Having worked for some time I had become quite relaxed when, out of the corner of my eye, I picked up a near vertical zigzag line of faint greyish white smoke. It ran through a position we had passed in orbit about thirty seconds earlier. Immediately I thought of Strela and looked up the line of barely discernible smoke to see if there was evidence of an airburst where Strela should self-destruct at around 13,000 feet. I could see nothing and soon lost the smoke trail altogether. When in later times I actually saw Strela missiles in flight, I realised that the trail I had seen here was definitely from a Strela that had been fired at us. The operator almost certainly fired when the aircraft was passing too close to the sun, which attracted the missile’s sensor to itself. This may very well have been the first Strela to be launched against a Rhodesian Air Force aircraft. Unfortunately it was not to be the last.
At half-hourly intervals Chris, Kevin and I exchanged information on how each of us was doing. By the end of our first day we had accumulated nine major bases between the three of us but made no call on the assault force because there was need to debrief on the first operation and make plans to improve tactics.
Back at Estima we found an elated brigadier who ceremoniously handed me a bottle of Antiqua. I was completely disarmed by all the Portuguese officers’ congratulations to 4 Squadron for setting up such a ‘magnificent operation’. They were tickled pink by the tally of sixteen FRELIMO dead and the largest haul of captured FRELIMO equipment in Tete to date. This included four 14.5mm anti-aircraft guns.
The assault commander said my Trojan had been under intense fire from the time the gunships left until I cleared back to base. He expounded on the bravery Mark and I had shown and how this had impressed and endeared us to his troops. We neither let on that we had been unaware of the fire nor that the Trojan had taken no hits.
With spirits so high, the brigadier and his assault force officers were confounded by the criticisms levelled against them by Rob Gaunt and me. We noticed, however, that the six Portuguese Air Force gunship and Puma pilots took kindly to our observations and that they were very keen to respond to suggested tactical improvements.
We had too many targets lined up for the assault force so it was decided to let the main line of bases settle down for a couple of days. Lesser targets were to be used to test and modify tactics during the next three days with only one being attended to each day. These were small enough for groups to be placed in stop positions on three sides to cover CTs escaping from the fourth group as it swept through target.
All three bases turned out to be FRELIMO regional bases supporting small numbers of men, most of which were away from base at the time of the assaults. The results in FRELIMO killed and captured were disappointing to the Rhodesian contingent but the brigadier and all of his staff were delighted, particularly with the quantities of weapons and landmines captured. All structures that had not been ignited by Sneb rockets or gunship fire were set alight by the troops. The brigadier acknowledged that he owed me three bottles of Antiqua.
Thursday 11 April was the day chosen to take on the main line of bases which, on the Ops Room map, were numbered from the first base we struck as (1) and ascending up the communication line to base (5).
Rob Gaunt and I were keen to take the assault force onto Base (5) then put in airstrikes on the other bases (2, 3 and 4) in that sequence. After their move through Base (5), the assault troops were to set up numerous ambushes both north and south. The southern ambushes were for FRELIMO moving up from the bases attacked by aircraft; the northern ambushes were to cater for FRELIMO coming down on normal resupply or to investigate air and ground activities of the previous day.
Unfortunately the Portuguese would not accept the plan or the idea of leaving forces in the field overnight (something to do with fresh bread). Instead, the assault force was to take on base (2) with Rhodesian Air Force jet-strikes on bases (3 and 5). The Portuguese Air Force would strike Base (4) with Fiat jet fighter-bombers; to which end English-speaking PAF officer Major Vizlha would fly with me to communicate with the Fiat pilots of Scorpion Formation.
I led the assault force to Base (2) for a strike at 09:00. This time two Pumas placed troops about 100 metres apart at one end of the base and two Pumas landed troops east and west to cater for lateral breakout. The northern end of the base was to be contained by the gunships. This time marking was by two rockets only to retain plenty for the forthcoming FAC marking runs for jet strikes. I had contemplated bringing in Kevin and Mark to take on opportunity targets with their Sneb rockets before proceeding to their recce areas but dropped the idea to avoid any confusion that might arise through language difficulties, I regretted the decision immediately because FRELIMO, seeming to believe the Pumas had surrounded them with troops, milled about in the opening several seconds presenting many good and concentrated Sneb targets.
