Externally things were going to hot up and prove just how seriously political restraints had increased costs and greatly expanded CT numbers.
ZIPRA plans revealed
DURING MARCH 1979, ACTING ON intelligence from their agent in Botswana, the Selous Scouts mounted an ambush on the main Grove Road linking Botswana with Zambia. This road ran close to Rhodesia’s western border where the Scouts established their ambush position. Their targets were two wellknown, high-ranking ZIPRA officers.
One was Dumiso Dabengwa (the ‘Black Russian’), second only to Nkomo and head of ZIPRA Intelligence. The other was Elliott Sibanda (the ‘Black Swine’), ZIPRA’s senior intelligence officer for the ‘Southern Front’ whose office was in Francistown, Botswana. These two men were transferring brand-new ZIPRA vehicles, purchased in South Africa, to Zambia.
When the Selous Scouts sprung its ambush, Dumiso Dabengwa escaped unharmed but Elliott Sibanda was seriously wounded and captured. Following stomach surgery that saved his life, Elliott Sibanda willingly gave the most important information we had received to date concerning ZIPRA’s future plans and dispositions.
We knew that ZIPRA indulged in a mix of conventional and irregular training and that the larger proportion of men had been preparing for conventional war. However, until Elliott opened Pandora’s box, we thought ZIPRA’s low level of activity was largely due to our external ops. Sibanda disabused us of such comforting thoughts.
Nkomo’s Russian advisors had persuaded ZIPRA to retain a limited force of active irregulars to keep Rhodesian eyes off the main intention, which was to invade Rhodesia. When the moment was right, the irregulars were to commit defined acts of sabotage in conjunction with a full-scale invasion by regular forces, supported by armour and air, in two drives via Victoria Falls in the west and Chirundu in the north.
Beira fuel refinery
WHILST SIBANDA’S INFORMATION WAS STILL being digested, the Selous Scouts were actively attempting to assassinate the elusive Joshua Nkomo in Lusaka and the SAS embarked on a daring operation to boost the MNR’s growing image by destroying the enormous fuel storage facility in Beira.
During Federation of Rhodesia and Nyasaland days and continuing for three months after the imposition of economic sanctions on Rhodesia, crude oil had been pumped from Beira to the Rhodesian fuel refinery at Feruka just west of Umtali. For this, Beira’s fuel storage capacity had been increased well beyond its original requirement, which was to service central Mozambique and Malawi. In consequence the target was huge.
In happier times it had taken only three hours for Rhodesian holidaymakers to motor from Umtali to the popular seaside resorts of Beira town. The Canberra that carried the SAS commander on a night reconnaissance to check the refinery’s lighting arrangements took a mere forty minutes from Salisbury. For the SAS and MNR attack group it took many days along a very circuitous route. Nevertheless they reached their target and, in a spectacular action, ignited the fuel tanks, severed the main fuel transfer line to spill crude into the docks and cut off the main electrical power-lines serving Beira town. They had completed their noisy job before FRELIMO defences woke up to what was happening.
During a running withdrawal under heavy FRELIMO gunfire, one MNR man was killed outright but was left where he lay. His body, plus many MNR leaflets and paraphernalia deliberately scattered around, convinced FRELIMO that the attack had been a purely MNR affair. The effects of this action really frightened the FRELIMO Government, which until now had been confident that the MNR was not powerful enough to target vital installations, particularly in built-up areas. In truth they were not; the SAS was responsible for the planning and its own specialists made up more than 90% of the attack force. All the same the world was awakened to the MNR’s existence and South African fire-fighters had to come to Mozambique’s aid to put out the raging inferno.
Assassination attempts
on Joshua Nkomo
BACK IN RHODESIA, DETAILED INTELLIGENCE given by Elliott Sibanda made it clear that ZIPRA’s invasion plan had to be stopped in its tracks—urgently.
A host of possibilities were discussed in COMOPS HQ. The courses to be taken were broken into four categories—assassination of key men—destruction of ZIPRA’s concentrated weapons holdings—attacks on ZIPRA regular force bases and—destruction of Zambia’s communication lines. It was clear that all of these things would have to be done, but priorities had to be established.
