With much ceremony he broke the sandwich in two and summoned John Britton to assist him. Looking straight-faced at the distant Himalaya mountain range, he commenced eating. Next to him John Britton attempted to follow Henry’s act but, as with others who tried to emulate our squadron clown, John failed; he was just too big and clumsy next to his slim nimble friend.
As he ate, Henry’s cheeks started to fill like a monkey’s pouches. When he had the entire sandwich in his mouth with cheeks fully extended, he commenced a violent choking and sneezing act. Each time he sneezed, with right forefinger held horizontally under his nose, a small stream of bread pieces flew vertically downwards from his mouth giving the distinct impression of muck flying from his nose, which he then wiped on his sleeve in long exaggerated strokes. Few comedians could bring an audience to such fits of laughter as Henry Jarvie. The hotel guests, now realising he was no hotel chef, enjoyed the act even more than we did.
Opportunity was taken to fly the squadron from Umtali to Centenary to link up with crews who had missed out on the Aloe Festival. The purpose of gathering the whole squadron was to have a squadron photograph taken, as this might not be possible for ages to come.
Himalaya mountains viewed from Leopard Rock.
In line with the propeller boss of the Trojan is Bruce Collocott. Moving left are Rob Tasker, PB, Warrant Officer Spike Owens and Chief Tec Mick Fulton. Pilots are to the right of those named and technicians to the left.
Early FAC to jets
MY FIRST CALL FOR STRIKES by Hunters occurred inside Rhodesia, though much work had been done before I gained sufficient confidence to do this. Air recce inside Rhodesia was much more difficult than in Mozambique. Within the country the locals had no reason to hide from ZANLA and any stresses that existed within the population could not be detected from height; all path systems appeared quite normal.
Because terrorists were known to move position continuously and reside at night in different kraals in ones and twos, their presence within the TTLs was impossible to detect. It was only within the boundaries of white-owned farms that terrorists based up in the bush, but never for more than two nights at a time.
For years the African nationalists had complained that white farmers had the best land and the African folk had been allocated those regions with poor soil. From the air one could see that there was no truth in this allegation. The Centenary farmlands bordering the Kandeya TTL typified most boundaries between organised commercial farmland and the subsistence farming areas inhabited by tribesmen.
Except for patches of bush on hills and rocky ground, Kandeya was substantially overgrazed and all maize fields were so over-utilised that the TTL exhibited a near desert-like appearance. Across the cattle fence that separated the TTL from adjoining white-owned farms, lush bush and grass cover contrasted as chalk with cheese, even though soil types were identical. Crop rotation and the use of fertilisers made white farmlands look rich and neat. This was why fresh pathways inside these areas stood out strongly. Although I was finding temporary bases in the farming areas, which were all confirmed by co-operative ground forces, I was gaining nothing more than an idea of what a temporary base looked like. I visited a couple of these places with ground forces to see for myself.
It perplexed me to learn from Special Branch who had interrogated captured terrorists that bases I judged to be for twenty terrorists were in fact for only ten. I could not reconcile this until Special Branch established that there had also been ten women in residence to provide female comforts to ‘their boys in the bush’. The lesson was clear—divide estimates by two.
I approached JOC Hurricane with the problem of not being able find terrorists in the TTL and requested that wide-ranging surprise visits be made on villages at all times of the night. The purpose of this was to see if we could force the terrorists away from the villages and make them base up in the bush. I guessed that, if they did this, each terrorist group would tend to site itself in a position with easy access to more than one village so that the daily feeding load could be spread whilst also giving them all-round early warning of any security force activities. I also guessed that female feeding parties would create telltale paths leading from villages to bases that, together with the inevitable paths within the bases, should make detection an easy matter. This ploy worked almost immediately. I picked up a well-defined campsite in the Kandeya TTL south east of St Albert’s Mission with fresh squiggly paths running to it from four different villages.