Again the two gunships, which were active at the northern end of the camp, did not see the bigger target opportunities in the base centre. I had not seen 20mm cannon fire from helicopters before Op Marble and was impressed with the visual effects of the exploding shells. However, considering the low kill-rate that had been achieved in the four previous bases, I moved above one gunship and watched it fire at dispersed individuals. In spite of the large flashes that were really close to running FRELIMO, the shells seemed to have little effect on them. Some FRELIMO tumbled but got up and ran on, probably slightly wounded and certainly shaken.
Then two running men went down when a couple of shells exploded halfway up the wall of a pole and dagga building they were passing. They dropped immediately and lay dead where they had fallen. Seeing this, Major Vizlha and I agreed that the shells landing on soft ground were exploding below surface causing them to lose shrapnel effect. (When we acquired 20mm cannons for our own helicopters later in the month, the neutralising effect of soft ground became well known. Because of this, many of our gunners became expert at using rocks and trees to gain airbursts for maximum lethal effect.)
Unrelated to the Op Marble airstrikes, Canberras and Hunters climbing in formation.
At midday I marked Base (3) sited in a mountainous area. It was not the crisp operation I had hoped to show Major Vizlha because of localised low cloud at 1,500 feet agl and a fifteen-second error in my understanding of Rick Culpan’s intended strike time.
Part of the Air Strike Report submitted by 5 Squadron reads:
From the IP to the final turn onto the target it became evident that the jet formation was too close to the marker aircraft. Speed was reduced to 200 kts. In spite of this the jets arrived too early and turned on to heading 225 deg M. This resulted in all the aircraft being in line astern formation with the marker aircraft leading.(Note: This must have been short-lived because:-) The target was marked and appeared at 90 deg to the formation 2000 yards away. The Hunters turned in and released their weapons on a heading 120 deg M. This was too close for the Canberras to bomb and they were forced to follow the Hunters for a restrike on the planned heading of 210 deg M.
Rob Gaunt had passed command of 1 Squadron to Rich Brand but for some reason he did not lead this attack. For a short while the timings of lead Hunter strike on FAC mark were not as crisp as I had become used to. In spite of this, all strikes were on target with the exception of one 500-pound bomb that must have hung up temporarily. It exploded directly below our Trojan giving Major Vizlha and me quite a shake up.
Digressing for a moment—The Board of Inquiry into the loss of the Canberra just seven days prior to this attack had concluded that an arming cap vane from one 28-pound bomb had managed to reach deep into the nose casing of a following bomb. In doing so it activated the pistol’s reversible diaphragm causing the detonation that set off the whole bomb load. (A reversible diaphragm was used to achieve an airburst just above ground level when backpressure from the ground caused the pressure-sensitive diaphragm to reverse and fire the cap that detonated the bomb.) The Rhodesian-designed and manufactured 28lb fragmentation bomb system was withdrawn from serv
ice leaving 250-pound, 500-pound and 1000-pound bombs as the only weapons available for Canberra strikes, hence the use of 500-pound bombs on this strike.
Major Vizlha was amazed to see each one of our jets passing through target and asked me if the pilots knew there were Strela missiles in the area. I responded by saying we were all acutely aware of this before he told me how fearful he was to be flying with me. He said the Portuguese Air Force dared not operate above 100 feet and below 15,000 feet because of the missile threat between these heights.
We could not stick around to watch for movement in the Base where some buildings were burning furiously because Scorpion formation checked in way too early just as the Hunters and Canberras cleared target. This forced us to move on to Base (4) earlier than planned.
It was pleasing to hear the Portuguese transmissions between Scorpion leader and Major Vizlha. I understood nothing of what was being said until I was told that three Fiats were holding at 30,000 feet over the cloud-free target, each carrying four 250-pound bombs and awaiting my markers. This distressed me because I was still ten minutes away and I knew that FRELIMO would certainly hear and see the jets. Nevertheless, there was nothing I could do but run straight to target, pitch up and roll over into the dive to fire the marker rockets. Major Vizlha gave a running commentary on our progress and reported the mark.
