by Bo Lidegaard
Svenningsen, like his mentor, Scavenius, remained convinced that cooperation was the only sound choice, viewed both pragmatically and ethically, and he was the official willing to take personal responsibility for putting this policy into practice. Although he was careful and punctilious in many ways, he was also a devoted activist with a sharp eye for the lesser evil: better to take the initiative than leave it to the occupying power. There is no reason to doubt Svenningsen’s motives or his sense of responsibility. But he had trouble figuring out the nature of what he faced in October 1943. For him, as for many of his contemporaries, Germany was still Europe’s greatest cultural nation, and it seems that Svenningsen saw Best more as a representative of the Weimar Republic and German culture than as a Nazi criminal with blood on his hands.
For members of the Jewish community, however, developments around August 29, 1943, were ominous. To the occupying power the cost of finally addressing the “Jewish question” in Denmark would be substantially lower, as the price in the form of the resignation of the Danish government had already been paid. The question was whether the permanent secretaries could provide the same protection as politicians previously had. Uncertainty arose here, as reflected in Svenningsen’s records of his own remarks at a September 25 discussion with the troubled leadership of the Jewish community: “It was quite impossible that the permanent secretaries would agree to implement provisions directed against the Jews, and if the Germans took anti-Jewish measures on their own, and put them over as a fait accompli, I was in no doubt that all the permanent secretaries would voice the most energetic protest to the German authorities.”25
This was meant to be reassuring, but obviously it was not. It was highly unlikely that even the “most energetic protest” would have any effect at all. Previously, refusing any measures directed against the Jews had been a make-or-break cabinet question for the government. But now the government no longer functioned. At the meeting Svenningsen also felt he should warn the Jewish representatives against any illegal emigration of Danish Jews. The argument was that it could magnify the possibility of action against their law-abiding fellows who stayed behind. The leading members of the community held similar views and largely seem to have been convinced by Svenningsen’s reports of Best’s repeated personal assurances that the Danish Jews had nothing to fear.
The director of the Danish Foreign Ministry, Nils Svenningsen, who from September 1943 served as the informal leader of the Council of Permanent Secretaries.
Svenningsen played a key role after August 29, 1943, when the elected politicians handed in their resignations.
Although Svenningsen saw himself as the politicians’ alter ego and remained loyal to the framework and borderlines established by them, he still felt empowered to act according to his own judgment whenever the cabinet ministers were prevented from doing so. As he regarded the ethics of a senior civil servant, his main obligations were to the constitution and the national interest as he perceived it. Seen through this lens, he, as an official, was not merely an instrument but an independent actor, someone who had the responsibility to execute his own judgments—and to vouch for them personally.
Polfoto
The German Team
Best’s assurances were a lie. In fact he had personally initiated action against the Danish Jews by sending a telegram on September 8, which went to Hitler by way of the German Foreign Office. The central section read: “A consistent implementation of the new course in Denmark in my opinion now entails a resolution of the Jewish … issue in Denmark.”
Setting the avalanche in motion, Best clearly realized the danger of becoming one of its victims himself. To mitigate that danger, he immediately endeavored to push as much responsibility as possible onto the broad shoulders of his archrival, General Hanneken, who was already overseeing the precarious state of emergency. Now was the time to move, so that the action would be carried out while martial law was still in force and the general would be blamed for anything that went wrong. Moreover, by having the general still formally in charge, some of the resentment the action surely would provoke among the Danes would be directed against him. With all this in mind, Best continued his telegram: “The measures that this entails must be taken before the current state of emergency ceases, because at a later stage they will cause a reaction in the country that will lead to new emergencies, probably under less favorable conditions than at present. In particular, according to my information from many sides, any functioning constitutional government would be likely to resign, just as the king and the parliament would cease all further participation in the government. Moreover, one ought to count on the possibility of a general strike because the unions will cease operating and thus end their moderating influence on the workers.”
