by Bo Lidegaard
It seems obvious that Rasmussen had in the meantime discussed the idea with political colleagues who had not endorsed the proposal. If the permanent secretaries decided to act, it would be without political backing.
That same afternoon at 4 p.m, they met for their third discussion of the matter. Svenningsen outlined what had taken place during the course of the morning, and also mentioned the many protests to Dr. Best that were pouring in from the country’s most influential organizations, now joined by bishops and the university, the Danish Women’s National Council (with more than one hundred thousand members), the Lawyers Council, and the Supreme Court. The women appealed to Best “not to take steps that would persecute innocent people because of their religion or race, as this would arouse deep and lasting bitterness and go against all that is right.”
From Sorgenfri the king had also issued a protest, which Svenningsen, after the meeting, would present to Best. Christian “felt compelled—not only out of humane concern for my country’s citizens, but also for fear of further consequences for the future relationship between Germany and Denmark—to emphasize to you that specific measures with respect to a group of people who for more than 100 years have enjoyed full civil rights in Denmark could have the most serious consequences.”
According to the king’s diary that day, he got “a message that Bishop Fuglsang-Damgaard had sent a message to the German envoy Dr. Best to waive the arrests of the Jews. The Industrial Council had forwarded a similar request. In line with these requests, I today sent Dr. Best a similar note protesting against the arrest of Jews who for centuries had been obedient citizens.”5
Meanwhile several of the permanent secretaries had discussed the situation with “their” former ministers, among whom there seemed to be widespread sympathy for a Danish action. But this was far from a consensus, and it remained unclear whether the alleged support also included the idea of Danish authorities arresting the Jews. The urgency of the situation provoked a sharp disagreement among the permanent secretaries as to how far their mandate could be extended. The group had only acted as a kind of emergency government for a few weeks, and the individuals did not have a common understanding of how far their authority went. The more traditional side, led by Jespersen, maintained that as civil servants they were not entrusted with governmental authority “once and for all,” as it had been “explicitly pointed out that it was only under certain specific conditions that officials could exercise legislative functions and the like; this excluded the undertaking of anything that was in violation of Danish law—and for me there was no doubt that was exactly the case here.”
Jespersen also still argued that the politicians should be involved, and he warned that the group “could not take active steps in violation of Danish concepts of justice that could provide a basis for the impression in the outside world that we were anti-Jewish.”
Time was running out, and the permanent secretaries felt the pressure of the situation. They hesitated to take an active part in the internment of innocent citizens, but also had a hard time satisfying themselves with protests no one believed would have any effect. Jespersen and his peers were more inclined to disclaim any responsibility for an action they feared would damage both the Jews and the country. But their colleagues kept arguing for the overarching necessity of remaining united. Ultimately Jespersen gave in—almost: “In response to the statements that we had to make every effort to achieve consensus … I expressed my agreement that we had to come together, as far as possible, and to that end, of course, we also had to demonstrate resolve—but when the talk turned to decisions that ran counter to an individual’s conscience, the majority, in my view, could neither bind nor justify any individual to act against his conviction when what was at stake for the country were crucially important political decisions.”6
Andreas Møller finally came to the conclusion that “the action against the Jews was an action by Germany, while the Danish counterproposal was a relief measure, which would be obvious to everyone.” Maybe. But the permanent secretaries’ conclusion sounded more like a prayerful incantation.7
The notes of the secretaries’ intense debate reflect the fact that they fully realized the impossible dilemma of the situation and that they were prepared to assume the heavy responsibility, although it was obviously more convenient not to. The men shared a profound concern about the impending action and despair at their own powerlessness, and an almost unbearable responsibility—knowledge of what was coming—had been placed on their shoulders. In the end they came to a decision. Although they reached it after thorough discussion, with open eyes and with the best intentions, we can now see that it was all wrong. If the permanent secretaries had been successful in reaching a quicker decision and in persuading Best to let the Danish authorities be responsible for carrying out the action, events might have proceeded entirely differently than what transpired next.