Established paths change direction frequently but exhibit a smoother flow than fresh paths that route around the smallest of obstructions. With the passage of time and season, the sharp kinks that characterise fresh paths progressively smooth out because man, being a creature of habit, will shortcut any sharp bend once he knows the route.
Having located this camp, which I estimated to be for thirty people, meaning fifteen active terrorists, I considered how it might be tackled with a handful of troops flown in by the only two helicopters available at the time. Looking back on the lessons learned on Op Sable it was obvious that most, if not all, terrorists would escape. A large ground force closing in on the camp might have worked but it meant gathering troops from far and wide with no certainty that the terrorists would be in residence when the force closed in. I opted instead for an airstrike that would shock the locals who were providing succour and, hopefully, account for a few terrorists.
My style of reconnaissance involved continuous elliptical orbits that moved along a general line. Orbiting was essential because paths that could not be seen when viewing down sun stood out clearly when looking up-sun. At the end of one line of orbits, I would shift position by one orbit width and commence orbiting along a parallel line in the reverse direction. This was repeated until a whole block of territory, usually over 800 square kilometres, had been covered in a five-hour sortie. The sun angle played an important role in visual reconnaissance and 10:00 to 15:00 was the ideal time-block.
This photo is not of the target in question but it shows the nature of terrain in the Kandeya TTL where hill features disallow cropping thus protecting some natural bush cover.
Down-sun blur versus up-sun clarity (same orbit).
I was running the first line when I located the camp. The orbits were continued along the search line so as not to give anyone any indication of my having seen the base. I called Peter Cooke in the Ops Room at FAF 3 and we discussed the matter before jointly agreeing to set up a jet-strike for 16:00 when, we guessed, the terrorists would be in base awaiting their meal.
By the time I landed, Peter had submitted an Air Request for a strike by Hunters and this had been accepted by Air HQ. The Air Task sent to No 1 Squadron was copied to FAF 3 to allow us opportunity to ensure that the Hunter pilots had received the correct details.
Using a Provost, I marked the target with smoke rockets at precisely 4 o’clock and pulled up into a steep climbing turn to watch the lead Hunter’s 30mm cannon strike running right through the centre of the target. Three following Hunters, responding to my directions, patterned their 68mm Marta rocket strikes perfectly. As the Hunters cleared, I moved back over the target and saw many civilians running helter-skelter from the nearest village.
Helicopters dropped off troops who found the fresh base well laced by cannon and rocket shrapnel. Unfortunately there had been no terrorists in residence at the time. Later we established that the terrorists had been with civilians at a beer-drink in the very village from which I had seen so many people running. I had been mistaken in thinking these were all innocent civvies, thereby losing the chance of diverting the helicopters and troops onto a good opportunity target.
This, my first attempt at directing jets by airborne FAC, had worked better for the jet pilots than any one of many GAC strikes made over-border in support of SAS operations. The secret to success in first-run strikes under FAC control lay in four basic factors. These were, good timing, minimal radio chatter, excellent visual markers at target centre and control by a pilot w
ho knew the precise location and extremities of the target and had witnessed the placement of each aircraft’s strike.
Air Staff was not put off by the absence of terrorists; rather it commented that this strike had proven that airborne FAC could provide consistent precision and allow jets to strike closer to troops and civilians than had previously been considered possible.
The face of terrorism
HAVING ESTABLISHED THEMSELVES WITH THE locals, ZANLA realised they had, at last, entered into a decisive phase which they named the ‘New Chimurenga’ war. The first Chimurenga had been the Mashona Rebellion of 1896. During that rebellion, the BSA Company executed the leading zvikiro (spirit medium), Nehanda, whose spirit lived on in successive living female persons. The current incumbent, who relayed messages from the all-important spirit of the first Chimurenga war, was Mbuya Nehanda. She advocated war as the only way of wresting power from the white government.
