The Continentals stood firm and shot it out with the British infantry. When pressed, they withdrew, and fought again. They protected the militia, stopped, and then shattered the British infantry. The American dragoons moved rapidly in a very short time span to cover both flanks. At each encounter, Washington had many more men than the British unit he drove off.
Private soldiers probably did not understand the subtleties of Morgan’s tactics. They knew what they, and their company, were expected to do, and did it. Their diverse backgrounds and incorporation into cohesive fighting units is another vital part of the Cowpens story.
Tarleton had little choice but to attack at the first opportunity. He knew “of a corps of mountaineers being upon the march from Green river.” Since British numbers would get no larger, Tarleton could not allow American strength to increase. To encourage his troops and intimidate the Whigs, Tarleton ordered the 71st Regiment to take no prisoners.8 Tarleton deployed infantry behind the protection of dragoons and placed cavalry on both flanks. His primary reserve was initially the 71st Regiment because there was no room to deploy them beyond the 7th Regiment’s left flank. At the militia line, the field was wider and he started the 71st forward. His reserve then became four troops of British Legion dragoons.
Tarleton planned on overwhelming Morgan’s militia with a quick infantry charge, denying them any opportunity to use their rifles. When the British charge broke through, the fleeing militia would be attacked by his dragoons. If faced with heavy resistance, Tarleton was disposed to send units around both flanks to surround them while his infantry used their bayonets to their front. He was unable to do this at Cowpens.
Creating the battle maps demonstrated other facets about the Cowpens deployments. Computerized scaling of units indicates that the battlefield was constricted and that both Morgan and Tarleton misrepresented things. Morgan’s flanks were covered, on his right by the west ravine and then by the headwaters of a small creek. On the left, the skirmish line’s left flank was in the air, but militia and main lines were covered by canebrakes and wet ground unsuitable for cavalry operations. Placing units on the battlefield shows that the only times Tarleton’s men were “loosely formed” may have been when they initially deployed east of the Green River Road to drive in the skirmishers. The field narrows at the militia-line position. At the main line, British infantrymen were compressed, but their casualties before this point meant they did not cover much ground. American casualty distributions suggest the British were probably in a tight formation at the main line.
Initially, Tarleton did not deploy his cavalry against the American battle lines because he could not use them. American flanks were covered by ground unsuitable for mounted operations. An additional factor was the skirmishers on both flanks who used ground cover well. Only when open ground presented itself on the main-line flanks did Tarleton order dragoons forward. They were devastating when they dashed through Hammond, hit the militia, and went through McDowell’s flankers. Ultimately, the British dragoons were not successful because they were outnumbered when Washington confronted them.
Morgan countered British tactics to rout his riflemen by supporting militia with Continentals, the “regular force” Hanger mentioned. Morgan fed his men who waited with freshly loaded weapons and clear instructions about their roles. He opted to attack the British leadership. “Morgan’s marksmen . . . presented the means of introducing disorder into the ranks of the enemy.”9 Morgan’s men used a devastating first fire twice at Cow-pens, on the militia line and on the Continental line. Morgan used this “precious resource” very shrewdly. The British infantry, on the other hand, faced a first fire from two different lines, one armed almost exclusively with rifles, without having a chance to get their own volley in first.
North Carolina militia not only fought as skirmishers. They continued fighting throughout the battle, and on the right flank bought a crucial minute or two that saved the Americans. South Carolina militia did not cross the field, obstructing Continental fields of fire because Morgan carefully planned their withdrawal to avoid any disruption of his main line. The South Carolina militia withdrew quickly, in good order, through the main line. They were reforming and reloading, behind Triplett’s Virginians, when surprised by the 17th Light Dragoons and a panic occurred.
The mistaken order causing a withdrawal from the main line was the result of a series of mishaps. The fault appears to lie with Captain Conway Oldham, who did not comprehend what Wallace wanted to do. The error was compounded when Wallace gave his order at the same instant the 71st Regiment fired a volley into the Virginians. Once Wallace saw confusion, he had no choice but to stabilize his men by continuing their march to the rear, dressing their ranks on the move and then halting.
The error might be due to misunderstanding the drum beatings, but veteran troops would not confuse the beat for “right wheel” with “forward march” even if the preparatory command were missed.10 If the preparatory command “To the right wheel” given by Wallace and his drummer came at precisely the same time the 71st Regiment volley struck the Virginians, it is likely Oldham and his platoon heard only the command of execution and stepped off to the rear. The error was compounded by the Virginia State Troops to their left. Their company commander, John Lawson, was killed by the same volley. His replacement saw Wallace moving off and ordered his men to withdraw as well.
American cavalry struck several times in rapid succession. The keys to understanding what they did lie in the recollections of Thomas Young and James Simons, and a knowledge of how narrow the battlefield actually is. Once their accounts were reduced to specific episodes, Washington’s actions could be linked with infantry activity. After a charge of less than 100 yards, Washington hit the 17th Light Dragoons on the American left flank immediately after the South Carolina militia fired a volley into them. The British dragoons were outnumbered four to one at the point of contact and routed. Approximately one-fourth of the 3rd Light Dragoons pursued the British while Washington withdrew.
