by Bo Lidegaard
A Danish Initiative? First Attempt
As Director Svenningsen had promised the representatives from the Jewish community, he summoned the permanent secretaries to a meeting at the Foreign Ministry at 2 p.m. At the same time he informed King Christian’s cabinet secretary of the unfolding events. Maybe the king could be brought into play? It appears from Christian’s personal diary that he had already been informed by his pastor before the message reached him through the formal channels.8
At the permanent secretaries’ meeting Svenningsen explained the situation: “From various reliable sources almost-certain information indicated that an action against the Danish Jews was imminent. Nothing official was available, but the rumors and information were of such a nature that one had to give them credence.… There was talk particularly of the night from Friday to Saturday.”
The permanent secretaries’ leader did not hide the seriousness of the situation: “The king had previously stated that he considered himself to be the protector of the Danish Jews, and it was a given that a constitutional government would have resigned if confronted with a demand for an action against the Jews. The question was: Can we do something, and then in what form?”
Svenningsen now laid out for his colleagues the terrible dilemma of trying to do something or disclaiming responsibility for the crime. An illegal mass exodus seemed impossible to carry out, but it was advisable that the Jews should make sure not to be home on the night the raid was conducted. The main question was what the permanent secretaries could do to avoid the disaster. The Justice Ministry’s permanent secretary, Eivind Larsen, threw out the notion that perhaps they themselves should offer to intern the Jews in Denmark. The idea had been discussed with Jewish representatives, who according to Svenningsen had said “that any such measure would be seen as welcome aid in the given situation.” That discussion was the one Dr. Meyer also participated in. His brief diary entries are the only contemporaneous account from the Jewish representatives, and they do not mention the startling proposal about Danish internment. Immediately after Denmark’s liberation C. B. Henriques repudiated the permanent secretary’s claim that he or his colleagues had accepted this proposal. It had been presented, but Henriques emphasized that it “won support neither from me nor from the later summoned cabinet secretary to the king,” and he demanded a retraction, so it would appear that “such a thought had not been supported by any responsible Jewish side.”
The issue was controversial for the Jewish representatives in 1945, but since neither Henriques nor Lachmann left written records of the actual conversation, we have only Svenningsen’s claim that the three guests endorsed the plan—and Dr. Meyer’s silence on the subject.9
According to Svenningsen the Jewish representatives considered “providing a larger sum of money as security from the side of the Jewish interests”—that is, payment of a kind of ransom. But the plans for internment in Denmark provoked several questions from the Jewish representatives: “How would it be possible to arrest Danish citizens, and what was the crime for which ransom should be paid? Would one accuse the Jews of sabotage?” Svenningsen’s answer had been a clear no: The goal was to bribe and soften. But their questions could not be conjured away.
For Nils Svenningsen and Eivind Larsen what stood out first and foremost was that the reality that awaited the Jews after deportation “was so terrible that the heads of administration must consider it a duty to do their utmost to prevent this from happening.” Svenningsen added that “it was hardly imaginable that something like this could be a reality in Denmark” before he turned to the head of the Department of Statistics with the words: “I cannot help but express our sympathy for our colleague Einar Cohn.” Everyone understood that the issues they were now discussing could mean life or death for Cohn and his family. According to the minutes the participants rose in silent sympathy before negotiations continued.10
The discussion that followed between the permanent secretaries was intense and penetrated to the very core of the dilemma of cooperation. The arguments for and against, and the entire terrifying moral quandary, were stunningly clear to the permanent secretaries that Wednesday afternoon. How far could they take responsibility for injustice if the goal was to avoid the worst? A protest letter from the bishop of Copenhagen, on behalf of all of Denmark’s Lutheran bishops, was read.* Also one from the dean of the University of Copenhagen, again an urgent protest. But to what avail?
While Larsen and Svenningsen argued for active engagement, most of the other state secretaries opposed it. Hakon Jespersen, the state secretary for the Ministry of Economy and Trade, who took detailed notes of the discussion, explains why: “I expressed the view that the heads of the administration, as an expression of public opinion, had to make specific objections against persecution of the Jews. This was one of those extreme measures about which there had always been agreement: The administration would not and could not be part of it. It had to be emphasized that such measures would sharply conflict with the Danish sense of justice and complicate the maintenance of peace and order, which was a prerequisite for a satisfactory Danish administration.”
Jespersen would protest. The others would, too, just as protests began to arrive from all parts of Danish society. He would also point out the decisive breach of trust such an action would represent, and refer to its consequences. But the protests were not the issue. It was as if the permanent secretaries were acting in a kind of self-defense. Larsen expressed it clearly in his support for Danish internment based on “realistic considerations.” He did not believe that either protest or argument would have any impact whatsoever other than causing irritation. The order came from “a place we could not penetrate with arguments. The task was to find ways to avoid the worst, namely deportation.” Svenningsen supported him without reservations. “He was not afraid of the consequences for the permanent secretaries … because it was about saving people from the irreversible, from death and horror and destruction of human life in a cruel manner.”