Mbuya (grandmother) Nehanda was a frail old woman but her guidance was considered of paramount importance to ZANU and its military wing ZANLA. To ensure her safety and to allow her total freedom to communicate with the original Nehanda, she was carried by stretcher all the way through Tete to a camp known as Chifombo on the Zambian border. From this place she gave ZANLA commanders the encouragement they needed when proceeding southbound for Rhodesia. The old zvikiro also blessed all arms of war that were paraded past her private hut.
By mid-1973 terrorism was spreading southward at an alarming rate and the names of three particular ZANLA regional leaders were on everyone’s lips. They were James Bond, Mao and Rex Nhongo. We were particularly keen to eliminate James Bond and Mao who were responsible for horrifying acts of brutality designed to put fear in the hearts of black people. They were eventually killed in 1974, whereas Rex Nhongo left Rhodesia and survived to become ZANLA’s commander at the end of the war.
Gone were the days when tracker-combat groups could relentlessly follow and destroy terrorist groups before they reached the black population. Gone too were the days when locals reported the presence of terrorists. At first some tribesmen did not understand the terrorists’ determination to fight for ‘freedom’ and ‘the vote’. So far as they were concerned, it seemed an awful waste of time and life to fight for something they could not eat, drink, smoke or poke. But when promised that they would inherit European farms, equipment and cattle, ZANLA’s objectives made a great deal more sense. Political indoctrination was not the whole reason for tribesmen failing to report the presence of terrorists; it was more to do with having become more afraid of ZANLA than the forces of government; and with good reason.
For anyone suspected of being a ‘sell-out’ (informer) to the SF, terrorist retribution was swift and cruel. Too often this gave rise to misinformation by opportunists who, having a grudge against another and knowing terrorists never bothered to check out any accusation, deliberately and wrongfully reported them as ‘sell-outs’. However, even wrongful killing of this nature fitted well enough with ZANLA’s campaign of terror.
Atrocities committed against the people, their livestock and possessions were widely reported in the media with graphic photographs of destruction, murder and maiming. Whereas the international community chose to ignore these horrors, the mindless slaughter of innocents angered urban blacks and the entire white community.
I saw the poor woman whose husband was killed in her presence before the gang leader cut off his ears, nose and fingers. The wife was then forced to cook and devour the grizzly items. No pity was shown when she retched and vomited; she was beaten until she retained even that which she had thrown up.
Another woman was flown in for medical attention. Her entire top lip had been cut away from back molars via her nose with electrician’s side-cutters.
The naked body of a young woman was found staked to the ground, arms and legs outstretched on ropes that were pegged into the ground. A blood-covered maize cob remained imbedded in her vagina as well as a thick burning pole that had been driven into her rectum to cause her an indescribably painful death in a very lonely place.
In the presence of his family and other petrifed tribesmen, this wrongfully accused youngster was murdered. After his death his body was repeatedly bayoneted (note no blood), to drive home ZANLA’s message.
A woman whose top lip had been cut off by terrorists.
In many cases the use of burning poles driven into women’s vaginas and men’s rectums was done in the presence of villagers who witnessed such horrifying murder that they dared not report the atrocities for fear of becoming victims themselves. Whole herds of cattle were slaughtered with automatic gunfire or were hamstrung, necessitating their destruction by government agencies.
The term ‘terrorist’ was entirely justified for cowardly leaders of ZANLA gangs who wantonly brutalised hundreds of hapless civilians; yet the international community called them ‘guerrillas’. These bullies, though intent on murdering white farmers, lacked the courage to achieve the levels sought by their ZANU politicos. Night attacks on white farmers mounted but the casualties and damage caused was so much lower than might have occurred if undertaken by men of courage. ZANLA could intimidate their black brethren but not the white folk. There were many instances of a farmer and his wife fighting off the most determined of terrorist forces, usually in excess of fifteen men, because the terrorists could not match their sheer guts and determination. Yet a mere handful of terrorists could have hundreds of tribesmen cowering from the simplest of verbal threats.
