by Eric Hammel
*
On February 7, the 5/7 Cav advanced 2,600 meters southward and encountered nothing more than an occasional harassing mortar round. As the battalion was regrouping in the open a little after noon, they saw a Huey log ship pass over the huge kilometer-wide rice paddy that separated the Cav battalion from Thon Que Chu. The NVA mounted a tremendous small-arms volley and shot down the chopper. Lieutenant Colonel Vaught had wanted to attack into Thon Que Chu from the southwest, but now he was obliged to turn ninety degrees and attack straight across open fields, for the log ship had fallen to earth in front of Thon Lieu Coc Thuong, the hamlet from which Sweet's 2/12 Cav had attacked Thon Que Chu on February 3. Thon Lieu Coc Thuong was just south of Highway 1 and about 300 meters northwest of the northern tip of Thon Que Chu. However, to get there, Vaught's battalion had to attack to the north-northeast, with the heavily wooded area of Thon La Chu and Thon Que Chu on its right flank.
A preparatory barrage of artillery and naval gunfire was hurriedly arranged, and the 5/7 Cav turned to its left and attacked into the flat, open rice-paddy area with Company A on the left and Company B on the right. Company C was screening the battalion right flank; Company D was in reserve, guarding everyone else's packs. Major Charlie Baker, the battalion operations officer, thought the battalion "looked grand" as it stepped off into the attack, "sort of like a Civil War scene, but with ten meters between our people." A huge wooded area—Thon Que Chu and adjacent Thon La Chu—loomed to the right as far as the eye could see, but 1,000 meters of absolutely flat, open ground separated the first file of Cav troopers from the downed log ship.
Nothing happened. The Cav battalion jumped off at 1320, but there was no resistance and there were no casualties. The crew of the downed Huey and all the supplies were recovered. Since there were no other helicopters available to recover the Huey, the Cav troopers stripped it of its machine guns and other useful equipment.
Civilians brought in for interrogation revealed that the NVA force that had been occupying Thon Lieu Coc Thuong had withdrawn to the north, across Highway 1, as soon as the artillery and naval gunfire began. The weather suddenly changed from moderately bad to thoroughly lousy—cold, rainy, and overcast— so the main body of the battalion set in for the night in Thon Lieu Coc Thuong. Company D was unable to come forward with the packs because no log ships were available. To play it safe, after sunset, Company D carried all the packs to a new location 400 meters away. The company was not molested, but sentries spotted the muzzle flashes of mortars in Thon Que Chu that were firing on PK 17. An artillery fire mission was called on target by the forward observer attached to Company D, and the NVA. mortars shut down.
Following the bloodless attack on Thon Lieu Coc Thuong, Major Baker, the battalion operations officer, conducted a detailed inspection of the NVA defensive positions. What he found were about thirty NVA fighting holes—neatly squared-off excavations a little over a meter deep and covered over with thin roofs of native materials just strong enough to stop artillery air-burst fragments. The villagers had spoken of "many" enemy, but Major Baker found only enough fighting holes for an NVA platoon.
On February 8, the main body of the 5/7 Cav stayed put in Thon Lieu Coc Thuong and established mutually supporting company perimeters. Log ships remained unavailable, so Company D and the packs stayed where they were.
Early in the day, Lieutenant Colonel Vaught established an observation post in the trees at the northeast corner of the Thon Lieu Coc Thuong "island." From there, careful observation of the enemy island revealed an inordinate amount of activity around what appeared to be a large concrete structure deep within the trees. By late morning, observers were certain that the bunker had an NLF battle flag flying over it. Lieutenant Colonel Vaught arranged for an artillery fire mission against the bunker, but the 105mm high-explosive rounds just bounced off the structure. It was not until later that Vaught learned that he was looking and firing at the American-built ferroconcrete bunker that the Tri-Thien-Hue Front was using as its headquarters. (In fact, the bunker, three stories high and two stories deep, had been proposed, designed, and built with American funds and supplies by a local contractor who was eventually unmasked as an NVA major with an engineering degree.)
