Severe public outrage at the government’s perceived corruption led to massive anti-government protests led by Anne Hazare and Arvind Kejriwal, and eventually, the public fury manifested itself in the historic defeat of the ruling United Progressive Alliance coalition in the 2014 elections. Clearing public life from corruption and improving the quality of public services remain two of the major challenges for the new BJP government. Prime Minister Modi recognises this as one of his major priorities and has made bold commitments to reform bureaucracy and regulations to return to fast economic growth. He has promised to rid the burden of redundant laws, reminiscent of colonial times or of socialist and state-controlled economy, to free the potential of entrepreneurial Indians and attract more foreign capital. He has vowed to move India to the top 50 countries in the ranking of ease of doing business of the World Bank in two years’ time. The success or failure will significantly influence India’s power of attraction, as the country’s economic progress in the last two decades has been a major factor behind the rising global recognition of India’s role.
Another specific bureaucratic liability, important for the country’s image abroad, is the hardship of its visa policies. As correctly observed by Tharoor, “If soft power is about making your country attractive to others, the Indian bureaucracy seems determined to do anything in its (not inconsiderable) power to achieve the opposite effect, in the way in which it treats foreigners wishing to travel to or reside in India” (2012: p.292). Time-consuming, expensive and often complicated, the visa process is what drives many people to opt for other destinations for tourism or business. One especially irritating rule was introduced due to security concerns, after the terrorist attacks in Mumbai in 2008 (happily withdrawn by late 2012), which prohibited return to India before a two-month break. The most discriminatory rules are those towards Pakistani nationals, which not only contribute to low favourability of India in Pakistan but which also do not go unnoticed by global public opinion. This case elucidates how hard security considerations were given precedence in Indian statecraft, which, in a way, proved detrimental to its soft power in the end.
As Tharoor exposed the harshness of this procedure, “journalists and even academics deemed to be insufficiently friendly to India are often denied visas or required to produce so much documentation, or fulfill so many conditions, that they give up the effort. Some who have expressed criticisms of India in the past, whether or not these criticisms are well founded, are placed on a negative list and denied visas when they apply. Such practices are disgraceful in principle in a democracy; worse, since they are intended to avoid negative views about India appearing abroad, they ensure precisely what they are trying to prevent” (Tharoor, 2012: p.294). Moreover, those who need to stay in India for longer periods must undergo additional verification for registration at the Foreign Registration Regional Offices – testing the good feelings and patience of even the most ardent India supporters. Treatment of foreign visitors evidences a lack of transparency, openness and willingness to interact with foreign audiences.
As Tharoor further states, “India’s ability to promote and leverage its soft power in the world will receive a major boost only if and when the country’s visa policy is thoroughly re-examined and, ideally, revised” (2012: p.294). Happily, this is anticipated to happen, as India is implementing the reform of its visa policy that many have urged for. Since 2011, it has offered issuance of visa-on-arrival for tourists of several countries. In early 2014, the government announced that, by the year’s end, the scheme will be dramatically expanded and will encompass all but eight countries (The Indian Express, 14 February 2014). In November, the Electronic Travel Authorisation (ETA) facility became operational for citizens of over 40 eligible countries. This was available for up to 30 days visit for tourism, medical treatment or business, and it encompassed those who arrive at one of eight selected airports. The scheme was renamed e-Tourist Visa (eTV) on 15 April 2015 and expanded to include over 70 countries. Soon, it will include most countries. This reform could be another right step to significantly relieve visa application bureaucracy and contribute to a rise in tourist trips to India and a better perception of India abroad.
Nurturing Democracy
One of the greatest strengths of India’s soft power is its open, pluralistic and democratic political system. Despite its many flaws, Indian democracy is commonly credited for the relative stability and resilience of internally diverse India as one country (Oldenburg, 2012). This value must be protected and democracy deepened to guarantee an inclusive and peaceful society. As rightly argued by Tharoor (2012: 289), “to wield soft power, India must defend, assert and promote its culture of openness against the forces of intolerance and bigotry inside and outside the country.” Responding to rising expectations of its increasingly aspiring society and international scrutiny, India needs to improve the quality of political life as well as the effectiveness and transparency of the current system.