Washington quickly reformed and attacked Ogilvie’s British Legion troop that penetrated the American right flank. Again, it was a question of mass. Washington had well over a hundred men while Ogilvie had fewer than fifty. Washington rode through Ogilvie, then turned and rode back through the stunned British. The distance covered in this second charge was less than 200 yards out and back and took less than two minutes.
While Howard’s infantry turned about to fire their surprise volleys, Washington reformed. When Howard charged bayonets, American dragoons rode into the 71st, sabers flashing, and knocking men down with their horses. Washington then rode about eighty yards through small groups of British infantry toward the cannon. Here they may have shot the artillery horses. As Continental infantry swarmed over the cannon, Tarleton brought some dragoons forward. The two mounted parties clashed, then the British drew off. As they withdrew, three British officers engaged Washington. It is unlikely that Tarleton participated since MacKenzie, who harbored an intense dislike for Tarleton, did not mention it.
The collapse of the British infantry seemed incredible to Tarleton and later historians, especially the Scots. He described the failure as “unaccountable” and astonishing, due to “some unforeseen event.”11 Three British infantry disintegration episodes affected the outcome of Cowpens. The first occurred when the South Carolina militia volley fire hit the British. The second occasion involved the 71st Regiment when it was blasted by surprise fire after the Continentals had withdrawn. Then, some British soldiers involved in the main-line firefight failed to pursue the Americans when they withdrew. These failures can be described as two different psychological problems resulting from similar causes.
In the five days before Cowpens, the British were subjected to stress that could be alleviated only by rest and proper diet. Tarleton had four days’ rations before commencing his operations.12 He moved rapidly after Morgan, averaging about fourteen miles a day, but operating for long hours. The average distance traveled each day
is misleading because so much of it was stop-and-go movement as streams were crossed and potential ambush sites cleared. There was no time to rest or forage when a unit was likely to be moving immediately. In the forty-eight hours before the battle, the British ran out of food and had less than four hours’ sleep. Loss of sleep has a pronounced impact on effectiveness, especially in combat operations. When sleep deprivation occurs in conjunction with hunger, the impact of both is magnified.13
The British were suffering nutritionally, too. Their regulation daily ration consisted of bread (1.5 pounds), meat (either 1 pound beef or .5 pound pork), peas (.25 pint), one ounce of rice, and one ounce of butter.14 This approximates 2,500 calories per day. Tarleton’s men marched rapidly and did not have time to supplement basic rations which ran out. Unless foraging was more successful than initially appears, Tarleton’s men got no meat because cattle were not driven with his force. In the absence of meat, the men should have gotten three pounds of flour or bread, but their four-day flour resource collected before 12 January and before the rapid pursuit of Morgan began was exhausted by 16 January. A typical army march during the southern campaign rarely involved carrying more than two days’ food unless the units were on a forced march,15 so Tarleton’s 16 January comment that the American camp “afforded plenty of provisions” is an important indication of food shortages.16
The damp, cold weather made additional demands on energy reserves beyond those needed for marching. If temperatures ranged from fifteen to forty degrees with high humidity and a wind chill, the men required additional calories for maintenance of body temperature. During their march to contact, the infantry waded at least two streams and used roads badly churned up by the Americans on 16 January. Instead of simply marching at the rate of three miles an hour, the British crossed rugged terrain on a bad path. Additional British infantry caloric needs due to the cold, wet, windy weather and the increased exertion can be estimated as approximately another 500 to 1,000 calories, which they had no way of obtaining.
British Legion infantry and light infantry initially led Tarleton’s force during the approach march. During this movement, they were exposed to bitterly cold weather, clearing obstructions in the road, and crossing streams, and subjected to at least three separate, but brief encounters with American scouts. While the sudden engagements did not physically involve most infantrymen until they deployed, the firing and uncertainty added additional stress. The cumulative impact on their nervous systems was similar to that noted during World War II when, “if a skirmish line was halted two or three times during an attack by sudden enemy fire, it became impossible to get any further action from the men, even though none had been hurt.”17
In combat situations, stress, or fear, is applied when lives are at stake. The threat may be real or imagined, but the reaction is still an onset of metabolic processes that consume energy.18 Early consumption of already depleted energy reserves to deal with psychological and physical stress (fear, cold, marching) led to failure later in the battle.
Once the battle began, British infantry deployed and marched forward under rifle fire that they did not return. Their final advance to engage involved moving approximately 300 yards during which they were under irregular skirmish fire. At a range of less than fifty yards, the officers were subjected to deliberate, aimed rifle fire by sharpshooters, some of whom definitely hit their marks.19 After advancing another ten to fifteen yards, they were struck by a volley fired by Brandon’s Battalion, and then by four more South Carolina volleys.20
Here, according to MacKenzie, between a third and a half of the infantrymen went down and many were physically wounded.21 It is significant that British authors mention fatigue here as a factor of the approach march.22 Since the references deal with the night march to Cowpens, fatigue was already a factor the minute the British arrived on the battlefield. The cumulative impact on the British infantry of four days’ marching, poor rations, bitter cold, and the American militia volleys is described in modern terms as combat, or battle, shock. Despite physical and psychological stress, many British soldiers kept on and moved forward to engage the American main line of resistance.