The aim seems to have been to anticipate the negative effects of the action. It is likely that at this point Best had already realized that a new Danish government could not be formed, and that accordingly his focus was to reinforce his own position vis-à-vis Berlin, his Danish counterparts—and General Hanneken: “It is possible that [we] will no longer be able to form a constitutional government under measures taken during the current state of emergency, so that a management committee must be created under my leadership, while legislative power is exercised by me through regulations.”
It was important for Best to prepare Berlin for trouble and for the widespread opposition that was to be expected in Denmark. At the same time he seems to have realized that the practical requirements of the situation could also be turned to his own advantage, because the action could justify the deployment of new police forces, which had long been at the top of Best’s wish list: “For in one fell swoop to arrest and transport approximately 6,000 Jews (including women and children), the police forces, which I have previously asked to be made available, will be required. They will be deployed almost exclusively in Copenhagen’s metropolitan area, where most of the Jews live. The commander of the German troops in Denmark [Hanneken] must provide reinforcements. Transport should probably first and foremost be by sea, so ships should be directed here in good time.”26
The telegram can best be explained as the expression of a delicate balancing act. Best knew the request for an action was under way following the breakdown of the cooperation. Anticipating these orders, he went ahead, but in a way that aimed to consolidate his own standing in Berlin, to strengthen his position in relation to Hanneken, and to forestall Adolf Eichmann in Berlin by acting toughly and energetically. At the same time it was critical for Best to keep cooperation going with the Danish permanent secretaries. Best was a man of action, and by taking the initiative he played an important card in relation to his rivals in the Nazi power apparatus.
At the German legation in Copenhagen, housed at Dagmarhus, overlooking the Town Hall Square, Best worked closely with forty-three-year- old SS Brigadeführer Paul Kanstein, who was his deputy and old acquaintance. Kanstein had been in Copenhagen since the first days of the occupation overseeing internal security, and he was well versed in the delicate cooperation with the Danish authorities. A third mem- ber of the team was a thirty-nine-year-old expert in maritime affairs, G. F. Duckwitz, who was to play a legendary role in the fate of the Danish Jews.
Paul Kanstein had long been a party member, but from the late 1930s he had also had connections to the German military opposition. Had the plot to assassinate Hitler on July 20, 1944, succeeded, Kanstein was supposed to have been appointed to head the new German security police. Starting in the summer of 1942, Kanstein had worked actively in Berlin to get Werner Best to Copenhagen, and it was also he who cautiously introduced Duckwitz to the German opposition against Hitler. Unlike Best, Duckwitz had a thorough knowledge of Denmark, where he had spent extended time before the war. He spoke Danish and had good contacts, in particular with the leading Social Democrats, including the young party chairman, Hedtoft, and the former prime minister, Buhl, who held the reins in Danish politics. During the dramatic days in August when riots were sprea
ding in the provinces, Duckwitz had persuaded Hedtoft, Buhl, and other leading politicians to visit Best for an intense exchange on the future of the cooperation.
From the outset Duckwitz had been a confidential adviser to Werner Best and his teacher in the noble art of understanding the Danes. The relationship between the two men went beyond the purely professional, and Best’s and Duckwitz’s families also socialized privately—often in a context that gave Best the opportunity to meet Danes in convivial settings. A surprisingly trusting relationship seems to have prevailed among Best, Kanstein, and Duckwitz, although there is no evidence to suggest that Best realized, let alone sympathized with, the opposition activities secretly pursued by Kanstein and Duckwitz. Still, it’s hard to avoid the thought that Best may have sensed more or less explicitly that his two closest advisers at the German legation were both active in the opposition to Hitler. Considering Best’s cunning mind, it is not at all unthinkable that he both sensed this and realized that knowing without knowing might in a given situation come in handy and be to his advantage. Be that as it may, both Kanstein and Duckwitz survived the wave of arrests after the July 20, 1944, attempt on Hitler, which suggests that if Best suspected his collaborators were involved, he kept quiet.