The 2014 general elections were celebrated in India and made headlines in international media with images of the energetic, colourful and largest-ever democratic exercise on earth. While this success must be cherished, emphasised and promoted, at the same time, the government cannot ignore difficult questions being raised about democratic deficiencies. There is an urgent need to invite reforms to remove persisting flaws, find answers to existing problems and improve the dismal human rights records.
International human rights organisations have often criticised India for excessive use of force by security personnel, the death penalty, arbitrary arrests and detentions, tortures and reoccurring communal violence (AI, 2012; HRW, 2014). In the 2014 report of Human Rights Watch, India was criticised for, “restrictions on Internet freedom; continued marginalization of Dalits, tribal groups, religious minorities, sexual and gender minorities, and people with disabilities; instances of remained marginalized and often without redress; and persistent impunity for abuses linked to insurgencies, particularly in Maoist areas, Jammu and Kashmir, Manipur, and Assam” (HRW, 2014: p.334). The Armed Forces Special Power Act of 1958 remains a matter of special concern: it gives extra impunity for armed personnel in Kashmir and other specified areas from any abuses and human rights violations. Human rights groups complain that, despite civil society pressure, authorities remain unwilling to repeal the law (AI, 2012: p.173). Although India has a right to protect its security and integrity by available means, it must calculate whether these measures incur more costs than benefits, domestically and internationally.
Even if criticism from foreign sources is seen with suspicion in India, there are, more importantly, numerous domestic voices monitoring the state of democracy and reporting its deficit on daily basis. The National Human Rights Commission, an independent and public body, has been regularly tracking human rights violations since its establishment, in 1993. Local NGOs and human rights activists, experts, and journalists, such as Arundhati Roy, expose failures of the Indian state in different spheres and the perils of environmental degradation, political criminality or marginalisation of minorities. The Indian media exposes disturbing trends in rising sex ratio imbalances, violence against women (rape, acid attacks, dowry death, sexual exploitation), and communal strife. Although it is not possible to change India’s situation overnight, as development and education needs time, better formulation and implementation of laws and policies is a daunting task. Tharoor is right when he says, “every time there are reports of sectarian violence or a pogrom like the savagery in Gujarat in 2002, or nativist attack like those by a fringe group in 2010 on women drinking at a pub in Mangalore, India suffers a huge setback to its soft powers” (Tharoor, 2012: p.288). Unfortunately, the vicious gang rape on a student in Delhi by five men on December 2012, or another instance of communal riots, like the one in Muzaffanagar in UP in autumn 2013, in which around 50 people died, deals further blows to India’s reputation abroad.
It is not to say that the Indian state has been a passive observer of these internal challenges
; on the contrary, the government has been proactive in some spheres by making the democratic system more responsive and efficient. For the first time in many years, high ranking officials were sent to jail for corruption, and new laws were introduced to provide women better security. Massive civil movements and protests against corruption, in 2011, or against violence towards women in, 2012 and 2013, reflect a more active and assertive nation, striving for a better life. This capital that cannot be wasted. A recent report by Human Rights Watch (2014) observed more positive steps: “strengthening laws protecting women and children, and, in several important cases, prosecuting state security force personnel for extrajudicial killings. The impact of these developments will depend in large part on effective follow-up by central government authorities.”
The historic victory of the BJP, in 2014 national elections, and the growing popularity of “Hindutva ideology” posed new questions about India’s democracy. In the light of recurring attacks on religious minorities, in the latter half of 2014 and early 2015, many people in India and abroad questioned the ability of the Indian state to control intercommunal relations and temper radicalisation of certain groups. Human rights groups and international media have criticised mounting religious intolerance and forced conversions, calling on Prime Minister Modi to “rein in the divisive agenda of his militant Hindu-nationalist supporters” (The New York Times, 2014). Also, President Obama observed in a speech, during his successful visit to New Delhi, in January 2015: “India will succeed so long as it is not splintered along the lines of religious faith.” Another editorial in the New York Times, in February 2015, titled “Modi’s Dangerous Silence”, called on the Indian prime minister to take a stance against religious violence. The crisis was eventually put to an end, after Modi, on 17 February, strongly condemned religious intolerance and vowed to crackdown on communal violence (The Wall Street Journal, 2015).
