Among the articles of the new constitution established by the Third C.N.R.A. was one which pointedly described the F.L.N. as a unique party, pursuing independence by revolution; a reassertion of primacy that was to have far-reaching consequences when the first serious negotiations took place between the French and the Algerians. Then, hardly had the F.L.N. delegates packed their bags in Tripoli than “Barricades Week” broke out in Algiers. At its end, with the will of the European “ultras” broken for the first time and de Gaulle triumphant, it would have seemed that, for the F.L.N. moderates, the omens for meaningful peace talks were never better. But with the hard-liners now well in the ascendant the interpretation the F.L.N. placed on the events of January 1960 was one of the overall weakness of the French position, presaging a total surrender to the maximum F.L.N. terms. With justification the hard-liners could point out that the first four years of fighting had overthrown the Fourth Republic and brought in de Gaulle and electoral franchise for Algerian Muslims; the next year had achieved “self-determination” and, now, the sixth year of the war had begun with Frenchmen firing on Frenchmen — altogether a not unsatisfactory balance. All that was required was to fight on for a few more months, a year or two at most, and de Gaulle would be forced to negotiate — on F.L.N. terms. Thus in their first public statements following the levelling of the Algiers barricades both Abbas and de Gaulle spoke with the same voice: that of harsh intransigence. Abbas would speak in aggressive tones of persisting with “a long and murderous war”; de Gaulle to the army in March would call independence for Algeria “a monstrosity”; Abbas would riposte by terming this “a declaration of war on the Algerian people”. The language was motivated by identical stimuli: necessity to placate the hard-liners, who now, in each camp, were the army leaders. Tragically, as so often is the case in modern times, it would be the hardliners, the apostles of “no compromise”, who would triumph in the long run.
Si Salah: “Operation Tilsit”
In the midst of these unpromising auguries for peace talks, there suddenly occurred one of the more extraordinary episodes of the Algerian war. Had a stray visitor been able to penetrate the unusually rigid security guard at the Elysée on the night of 10 June 1960, he would have been amazed to see the President of the French Republic seated at his desk in conversation with three F.L.N. leaders.
The Algerians comprised the entire command of Wilaya 4, the key sector adjacent to Algiers, and they were headed by the Wilaya chief, Si Salah. The changeable fortunes of Wilaya 4 have already been recounted, from the time when, during the Battle of Algiers, it had presented a model command to the period when its infection by la bleuite (caught from Amirouche’s Wilaya 3) had almost brought it to its knees in a welter of debilitating purges. The one bright spot for the Wilaya 4 command then had been the adroit fooling of French intelligence by that redoubtable fighting commander, Major Azedine, who, when captured, had persuaded them of his intention to negotiate a surrender on behalf of the Wilaya leaders, and had then decamped, leaving his inquisitors humiliated — and extremely suspicious.
This had been at the end of 1958. Then, on 17 March 1960, the cadi of Médéa, a small town nestling in the Atlas some fifty miles south-west of Algiers, received three clandestine visitors. They were Si Lakhdar, a former mason with a reputation for aggressive courage who had succeeded Si Salah as intelligence chief of Wilaya 4, Halim, the political boss of the Wilaya, and Abdellatif, commander of the Médéa zone. The message they brought the astonished cadi was that Colonel Si Salah and themselves were desirous of negotiating de Gaulle’s formula of a paix des braves — so brusquely rejected by the G.P.R.A. — for Wilaya 4 and any others that might follow suit. But they would not negotiate with local military or civil representatives, of whom they were distrustful; it had to be a high authority in Paris. On receiving news of the démarche from the cadi of Médéa, French intelligence in Algiers immediately attached the utmost importance to it. Si Salah was respected as a highly serious and influential leader; a thirty-one-year-old Kabyle whose real name was Mohamed Zamoun, his father a teacher with Communist sympathies, he had been in the revolt from the very first day, was a close friend of Krim and Ouamrane, and had been a member of the C.N.R.A. since September 1958. His military deputy, Major Si Mohamed (alias Bounaama Djillali[2]), was also held to be perhaps the most dynamic of all the current A.L.N. leaders of the “interior”.