However, even with the benefit of hindsight it is hard to condemn Svenningsen and his colleagues for deciding to make the offer. The permanent secretaries’ offense was not their plan—disastrous as it may have been. It was their lack of understanding of their own limitations. They failed to see that in this situation there were possibilities completely beyond their ken. That they themselves didn’t possess the tools that could avert the disaster did not—as they lulled themselves into believing—imply that no option existed. In this way the plan became a confirmation of the truth that one of man’s most dangerous limitations is the inability to recognize those very limitations.8
The next step was now up to Svenningsen, who thought he had a workable mandate from his colleagues. He had agreed to meet with Best at Dagmarhus that same afternoon at 6 p.m. He would offer to intern the Jews against a German guarantee that they would not be deported. It was urgent. No one knew when the Germans would strike. But the rumors were pointing to that very Friday night.
By Friday the rumors also reached London, where Reventlow was informed of both the impending action and the Swedish note that had been delivered in Berlin the day before. He noted the facts in his diary with the comment that Kauffmann’s initiative from Washington the previous day had accordingly not been premature. But little if anything could be done.9
This was confirmed on Friday by an unexpected source. Helmuth von Moltke, an expert in international law at the Wehrmacht high command in Berlin, stopped over in Copenhagen on his own initiative in order to secretly warn Danish friends of the standing orders to launch the action against the Jews. Knowing nothing about the actual situation in Copenhagen, he imagined that he might be the first to pass on the vital information. As it was, Moltke’s personal courage had no practical importance for the fate of the Danish Jews, beyond the memory that there were prominent Germans who opposed the action for reasons other than their narrow personal or bureaucratic interests: They were simply utterly against the ideas on which it was based. Moltke was one of the founders of the secret opposition group known as the Kreisauer Kreis, and after the July plot against Hitler, he was executed in Berlin-Plötzensee on January 23, 1945.10
On the Beach
Poul Hannover resumes his narrative on the same afternoon the families were leaving Nykøbing Falster heading for Hesnæs on Falster’s eastern tip, 20–30 kilometers from the town: “As I dared not go on with the overloaded car, I got an additional one—I think we hired them for about 600 kroner in those few days—and started again—off to the east. When we were 1½ kilometers from the agreed place, I dismissed one vehicle—we shouldn’t have too many witnesses—allowed part of the company and luggage to continue with the other, while some of us walked until the car returned. I did notice that we passed a large van by a farmhouse along the way—but now we had a small wagon, all our luggage on the coast—not so particularly smooth or confidence inspiring—now what?”
His sister-in-law Kis also doesn’t have an answer: “So then we were all out in the woods with our luggage and glanced out over the water, which looked pretty scary, it was cold and win
dy.… Either we could drive around 4 kilometers into the countryside, where there was a small hotel, but then we probably couldn’t get a car, if we were to sail, since this one is supposed to be back home before 8—The other option was to stay in the woods. We did this, although it was not encouraging to think that perhaps it would be for the whole night. We were told that there was an empty holiday camp nearby, which we might get into.”
Poul Hannover is plagued by doubts that are only confirmed when the group meets other refugees in the forest:
A moment later—it was almost 6 p.m.—the second car rolled up—out came Talleruphuus with a gentleman I had seen at the station in Nykøbing the previous day. His name was Goldstein. He asked me if I trusted Talleruphuus. I answered honestly that I wasn’t sure if I did or not. It turned out that they also did not know whether we would leave or not. The skipper, who was about to sail, had unfortunately gotten a hernia from lifting a cupboard—and as he had previously suffered from this affliction, and was afraid that something bad had occurred, he now wanted to go to the hospital to be examined. It sounded so crazy that you almost had to believe it. So they were waiting for a 7:30 p.m. message to know if we would get away or not. In the meantime we could either wait here—in the woods—or go 4 kilometers inland, where there was a small hotel—but where you were not sure you would be able to get a car—or rather it was almost certain you would not be able to get a car since it would have to be home before 8 p.m.