Nevertheless, this is a warning for India. Communal harmony and internal stability are not as important for international public opinion as it is for India itself. Indian strategist Raja Mohan (2014) warned in December 2014, “If unchecked, the extremist forces of the Hindutva will not only undercut India’s soft power but also overturn Modi’s hopes to rapidly enhance Delhi’s hard power through a vigorous engagement with friends and partners” (Mohan, 2014). Any changes in the status of Indian Muslims, the attempted reform of Article 370 or the rising intolerance, could worsen the already burgeoning internal instability and harm India’s global reputation.
One important area to measure the quality of the political system is freedom of speech and the media. In the 2014 World Press Freedom Index, an annual ranking of countries compiled and published by Reporters Without Borders, India was classified in a distant 140th place, between Chad and Jordan, and worse than even Afghanistan or Nepal. This abysmally low ranking is not acceptable for the world’s biggest democracy. Restrictions imposed on media harm not only India’s international reputation but are counterproductive for its domestic functioning. As argued by Tharoor, “Free speech keeps our government accountable and helps political leaders know what people are thinking” (2012: p.302). India should avoid going the Chinese way, as democracy is one crucial area in which India has an obvious edge over its regional rival (Lee, 2010b).
Government decisions that infringe on the independence of the media and freedom of expression send a negative signal. It is certainly not a smart policy to limit criticism of the government by limiting freedom of speech (Tharoor, 2012: p.302). Government attempts to control and censor Facebook or Twitter, over a controversy with Union Minister Kapil Sibal, or the arrest of anti-corruption cartoonist Aseem Trivedi, on sedition charges, in 2012 (BBC, 2012c), or two young women, over comments posted on Facebook (BBC 2012d), did not serve India’s reputation well. It stirs concerns about the state of India’s democracy and brings India dangerously close to dictatorial regimes, which seek tools to limit Internet access for their own populations. National security benefits from such actions are also questionable.
The government’s decision, in January 2013, to make it compulsory for the police to seek clearance from high-ranking officials before making an arrest, under the 66A section of the Information Technology Act—previously much abused, was a step in the right direction to protect basic rights (HRW, 2013), but threats to freedom of speech are still pervasive. In this sense, the verdict of the Supreme Court, in March 2015, to strike down Section 66A of the Information Technology Act, 2000 (IT Act), was hailed by civil society, media and external observers as a “victory of free speech” (The Hindu, 2015a). This signaled the endurance of India’s system and the resilience of its democracy.
Perfecting a Grand Strategy for Foreign Policy
One fundamental element of soft power is the legitimacy of foreign policy. If the country’s decisions in external relations do not match its projected image, its soft power is undermined. In this sense, the problem for India is that its foreign policy objective and execution have been unclear, and it has been seen in recent decades as reactionary, defensive, ambiguous and lacking a long-term vision or grand strategy. As observed by David Malone (2011: p.72): “Indian foreign policy following the Cold War has been pragmatic, but it has also been devoid of the kind of strategic vision required for India to achieve great power status.”