The Fiat pilots were obviously super-sensitive to Strela. They turned into their attack dives about five seconds apart from 30,000 feet and probably released their bombs at around 15,000 feet. We did not see the jets at any stage.
I was beginning to doubt that the markers had been seen because nothing happened for ages. Holding well away from the base, I had completed half an orbit before the first cluster of four 250-pound bombs landed in the base. A long pause followed, then the second cluster struck, again inside the target. In the same way we had heard the first two strikes, the third ‘krrrump’ of bombs sounded much louder but we had not seen them explode. It took another quarter of the turn before we spotted the dust cloud of the strike behind us about 800 metres short of the target.
The combined area covered by the two sets of tightly grouped bombs within the target was substantially smaller than that obtained by a single Hunter using Matra rockets. This strike had been a complete waste of time and we saw no movement whatsoever in or near the base. Major Vizlha agreed that the Fiats had given the game away long before the marker rockets were fired.
Though embarrassed by the strike of his own force, Vizlha was very impressed by the swiftness of the final FAC-controlled strike by Hunters and Canberras against Base (5) and remarked on our radio disciplines, which involved only a few short verbal exchanges.
Base 5’s anti-aircraft guns were sited well outside the perimeter of the target and they put up so much fire at us that I broke away and returned to base. In this case the anti-aircraft gun tracer rounds coming our way had been made highly visible because the whole area of the target was in the shadow of high-level cloud. Major Vizlha’s high-pitch Portuguese outburst did nothing to dampen my own fear.
Next day the assault force was used to check out the effects of the air strikes on the three bases. Considerable quantities of FRELIMO equipment were recovered out of each of the bases though this would have been greater had the force been used straight after the strikes. Anti-aircraft shell casings littered a number of gun positions but all guns had been taken away during the night.
In Base (3), eight FRELIMO bodies were found burnt in or next to thatched structures with evidence of the burial of others. No bodies were found in Base (4). Something in the order of twenty FRELIMO dead were in Base (5) where many fresh field-dressing packets showed that a number of wounded had been taken to safety.
On 13 April the assault force was put in on a base, I think by Kevin Peinke. I continued with my own recce directly to the north of Chris Weinmann’s area with our Director of Operations, Wing Commander Porky MacLaughlin, who was visiting the Air Detachment at Estima. He had insisted on accompanying me on a flight during which we conducted FAC for another combined jet strike before we led Clive Ward flying a Trojan and Chris Dickinson flying a Provost onto a smaller base.
My recall of these strikes is vague, but the Air Strike Reports indicate that the thatching of buildings in the base struck by jets was so green that the troops had difficulty in setting them alight. In spite of this, the base had been deserted before the strike went in, indicating that FRELIMO had become jittery. So it was decided to switch all attention to a new area.
On 14 April I moved east of the areas we had disturbed. At midday Chris Weinmann and I checked in for a routine exchange of information. Chris said he was onto something big in the very area I had warned him to treat with caution. I was doing well myself and told him so. At 12:30 I checked in with Chris again but received no reply.
Every five minutes thereafter I called Chris, but still no reply. I wondered if he had returned to Centenary, or maybe the small Portuguese base at Nova Mague just south of the Zambezi River. Maybe he was trying to arrange for attacks on whatever he had found. But I could not understand why he would have done this without letting me know. By 14:30 I had become very concerned but was unable to talk to Rob Gaunt because Estima was out of radio range and a relayed discussion was not possible as Kevin and Mark had already returned to base.
When I reached Estima at around 15:30, Rob Gaunt sent a signal to Air HQ requesting Ops to establish if Chris had returned to Centenary. The Portuguese were asked to check with Nova Mague but, unfortunately, that small base was only contactable on routine radio schedule at 17:00. In the meanwhile, Rob Gaunt had accepted a challenge from the brigadier and his adjutant to a shooting competition with Rob and me.
