter of India’s power of attraction. During the first 12 months in office, he has shown strong leadership, more active diplomacy, and greater use of culture and digital media in foreign policy. Soft power has become, for the first time, an oft-repeated term in the Indian media, and it has drawn more attention from the experts.
Although Modi already has contributed greatly to India’s image, there are still many challenges ahead. As shown in Chapter V, India’s relatively low rankings in soft power terms points at a potential yet unleashed. According to Rohan Mukherjee, India’s inability to capitalise on its soft power resources is the result of three factors: the overestimation of these resources by analysts; lack of sufficient hard power to under gird India’s soft power ambitions; and unresolved elements of India’s identity that tend to undermine its efforts at soft power projection through public diplomacy (Mukherjee, 2013: 1). For John Lee, the main factors contributing to India’s perception problem include: lack of social progress, lack of control over the media, unproven record of structural reform, belated entry into the global economy and poor use of cultural diplomacy in Indian statecraft (Lee, 2010c). For some authors, it is rather an outcome of abandonment of great soft power ambitions of its first generation of leaders, especially Gandhi’s and Nehru’s idealism (Hymans, 2009; Abraham, 2007). Still others claim that India’s reluctance to use its democracy credentials in foreign policy substantially weakens its soft power (Wagner, 2010; Tharoor, 2012). In the words of Shashi Tharoor (2012: 292), “India’s failure to leverage its soft power lies in its inability to exploit its own democratic tradition of freedom.” Kanti Bajpai (2014: 12) gives a longer list of the limitations of soft power resources by adding India’s increased domestic weakness: “lack of leadership, rudderless political parties, incoherent coalition governments, incapacitating federalism, rampant corruption, ramshackle bureaucracy, unrestrained judicial activism, irresponsible media coverage, undernourished civil society, increasing left and right wing radicalism, unchecked identity politics and human development levels that are often worse than that of the smaller South Asia countries and Sub-Saharan Africa.”
This chapter offers comprehensive explanation of the weakness of India’s soft power and characterise major liabilities. It focuses on several major challenges for India’s attractiveness: the deficiencies of hard power, flaws of democracy and inefficient bureaucracy, underdeveloped software of diplomacy, and the need for a coherent foreign strategy. It offers some suggestions as to how can India’s government address these shortcomings and make a better use of soft power strengths.
Modi as Soft Power Asset?
India’s relatively respectable position on the international arena in the first years after gaining independence is commonly attributed to the personal skills, vision and charisma of its first leader – Jawaharlal Nehru. It is argued that, in the following decades, the leaders of the next generation were far less effective and respectable abroad. Certainly, the presence or lack of inspiring personalities impacts the country’s position: those who can inspire foreign audiences while dealing successfully in direct contacts with other world leaders naturally promote the standing of their country. The previous Indian Prime Minister, Manmohan Singh, who served from 2004 to 2014, was initially highly regarded as a prominent economist and author of Indian economic reform in the 1990s. Along with his professionalism, Mr. Singh’s practice of the Sikh religion strengthened the image of India as a diverse, secular and tolerant country, where members of all religious communities have equal access to the highest state office. However, his standing decreased during the second term within the governing Congress Party, and so declined his reputation in the international media; his negotiating position on international forums quickly followed. Singh’s low profile and reported reluctance to travel internationally further impaired India’s global interests. The rising weakness of the prime minister, as exposed in Sanjaya Baru’s book, The Accidental Prime Minister, underlined the impression of the leadership deficit in recent years.
Hence, the successful election campaign, solid democratic mandate and personal charisma of new Prime Minster Narendra Modi revived confidence in the political system. Despite some dissenting criticism from sections of the domestic and international media, brought about by Modi’s close association with the right-wing Hindu nationalist movements and accusations of his murky role in the 2002 anti-Muslim riots in Gujarat, Modi nevertheless won respect and support from many sides. In external affairs, he continues the course charted by his predecessors, but a number of initiatives and new style of diplomacy gave the impression of a more self-assured and assertive India. Narendra Modi placed economy at the centre of foreign policy and keenly increased India´s soft power through better utilisation of digital, cultural, and traditional diplomacy.
Modi has emerged as one of the most active Indian prime ministers in the foreign relations domain. Within his first year in office, he undertook 19 state visits abroad, for both multilateral and bilateral meetings, and received a number of foreign leaders. He attended the BRICS Summit in Brazil, in July 2014; UNGA in the US, in September 2014; the East Asia Summit in Myanmar; the G20 Summit in Australia; and the SAARC Summit in Nepal, in November 2014. He also made trips to Japan, Germany, France and China. Delhi hosted, amongst others, leaders from China, Russia and the United States. From his inauguration ceremony, in May 2014, to which all SAARC leaders were invited, and first foreign trips to Bhutan and Nepal, Modi prioritised a neighbourhood policy. In the larger expansion to Asia, he transformed the “Look East” policy into an “Act East” policy, promising more vibrant cooperation with South-East Asian nations. Even though he hardened India’s stance towards Pakistan, he generally pursued a pragmatic foreign policy focused on rebuilding the country’s credibility as a responsible power, stable democracy and business-friendly place.