Although the Holocaust’s systematized consistency was not yet known in all its ghastly details, Svenningsen’s remark reflects a very precise idea of the fate that awaited Jews who were deported to Germany or German-occupied Eastern Europe. Svenningsen had to balance this knowledge against his own limited ability to prevent a disaster. It says a lot about human psychology that when faced with this almost unbearable dilemma, he chose to cling to the hope that he could, after all, rely on Werner Best, whom he knew as a reasonable man. If Best could be persuaded that it was better for all parties that the Danish authorities themselves intern the Jews, it would be a way out that could avert the impending disaster. It was all about gaining time: Bureaucratize the matter. Make it the subject of negotiation, wrangling, and mutual promises. Give concessions where necessary to avoid the worst: deportation. Seen through Svenningsen’s eyes, there was no way around it: The permanent secretaries had to take the heavy responsibility. And they had to rely on Werner Best.
This mind-set was endorsed by an increasing number of state secretaries. Even Jespersen swung over, with the essential caveat that he did not think there could be any possibility that Danish authorities themselves would be responsible for the internment: “You could probably defend agreeing to receive Jews arrested by the Germans in Danish internment camps, as this would be better for the Jews than to sit in German camps, but in my view you could not in any form actively contribute to getting Jews gathered in internment camps.”
Jespersen had a strong feeling that the permanent secretaries were out on a limb with a decision that went far beyond their competence, and he appealed for consultation with politicians from the newly outgoing government to share responsibility for this most unusual step: “I considered the present question to be an extremely important issue and a matter outside the administrative tasks that were assigned to the state secretaries. I necessarily felt it appropriate that the issue be presented to representatives of the parliament—if one could not connect with more, at least Min
ister Buhl as chairman of the Committee of Cooperation.”
Larsen replied that the Danish plan was hardly feasible if the Danish authorities did not also engage in the internment: “The greatest asset in the Danish counterproposal lay in the fact that from the German side, it could and of course would be used as propaganda. We had to provide something in return for the rescue operation, and this might be that we provided for the Jews ourselves, although formally it would be done in collaboration with the Jews themselves. You had to ask for a guarantee from the German side that they didn’t subsequently do what we by our actions had just intended to avoid.”
Larsen was obviously aware of the danger: that the Danish authorities interned the Jews and the Germans then, despite all their promises, deported them. It had to be avoided at all costs—but the only guarantee was ultimately a promise from the occupying power—from Werner Best. The discussion continued, but it was clear that the majority were in favor of internment. If it concerned the secretaries’ self-interest they had to refuse, but now the central message was that it had to be done for the Jews.
At this point Einar Cohn made his views clear. He had already spoken out in support of any steps that could mitigate deportation, and now he declared “that it would not cause any misunderstanding if the Danish authorities helped to capture the Jews, as the intention was very clear.” This would be “far preferable,” and “people would not misunder- stand it.”
The prime minister’s permanent secretary, Andreas Møller, stated that the permanent secretaries could not escape responsibility by turning to the politicians. They had to carry it out themselves. The result of the discussion was that Svenningsen and Larsen were mandated to go to Dagmarhus as soon as possible and seek an audience with Dr. Best to demand assurances and a more solid basis for any Danish decision to offer to intern the Jews.
Best had already been visited at Dagmarhus by the director of the Danish Red Cross, Helmer Rosting, who came on his own initiative. He, too, had heard the rumors, but for the distinctly German-friendly Rosting, the situation opened new opportunities, which he presented to Best. Rosting wanted to use the internment of the Jews as an opportunity to release those Danish officers and soldiers who since August 29 had been detained in their barracks as protohostages. The release might mitigate public reaction to the internment of the Jews. Best jumped at the suggestion and even developed further an idea to use the Jews as hostages in the fight against sabotage, whereby fifty to one hundred Jews would be sent to a concentration camp for each act of sabotage. He immediately sent the proposal to Berlin, but it was rejected by Ribbentrop, who did not want the action against the Jews to be protracted but implemented once and for all.
That afternoon Best sent another brief telegram to Berlin. He accepted an invitation to come to a meeting in Posen (now Poznan), Poland, to meet with SS Reichsführer Himmler on October 4, together with other senior members of the SS, and asked for official permission to travel there for the occasion although the action against the Jews was imminent. To be present in Posen was important for Best not least because it would provide him with the opportunity to discuss directly with Himmler the issue of the German police in Denmark, which was crucial to Best’s own position. Whatever his motives, it was an essential meeting Best now signed up for.11
The two leading permanent secretaries, Nils Svenningsen and Eivind Larsen, were received by Werner Best on Wednesday afternoon at 5:30 p.m. According to his own records, Svenningsen began by underlining that he normally would not heed hearsay: “But the rumors had now assumed such a form, and appeared with such persistence and in such detail, that we felt compelled to consult with Dr. Best. If this issue were really to be raised and implemented as reported, it would have an incalculable impact in this country. The anticipation was currently immense, and conditions would deteriorate if the action was carried out. This question was of enormous importance to the general population, to the official stance, and to the permanent secretaries.”