On our first shoot from 100 metres Rob and I, using FN rifles, had fired off ten rounds each before the brigadier and his adjutant, using Armalite rifles, had fired their second shots. We beat them hands down. The brigadier was not at all impressed by the ‘reckless rate of fire’ we had displayed and emphasised how one needed to fire, settle, aim and squeeeeze the trigger. We said we should try this at 200 metres. But, again, Rob and I cleared our magazines before our challengers had fired second shots. We were already standing up as the brigadier fired his third shot and Rob whispered to me, “I put my tenth round into the brigadier’s target. Lets see how he reacts to being called a cheat.” We never did find out because, during our walk to inspect targets, we were all summonsed urgently to the Ops Room. Chris Weinmann had not landed at Centenary or any other Rhodesian base and Nova Mague reported that no aircraft had been seen or heard all day.
Search for Chris
I PREPARED IMMEDIATELY TO COMMENCE SEARCHING for Chris who I knew must be in serious trouble. Rob Gaunt advised Air HQ of my intention but received an order that I was not, under any circumstances, to fly until cleared to do so. This clearance was only given one and a half hours after sunset following continuous niggling to let us off the leash. I intended to fly alone but Mark Knight persuaded me that I needed a second pair of eyes to watch my blind side for any distress signal that Chris may use if his emergency beacon was not working.
It was a very black night and the vague line of the Zambezi River was just sufficient to get us to a point south of where Chris had reported “something big”. Although we were flying around 10,000 feet above the ground, it still makes me shudder to recall how, for Chris’s sake, we deliberately flew with our rotating beacons flashing brightly. This provided any Strela operator with the most perfect aiming point for a missile that would easily detect our exhaust heat against the cold black sky. Were we brave or stupid? It is impossible to say because our safety seemed less important than the safety of our colleague on the ground.
Mark and I had agreed that lights had to be used just in case Chris was running, breathless and unable to hear the aircraft. For three hours we ran an expanding square search but heard no emergency signal and saw absolutely nothing save one group of small fires burning inside a Portuguese aldeamento. We felt to
tally helpless and were overwhelmed by a deep sense of foreboding by the time we returned to Estima after midnight. Rob told us that our three Trojans and crews were required to position at Nova Mague next morning to participate in a search for Chris. He also let me know that he had received a signal revealing that one of my junior technicians, Senior Aircraftsman Rob Durrett, had been flying with Chris.
Rob left all of our ground equipment at Estima, at least for the time being, so that we could continue with Op Marble when this became possible. He returned to Thornhill by Dakota once my three aircraft were airborne for Nova Mague.
At Nova Mague, the Operations Officer (I cannot recall who it was) and a team of Volunteer Reserve men were setting up communications in a tiny building next to the grass airstrip whilst others unloaded tents and supplies from a Dakota. Four helicopters, two Trojans and two Provosts released by FAFs 3 and 4 arrived just behind us. More aircraft arrived later from New Sarum and Thornhill.
Inside the small communications room was a large, beautifully carved wooden casket containing the body of a Portuguese soldier. It had been there for many months awaiting shipment to Portugal. The casket lay elevated on boxes at a height that made it an ideal working platform for 4 and 7 Squadron’s flight authorisation and aircraft F700 technical log books. Each time a pilot or technician came to attend to these he would say something along the lines, “Excuse me Alfredo” and on completion, “Thanks Alfredo”.
Based on what I knew, and supported by Peter Cooke’s knowledge of Chris Weinmann’s intended recce area on the day he went missing, a search involving every squadron had been planned by the Air Staff. The area stretching northwards from the Zambezi River had been broken into defined blocks, each to be searched by its assigned squadron. Operating in pairs, Hunters, Canberras, Vampires, Dakotas, Provosts, Trojans and Alouettes were involved. A commando of the RLI was on hand to protect Nova Mague and to give ground assistance as soon as either the missing aircrew or the Trojan was found.
Winds of Destruction: The Autobiography of a Rhodesian Combat Pilot Page 55