Consideration was given to eliminating ZIPRA’s Russian advisers who were all known in detail, including their home locations. However this was discarded as the benefits to be gained would be short-lived and the consequences to Rhodesia potentially damaging. Joshua Nkomo’s early demise made much better sense as it would cause major disruption to ZAPU’s leadership and profoundly affect morale, thereby giving us more time to produce detailed dossiers on all other targets.
Even before Elliott Sibanda’s information had come to hand, Selous Scouts had attempted to assassinate Nkomo using a car bomb. But, no matter where it was positioned, Nkomo always followed another route home; so another option was adopted. This was to kill the ZIPRA leader in his home, which necessitated having a Selous Scout in Lusaka to watch for the right moment. This was no easy matter as Nkomo spent a great deal of time on overseas and local travel. Once home however, he would remain there for the night. But, since there was no certainty he would be in his high-security house the following night, action had to be taken immediately Nkomo was known to have returned home. Three times Ron Reid-Daly received the codeword sent from Lusaka via a contact man in South Africa to say Nkomo was home, and three times the assassination group launched into Zambia.
The first group went in by helicopter for a night walk-in approach to RV with the agent. But the agent failed to turn up with transport to take them to target. This was because heavy rain had washed away a vital bridge between Lusaka and the assault group.
On the second occasion, the Scouts assault team was helicoptered to a drop-off point much closer to Lusaka. However, they encountered such heavy jesse bush that they were unable to reach the agent and his Toyota Land Cruiser, this time waiting at the RV point. Instead, the assault force found itself in the middle of a Zambian Army exercise and had to make a hasty retreat for helicopter recovery.
The third attempt probably gave the Scouts their best chance of success. This was a parachute descent onto the same road the agent had been using, but very close to Lusaka. Following their para-descent, which was to be controlled from the ground by the Scouts agent, the Dakota was to mask the purpose of its presence by flying straight on to drop pamphlets onto a known ZIPRA base.
Unbeknown to the Scouts, however, their agent had been arrested by Zambian police just after he had passed the codeword that launched the assault force into the air. In consequence, with nobody at the drop-zone, the troops had no alternative but to remain aboard the Dakota for the leafletdrop and an unhappy ride home.
Though certainly not for want of trying, Selous Scouts had experienced such unbelievable bad luck in their attempts to kill Nkomo that our COMOPS planning team recommended to General Walls that he should pass the task to the SAS. The general agreed.
When he learned of this decision, Ron Reid-Daly burst into COMOPS in a rage. He took the COMOPS decision as an insult to himself and his men. He could hardly be blamed for believing that the Selous Scouts were being badly rated by COMOPS, or for worrying about the profound effect this would have on the morale of his force. So it was with some difficulty that General Walls assured Ron that his COMOPS planning staff had simply recognised that such a run of bad luck had to be broken and a fresh start made.
When Ron had calmed down, he suggested that Selous Scouts should be given one more try. He advocated flying the assault team directly to the golf course that lay just over the road from Nkomo’s home. This was an intriguing idea which, being so utterly crazy and brazen, would almost certainly have worked—but considering the Scouts’ run of bad luck, Nkomo would probably be
away on his travels anyway. “No, Ron,” said General Walls, “the SAS have the task—and that is final!” But the Selous Scouts’ commander would not let go.
In an endeavour to reach some sort of compromise, Ron asked the general to let the team he had sent to Zambia participate with the SAS. This was flatly refused but, recognising Ron’s deep desire to have some level of Scouts’ inclusion, General Walls decided that SAS would take one white Scout who knew Lusaka backwards, he having been the agent with the car bomb. In addition, a black Scout who could speak Zambian languages would also join the SAS team to do any talking, should this become necessary.
The SAS were already in an advanced stage of planning when General Walls ordered them to include these two Scouts. To say that the SAS officers were incensed by this instruction would be understating the case. I recall that they were as mad as hell at such high-level interference in specialist planning that already included a navigator for Lusaka. The black Scout seemed a good idea but this, it was felt, should have come to them through Brian Robinson as a ‘useful suggestion’. But then, orders are orders!
