The moment the dogs were put on the trail it became obvious to me that they were not going to run. After a number of failed attempts I landed back at the farm and questioned the two trackers. Neither one had ever seen action and both had heard horrifying stories of soldiers and airmen being killed in helicopters. I decided then that the dogs must have sensed their handlers’ fear and that this was the reason they had reacted badly. I needed to prove this.
With JOC Hurricane’s approval I arranged for a group of black soldiers to lay a trail from the same farm at the same time as the CTs had attacked it. Next morning I put down on their trail at the same time we had landed on the CT trail the day before. The dog handlers knew there would be no shooting at the end of the run and the dogs reacted normally, easily running down the soldiers ten kilometres from the start point.
The handlers’ fear of potential CT fire and the adverse effect this had on their dogs had been proven. However, to give dog handlers airborne combat experience was an impossibility that threw the whole radio tracker dog concept out of the window. My own very biased opinion is that had I spent another year on helicopters back in 1969 this situation would have been foreseen and many successes might have resulted. The obvious solution was to train Air Force dogs to be handled by combat-experienced helicopter technicians or soldiers.
More enemy reversals
ZIPRA HAD BEEN PRETTY INEFFECTIVE inside the country because sporadic RSF actions had disallowed them from establishing themselves in the N’debele tribal areas as effectively as their ZANLA opponents had done in the east. So troubled were ZAPU’s leaders about their waning image that they even resorted to claiming one of ZANLA’s notable successes. This was an attack against the large fuel storage depot in Salisbury’s industrial sites.
During the night of 11 December 1978, a small ZANLA sabotage unit fired RPG 7 rockets into three fuel-storage tanks, setting them alight. Such surprise was achieved that the CTs were gone before the Police protection detachment realised what had happened. The resulting fires radiated such intense heat that the tanks partially collapsed, spilling fuel in a chain reaction that destroyed twenty-two of the twenty-eight tanks in the complex. This attack dealt Rhodesia a near-crippling blow and it took three long months before the country’s precious fuel reserves were restored.
In the meantime, ZIPRA agents and operatives in Rhodesia, obviously following ZANLA’s lead, had been very busy recruiting in Matabeleland causing JOC Tangent great concern for the sudden high outflow of youngsters to Botswana. Most were being taken out at gunpoint! Nevertheless ZIPRA was still considered to be in a state of disarray following earlier SAS activities in Zambia. So, for the time being, ZANLA remained our primary concern.
During the latter quarter of 1977, the SAS was moved into the Gaza Province in an attempt to subdue that region in the manner they had tamed Tete. Unfortunately SAS was too small a unit to handle both provinces at the same time and the replacement troops sent to Tete did not operate in the same effective manner as SAS, simply because they were not trained for such specialised work. Consequently FRELIMO and ZANLA in Tete Province were let off the hook. Instead of being the hunted, they became the hunters again, which allowing CTs to pour into the Op Hurricane areas virtually unchecked.
In Gaza the SAS had good successes but they also had a very hard time. The FRELIMO Government had given greatest priority to assisting ZANLA with its main thrust into the southeast of Rhodesia. Because the Selous Scouts, SAS and air operations into Gaza had not been sustained on an ongoing basis, FRELIMO had been given the breathing space needed to build up substantial force levels to maintain the infiltration line for ZANLA.
Just before SAS was temporarily withdrawn from Gaza for the Op Dingo attacks on Chimoio and Tembue, a larger than normal SAS team dropped into Gaza Province on 1st November 1977. In an endeavour to mislead FRELIMO about the purpose of the para-Dakota’s presence, the Dakota crew descended to low level to hand-launch Alpha bombs through the open cargo door along the general line of the railway. A very bad moment was experience when the Dakota inadvertently passed directly over heavily defended but blacked-out Mapai. The pilot bunted the aircraft in his endeavour to escape enemy 12,7mm, 14,5mm and 23mm fire that was ripping through his aircraft. In so doing, loose Alpha bombs and bodies floated in the air until forcibly dumped onto the floor when the aircraft levelled-off sharply too close to the ground for comfort.