There were encouraging precedents for believing that Si Salah might be on the level; under the first pressures of the Challe offensive, had not one area commander, Youssef Smail, come over and then broadcast an appeal to his comrades to accept de Gaulle’s paix des braves? Moreover, secret radio intercepts by the French Bureau d’études et de Liaisons (or B.E.L. — the innocent-sounding Gaullist inheritor of the intelligence functions of the somewhat discredited S.D.E.C.E.) fully confirmed how grave was the state of disaffection inside Wilaya 4. Already in the summer of 1959 Si Salah was warning A.L.N. headquarters of the serious slump in morale following the heavy casualties inflicted by the Challe offensive, and at the beginning of December he was demanding arms and ammunition from the G.P.R.A. in unusually pressing and aggressive terms. In January a message from Si Salah to Boumedienne accused the “exterior” of neglectful arrogance, and cautioned it that “the maquis is tired and disheartened. De Gaulle proposed the paix des braves, and complete equality for all. That’s what we ourselves want…. If you don’t provide us with the means for waging war we shall accept that proposition. You can’t expect otherwise….” Agitated signals flashed back from A.L.N. headquarters requesting verification and clearly suspecting the hand of French intelligence. A few weeks later Si Salah despatched a more deadly communication to Tunis.
Is it true [he asked] that de Gaulle has addressed a peace plan to the G.P.R.A.? Why do they not take the advice of the “interior”? The struggle cannot continue: the people are tired, the combatants discouraged. If the G.P.R.A. does nothing, Wilaya 4 will make contact with the French to negotiate an end to the fighting. We shall hide a portion of the arms that remain….
On 7 March a terse signal from Si Salah was intercepted by the B.E.L.: “Failing a response to our plan, we shall move to execute it on 15 March.” A frantic, but stalling, reply came by return from the G.P.R.A.: “Think of the revolution. Wait. Instructions follows.” On 17 March Si Salah’s emissaries made their entry at Médéa.
In a very short space of time the information had passed from Colonel Jacquin, director of the B.E.L. in Algiers, upwards to de Gaulle. To all those privy to it, it looked like a first break in the monolithic façade of the F.L.N. Challe, about to relinquish his command, was especially enthusiastic. Here, it seemed, lay within reach the goal to which his whole strategy had been directed; a chance to administer the coup-de-grâce to the A.L.N. of the “interior”, and perhaps a last chance to retain some form of Algérie française. De Gaulle’s first reaction, rebuffed as he had been repeatedly in his overtures to the G.P.R.A., was also favourable, and from that moment was born “Operation Tilsit” — named (not without prescience) after that 1807 truce of unreality between Emperors Napoleon and Alexander aboard their raft in the middle of Niemen. For a whole year “Tilsit” was to remain a deadly secret to all but the handful entrusted with its execution.
To treat with the Wilaya 4 leaders, de Gaulle sent his own aide, Bernard Tricot, supported by Colonel Mathon from Premier Debré’s staff, and in the later meetings they were also accompanied by Jacquin of the B.E.L. The first, historic encounter took place on 28 March, a grey and cold night, in the Médéa prefecture, which, for once, stood unguarded. At the appointed hour, Bernard Tricot inside nervously lifted a corner of the curtain, peering out into the garden to see if anything was going to happen. After a few minutes three figures approached, walking unconcernedly down the street, and entered the building: “three young men with brown faces, correctly dressed in civilian clothes”. They introduced themselves: Lakhdar, Halim and Abdellatif. The contrast between the Algerians out of the maquis
and the urban, courteous Parisian intellectual, Tricot, must have seemed extreme, and there was a moment of awkward stiffness. The most at ease, noted Tricot, was Lakhdar, and the ice visibly thawed when Tricot explained that he was there as personal representative of President de Gaulle. The Algerians stated that they wanted a cease-fire, and beyond that an end to “European domination”. Soon they were spilling out their animosity against the G.P.R.A.; the people had suffered too much and “We ourselves now have hardly any regular contact with the exterior.” Tricot received the impression
of men who had wanted independence but who, perhaps, would be satisfied with an autonomy where their country would enjoy both liberty and the aid of France. But they had reflected little on the shape of the future. “Maquisards don’t see any further than the end of their submachine-guns,” said Lakhdar. What was certain was that the men we had in front of us thought that their struggle no longer had a raison d’être.