Although Duckwitz entered the party in 1932, he gradually distanced himself from the Nazi mind-set. While retaining his party membership, he moved to New York to work in the shipping business. In 1939, the Foreign Office requested his shipping expertise and sent him to the legation in Denmark, a mission mandated by the military intelligence service, Abwehr, though his exact mission is unclear. On his way back to Europe, Duckwitz wrote notes illustrating that at this point he still shared many of the Nazi ideas in regard to the damaging role of Jews in Germany. Duckwitz was a shrewd operator with direct access to the German foreign minister Ribbentrop, who as part of the power struggle within the Nazi leadership was seeking to build up his own intelligence network in the Nordic countries. Although parts of Duckwitz’s work and mandate remain enigmatic, it is obvious that he and Best worked closely together, both on the implementation of the action against the Jews and in attempts to fend it off. The two men were not necessarily driven by the same motives, but both wanted the cooperative policy in Denmark to be continued, and both realized that a brutal action against the Danish Jews would undermine it. If things went wrong, everything would be at stake—including their own lives. It is from this perspective that one must try to decipher Best’s double game and Duckwitz’s role in it. Best believed that Berlin expected a move for an action against the Danish Jews—or at least that his enemies could use it against him if the initiative did not come. But for Hitler it also weighed heavily that cooperation with the Danes did not collapse. Here Duckwitz could play a key role. The two incompatible goals had somehow to be reconciled through a series of improvisations played by political ear. And the one thing Werner Best and G. F. Duckwitz surely had in common was exactly that: a political ear.27
Georg Ferdinand Duckwitz was the maritime expert of the German legation in Copenhagen, where he was one of Werner Best’s closest confidants. He came to play a key—though not entirely clear—role in the rescue of the Danish Jews.
Duckwitz had a professional background in Copenhagen in the shipping business, and he spoke Danish. He also had a wide personal network, which included leading Danish Social Democratic politicians. It was his warning and personal credibility that finally convinced prominent Danes, including the leadership of the Jewish community, that the threat was real.
Duckwitz was a conservative German patriot, and in the early 1930s he joined the Nazis. He shared the prevailing negative attitude toward the Jews in Germany, and there is no evidence that he distanced himself from the party before the war. But gradually he began to look more critically at Nazi practices. In late 1942 his colleague at the legation in Copenhagen, Paul Kanstein, connected him to the German opposition. Duckwitz worked closely with Best to maintain and develop “the policy of reason” that aimed to continue cooperation and avoid an escalation of violence in the occupied country. Duckwitz called Denmark his “chosen fatherland” and shared with close friends in the Social Democratic Party a deep distrust of the Communists and their engagement in the Danish resistance. At the same time he resented German fanaticism and violence and worked with Best against Wehrmacht demands for military solutions to problems Duckwitz saw as political. Likewise, he turned against the Gestapo terror after August 29, 1943. As a strong advocate for a peaceful occupation, Duckwitz became a crucial liaison between Danish politicians and the German authorities.
Frihedsmuseet
Preparing for the Action
Three days after Best’s telegram calling for the action against the Jews to be initiated, Best and Duckwitz agreed that the latter should travel to Berlin to attempt to influence the decision-making process there. Duckwitz flew on September 13 and later explained that his goal was to prevent the telegram from reaching Hitler—which makes no sense. But given the tense gambling it was of great importance to the legation in Copenhagen to have a clear picture of how the matter stood within the complex power games in Berlin, and to put in a word where necessary. Duckwitz noted in his diary from Berlin that a friend offered him a new post in Stockholm. It was tempting to get away but obligatory to stay. Duckwitz stayed, and on September 16 he had a long conversation with Werner Best on which he noted in his diary: “The Jewish question is simmering, and I have warned him of the consequences.… [h]e secretly agrees. Deep down he’s decent.”28
On September 17, Best’s telegram triggered the expected order from Hitler on the implementation of the final solution in Denmark. German police forces were made available, but while the practical preparations for the raid progressed, the plan was subjected to surprisingly strong criticism from within the Nazi administration, spurred also by Best, who made a point of emphasizing in his reports to Berlin that the action would likely lead to a very significant deterioration of the political situation in the occupied country. Clearly it was not consideration for the Jews that led to doubts about both the advisability and the feasibility of the planned action, but rather whether the operation would upset the fragile cooperation with the Danish state secretaries, which now seemed the most likely avenue toward maintaining some degree of continuation of the policy pursued since the beginning of the occupation.