Two days later, on 3 November, the SAS team brought a large convoy of FRELIMO vehicles to a halt when the lead vehicle struck the land mine SAS had laid as an initiator to their planned ambush. However, a series of explosions from ordnance on this vehicle made it impossible for the rest of the column to continue forward. Fearing air attack, the convoy backtracked a short distance and moved off the road.
The SAS had inadvertently hooked a much larger fish than the ZANLA convoy they had been expecting. They backed off immediately because the FRELIMO force was much too large and angry to engage. Through Giles Porter, (callsign C4) flying a Lynx with the SAS airborne liaison officer, Captain Bob MacKenzie, Air Force Hunters were called in for a dawn attack to destroy the vehicles, now hidden in the cover of dense trees and out of sight of the SAS men on the ground.
Vic Wightman and Dave Bourhill came in as Red Section. John Annan and Spook Geraty followed later as White Section. The term ‘Bingo’ in Vic Wightman’s ASR means ‘minimum fuel remaining’.
Vic’s ASR reads:
Red Section arrived in the target area at approx. 0540B. C4 pointed out the burning vehicle which was about one kilometre up the road from where the hidden vehicles were believed to be. As no vehicles were visible either to C4 or Red Section, C4 suggested that Red Section descend to low level and have a look. Red Lead declined the offer on the grounds of fuel consumption and poor spotting capability at low level, whereupon C4, with a commendable display of moral fibre, descended to 50 feet and flew up the road from South to North. When he reached the assessed position of the hidden convoy a large number of twinkles from intense enemy fire appeared from the bush to his left with airbursts assessed to have come from 37mm. As he broke away to the right Red Section turned in and fired long bursts of 30mm into the AA positions. After Red Section’s first attack something (possibly a vehicle) was seen to be burning.
During the dive for the second attack, Strela smoke was seen heading northeastward. Another Strela was fired at Red Lead as he pulled up to perch for the third attack and the airburst was seen some way behind the aircraft. Red 2 also had a Strela fired at him as he pulled up. This is not the first time Red Lead has had Strela fired at him and there is no difficulty in identification.
Red Lead’s third attack was guns only at the Strela site—Red 2 used 24 Matra. Since all 30mm ammo was used up and, at most, one vehicle was burning, Red climbed to FL 200 and called for another pair. While in the holding pattern several glints were seen which might have been reflections off windscreens. The position of one of these was noted. Red 2 ran short of fuel before White Section arrived but Red Lead was able to place 6 Matra at the position at about 0645B just as fuel reached Bingo for Buffalo Range. It was a lucky guess for the unseen vehicle burst into flames and started exploding.
At 0615B White Section was airborne. En route they were briefed by Red Lead and C4 on the situation and the AA. As they arrived overhead they observed Red Lead’s final strike. C4 asked White Lead to strike along the left of the road in a northerly direction and White 2 along the right. Both used Matra and 30mm and were on target as observed by C4 who was by this time overhead at FL 120. As White 2 was pulling out of his attack he saw a group of vehicles just to the left of and about 2/3 along his line of strikes. He attempted to get White Lead’s eyes onto target by clock reference from the burning vehicle.
White 2 observed White Lead’s second strike to be at the left of the assessed position of the (unseen) group of vehicles and while pulling out White Lead also noticed them. Both he and White 2 attempted another strike but only saw the vehicles after
ceasefire though White 2’s second and third attacks appeared to rake through them. His subsequent attacks were to no avail as a 7.62 round had severed his armament circuits. White Lead was also having difficulty with intermittent firing. At this stage C4 assessed the targets as severely damaged and he recommended that no further Hunters be called for. White Lead was streaming fuel from his port 230 tank so diverted to Buffalo Range. White 2 returned to base.
As can be seen from the ASR, the Hunter pilots did not fully realise what damage they had inflicted. Giles Porter and Bob MacKenzie had been extremely lucky to survive the low pass in which unbelievably heavy fire, including flak and missiles, was directed at them; but this brave action had succeeded in finding the convoy. The SAS on the ground said the Lynx passed through the heaviest fire they had ever witnessed, making it all the more amazing that the Lynx suffered no hits.
