by Mark Lardas
US carriers made a second Rabaul air strike on Veterans’ Day. The Japanese found and attacked one American carrier task force. Here a Japanese torpedo bomber explodes astern of USS Essex after being shot down by antiaircraft fire. All 14 B5Ns sent were shot down. (USNHHC)
To permit the largest possible airstrike against Rabaul, 24 Corsairs from VF-17, a land-based Navy squadron in the Solomons, reattached their tail hooks and flew top cover over Montgomery’s task force while the strike was launched. Once the strike was away, they landed on the carriers and refueled. By noon, as the Rabaul strike was returning, they were aloft again. It was as well, because Kusaka’s scouts found Montgomery’s ships. At noon Kusaka sent well over 100 aircraft in pursuit. American radar detected the force at 1313hrs, 120 miles away.
Montgomery was preparing a second strike against Rabaul. To clear the flight deck he launched these aircraft ten minutes later. Twenty minutes after that, American fighters intercepted the Japanese aircraft, 40 miles from the carriers. A massive dogfight ensued, with some of the bombers launched for the canceled second strike joining US fighters in attacking. Over the next 30 minutes the sky rained bombs, torpedoes, and shot-down aircraft. Although the Japanese launched eight torpedoes at the carriers, all missed. None of the dive bombers put a bomb on a target either.
The Japanese lost most of their bombers. All 14 B5N torpedo bombers were shot down by US fighters or flak, as were 17 of the 25 D3A dive bombers, four D4Y1 bombers, and perhaps three G4M rikko. Only two Zeroes failed to return, but one of the planes was flown by the commander of Zuiho’s fighter squadron, Lieutenant Masao Sato, a Pearl Harbor veteran. In exchange the US Navy lost six aircraft. Two Corsairs ditched when they ran out of fuel, two Hellcats were shot down, a patrolling Helldiver disappeared (presumably shot down by the outbound Japanese), and one Avenger was destroyed in an accident.
Extravagant claims were made by both sides. The Japanese claimed to have sunk a cruiser and damaged two aircraft carriers. US Navy flyers claimed 86 aircraft shot down. The best assessment of the exchange was made by Admiral Koga. He ordered all cruisers out of Rabaul, and never again used it as a base for his surface ships. Additionally, on November 12, Koga withdrew the surviving carrier aircraft sent to Rabaul two weeks earlier. Of the 150 aircraft sent, just over 100 remained. Rabaul’s permanent air garrison had lost a similar percentage of aircraft. As replacements, Koga withdrew aircraft stationed in the Marshalls, transferring them to Rabaul. The transfer worked to the benefit of the United States, which invaded the Marshalls in January 1944.
After November 12 the US Navy dominated the waters around the northern Solomons. Less than two weeks later a flotilla of US destroyers intercepted a Japanese run to Bougainville. The battle fought just south of Cape St George on New Ireland saw three Japanese destroyers sunk with no damage to the American ships. Rabaul effectively ceased to be a naval base.
Fighter siege: December 10–January 6, 1944
October and November heralded a turning point: Rabaul’s garrison shifted to a strictly defensive posture after mid-November. They lacked the aircraft to effectively attack Allied bases in the Solomons or New Guinea. They launched a series of airstrikes against the Bougainville beachhead on November 17 but the results were dismal. In exchange for sinking one fast transport (a converted World War I-era destroyer), the Japanese lost 14 aircraft. The loss rate was unsustainable, even if the inflated claims of five ships sunk had been true. The withdrawal of the cruisers to safer waters left the Allied ships off Bougainville unthreatened by surface warships – and even meant the Japanese were unable to meet the US Navy in the waters around Rabaul.
For the next few weeks, from November 12 through December 16, the daytime skies over the Gazelle Peninsula remained quiet. Except for nighttime intruder raids against Simpson Harbor and Rabaul by Australian Beauforts, the Allies remained out of the skies over Eastern New Britain. This was as well for Kusaka and his aviators. By mid-November, the Allied assault had whittled down Rabaul’s air garrison to 110 operational aircraft. Its paper strength exceeded 200 aircraft, but many had combat damage or were unflyable due to wear. The pause gave them a brief opportunity to recuperate.
Yet the pause was a reprieve and not a pardon. The carriers had left to support operations in the Central Pacific. Comairsols was focusing its attention on supporting the beachhead at Empress Augusta Bay. The Fifth Air Force was absorbed by supporting preparations for landings in western New Britain.