On September 19, Duckwitz, according to his own report, was informed that the order was now in motion. That day he wrote in his diary: “Now I know what I have to do. Who can take responsibility for such an act?? An unprovoked, hazardous game for which the instigator is ultimately responsible.”29
The instigator was Best, even if he already had begun to maintain that his telegram to Berlin had not been intended to provoke the order. On the same day the new head of the German security police in Denmark, SS Standartenführer Rudolf Mildner, arrived in the country. He would be in charge of about three hundred Gestapo operatives who would be responsible for the implementation of the action against the Jews. But Mildner’s overarching mandate was to combat the armed resistance in Denmark. Mildner had worked in Poland since 1941, and he was known to have been a tough head of the Gestapo in Katowice. Mildner’s responsibilities included Auschwitz, where he conducted courts-martial. He was thus well versed in the mechanics of the final solution and in the fate in store for those deported to the camps.
Immediately upon his arrival in Copenhagen, Mildner began the practical preparations for the action. But not many days passed before he hesitated and, supported by Best, recommended to Berlin that the entire operation be canceled, or rather postponed, probably because he considered the job almost insoluble in a situation where the Jewish population was already highly alarmed by rumors about an impending action, and where the population as a whole could not be expected to provide any support for it. If the Jews went underground, it would require close cooperation with local Danish police to root them out of city and country. This cooperation was very unlikely to materialize,
and even worse, both Mildner’s and Best’s highest priority was to build a future working relationship with the Danish police. Both men realized that an action against the Jews would poison that possibility.
But even Mildner couldn’t stop the train now, and a few days later he flew to Berlin with Kanstein to put the last practical details in place. Still, Mildner’s hesitation seems to have raised some concerns in Berlin, because a few days later, Adolf Eichmann’s deputy, Sturmbannführer Rolf Günther, also arrived in Copenhagen with two more men. They were sent to administer the action and see to it that the matter would be pursued with sufficient zeal.
In this way multiple layers of mutually highly suspicious German police were responsible for the action’s practical organization. On the hard end was Rolf Günther, who established his own office and got his own Gestapo people attached to it. The first lists of 1,673 Jewish families in the metropolitan area, about 33 in the provinces, and 1,208 families from Germany, had already been compiled with the help of Lorenz Christensen working under Best. The lists were presented to Mildner, who relied heavily on Best’s local knowledge and contacts. Eichmann’s people were not only up against deep Danish resistance, whose impact spread to the Danish authorities’ outermost parts, including the Danish police. They were also up against a sluggish, passive resistance by the local German authorities and also the new head of the security police, Dr. Mildner.30
The hesitation of the German authorities reflected the two sides’ mutual interest in the continuation of cooperation, even in the reduced form of the state secretaries. The German administration in Denmark realized that an outright, brutal deportation of Danish Jews to the death camps would make it impossible to continue cooperation with the Danish authorities. Maybe another consideration also played a role for the Nazi officials in Denmark. Many must at this point have realized that Germany was going to lose the war, and that once that happened everyone in the Nazi executive would need whatever “good deeds” could be collected to save their necks. On the other hand, it was far from risk-free for prominent Nazis to take a moderate approach when it came to one of the party’s highest objectives, namely the extermination of the Jews. Yet it is undeniable that even hardened Nazis in Denmark went out of their way to soften the blow. In the operational planning, Mildner pushed the point that German police must not break into Jewish homes with a violent show of force. Günther was fuming but could not change the decision. The argument was that breaking into apartments could easily lead to looting, which would put the action in an embarrassing light and give Germany a bad name among the Danes. Regardless of the reason, the guideline was that the police-soldiers should knock on doors when the action was launched but not force their way in if nobody opened them.