Hope fades that they can get to Sweden that evening, and the family has to think about where to spend the night. They don’t dare go to the hotel—and four kilometers is a long way with children and luggage. At the same time they are afflicted with doubt: Was Talleruphuus trustworthy? What to think of the fisherman with the strange story about the hernia? Where would it leave them if it was not true? In just two days the two families had made the journey from a safe world north of Copenhagen to a cold and dark night on the open beach without shelter or a firm plan for what to do next. And all the fuss had been triggered by a threat that had not yet materialized. Maybe the whole thing was a false alarm and they had simply overreacted?
The same day Adolph Meyer at last decided to make the next move. As nothing was occurring yet, and he was relatively unconcerned about the danger, the pediatrician simply went home to make the last practical arrangements. Meanwhile, German military police made their final preparations for the planned operation that evening. Meyer noted:
Decided next morning to go to Hart …, checked out, paid in the office, and went home by bus # 3. The train would depart at 1:25 p.m. It was now Friday, October 1; at home I asked that several paintings be removed, had all my clothes packed in the steamer trunk, Uncle Moses’ suitcase, my leather suitcase, my red suitcase and a new suitcase that the girls bought, and my attaché case and my oilcloth bag with my eiderdown blanket.… I arranged with Bülow that he should pay my taxes and rent, and terminate the apartment and give my trusty maids one year’s salary and one year of expenses. He would sell 50,000 kroners’ worth of bonds. I had approx. 5,500 kroner on me and in Honoré’s box which he brought me, 11,000 kr was deposited on September 29, which he brought home to me October 1. I kissed the girls good-bye at home. They drove the suitcases and my bike to the station, whereas I took the tram and tickets to Ruds Vedby. I arrived at 4:30 p.m., … Went up to Hart, who had been waiting for me since Thursday. I lived there under the name Dr. Madsen until the fourth of October.
Dr. Meyer felt relatively safe, comfortably installed at his colleague’s house in the countryside. But his sense of security was quickly mixed with growing anxiety for the rest of his family and relatives, including his sister-in-law, Mary Goldschmidt. Everyone was afraid to call and communicate directly, and all the secrecy opened many possibilities fraught with misunderstanding: “They were immensely gracious to me. I immediately said that I would be a paying guest. I was very sad I knew nothing about my children. Despite my pseudonym, Michael knew me from last summer, so did the housekeepers. I knew, or thought at least that I knew, that Mary had a connection to Dagmar Christensen and I wrote to the office head, to ask if Mary would get in touch with me. The Harts had offered to have her to stay with them. Later in the evening, I asked Dr. Hart to telephone … to say that Mary was welcome at the Harts and could get there Saturday by the 13:28 train from Copenhagen. I would not have done so if I had known that she was with [relatives] in Ålsgarde, waiting for a boat that they had bought together. She thought, in turn, that I, who was alone, wanted her to come over to where I was, and in her goodness she left the others, which is why I have also felt great responsibility for her since.”
For very wealthy people, fleeing presented an additional problem, since they had to dispose of their assets at short notice, so they—hopefully—could be recovered after the war. This was true whether the individuals in question were being pursued, or whether they simply feared it. One example was the prosperous Supreme Court lawyer and art collector C. L. David, who was publicly known as a Jew, and was vilified as such in the local Nazi press, although strictly speaking he was, according to the Nazi concept, “half Jewish” and therefore not yet in the Germans’ spotlight. But dared he trust this? David doubted it and sought the advice of his personal friend, the respected lawyer H. H. Bruun, who with great thoroughness sought to clarify the question of whether David could safely stay or not. It is interesting that the seasoned lawyer, according to his own handwritten notes, went directly to the primary source in the form of the German consul general, who on Friday, October 1, before the action was launched, carefully explained to Bruun the German arrangements in regard to half and quarter Jews.