Pragmatism, although often more efficient than principled foreign policy, also causes inconsistency in India’s position on international issues. India often behaves differently on similar matters, depending how it perceived its interests as being better secured. For instance, it can sign a declaration on strategic partnership with Iran in 2003, yet vote against Iran in the International Atomic Energy Agency resolution in 2005 and 2006; vote against Sri Lanka in the UN Human Rights Commission in 2012 and 2013, and abstain from voting on the same issue in 2014; stand for the principle of non-intervention and territorial integrity and national sovereignty when criticising the Western intervention in Libya, in 2011, and refrain from criticising Russia, its important ally, when it breached the sovereignty of Ukraine in Crimea, in 2014. India’s abstention from voting in many crucial conflicts (e.g., Syria 2012, Ukraine 2014) creates misunderstanding in the assessment of its intentions. It struggles to reconcile its calls to nuclear disarmament with the buildup of national nuclear capabilities and its traditional criticism of the discriminatory character of the current nonproliferation regime with its rejection of the same rights for Iran. As one former Indian diplomat admits, “it is of course illogical that India should be asking other States to observe their obligations under an international treaty that India itself has not signed” (Sikri, 2009: p.143). These confusing decisions open India to criticism and questioning, by some, of its ability to be a “responsible power” that can share the burden of providing security and stability throughout the world.
Moreover, in the realm of global governance, “India has been accused of being a spoiler on issues as diverse as trade, nuclear non-proliferation and humanitarian intervention” (Mukherjee, 2013: 11). Malone (2011: p.249) claims that even though “India’s stature has grown, its stake in some forms of multilateralism has diminished”. Its position in the WTO, the CTBT, and the NPT or climate change negotiations is seen as “obstructionist”, “arrogant”, “moralistic”, or “confrontational” (Malone, 2011: pp.300–302).
Moreover, human rights groups and certain Western governments claim, “India did not live up to expectations in promoting respect for democracy and human rights in its foreign policy. Although the country aspires to a growing role in world affairs and a permanent seat on the UN Security Council, it did little to address some of most pressing problems confronting the world in 2013, such as the crises in Syria and Egypt” (HRW, 2014: p.341). It is criticised for its reluctance to share more burdens as a “responsible stake holder” to match its major power aspirations.
In a sense, this means India rejects the notion of its special role in international relations, which it claimed during the Cold War. Accordin
g to Raja Mohan (2003: p.268), “the critics of the new foreign policy have accused India of giving up its unique moral standing and political exceptionalism in the world. In becoming less ideological and intensifying the quest for the traditional attributes of national strength, India has become a normal power that is no longer focused on transforming the world.” Also, as Malone confirms,“post-1990 India was no longer as convinced of its moral uniqueness and began to think of itself as a nation like several others in the quest of great power” (Malone, 2011: p.236).
This “normalcy” and abdication of larger international aims may bring more short-term gains and be perceived positively in the West, but it was highly disappointing for many in India and the developing world. As stated by one scholar, India lost its “once distinctive diplomatic voice”, ethically informed uniqueness and, now, “it increasingly behaves like the countries it once criticized”. (Abraham, 2007: 4,210). It does not use the asset of its spirituality in foreign policy enough, which could form its largest source of soft power (ibid). Others argue that India does not properly use Nehru’s heritage of India acting as legitimate “peacemaker” and “honest broker” in world conflicts, and the potential of participation in UN peacekeeping missions is woefully unexplored.
Overall, India’s lack of involvement creates a perception that it has stepped back from global politics and left the space it had occupied in the past as leader of the developing world. It risks missing some opportunities to make its voice heard at the global level. Unlike in the past, India is not actively engaged in diplomatic negotiations over many critical international issues, such as nuclear talks with North Korea or Iran, or the peace process in the Middle East or the African countries. Having enjoyed cordial relations with most of the conflicted parties, India could play a more active and positive role as an honest facilitator and earn more prestige in international affairs. As bitterly commented by one author, “Simply dispatching warm bodies for peace keeping missions is not quite what Nehru had envisaged as a proper role for India on the world stage. If contributions to UN peacekeeping are measures of soft power, then Bangladesh is ahead of India” (Chaulia, 2007). As a response to this gaping opportunity, the new government would be advised to come up with diplomatic initiatives that would put India as the main mediator and peace broker in important international crises to show its attractiveness as a “peace provider”.
India’s Soft Power: A New Foreign Policy Strategy Page 21