Svenningsen spoke in no uncertain terms, but if he had hoped that Best would change course at the last minute, he was disappointed: “Dr. Best answered evasively, asking a variety of questions such as: ‘What then do these rumors say?’ ‘What is it all about?’ ‘Where do they come from?’ ”12
Despite Svenningsen’s confidence in Best, it was obvious that the German was avoiding the issue and giving no hint of assurance that the action would not take place. Thus the plenipotentiary of the Reich in fact confirmed the permanent secretaries’ worst fears. The conversation ended with Best promising to telegraph Berlin to ask “whether he was authorized by the Foreign Ministry to deny the mentioned rumors.” The maneuver was slick because it both achieved a delay and instilled in Svenningsen yet another false hope—and perhaps most important, it helped to reinforce the impression that the order came from Berlin while Best himself was floating in the dark and—apparently—working to prevent its implementation. And Svenningsen took the bait. He had already told his colleagues that afternoon that the action “was due to a higher order from Germany,” thwarted by Best, and when, the next day, he summoned the permanent secretaries again, he said that the conversation with Best had left the impression “that the issue was acute but not definitively settled,” and that “there was an attempt to stave off the action.” It was Wednesday evening, two days before the planned attempt to arrest and deport the Danish Jews to Nazi concentration camps.
· · ·
That same day a discreet meeting was held by a group of prominent politicians from the parties supporting the policy of cooperation. Since August 29 the country had been without functioning constitutional bodies, and the politicians maintained that they were unable and unwilling to assume responsibility, either formally or informally, as long as the state of emergency was maintained. The leading elected politician, former prime minister Buhl of the Social Democratic Party, summoned senior members from the other democratic parties to deeply confidential discussions, partly to ensure the continued support of the permanent secretaries and the entire administration, and partly to monitor and prevent any move that could be the germ of something the Germans could present as an interim Danish government under their control. Policy was discussed at “Buhl’s group” at a time when the politicians agreed that it was crucial to have no policy at all.
The Buhl group had hardly been established on a regular basis when it gathered that Wednesday at 1:30 p.m. The politicians spoke in support of the permanent secretaries as long as they “acted just as before, without German control.” This meant that they were not supposed to turn into some sort of de facto government under German auspices. Best had given his support to their functioning on an independent basis, but he again kept Berlin in reserve with the comment to Buhl that his colleagues there would perceive the Danish refusal to form a proper government “as a sign of defiance and resentment.” At their meeting the politicians also long debated whether the Folketing should open on October 5 as prescribed in the constitution. In the end the majority opposed that, but some argued in favor, and the discussion seems to have been quite heated.
Buhl also told his colleagues that “one credible source had informed him that an action against the Jews would be conducted any day now.” It concerned six thousand Jews, and eighteen hundred Gestapo men would arrive in the city to do the job. The scribbled notes by a participant in the meeting are almost illegible, but it seems as though Buhl also passed along the reflection of Best’s resistance and of the pressure from Berlin. However, there is nothing in the notes to suggest that at the time Buhl or the other politicians were aware of the permanent secretaries’ discussions regarding a possible Danish internment of the Jews.13
Vilhelm Buhl was, after Thorvald Stauning’s death in May 1942, the most prominent Social Democratic politician, even though the much younger Hans Hedtoft was chosen as the party’s new chairman. Hedtoft, however, with his pronounced anti-Nazism, was unacceptable to the Germans, and it was therefore the former finance minister, Buhl, who bec
ame prime minister. Buhl was convinced of the cooperation policy’s necessity, but he was painfully aware of the limits that had to be adhered to. Within the government he usually opposed Foreign Minister Scavenius’s quest for more active cooperation with the Germans.
During Buhl’s six months—May to November 1942—as prime minister, the situation deteriorated almost by the day, not least because of increasing sabotage that caused the Germans to threaten to take over law enforcement. Buhl saw no other way to avoid this than stepping up the Danish effort against sabotage. In this context, on September 2 he gave a radio address that became notorious for his urgent warning about the devastating consequences of sabotage, which he labeled to be against “the fatherland’s interests.” What seemed most offensive was Buhl’s request that the public help by turning suspected saboteurs in to the police.
For Buhl and like-minded politicians, armed civilians conducting their own policy—namely, the armed resistance—constituted a danger to the rule of law and thus to upholding democracy. Even worse was the prospect of direct German law enforcement, provoked by the resistance. Therefore, to him it was imperative that the Danish authorities retain full executive powers, including the police, and when the German ultimatum issued on August 29, 1943, compromised this principle, it was Buhl who formulated the clear Danish rejection, just as it was he who kept Scavenius and the other politicians firmly on track in opposing any attempt to form a new Danish government. At the same time Buhl, like other leading politicians, deeply distrusted the Freedom Council, which he regarded as a threat to parliamentary democracy—the crucial frontier that had to be defended at all costs.