Two SAS men were dropped from an operation considered by some to be ‘an exciting opportunity’. However, the men whose names were taken off the list had no idea of this because the plan was only known to a handful of officers right up to the moment the operation was launched.
Whilst this was happening, the Canberras were tasked for a second raid on ZIPRA’s Mulungushi camp. It was supposed to be another offset bombing raid in which Schulie would be setting up the RAMS flares. As it happened, Schulie called Ron Reid-Daly at Selous Scouts HQ late in the day to say the attack should be postponed because he had only seen a few ZIPRA in camp. Air HQ received this message but, with COMOPS concurrence, decided the raid should go ahead because the moon conditions were favourable for a visual attack. Ron Reid-Daly was unable to pass this decision to Schulie who had switched off his radio for the night and had set off for an even closer inspection of the target.
Why these vital changes in plan had failed to pass from Air HQ (the tasking agency in all air matters) to the Canberra boys I cannot say. They got airborne on the night of 10 April and, working to their original Air Task, proceeded to target fully expecting Schulie to ignite the outer flare at 19:00.
Ted Brent received no response to his calls to Schulie and no ignition of the inner flare occurred when he transmitted the RAMS coded signal. Though agitated by this turn of events, Ted could not avoid taking his formation directly over the target and drawing heavy fire from Mulungushi’s AA guns. He was blissfully unaware of Schulie’s close-in recce as he brought the formation around for the run onto a target whose specific location was readily identifiable from the source of tracer streams that continued to rake the sky.
Mulungushi barrack lines top left. ZIPRA HQ, stores and senior accommodation lie either side of the small sports field – bottom right. X marks, so far as I can recall, are positions of Russian tanks.
On the ground close to target, Schulie and his mate experienced a mixture of angry disbelief and fear when the changing position of the Canberras sound made it obvious that the jets were coming around again for a visual strike. All they could do was lie flat and pray until bomblets passed over them and detonated too close for comfort. ZIPRA on the other hand had been given so much warning that the casualties they sustained that night were low. According to intercepted Zambian radio traffic, only three ZIPRA were killed and twenty were wounded.
The Canberras returned to the same target at 08:30 the next day in hopes that senior ZIPRA officers would be doing their usual thing of visiting the base following a night attack. As it turned out this did not happen because, unbeknown to COMOPS at the time, all the CT brass was tied up in some special meeting in the Mulungushi Hall at Lusaka’s International Conference Centre.
That same afternoon at 17:30, Canberras and Hunters struck a ZIPRA training base known as Shilende Camp. After this attack, a Zambian Army unit’s communiqué to Army HQ in Lusaka reported having found 134 ZIPRA dead and over 200 wounded. Two days later, 13 April 1979, Nkomo was reported to be home for the night and the SAS assassination team was unleashed from its waiting position on the waters of Lake Kariba.
As usual during all our special ops, Brian Robinson and I remained in COMOPS with the duty staff through the whole night. We sat chatting and drank endless cups of coffee whilst awaiting codewords relayed from Lieutenant-Colonel Garth Barrett (SAS had changed from ‘squadron’ to ‘regiment’, hence the OC’s rank). Garth was with Wing Commander Peter McLurg in the Command Dak flying over uninhabited ground inside Zambia. The codewords would let us know the progress of the vehicle-borne force during its route to Lusaka and back.
Apart from the Command Dakota, there was nothing the Air Force could do to assist the SAS during the night. Nevertheless, Hunters at Thornhill and helicopters at Kariba would be waiting at immediate readiness before dawn in case the SAS had need of them. Two of the Hunters were armed with Sidewinder missiles to take on Zambian Air Force fighters posing any threat during the SAS exfiltration phase.
Because SAS had chosen to conduct a vehicle-borne operation using their own specialist Sabre Land Rovers, it gave opportunity to increase the force level and objectives for the foray into Lusaka where a number of worthwhile ZIPRA targets existed.