Three days later a second meeting took place, after which Tricot verified to de Gaulle that the Wilaya spokesmen were genuine.
A long series of talks now began at highly discreet rendezvous, sometimes in deserted corners of the bled, sometimes with the Algerians appearing in the guise Yacef had once favoured — with feminine garments enveloping their combat denims. Their first concern was that honour should remain intact; that acceptance of a paix des braves should in no way be allowed to look like capitulation. Accordingly, Bernard Tricot worked out a formula whereby the maquisards would “deposit for safe-keeping” their weapons in local gendarmeries (specifically not turning them over into army hands); they would then file away to their villages; only those guilty of “murder” would be placed under surveillance until the definitive end of hostilities; on reaching this point, France was to be trusted to institute a massive amnesty. The next hesitation of the F.L.N. leaders stemmed from an anxiety not to “desolidarise” themselves from their fellow combatants. They wanted to see Ben Bella to canvass his support; they wanted to go to Tunis to press their case there. Both propositions were refused by de Gaulle, and were indeed quite unrealistic; Ben Bella would have been unpersuadable; once in Tunis the F.L.N. would never have permitted them to return. They wanted more time to bring with them the maximum number of their adherents and, further, to spread the doctrine of what they called degaullisme to neighbouring disaffected Wilayas, notably Kabylia. They proposed an extended interregnum of eight weeks, during which time the French would cease all operations in the Wilaya.
There was consternation in the French camp at this delay, and — with memories of how they had been duped by Azedine — suspicions were aroused that Si Salah might yet be playing a double game. But Colonel Jacquin, now himself taking part in some of the clandestine meetings, was able to provide fresh assurance through intercepts of radio messages from Si Salah which disclosed a final break with the G.P.R.A.[3] Moreover, the inducement that Si Salah might spread the spores of degaullisme even beyond the confines of Wilaya 4 was highly alluring. The interregnum was agreed — though not (according to Jacquin) the cessation of anti-guerrilla activities, on the ground that this would imperil the secrecy on which all were agreed.
As May arrived the F.L.N. leaders (Si Salah had not yet presented himself) still seemed haunted by fears of being accused of treachery by those of their colleagues who still harboured misgivings; among them being, apparently, that tough soldier Si Mohamed, military deputy to Si Salah. Then, on either his fourth or fifth flight between Paris and Algiers, with the inspiration that altitude sometimes brings, “an unprecedented idea” occurred to Bernard Tricot; why not confound the doubters by whisking Si Salah to Paris for a meeting with the president himself? Surprisingly, de Gaulle immediately said “Yes”. Returning to Algeria, Tricot asked the F.L.N. leaders whether Si Salah would be prepared to talk to a “high political personage” in Paris, without mentioning the name of de Gaulle. On 9 June Tricot and Colonel Jacquin flew to Paris, taking with them Si Salah and Si Mohamed — both presenting themselves for the first time — and Lakhdar. Just in case the Algerians should be contemplating a Ben Bella operation in reverse, two plainclothes gendarmes were also abroad the aircraft. They were not needed; Si Salah — who turned out to be a good-looking man nearly six feet tall with intelligent features and a well-groomed moustache — suffered from air-sickness. Si Mohamed, a rugged individual with the roughness of the simple peasant, and Lakhdar — neither of whom had flown before — were preoccupied with the marvels of the flight, while Lakhdar ravenously consumed an entire camembert.