During the night two days after the attack, a close-in reconnaissance revealed that the SAS had halted a mobile brigade including Russians who were aiming to establish this brigade’s HQ in Mapai. Thirteen brand-new transporters and specialist vehicles had been destroyed along with spares for Russian tanks that were already in position at Mapai
Actions such as this should have been sustained but, with the SAS withdrawal from Gaza for Op Dingo, breathing space was again given to FRELIMO and ZANLA, allowing the rate of incursions into the Op Repulse area to increase. By now FRELIMO, incensed by Rhodesian forces’ actions against them, increased their own numbers entering Rhodesia.
The SAS had expected to return to Gaza immediately following Op Dingo but their expertise was needed in Zambia and Botswana to counter renewed threats from ZIPRA’s attempts to establish an effective front in Matabeleland.
In what was probably the most successful ambush of the war, ZIPRA lost large numbers of men and equipment in an SAS ambush in southern Zambia. After the ambush landmines were laid to take out ZIPRA hierarchy who were sure to visit the scene once they felt it was safe enough to do so. Three days later, in spite of Zambian Army assistance and a very precautionary approach to inspect the devastation, ZIPRA suffered the loss of its military commander, Alfred Nkita Mangena, and three senior men wounded when their vehicle detonated one of the landmines that awaited them. SAS had put ZIPRA on the back foot again, giving the overstretched RSF the respite they needed.
Deaths of du Toit and Nelson
AS STATED EARLIER, FRELIMO AND ZANLA had regained composure and control in the Tete Province following the withdrawal of the SAS. RLI teams were still there when, on 28 July 1978, two G-Cars with a Lynx in support were tasked to uplift callsign 74. This was about thirty kilometres north of the position where Cocky Benecke’s Mini-golf bomb had relieved RLI callsign 75 eight days earlier. However, due to an aircraft un-serviceability problem, the RLI officer responsible for the external operation arrived to give the aircrew a briefing very late in the day. This unavoidable situation was a contributing factor to developments that occurred when it was too late to call for Hunter support.
Just before sunset and about three kilometres short of c/s 74, Francois du Toit was leading Air Lieutenant Nigel Lamb at about twenty feet above the trees when both helicopters came under intense fire from their left side. Francois, flying some 100 metres to the left of Nigel, was seen to flare indicating he was force-landing before disappearing from Nigel’s view behind trees.
Still under heavy fire, Nigel had no alternative but to press on to collect c/s 74 to bring troops back to check on the downed helicopter. As he did this, Nigel briefed Flight Lieutenant Mike Abrams flying the accompanying Lynx. When Nigel looked up for the Lynx he saw that “flak was bursting all around the aircraft.” This was most likely RPG 7 rockets and Strela.
Due to high fuel weight, Nigel could only lift two men from c/s 74. Under supporting fire from the Lynx, he deposited the two soldiers, now called 74A, on the ground about fifty metres from the downed helicopter; but these two men came under intensive fire the moment the helicopter turned around to collect the remaining two members of c/s 74.
The weight of fire coming from a position just fifty metres from the crash site, which was over to 74A’s right, showed the enemy’s strength to be far too great for the two soldiers. Nevertheless they managed to get to within thirty metres of Francois’ aircraft and reported that there was no movement whatsoever from the badly flattened helicopter. By then heavy fire, including RPG 7 rockets, was also being directed at c/s 74A and the Lynx from high ground 200 metres west of the crash site. Fire was returned by c/s 74A, the Lynx and the returning G-Car, but 74A remained pinned down.
Moving behind the cover of a low ridge, Nigel and his technician-gunner Chris Saint, dumped everything possible from their fully laden Alouette preparatory to rescuing c/s 74A. There was no time to dump the helicopter’s refueller or the hot extraction gear. Fighting jangled nerves and uncontrollable shaking of his legs, Nigel flew back to recover the very distressed pair of soldiers. As he went he prayed for a safe LZ, a reliable engine and a very strong gearbox. Under heavy fire Nigel found a suitable LZ and Mike Abrams attacked to draw attention to himself whilst the two soldiers made a bolt for the helicopter. When the two panting men arrived, Nigel ordered them to abandon their packs before making a substantially overweight lift–off for Rhodesia. To have left the four RLI soldiers on the ground for the night was never a question, and it was too late to bring in other soldiers to the crash site.