Even more interesting is Bruun’s subsequent calming advice to the frightened David. In the midst of the madness both men seemed to still have great confidence in the soothing assurances of German officialdom. So David stayed on.11
Messages to Best
In a short note dated October 2, Nils Svenningsen outlined his attempts to get in touch with Best the previous evening. The frustration is apparent, as is the dual purpose of the account—to serve also as life insurance when, in the fullness of time, questions are asked as to his role in the critical hours, history is written, and responsibility established: “On Friday, October 1 at 4:30 p.m., an appointment was arranged … for me to be received by Dr. Best at Dagmarhus at 6 p.m.
“Dr. Best’s secretary called at 5:45 p.m. to cancel the meeting. Dr. Best was suddenly called away. The secretary did not know where he had gone and did not know when he would be back. It would hardly be possible for me to be received in the course of the evening.”
With the mandate obtained from his colleagues, Svenningsen went to Dagmarhus anyway to talk to Best’s staff, who turned out to be polite but impenetrable. Everybody claimed total ignorance. Svenningsen delivered the king’s letter and the Supreme Court’s appeal and otherwise continued to look for Best, who actually got the note from the king, as can be established from the fact that he telegraphed it to Berlin at 7:30 p.m., confirming what Best had already warned, namely that the intense rumors of the impending roundup would “impede the action, as many Jews will not be in their own apartments.” The action would start at 9:00 p.m.12
At approximately 8:40 p.m. Svenningsen received a message through the Foreign Ministry—actually dispatched from Dagmarhus, where he was still waiting—informing him “that in the course of the night arrests would be made of a number of ‘individuals hostile to the Reich.’ Dagmarhus asked that police across the country be informed in order to avoid clashes between the police and the German authorities who were carrying out the action. Notification to this effect had been sent to the police by telex.”
This was the signal that the action against the Danish Jews had been launched. The following day Svenningsen noted subsequent events at Dagmarhus, where his colleague from the Justice Ministry, Eivind Larsen, had joined him: “Shortly after, the phone lines were cut. Partly as a result of this it was not until 11:15 p.m. that I managed to
get an audience with Dr. Best. Permanent Secretary Eivind Larsen accompanied me. I referred to the conversation on Wednesday and said that I had wanted the opportunity to talk about the case with Dr. Best earlier in the day. However, this evening we were informed that there would be the arrest of a number of individuals hostile to the Reich, and we understood that it meant the Jews, which Dr. Best confirmed. He also confirmed, on inquiry, that those concerned would immediately be taken to Germany on Saturday morning. Those fit to work would be put to various tasks, while the elderly and unfit would be taken to Theresienstadt in Bohemia, a city where Jews had autonomy and lived under decent conditions. From there they would be able to correspond with the outside world, including also with their relatives in Denmark.”
Svenningsen was not persuaded by Best’s reassuring references to German concentration camps. He was aware that the worst was now at hand: For the permanent secretaries this was precisely the situation in which their offer of Danish internment had to be made immediately as a last resort:
After Dr. Best had thus confirmed that this was about immediate deportation, I presented a proposal for internment by Danish authorities in this country, as I delivered a handwritten letter with the following text [in German]:
“Tonight I have … received notification that German authorities intend tonight to arrest a number of individuals hostile to the Reich. I understand this message to mean it is about the arrest of Jews. Since I was not able to get the opportunity to speak with you personally about this matter today, I send you these lines, despite coming at the last hour, to ask whether any possibility exists to at least avoid this: The deportation of those concerned. If it really is about immediate deportation, Mr. Eivind Larsen and myself stand ready to do everything possible to create an arrangement whereby the persons wanted by the German side would, by Danish initiative and by our own authorities, be interned together here in Denmark. I ask you to ensure that a further exploration of such a solution is not prejudged.”