After noon, Lieutenant Colonel Vaught decided to conduct a reconnaissance in force against Thon Que Chu. Two rifle platoons from Captain Howard Prince's Company B prepared to move out of Thon Lieu Coc Thuong's treeline and advance toward Thon Que Chu. Unknown to Lieutenant Colonel Vaught, Captain Prince, or anyone else in the 5/7 Cav, the two infantry platoons had been assigned a mission that Lieutenant Colonel Dick Sweet's entire 2/12 Cav had accomplished on February 3 only after a bloody day-long struggle.
Captain Prince arranged his force in a single column and, at 1600, pushed off into the stubbly, fallow paddyfield. Nothing happened as the Cav troopers moved across the open field, but, as soon as they entered the woods, the NVA ambushed them from three sides. The 1st Platoon was hit hardest, and every man in the lead squad was killed or wounded. The survivors were hopelessly outnumbered, but the NVA made no move to leave their positions and overwhelm them. As the battalion command group tried to assist from inside the Thon Lieu Coc Thuong perimeter, a single stream of .51-caliber machine-gun bullets from Thon Que Chu struck the side of a house just behind the battalion TOC hole. The machine-gun fire kept the battalion staff pinned down for about thirty minutes, and then it suddenly ceased.
Company A launched a feint around Company B's left flank, alleviating some of the pressure on the survivors. Even so, it took three hours and a supreme effort for Captain Prince and his troopers to disengage and withdraw with their six wounded comrades. Artillery smoke rounds helped a great deal when it came time for the two Company B platoons to pull back across the 300-meter open space. About 1,500 high-explosive artillery rounds and several dozen aerial rockets blotted out the NVA positions. Despite incredible acts of bravery and devotion, however, all three of Company B's dead—the 1st Platoon point element—had to be left where they fell, just inside the Thon Que Chu treeline.
The wounded could not be medevacked until after dark, because the NVA had most of Thon Lieu Coc Thuong zeroed in. When the medevac birds finally arrived, the weather was so bad that the crews could not find the strobe lights set out to mark the day's LZ. Despite the inherent danger, the pilots turned on their landing lights to mark their positions in the sky, and the helicopter ground team talked them down safely. Though the NVA certainly could have driven off the medevac birds with machine guns and mortars, they withheld their fire.
In the wee hours, an all-volunteer patrol crept back to Thon Que Chu to collect the three KIAs who had been left behind. Though the patrol could hear NVA soldiers talking, the troopers were not attacked, and they brought back all three of the dead.
NVA mortars attacked the isolated Company D perimeter in the middle of the night, and three troopers were wounded. Company C's 60mm mortars were able to lay on the NVA from within the Thon Lieu Coc Thuong perimeter, and their fire shut off the NVA fire.
By the next morning, the Thon Que Chu-Thon La Chu island had a nickname known to everyone in the 5/7 Cav: T-T Woods, or, in the vernacular of the day, Tough-Titty Woods.
*
On February 9, Lieutenant Colonel Dick Sweet's 2/12 Cav left its high-ground position and attacked the defended hamlet of Thon Bon Tri. The hamlet was right at the base of the Annamite Cordillera, due south of Thon La Chu and astride Provincial Route 554. The move down from the mountain was not contested, but the NVA opened a fierce defensive fight as soon as the Cav troopers approached Thon Bon Tri itself. There was a persistent shortage of artillery rounds in the U.S. Army fire bases north of Hue. Since 1,500 precious rounds had been expended in support of Company B, 5/7 Cav, on February 8, it took all the limited artillery available on February 9 to support Sweet's hard-pressed battalion. Nevertheless, by day's end, Sweet's thin companies were able to push 300 meters northward through the heavily built-up area. A
gainst an unknown number of NVA casualties, Sweet's battalion lost two killed and fourteen wounded.
Throughout February 9, Vaught's 5/7 Cav remained inside Thon Lieu Coc Thuong, strengthening its defensive positions. The 5/7 Cav was mortared several times during the day, every time a helicopter flew over or tried to set down. By the late afternoon, the NVA mortars had the Company B and Company C positions zeroed in. In no time, Company B had sustained nine more wounded, including a platoon leader, and Company C had lost twelve wounded. Until medevacked after dark, one of the wounded men screamed so loudly that everyone within earshot just about ground their teeth to dust.