Serious consideration was given to including a team to release the Selous Scouts agent from Lusaka Prison; but this highly emotive issue, was dropped for two reasons. Firstly, if the rescue attempt failed and Zambians were killed—a real possibility—the agent would be identified for what he was and he would be left to pay a horrible price. Secondly, it would divert effort away from our main objective, which was to counter ZIPRA’s invasion plans.
Final selection was made for two additional targets. One was Zambia’s National Stores in which ZIPRA had amassed large quantities of war matériel alongside that of the Zambian Army. The second was Liberation Centre, the joint HQ for co-operative planning by senior officers of ZIPRA, South African ANC and SWAPO (South West African Peoples Organisation).
With the advent of landmines, SAS specialist Sabres (modified long-wheel-base, four-wheel-drive Land Rovers) had been withdrawn from active service—but they were just the vehicles for this operation. Seven Sabres and the three assault teams were waiting on the vehicle transport vessel Sea Lion. Then the signal came through to move from their starting point out on Kariba Dam’s deep waters where they had been waiting well away from prying eyes.
The force made an uneventful landing on the Zambian shore just before darkness fell and set off through rough country on an old disused road. Numerous difficulties were encountered in navigating at night along this indistinct track. Negotiating muddy rivulets with steep approaches made the going tough. One of these muddy ravines caused the loss of one vehicle through engine failure. The consequence of this was that critical equipment on the stricken Sabre forced National Stores to be dropped from the target list.
Because of its difficulties, the convoy was running late when it turned onto the main tar road to Kafue Bridge and Lusaka. The bridge was considered to be the greatest threat point of the entire mission. But, as it happened, the large Zambian Army protection force that was expected to be there simply did not exist, much to the relief of all concerned, and the convoy continued on to Lusaka without incident.
Whereas the attack on Nkomo’s home was scheduled for 02:00 it went in almost one hour late. Odd hiccups occurred in breaking through Nkomo’s elaborate security ring but these made no difference to the ultimate outcome. Following the elimination of moderate resistance by ZIPRA security guards and the destruction of the house, a thorough search failed to find the unmistakable fat body of Joshua Nkomo.
Considering the efficiency and completeness of the attack, there was great disappointment, even anger, for the SAS operators and the staff at COMOPS. But it was clear to us in COMOPS that Nkomo had been tipped off. The big question was, ‘by whom?’. This issue will be dealt with later.
But one thing needs to be said for the benefit of many people who believe that Ken Flower, Director of Central Intelligence, was the mole who gave early warning to Britain and CT leaders. In the case of Nkomo this was not possible. He was in COMOPS the whole time from launch to return of the SAS group. At no stage did he use a telephone of any signalling equipment. I have to say that I have always considered Ken’s number two in CIO to be the more likely culprit.
Not far away the team assigned to Liberation Centre put in its attack the moment they heard firing from Nkomo’s house. Having completed their noisy work and set explosive charges to blow Liberation Centre’s offices, armoury and many vehicles sky high, the team was preparing to depart when a ZIPRA vehicle came charging towards the SAS men. The vehicle was hit by a hail of bullets but careened on down the street and away into the night. The SAS did not know it at the time but they had come very close to killing ZIPRA’s second commander, Lookout Masuku. I will give Masuku’s account of this incident later.
The two task teams then linked up and the convoy travelled back to the rough bush track without incident. Behind them the President of Zambia was red-faced over such a commotion in peaceful Lusaka because it had disturbed the sleep of 300 guests engaged in the OAU Conference he was hosting.
Long after sunrise, the mission commander called for a helicopter to collect three soldiers who had been wounded during the attack on Nkomo’s house. This was to save them the agony of a very bumpy ride down the final tortuous stretch of track to the lake. By midday, the force was back on Sea Lion and the exhausted expedition commander was debriefing us in the COMOPS Op Room by mid-afternoon.
Nkomo’s house, after the attack.
Winds of Destruction: The Autobiography of a Rhodesian Combat Pilot Page 86