On Bougainville, US Marines gouged out a toehold in the center of Bougainville large enough for airfields. By Christmas Day the perimeter was 6¼ miles wide and 4½ miles deep. Navy Seabees and New Zealand combat engineers started work on an airstrip just off the beach next to Cape Torokina literally days after the November 1 landing. On November 24 it received its first arrival, a flak-damaged Marine SBD.
The Torokina airfield was crude, but effective. In three weeks Seabees had graded a single 4,750ft by 200ft strip of beach, covered it with a layer of coral, and topped it with metal planking. It still lacked taxiways, hardstands, and buildings on that date, but these were soon added. On December 10, the airfield was declared operational.
Nor was Torokina the only airfield built on Bougainville. As the Marines pushed inland the Seabees and engineers followed. They began carving two additional landing strips in jungle 3 miles inland. One was a mile long. The second, intended for bombers, was 8,000ft long. Work started on the bomber strip on November 29 and on the fighter strip on December 10. Unlike the Japanese airfields on the Gazelle Peninsula, which took upwards of a year to complete, both were finished within a month. The bomber strip was operational on December 30, with the fighter strip completed by January 3. As with Torokina, these two airstrips, Piva Uncle and Piva Yoke, were covered by coral and surfaced with metal planking.
Bougainville was not the only place where new Allied airfields were emerging. On December 16, 1943 Allied forces landed on Arawe, a small island just off the southwest corner of New Britain. The objective was a shallow-draft harbor to base motor torpedo boats. Then, on December 26, the US First Marine Division landed at Cape Gloucester, on the northwest end of New Britain. Both sites had existing airfields built by the Japanese back when New Britain was intended as the springboard to Australia. By December 1943 both were largely abandoned, with no permanent air garrison and lightly held by land forces. The Japanese could only reinforce these sites by sea, as the road network joining the two ends of the island was notional rather than real. Since the Fifth Air Force and Comairsols controlled the waters around New Britain the garrisons were on their own.
The Allies soon improved both airfields, paving both with steel planking. Neither airfield proved particularly useful, however. The Bougainville fields were closer to Rabaul and New Ireland. Arawe and Cape Gloucester were ill-placed for supporting further Allied advances – except perhaps towards the Gazelle Peninsula and Rabaul, an idea long since abandoned. It was, however, a further signal that the Rising Sun was setting.
Torokina’s opening marked the beginning of the end for Rabaul. The day after it was declared operational eight Corsairs from the Marine VMF-214 squadron landed at Torokina to refuel. The squadron’s commander, Greg “Pappy” Boyington, had landed there the previous day and found it adequate. The other pilots of his renowned “Black Sheep” squadron agreed.
Corsairs fueled at Torokina could reach Rabaul and return with reasonable fuel reserves. Boyington’s squadron, along with other Marine and Navy fighter squadrons, had been stationed at Munda on New Georgia. Although these squadrons would soon be transferred to Torokina Boyington realized they could strike Rabaul even before the transfer. He proposed a fighter sweep with aircraft based at Munda landing at Torokina, refueling, and then going to Rabaul.
The Curtiss SB2C-1 “Helldiver” scout bomber made its appearance over Rabaul on the November 11 air strike flying off USS Bunker Hill. Helldivers were also used in raids on Kavieng, on New Ireland. (USNHHC)
Seabees carry sections
of pressed steel runway surfacing, building the Torokina airfield in December 1943. This base allowed single-engine fighters like the Corsair, Hellcat, and Kittyhawk to reach Rabaul. (USNHHC)
Everyone wanted to get into the act and participate in the first sweep. VMF-214 found itself joined by the rest of the Marine Corsairs, Navy F6Fs, and RNZAF Kittyhawks (an export version of the P-40E). The sweep did not take place until December 17. That day 32 Corsairs, 24 F6Fs, and 24 Kittyhawks took off from airfields at New Georgia and Vella Lavella, rendezvoused at Torokina, topped off their fuel tanks, and headed to Rabaul.