In the course of moving around their farms and out on the country roads, farmers and their families needed to be prepared and armed to face the ever-present threat of landmines and ambush. Incredibly, very few farmers abandoned their farms because of these dangers. The vast majority stubbornly refused to be intimidated, as ZANLA had been assured they would. Most children attended boarding schools and were brought home to the farms for their holidays. Every effort was made to keep farming life as normal as possible and many incredible stories can be told of the community that bore the brunt of the war against whites.
One Centenary farmer received a hand-written note from the leader of a particular terrorist gang asking him not to allow his daughters to ride their horses on an adjacent farm where their safety could not be guaranteed. So long as they rode on their own farm they would be safe. It seems the farmer in question was popular with his workers whereas the farmer on the adjacent farm was not.
Amongst Christians there were stories of divine intervention. One of these emanated from a captured terrorist who explained why his especially large group abandoned their planned attack of a farmstead. He said the attack was aborted when, upon arrival at the farmstead, many armed men dressed in illuminated white clothes and riding white horses surrounded the place; yet not one horseman had been present that night.
ZANLA recruitment
TERRORIST NUMBERS INSIDE THE COUNTRY during 1973 were insufficient to spread the SF as thinly as ZANLA had hoped. ZANLA losses, particularly to its leadership, were having a greater detrimental effect than we realised. Recruits sent to Tanzania for training would only be available in late 1974, but ZANLA could not wait that long. The short-term solution was to train recruits internally.
Diverting for a moment—our verbal, written and radio terminology changed in this period to identify individuals. These were:
CT—Communist Terrorist
EFA—European Female Adult
LTT—Locally Trained Terrorist
AFJ—African Female Juvenile
AMA—African Male Adult
EFJ—European Female Juvenile
EMA—European Male Adult
AMJ—African Male Juvenile
EMJ—European Male Juvenile
AFA—African Female Adult
Willing and unwilling recruits, mainly young males, were inducted for immediate training inside the country. Given old SKS and PPSH weapons, these young men and teenagers were taught rudimentary skills preparatory to armed combat. In most cases n
o more than two rounds were expended in training to conserve ammunition and limit the risk of exposure by the sound of gunfire. Inevitably these LTTs gained their shooting experience in combat, providing they survived the first contact with our troops; many did not!
The real value of LTTs to the regular elements of ZANLA was their local knowledge and their ability to move amongst the people. They could also expose themselves openly amongst the RSF when unarmed to gather intelligence and provide early-warning services. But the LTTs themselves gave ZANLA leaders many headaches since most became nasty little thugs who committed murder and rape, causing a great deal of tribal chaos. Many other youths, impressed by LTT thuggery, fashioned replicas of CT weapons from wood to terrorise adults, thereby creating a general breakdown in family unity and discipline.
Along with the training of LTTs, ZANLA commenced forced recruitment of youths, male and female, for external training. This came to the country’s open attention on America’s Independence Day when, during the early evening of 4 July 1973, seventeen heavily armed CTs stormed into the usually peaceful St Albert’s Mission, causing fear and panic as they rounded up over 270 people. They stated that they were taking the secondary-level children, together with a number of adult teachers and mission staff, for military training outside the country.
Harassing and hurrying their frightened abductees, the CTs used force to accelerate the collection of food, clothing and blankets for the long walk through Mozambique to Zambia. From there they were to be transported to the Tanzanian training camps. Father Clemence Freymer bravely insisted he must go along to be with the children. He was the only white member of the group that set off that dark night for the steep descent down the escarpment. The missionaries, fearing landmines and ambush, set off on foot to raise the alarm at the nearest white farm. This could not be done by telephone because the lines had been cut and the mission had opted not to be on the Agri-Alert radio network.
Winds of Destruction: The Autobiography of a Rhodesian Combat Pilot Page 47