The next day, with Hunters overhead, the RLI moved in and confirmed what was already known. Flight Lieutenant du Toit and Sergeant Nelson were dead, Francois having been mortally wounded in the initial ground fire. He died in his seat before he could complete the autorotative forced landing he had initiated. Either bullet wounds or the resulting crash killed his technician because both bodies were riddled with bullet holes. Many years after this incident, Nigel told author, Beryl Salt, “I have found it more comfortable to believe that these were inflicted before impact.”
Like so many of our aircrew youngsters then engaged in operations, I hardly knew Sergeant Nelson (whose brother had leaped to his death from the burning helicopter). On the other hand I knew Francois very well; and Beryl had a particularly soft spot for this super young man with his ever-ready smile.
Second Tembue attack
I ONLY LEARNED OF FRANCOIS’ DEATH when I was about to get airborne for another attack on Tembue, again as the Admin Base commander. It was early morning on Sunday 30 July when we set off for the Train to refuel in freezing cold weather before continuing on to Tembue. ZANLA had reestablished Tembue base a relatively short distance away across the main road running from Tete town to Zambia to the east of the original base. This base was nothing more than a number of interconnected camp areas containing small bashas with no major structures such as kitchens, lecture rooms or latrines.
Two two-man Selous Scouts recce teams had been sent in but one was blown almost immediately forcing it to call for hot extraction. However, Schulie and his man remained in position and reported that, whilst CT numbers were way below expectation, there were certainly CTs present at the end of the base that they could see from their hide.
Airstrikes went in on time followed by paratroopers, helicopter-borne troops and K-Cars. The DC7 staggered over the Admin Base and put down the protection party, ammunition and fuel exactly where I wanted them dropped. This admin base lay in a vlei three kilometres to the west of the main road with Tembue 2, commencing some six kilometres away and stretching eastward for another six kilometres to Schulie’s hiding place. Earlier admin area experience made the matters of parachute- and drum-handling run smoothly despite the discomfort given by the presence of many itchy buffalo-bean bushes. On this occasion I had a folding chair and a table on which to place my radio and keep simple records under a huge mahobahoba tree.
It was clear from the outset that very few CTs were being accounted for. Selous Scouts blamed the Air Force for dropping the paratroopers in the wrong place, forcing them to walk too great a distance to the CT bas
e areas in which the embers of many night fires still glowed red. Unfortunately Selous Scouts had changed character a great deal by this stage in the war and were quick to point fingers when they themselves may have been at fault. Anyway, I have no doubt that Flight Lieutenant Dave Thorne, who led the four paratrooper Dakotas, placed the troops precisely where they were supposed to land.
At midday FRELIMO came to the party and commenced firing at helicopters crossing over the main road between the CT camps and the Admin Base. Explosions from the hills close behind us had me really worried until the protection troops said these were no more than echoes from the exploding RPG 7 and Strela warheads being fired at passing aircraft. Nevertheless there was now some concern for the safety of the helicopters and personnel in the Admin Base area, so SAS sticks were flown in from unproductive sectors of the CT bases to bolster the existing Admin Base protection party.
During the afternoon one helicopter coming in to land passed directly over another whose rotor blades were still slowing down after engine shutdown. This forbidden action resulted in the helicopter on the ground sustaining damage when its still turning blades flapped down into the tail cone. Moments later, a sound resembling heavy-calibre machine-gun fire in the centre of the Admin Base made everyone dive for cover before it was realised that another helicopter’s rotor wash had drawn in a parachute that was being flayed by its fast-moving blades. Fortunately the only damage incurred was the destruction of the small plastic reservoirs on top of the rotor head; but these contained vital hydraulic fluid for the rotors damper systems and the aircraft could not be flown.
Winds of Destruction: The Autobiography of a Rhodesian Combat Pilot Page 81