Since log ships from Camp Evans remained unavailable and the LZs inside the battalion position were too dangerous, Company D finally humped all the packs in its care north to Highway 1 and, at 1700, rejoined the battalion main body through the back door. The return of the packs greatly improved the battalion's morale.
*
On February 10, Sweet's 2/12 Cav remained largely inactive inside Thon Bon Tri, and Vaught's 5/7 Cav continued to improve its defensive posture in Thon Lieu Coc Thuong and observe the NVA across the way. In the afternoon—after Company A, 5/7 Cav, had swept Highway 1 for mines—a logistics convoy rolled in all the way from Camp Evans. Several Company B troopers who were firing a .50-caliber machine gun from beside the grounded Huey were blown out of their position after an hour's sniping by a twenty-round 82mm mortar barrage from Thon Que Chu. A trooper who went back to retrieve part of the machine gun that had been left behind was shot dead by an NVA sniper. That night, word came down from the brigade intelligence officer that the entire Communist effort around Hue seemed to be controlled from the headquarters bunker in Thon La Chu.
Nothing much happened on February 11. The weather was execrable. The 2/12 Cav remained in Thon Bon Tri, and the 5/7 Cav stayed close to Thon Lieu Coc Thuong. At 0830, three NVA 82mm mortar rounds fired from Thon Que Chu wounded thirteen more troopers from Company B, 5/7 Cav, including the company exec.
After line-company officers and noncoms advised the battalion staff of the obvious—that NVA snipers and mortars had the Company B and Company C positions in the treeline zeroed in— Lieutenant Colonel Vaught ordered the main body of the battalion to shrink back 200 meters into a tight, well-constructed defensive position around the center of Thon Lieu Coc Thuong. Only well-concealed observation posts would be manned at the edge of the woods.
In the center of the 5/7 Cav's new battalion perimeter were three deep bunkers—the battalion aid station, the battalion CP, and the battalion TOC. Each new fighting hole was large enough to accommodate three troopers, and each was manned around the clock by at least one of the troopers assigned to it. Machine guns were sited in mutually supporting bunkers all the way around the battalion perimeter, and all the 81mm and 60mm mortars were preregistered on a host of targets and approach routes. Altogether, it was an impressive, formidable position.
As the troopers were digging in, Lieutenant Colonel Vaught requested and quickly received permission to mount a battalion assault the next day against the NVA headquarters bunker in Thon La Chu. Ample artillery support was promised, as well as fixed-wing and helicopter-gunship air support if the weather cleared. A carefully crafted operations order was drawn up.
That night, Jim Vaught taught his battalion a great deal about fighting in the dark. In the dead of night, a tripflare was set off, and the troops heard a lot of moving-around noise out in front of the battalion perimeter. Instantly, the battalion TOC was besieged with requests for illumination. Lieutenant Colonel Vaught denied the requests and declared that no one had permission to fire rifles or machine guns. Vaught passed the word that M-79 grenade launchers could be fired—they had no muzzle flash—but that the grenadier had better be able to show the battalion commander a dead body come morning. The noise to the front persisted, and troopers popped off several M-79s at fleeting targets. At first light, the dead body the battalion commander was shown proved to be that of a village pig.
***
Chapter 35
Major Charlie Baker worked on his plan of attack through the night; had it approved by Lieutenant Colonel Jim Vaught; and, at a dawn meeting on February 12, explained it to the company commanders and supporting-arms representatives. In its essentials, Baker's detailed plan differed little from the one the 2/12 Cav had executed on the run on February 3. In its initial phases, it was to cover much of the same ground. Two companies—A, on the left, and C, on the right—were to move to a line of departure tangent to the Thon Lieu Coc Thuong treeline. They would then assault across the open paddyfield area to two intermediate objectives: Company A would take the small wooded cemetery, and Company C would take Thon Phu O. Company A was then to reform and, under cover of artillery smoke rounds, attack into the northern edge of Thon Que Chu—T-T Woods.