Major Gregory Boyington, USMCR commanding Marine Fighter Squadron VMF-214, waves while taxiing his F4U Corsair at Torokina. Boyington led the first fighter sweep against Rabaul on December 17, 1943. He was shot down and captured on January 3, 1944. (USNHHC)
The three types of aircraft had different flying characteristics and different cruising speeds. The Kittyhawks, slowest of all, took off first. The plan was for them to come in at 15,000ft, and draw in the Japanese. Next came the Hellcats, flying above the Kittyhawks. The last to leave were the Corsairs, who flew top cover. It was a long flight over open water, calculated to make the pilot of a single-engine aircraft nervous. If the engine failed it was a long swim home.
The battle started as planned, with the Kittyhawks getting the jump on the Zero fighters scrambled to meet them. The Japanese had reinforced Rabaul in response to the Arawe landings, and were able to launch 35 fighters to meet the Allied fighters. After the Kittyhawks made their first pass, shooting down a Japanese fighter, the advantage switched to the more agile Japanese. The squadron leader’s P-40 was fatally damaged and a second Kittyhawk went down after colliding with a Zero. Remarkably, both pilots survived.
Meanwhile both the F6Fs and Corsairs, at high altitudes, were coming up empty. The Corsairs circled Lakunai field without finding targets. Boyington exchanged insults with an English-speaking Japanese officer over the radio, but despite his challenges found no targets in the air. When all aircraft returned to base, the score was even. Two Kittyhawks and two Zeroes were lost; one each due to the collision and one shot down by both sides.
Post-mission evaluations concluded that too many aircraft had been sent on that first sweep. Control proved impossible on that scale. Future sweeps were scaled down, but the December 17 mission set a pattern which would be followed for the next three weeks. Fighters flying out of Torokina, often staged from airfields further south, would grind down Rabaul’s air garrison.
It was an attrition battle, one favoring the Allies. In mid-December the Japanese had 140 fighters and 110 bombers available for the defense of Rabaul. That number included aircraft normally stationed at Gasmata in central New Britain and on New Ireland which could assist the 100 fighters and 75 bombers flying out of Gazelle Peninsula fields. The Allies within Comairsols had 200 fighters, 200 light and medium bombers, and 100 heavy bombers operational – with 70 fighters and 60 bombers in reserve, undergoing maintenance and repair.
Even when the 50-odd operational P-39s were excluded from the Allied fighter tally, the Japanese barely managed parity with the Allies. And, except for those P-39s, the Allied fighters were equal to or superior to the Japanese Reisen, especially the 130 or so Hellcats and Corsairs. A further handicap for the Japanese was logistics and personnel. The Allies could replace destroyed aircraft and injured aircrew. The Japanese could not. Their aircraft replacement rate was below their loss rate, they had few aircrew replacements, and many of the pilots at Rabaul were grounded. Nearly one-third were suffering from malaria or other tropical diseases.
The next Comairsols raid on Rabaul took place December 19. A follow-up raid had been planned for December 18, but was washed out due to summer rains common in a Southern Hemisphere December. Weather affected the December 19 attack. Of 48 B-24s sent, 32 turned back. The 16 remaining bombers were escorted by 51 Allied fighters: P-38s, Kittyhawks, and Corsairs. The Japanese sortied 94 fighters in response, but were as affected by the weather as the Allies. Less than half made contact with the enemy. In the resulting melees, five Zeroes were shot down. Ten Allied aircraft were lost, but only two shot down. The other eight were due to a mid-air collision and landing mishaps, all near home.
Storm fronts prevented an Allied return to Rabaul until December 23. On that mission, B-24s escorted by Corsairs and Hellcats bombed Lakunai. Radar gave the Japanese early warning and nearly 100 Zeroes were scrambled. Sixty made contact with the bombers. The bombers were jumped by the fighters after successfully hitting Lakunai. No bombers were lost, but two Corsairs were shot down in the ensuing dogfights. The twist was that the Americans followed up the raid with a fighter sweep: 48 Corsairs. They arrived 15 minutes after the bombers left, surprising the airborne Japanese fighters, most of which lacked radios. Six Reisen were shot down, several others damaged. It was a good exchange for two Corsairs.
The Allies returned on the following two days. On December 24, the fighter sweep preceded the bombers. The Allies claimed 18 kills, but probably downed only six, while the Japanese claimed 55 (a total greater than the fighters sent), but shot down six RNZAF Kittyhawks and one Hellcat. A bombing raid on Christmas Day saw each side lose three fighters.