India managed to strengthen relations with all major powers, despite the increasingly divided international community. Modi upheld a strong partnership with Russia and did not join the West in imposing sanctions, and yet managed to rebuild strained relations with the US: American President Barack Obama was even a special guest for the 2015 Republic Day. But Modi’s interpersonal relations went deeper than just the surface: he secured the promise of multibillion-dollar investments in Indian infrastructure from Japan, China and the US, and he encouraged transfer of technology and supply of nuclear fuel from others.
A new, remarkable element in foreign policy was the extensive use of social media as a key public diplomacy tool. Still, as chief minister of Gujarat, Modi had already been very active on Twitter, and one of the first decisions he made after taking office was to recommend his ministers to open Twitter accounts. The list of his followers quickly expanded to a record high. By mid-2015, with more than 12 million Twitter followers and 28 million Facebook page likes, Modi was the second-most followed political leader on social media, after US President Barack Obama (58 million Twitter followers and 43 million Facebook page likes). He has regularly used Twitter to connect with the public but also to send condolences and political messages to other countries. Moreover, in November 2014, he joined Instagram, and within hours of posting his first picture, the account had nearly 38,000 followers, and after the first five months, the number rose to more than 443,000 followers (Mallapur, 2015). Ahead of his visit to China – in May 2015 – Modi joined the Chinese social media platform Weibo to connect with Chinese citizens.
Modi presents an open and dynamic style of diplomacy to reach the maximum number of people and communicate directly with the public. For instance, during his visit to New York, in September 2014, he found time, not only for official meetings with VVI
Ps, but also to interact with ordinary Americans at a concert in New York’s Central Park, to talk with the Indian diaspora during a rally in Madison Square Garden, to have breakfast with the CEOs of multinational corporations, and to give a speech at the Council on Foreign Relations. He even made time to pen an op-ed in The Washington Post promoting his “Make in India” project. His omnipotent nature is not limited to the United States: Modi also became the first Indian prime minister to address the Australian Parliament while visiting the country in November 2014.
Modi has walked the extra mile in using India’s cultural soft power in foreign policy. He has missed no opportunity to promote Indian traditions and heritage, boosting the pride of Indian’s in their country. In contrast to previous Indian prime ministers, Modi chose Hindi as the official language for public speeches and official contacts, stressing some kind of Indian linguistic sovereignty. Most of the new initiatives and campaigns were given Hindi names or acronyms as another sign of growing cultural self-assurance. To underline the importance of the past achievements in natural medicine made by Indian civilization, the new government has, for the first time, called into being a separate Ministry of Ayurveda, Yoga and Naturopathy, Unani, Siddha and Homoeopathy, cleverly abbreviated as AYUSH, which, in Sanskrit, means “long-life”.
Naturally, Delhi has not been hesitant in projecting its rich cultural inheritance from the past or celebrate Indian values, languages and traditions, but it has also not shied away from promoting its modern culture. Modi supported traditional promotion through the ICCR Indian culture centres, additionally offering more innovative ways to promote Indian heritage. Buddha, Bollywood, Ayurveda, Yoga, curry or cricket became standard tools of public diplomacy. As India’s prime minister, Modi has been picking out certain artefacts based on the needs and expectations of his interlocutors, to warm up the atmosphere for bilateral visits and infuse more trust into cooperation. Symbolic visits to Buddhist temples in Japan or Sri Lanka, or supporting the Indo-Chinese film co-production on the life of a Chinese monk – Xuan Zang (Hieun Tsang), who, in the 7th century, spent 17 years in India, or visiting a cricket stadium in Australia – such symbolic gestures have become a trademark of his diplomacy (Aneja, 2015).
Buddhism has been at the heart of India’s efforts in the region of South-East Asia to build stronger ties, promote tourism and reassure India’s spiritual leadership in the region. Reviving Indian heritage as a birthplace of Buddha, Modi aims at projecting India as a “soft power” using the Buddha connect in political and economic diplomacy, in what Indian media recognises as “Buddhist diplomacy” (Aurora, 2015). As democracy has been used as an ideational bond with Western developed states, Buddhism has been recognised as a common ground with many Asian nations. This fits well into the idea of promoting Asian values, as opposed to universality of the Western liberal model.
Even though Modi’s political roots are far from revering Mahatma Gandhi, he does not shy away from using this best known Indian icon for promotional gains. During his visit to China, in May 2015, Modi called Gandhi a “global citizen” and apostle of peace who can offer inspiration for finding a way out of contemporary crises. While launching the Centre for Gandhian and Indian Studies at Fudan University, he emphasised: “The world today is going through two major crises—global warming and terrorism. Solutions to both lie in Gandhi’s teachings. Gandhi is still relevant” (The Hindu, 2015b).