The following morning Tricot informed the astonished Algerians that, at ten o’clock that evening, the “personage” they were to see was no less than the President himself. To give them extra assurance that they came as trusted dignitaries, Tricot made a point that they should not be searched for weapons before entering the Elysée; he and Mathon would be the only others present at the interview in the room, and they would be unarmed. De Gaulle’s military aide, Colonel de Bonneval, was appalled at the security hazard, and — as a single precaution — a lone marksman was installed hidden behind a tapestry. The risks remained considerable, but de Gaulle — as always entirely fearless for his own physical safety — accepted them unhesitatingly. The Wilaya 4 leaders were obviously impressed by the simple dignity of de Gaulle’s reception. To Colonel Jacquin afterwards, Si Salah confided, “I had prepared a little speech, but was so moved that I let my heart speak.” De Gaulle opened by recalling his “self-determination” proposals; Si Salah repeated his aims that had been thrashed out with Tricot over the past months. Nothing new on either side. Then de Gaulle revealed to the Algerians that he was about to make, in four days precisely, a new appeal to the G.P.R.A. to discuss a cease-fire. In the event of their reply being unfavourable, he would proceed with Si Salah’s plan. Si Salah declared that he would go ahead and establish contact with the neighbouring Wilayas, but added that if the G.P.R.A. responded to de Gaulle’s overture, “then you will hear nothing more from us”. The interview over, de Gaulle rose to his feet and with proper formality declared: “Because we are fighting each other, I will not shake your hand, but I salute you.”
Thus ended the first, and only, direct conversation that de Gaulle was ever to have with any leaders of the Algerian revolt by which he had been brought to power.
Already on the flight back to Algeria Si Salah was expressing misgivings about de Gaulle’s projected appeal to the G.P.R.A.; if the latter were to accept, it would be nothing but a feint, he assured his French companions. On 14 June de Gaulle made his television broadcast, beginning somewhat patronisingly about the backwardness of his “old country”, which he said, must be made to “marry her time”. He spoke of a glowing future when “the Sahara natural gas, the reserves of which are inexhaustible, would be capable of transforming the existence of Algeria and influencing that of Europe”. Finally, he addressed himself, “in the name of France, to the leaders of the insurrection. I declare to them that we await them here in order to find with them an honourable end to the fighting that drags on”.
The army in Algiers was outraged by the directness of de Gaulle’s appeal to the G.P.R.A.; to them it seemed to be wholly at odds with all that he had promised he would not do during his March tournée des popotes. Even more outraged were those leaders, like Colonel Jacquin, privy to “Operation Tilsit”, who had understood from Si Salah that he would only go to Paris to deal with de Gaulle on the implicit understanding that the latter would not resume dealings with the G.P.R.A. On 18 June, though feeling that de Gaulle’s speech had pulled the carpet out from under Si Salah, Colonel Jacquin met him again and agreed to escort him to Kabylia en route for his voyage of persuasion to Wilaya 3 and its leader, Mohand Ou El-Hadj. On the 20th the G.P.R.A. in Tunis announced that, under certain conditions, it accepted de Gaulle’s invitation and would send a delegation to France. On the 21st Jacquin deposited Si Salah and his colleagues at the appointed meeting place in Kabylia.
It was the last time that any of them were see
n alive by Jacquin or any other French official.
The final act of “Operation Tilsit” remains clad in a grim mystery. According to General Jacquin, as he is today, a “killer” despatched from Tunis from the G.P.R.A. forced Si Mohamed — always the most reluctant of the Wilaya 4 leaders — to return to the fold, and imposed upon him the execution of his guilty peers. Lakhdar, Halim and Abdellatif were summarily put to death, while Si Salah — on account of his seniority and distinction as a maquisard — was ordered to make his way to Tunis and stand trial there. Many months elapsed, unaccountably, with Si Salah apparently still under arrest in Algeria. Jacquin’s B.E.L. attempted a cloak-and-dagger operation to liberate him, but without success. Then, in July the following year, Si Salah, evidently on his way to Tunisia at last, was killed in an ambush by a French patrol; little more than two weeks later, but in another corner of Algeria, Si Mohamed was also tracked down and killed in an opération ponctuelle mounted by the 11th Shock. The coincidence, and curious circumstances, of the deaths of the two leaders have encouraged anti-Gaullists in the French army to speculate, even today, that there may have been more to it all than met the eye. Undeniable it was that, following their deaths, no one was left on the Algerian side able to give evidence about the whole sad story of “Operation Tilsit”.
A Savage War of Peace Page 57