The 71st Highlanders experienced a similar shock but had different reactions. They underwent the same approach march at the rear of the column. Since the British kept halting to clear stream crossings, checking for ambushes, and waiting for scouting reports, the rear was subjected to periods of waiting and chilling, then periods of heavy exertion as they hurried to catch up. If anything, by the time the Scots got on the field, they were more debilitated than other British units.
On the battlefield, the Scots deployed, mixed with the 7th Fusiliers, and were sorted out. Then they stood in reserve behind the 7th Regiment, where any bullet missing the fusiliers likely fell into their ranks. Then, after trotting uphill over 300 yards and firing a volley, they saw the Americans retreat and reacted with exhilaration. After charging over more than one hundred yards, they ran into surprise volley fire that staggered them. After all their exertions in cold, damp weather, the sudden turnaround, accompanied with noise, injury, and flashes of light stunned them. This is an even better example of classic combat shock than what happened in front of the South Carolina militia.
Combat, or battle, shock is an acute form of combat fatigue.23 For the 71st, it was precipitated by massed, and sudden, fire power of the Continental volleys. Onset was so debilitating as to render some of the Scots incapable of flight, much less fighting. Aspects of combat shock can be seen in those Highlanders who fell stunned to the ground, leaving very few individuals to resist the Continental bayonet charge. Shock was followed by flight, as the 71st simply broke and ran, an episode Tarleton described as an “unaccountable panic,” which was quickly communicated to other British soldiers.24
When the Highlanders stopped running and tried to reform, militia fired into them from two, perhaps three, sides, and bayonet-wielding Continentals advanced on them from another. Howard described the 71st as “broken into squads,” although others said they had “formed into some compact order.”25 The phrasing describes “crowding” or “bunching” behavior as men drew closer for security.26 As Richard Fox pointed out in reference to the Little Big Horn in 1876, “mass flight following disintegration . . . is most dangerous. Once men take to flight, they do not stop until overcome by some obstacle or exhaustion.”27 At Cowpens, a combination of uphill running and exhaustion, and their two light infantry companies in “compact order,” brought them to a halt.28
Disorganized, under heavy fire, and facing another onslaught of Continental bayonets proved too much, even for Highland officers, to bear.29 The 71st was unable to continue fighting and surrendered. What is remarkable about the 71st Regiment is that they experienced all the earlier trials without breaking, even though “fatigued troops—hungry, thirsty, tired—will very readily break under even moderate stress,”30 as the legion and light infantry soldiers demonstrated in front of the militia.
The lack of support for the 71st demonstrates another, lesser impact of stress in combat. The light infantry, legion infantry, and 7th Fusiliers did not pursue the withdrawing Americans with the same vigor as the Scots.31 Their failure was due to combat fatigue. MacKenzie noted fatigue “enfeebled the pursuit, much more than loss of blood.”32
Combat fatigue is the gradual onset of mental breakdown in battle. It usually takes four stages during prolonged combat operations.33 At Cow-pens, the preliminary stages were accelerated by poor diet, lack of sleep, and physical exertion over the four days before 17 January. Analysis of World War II combat fatigue casualties provides an understanding of what befell the British Legion infantry and the light infantry. “Rapid exhaustion due to additional noise, as well as heat or cold, has to be mentioned . . . stress accelerates all those bodily functions important for survival, and thus speeds up the metabolic process . . . this accelerates exhaustion.”34 Many British infantrymen, aside from the 71st, were victims of combat fatigue and simply unable to move forward, even
though they advanced to the main line and engaged it in a stubborn firefight. When the Americans moved off, some were too spent to pursue.
The Scots’ greater resistance to combat fatigue may have been due to their being an elite unit.35 The physical activity of the 71st involved two different sorts of bodily-reserve depletion. One was similar to a marathon in terms of the approach march. The other was the run into position followed by the charge after the Continentals. Both types of exertion reduced resistance to the onset of fatigue.
The cumulative outcome of all factors—diet, cold, humidity, psychological stress, and physical exertion—was pronounced, as virtually all British infantry ceased functioning as combat soldiers. Some did not move, others panicked and ran; the few hardy soldiers whose bodies and souls still endured put up a fight but they were too few and too scattered. Tarleton’s infantry were broken, routed, and captured.
Tarleton’s baggage train was not plundered by Tories. Americans, including Thomas Young, were the culprits. Young explained what happened at the baggage train as well as why the British panicked when crossing the Broad River. Young’s account coincides closely with the Tarleton and Otterson accounts to explain the American militia pursuit.
Finally, there is the question of how long the battle lasted. Participant recollections varied from less than an hour to all day. The time depends on when a soldier thought it started and when he finished his duties. Duration would be lengthened by anyone who considered that the battle included dragoon skirmishing, reconnaissance by fire, and pursuit. Actual fighting, from the time the British advanced infantry to the rivulet, until Tarleton’s dragoons fled the field, lasted well under forty minutes.
A Devil of a Whipping Page 20