The most spectacular example of using cultural heritage in foreign relations came with the establishment of International Yoga Day by the UN. During his speech to the United Nations General Assembly, on 27 September 2014, Modi called members to support the promotion of yoga around the world calling it “an invaluable gift of our ancient tradition.” With special mobilisation of the Foreign Office, the proposal soon won the support of 175 sponsors at the UNGA for the resolution establishing 21 June as the International Day of Yoga. The resolution was adopted with haste through an acclamation on 11 December 2014 – less than 100 days since the proposition was first tabled. This way, India reclaimed its special links with yoga and made it an international platform for the promotion of Indian values. Together with International Non-Violence Day, established by the UN in 2007, and celebrated on 2 October – the day of Mahatma Gandhi’s birth – this was the second recent important recognition of India’s contribution to humanity.
Another crucial element in this new soft power strategy has become a bid for a stronger engagement with the Indian diaspora. Wherever Modi went, meetings with the Indian community were an important part of the program and spectacular public diplomacy undertakings. An event, organized in Madison Square Garden in the US, was a special occasion to celebrate the success of Indians abroad. At the 13th Pravasi Bharatiya Divas, held in Gandhinagar on 9 January 2015, Modi inaugurated an annual event and called the Indian diaspora the “great capital” for the country. He appealed to them to help transform the nation and especially to join the Clean Ganga campaign. He informed some 4,000 delegates from 57 countries about reforms to ease travelling and visa restrictions for overseas Indians and tried convince them that India is now the land of opportunities they were once seeking abroad (Gaikwad, 2015). He made promises to overseas Indians regarding lifelong visas and other incentives and encouraged them to take part in India’s development.
It is very important for India’s soft power reforms to be undertaken at home. By launching several national campaigns and projects addressing the pressing needs of the country, like sanitation, water pollution, treatment of women, etc., Modi sent a clear signal that India is going to address and overcome its major challenges and no longer deny or ignore its shortcomings. The most important element of the new approach was the inauguration of the “Make in India” programme to present India as attractive economic partner and next manufacturing hub for the world. As part of this flagship campaign, Modi promised major reforms in bureaucracy, elimination of unnecessary rules and regulations, more transparency and accountability of the government and a more favourable environment for entrepreneurs.
These moves have already changed the international perception of India and helped to build more confidence in the Indian economy, bringing more investments and trade. However, though he has already done much to better India’s image and attract new FDIs, the hardest part is yet to come: delivering on promises. As observed by the media, “substantive policy changes and not speeches alone would determine the success of Narendra Modi’s desire to bolster investment and encourage tourism and manufacturing” (Pande, 2014). Hence, although there is a lot of room for optimism after his first year in office, the coming years will show whether Modi’s imprint on India’s soft power will be a lasting one or end in another disappointment at home and abroad.
Re-branding India
Promoting a new narrative about India is not an easy task, as it must begin from a relatively low starting point. It is important to remember that India has been, for decades, depicted and understood as huge and interesting but at the same time as a highly impoverished and underdeveloped country, with rich spiritual traditions but also a highly unequal society. India needs to challenge age-old stereotypes and racial prejudices still prevalent in some countries. As explained by Nayar and Paul (2003: p.93), “India has been a victim of pervasive cultural biases and racism prevalent in the global system. India’s inability to obtain a leadership position would thus be regarded as the result of the widely held stereotypical and negative images of India, especially in the West.” It is not only a problem of India’s underdevelopment, it may also refer to the heritage of colonial rule and the general attitude of superiority of the West towards post-colonial states, which Edward Said exposed in his famous 1978 book, Orientalism. Although there is a growing interest in the “rising India” in the West, still many people continue to look at it through the prism of old clichés of a socialist, non-aligned or mystical state.
One important example of this patronising attitude is the West’s discriminatory policy on nuclear weapons, in
which “India has been portrayed as the part of the ‘other’ who cannot be trusted with nuclear weapons” (Nayar and Paul, 2003: p.97). John Hymans may be right when he observes (2009: pp.238–9), that Western perceptions of India have oscillated between two dominant negative images: that of “Feminine India” – soft and tempting – and “Savage India” – violent and irrational. These images are present today and form “India’s soft vulnerability.” Challenging this perception in the modern globalised era is even more complicated, as Western media coverage concentrates usually on bad news and individual accidents, reaffirming the negative image of a country. Hence, it would require extra effort to construct a new narrative about India. And this cannot happen without the Indian state’s active participation.
The “Incredible India” campaign, a more active cultural promotion or stronger engagement with the diaspora, are some examples proving that the administration can effectively shape the country’s image in the world. But still, much is needed to rework old assumptions and myths. The “Make in India” campaign, launched in 2014, focuses on economic potential of the country and is a much-needed successor to the previous “Incredible India” project. It supplements an exotic image of India as a land of adventure with a new one of India as a land of business opportunities and an emerging economy. Regardless of its effects on the investment flows to India, it can be instrumental in spreading a new message of India as a modern country and promising partner.
India’s Soft Power: A New Foreign Policy Strategy Page 19