On that same day, the Navy launched a carrier raid against Kavieng, while the Army landed on Cape Gloucester. The raid on Kavieng was conducted by a carrier task group consisting of the Essex-class USS Bunker Hill and the Independence-class Monterey. It served a dual purpose: to distract attention from the landings at Cape Gloucester and to interdict sea traffic between Truk and Rabaul. The attack sank a 5,000-ton freighter and a minesweeper, as well as damaging several other ships. The task group conducted several more raids against Kavieng through January 4, shooting down ten Japanese fighters during these raids and further isolating Rabaul.
Comairsols took Boxing Day off, but conducted fighter sweeps over Rabaul on December 27 and 28. Sixty Corsairs and Hellcats participated in the December 27 sweep. They arrived just as the survivors of a Japanese airstrike against Cape Gloucester returned. The Japanese, who had lost seven out of 78 fighters sent during the Cape Gloucester attack, lost another seven in the ensuing melee. The Americans lost one. Twenty-eight Corsairs returned the next day. This time the Japanese got the advantage, sandwiching the Marines between two large groups of Zeroes. Three Corsairs were shot down, but so were three Zeroes, with two others badly damaged.
First fighter sweep, December 17, 1943
The opening of the Torokina fighter strip permitted single-engine fighters to reach Rabaul. Major Gregory Boyington wanted to mark its opening with a fighter sweep over Rabaul. Although it was originally intended as a Marine-only activity, everyone else wanted to join in, too. When the sweep was flown on December 17, 80 aircraft participated – US Navy Hellcats, USMC Corsairs, and RNZAF Kittyhawks. The plan was for the Kittyhawks to come in first at 15,000ft to lure up the Japanese, with the Hellcats covering the Kittyhawks from above, and the Corsairs above the Hellcats.
The attempt at coordination fell apart while launching so many aircraft from one airstrip. Twenty Kittyhawks pressed on without waiting for the rest. Around 40 Zeroes from Lakunai and Tobera airfields took off to intercept the Kiwis. An aerial brawl took place in which two Zeroes and two Kittyhawks were downed. One Zero was shot down by Wing Commander Trevor O. Freeman, leader of the New Zealand contingent. In turn his Kittyhawk was hit in the engine and crashed.
A more spectacular incident occurred when Flyer 1st Class Masajiro Kawato collided with Flight Lieutenant John O. McFarland’s Kittyhawk. Kawato was making a head-on pass at the Kittyhawk. Neither pilot was willing to break off and expose his aircraft to enemy fire. The two planes touched wings when Kawato tried to pull away. Kawato’s Zero swung into McFarland’s fuselage, striking it behind the pilot’s compartment. Both pilots successfully bailed out and landed safely.
It was the second collision for Kawato, then 18. The previous month he had deliberately rammed an enemy fighter after running out of ammunit
ion. McFarland, taken prisoner, died before the war ended. Kawato survived the war, leaving Rabaul when the aircraft were withdrawn. He eventually moved to the United States.
Whether under the Army name B-24 or the Navy designation PB4Y, the Liberator played an important role during the Rabaul campaign. These PB4Ys are on a patrol in the Southwest Pacific and were used for high-level bombing. (USNHHC)
Rain washed out operations on December 29 and a scheduled fighter sweep on December 30. However, 36 Liberators, escorted by 20 Hellcats and 20 Corsairs, bombed Rabaul. One B-24 was lost on the raid, hit by antiaircraft fire. No air combat occurred. Another bombing raid took place on January 1. This time, the 15 B-24s and 68 escorting fighters met heavy fighter opposition. A further 40 Reisen had been sent to Rabaul from Truk, manned by veteran pilots. One B-24 was shot down, and two others badly damaged. One of these two made an emergency landing at Torokina, where it and a Corsair were destroyed in a runway collision.
Two more fighter sweeps took place on January 2 and 3. Both were instigated by Boyington, eager to score a 26th and 27th kill before his tour ended. Making 26 allowed Boyington to tie Eddie Rickenbacker’s World War I record of 26 aircraft shot down. More would exceed it, making Boyington America’s ace-of-aces. Forty-eight US fighters flew the first sweep and 44 the second. The two sweeps managed to lure plenty of Zeroes into the air; 80 on the 2nd and 70 on the 3rd. The Japanese lost two fighters on each day, including one shot down by Boyington on January 3. However, the United States also lost two Corsairs on January 3, including one flown by Boyington. He spent the rest of the war a POW.