Once inside the treeline, Company A was to re-form once again and press south through Thon Que Chu and Thon La Chu toward the Tri-Thien-Hue Front headquarters bunker. At the same time, Company C was to launch a flank attack in the open, down the west side of T-T Woods and on into the NVA headquarters sector in Thon La Chu. Company D was to be the battalion reserve, ready to jump off at a moment's notice. During the initial phases, Company B was to man a base of fire in Thon Lieu Coc Thuong, alongside the battalion's 81mm mortars, one 106mm recoilless rifle, and the .50-caliber machine gun. It would move forward as the situation demanded. Brigade informed the 5/7 Cav that the 2/12 Cav was going to launch a simultaneous attack from Thon Bon Tri into southern Thon La Chu, but a patrol from Lieutenant Dick Sweet's battalion encountered unexpectedly strong opposition, and the 2/12 Cav's attack was canceled.
The 5/7 Cav's attack, set to begin shortly after daybreak, was delayed because artillery support was not available in the morning. According to the new schedule, the assault companies were to cross the line of departure at 1230. Company C stopped short of the line of departure to wait for the exact time, but Company A kept going. Later, Major Charlie Baker asked the lieutenant commanding Company A why he had not stopped. The lieutenant's explanation led Baker to realize that the young officer did not know what a line of departure was. Baker blamed himself.
Company C stepped over the line of departure to support Company A's premature advance. The fire-support plan came unglued because the assault companies were reaching targets before the support could be fired. Company B covered the attack with direct fire, and that helped. Company A advanced beyond the cemetery and then wheeled slightly to the left, toward Thon Que Chu. As soon as Company A eased left, many NV manning positions within a facing bamboo thicket opened fire, forcing the Cav troopers to take cover behind a prominent paddy berm that ran from northwest to southeast. When Company A came under fire, Company C naturally stopped too. Company A had partial protection from the berm, but Company C went to ground in the open. Its only cover was the stubble in the paddyfield.
The Cav troopers came under increasingly intense small-arms fire from the bamboo thicket on Company A's left, while, 150 meters dead ahead of both companies, mortars and artillery were fired at the NVA—but without noticeable effect. Company D maneuvered to Company A's left, but it was pinned down in the paddyfield to the left of the cemetery.
*
As soon as the attack bogged down, Battalion requested ARA (aerial rocket artillery), an emergency ammunition re-supply, and fixed-wing air support. The companies made no further progress, but the ARA ships arrived and attacked the enemy-held woods. Meanwhile, ammunition-laden Huey log ships landed, through intense fire, behind the berm and the cemetery, only 150 meters from the NV^'s defense line. The first flight of Air Force jet attack bombers did not arrive until after 1400, but they attacked vigorously through broken cloud cover. Unfortunately, the spotter plane from which the jet strike was being coordinated had difficulty with low clouds and fired its marker rockets deep inside Thon Que Chu. Therefore, the effort was largely wasted. In the end, none of the outside support had much influence on res
tarting the ground attack, which had gone awry from the opening minutes.
The weather deteriorated through the middle and late afternoon, but Battalion kept requesting air support to fully prep the NVA-held treeline. Four separate jet strikes were unleashed upon the NVA. Coordination improved marginally following a tongue-lashing by Lieutenant Colonel Vaught, and the northernmost bamboo thicket and treeline facing the Cav battalion were reduced to kindling.
Throughout the hours-long softening-up process, Lieutenant Colonel Vaught peeked over the edge of a burial mound only fifteen meters behind the front line of Cav riflemen. Despite the incessant sound of gunfire and bombs, Major Charlie Baker heard a whump every time Vaught lifted his head. Baker realized that an NVA sniper had been attracted by the CP group's radio antennas. Fearing for Vaught's life, Baker finally said, "Sir, would you mind getting down here behind the mound with us? I think they have you spotted." Vaught just smiled and carried on. A short time later, Baker crawled to the left through sporadic sniper fire to alert Company D to its role in the upcoming attack.
Company D had moved out of Thon Lieu Coc Thuong and advanced with relative ease to the paddy dike that faced the northern tip of Thon Que Chu and extended at about a right angle from the dike Company A was using for cover. Thus, Company D was facing southeast toward the same bamboo thickets that the left half of Company A was facing from the west.