by Anuj Dhar
Prime Minister Nehru announced in Parliament on 3 December 1955 the setting up of Netaji Inquiry Committee (NIC) under the chairmanship of Shah Nawaz Khan.
Shah Nawaz was to be assisted by ICS officer Shankar Maitra, who had been handpicked by the Bengal Chief Minister after his Home Secretary Ranjit Mitra, his first choice, declined the offer. Suresh Bose, a former Bihar Executive Service officer, came to represent his family. His nephew Amiya was unwilling and Shah Nawaz did not want him on the panel. According to a prime ministerial minute, Shah Nawaz suggested that the “right person to go as a member of Shri Subhas Chandra Bose’s family was his eldest living brother”. “He did not at all like the idea of Amiya Bose being sent and thought that this would be an unpopular choice.”
Amiya’s inclusion would have been disastrous for the Government. This fiery, London-educated barrister would have been of far greater nuisance to them than his sexagenarian, mild-mannered uncle turned out to be.
From the start, the unseen hand of the Ministry of External Affairs worked the Shah Nawaz Committee from behind like a puppet. A secret letter of October 18 discloses the names of two prominent string pullers: TN Kaul and AK Dar. Writing to Ambassador Sen in Tokyo, Kaul made it clear that Dar would “guide” the committee during its all-important Japan visit.
Dar had already held secret parleys with the Gaimusho. In ordinary circumstances, the Japanese would not have done anything to revive ghosts from a past they had severed most connections with. But this circumstance was extraordinary. They were facing the wild allegations of murdering Bose and the tightlipped Japanese embassy staffers in India were giving rise to all sorts of misapprehensions.
Even after a decade of Bose’s reported death, the Japanese ambassadors in India at that time—T Nishiyama and Seijiro Yoshizawa—would turn stoic every time mediapersons questioned them. The only thing common between the Japan of 1945 and the Japan of 1955 was that same man was the foreign minister. Mamoru Shigemitsu had been convicted of “war crimes” but was dealt with less harshly for his peaceful overtures to the Allies during the war. He spent seven years in jail and then made a most remarkable comeback.
The Director of Asian Affairs Division at the Gaimusho told Dar that the Indian government proposal to inquire into Bose’s death was “acceptable to the Government of Japan in the terms in which the proposal was made by the Indian Ambassador to the Foreign Minister [of Japan]” at the specific instruction of Prime Minister Nehru. Dar’s note for New Delhi threw further light on “the terms” and their implied meaning:
Mr Nakagawa added that the Government of Japan hopes there would be no departure from the main objective in view and extraneous inquiries and aside researches would not be made.
To ensure that there was “no departure from the main objective in view”, the terms of reference for the inquiry committee came preloaded with the assumption that Bose had died following an air crash. Shah Nawaz’s original draft of the committee’s basic term of reference—“to inquire into the departure of Netaji Subhas Chandra Bose from Bangkok on or about 16th August and the subsequent events leading to his disappearance”—had been okayed by MEA Deputy Secretary AJ Kidwai. “This appears to be a sufficiently elastic formulation and the word ‘disappearance’ is more appropriate than the word ‘death’ which we have used so far,” he noted. Not for Kaul. “I would suggest ‘alleged death’ instead of ‘disappearance’,” he countered. The final text approved by Foreign Secretary Dutt made the aircraft accident a foregone conclusion. The dotted lines were drawn.
True to the spirit that no “extraneous inquiries and aside researches” should be made, Shah Nawaz conducted an inquiry which has come to be labelled as his “command performance” for the Prime Minister. On the face of it, that sort of disparaging description doesn’t appear to do justice to a sleek report with six concise, neatly narrated chapters spread across 78 pages interspersed with images of the plane wreck, covered body of Bose, a bandaged Habibur Rahman, Renkoji temple and the ash container lying next to an image of Bose.
The first chapter—Last plans of Netaji Subhas Chandra Bose—downplays the Russian connection to the extent that it virtually stands dismissed. It twists Bose’s long-standing plan to create the impression that it was a knee-jerk reaction, and the idea of contacting the Russians occurred to him at the eleventh hour:
There were a number of reasons for Netaji to go to Tokyo, although his ultimate goal was Russia via Manchuria. …There was no time then to contact Russian authorities or to make out detailed plans ahead. [18]
The best person to clarify the matter pertaining to Bose’s plan about Russia would have been Foreign Minister Shigemitsu. With so many people and records referring to him, it was in the fitness of things to invite him to give evidence to the committee probing the fate of a man he had regarded as a friend. It wasn’t.
The next three chapters of the NIC report are graphic and draw from the testimonies of six of the seven survivors, doctors and other witnesses. One after another, the survivors of the crash and witnesses to Bose’s death at hospital recount the horrific details. “There is absolutely no reason why they should come and depose to something which they know to be untrue,” [19] the report says and gives illustration of how some Japanese witnesses greatly inconvenienced themselves just to tell the committee of Bose’s death:
Mr J Nakamura, who was an interpreter, and was present at Netaji’s death-bed, although 70 years of age, came on his own all the way from Kyushu, about 1,200 kilometres from Tokyo. [20]
Dr Yoshimi, who owns a medical clinic at Miyasakiken in Kyushi Island, had to close down his clinic for several days and come to Tokyo, a distance about 1,200 kilometres from his place. [21]
The Japanese clearly went out of the way to support the official view. Shutting down his clinic for several days was too big a gesture for Bose by Dr Yoshimi, who had never known him. His only association with the severely burnt man identified to him as “His Excellency Chandra Bose” began and ended on 18 August 1945. And yet, the doctor became overtly mushy while describing the final moments of “Bose”. The report says that “describing this poignant scene before the committee, Dr Yoshimi himself broke down and sobbed audibly”. [22]
Pakistan government official Habibur Rahman’s deposition before the committee in New Delhi marked his first and last appearance in India since Partition. He was expected to make a long statement. A comprehensive one he did make. The record of Rahman’s statement continues to be security classified and therefore is not available to the researchers in any archive or library. Anyhow, flipping through a copy, this is what one would read Rahman narrating about the topography of Matsuyama aerodrome and the crash:
The direction of the runway was north to south. The runaway is in flat country with mountains to its north and north-east at a distance of about eight to 10 miles. …After taking off, the plane circled over the airfield at a few hundred feet height and then it turned north or north-east. We were no more five or six minutes in the air and the plane was still gaining height, when suddenly I heard a deafening noise as if some shell had hit the starboard side of the plane.
At the end of the statement, Rahman was put a few questions by Suresh Bose and Shah Nawaz. One of Suresh Bose’s pertained to the exact site of the crash:
Q: You have stated that the crash took place about one and a half or two miles from the boundaries of the airport. Did it crash against the side of a hillock?
A: Yes. No, it crashed on plain ground.
Some time before Rahman gave evidence to the committee, the Gaimusho presented to the Indian embassy its own report titled “Investigation on the cause of death and other matters of the late Subhas Chandra Bose”. An enclosure attached to it contained four sketches showing sitting arrangement in the plane which had carried Bose and others and the hospital ward and room where he was treated following the crash. The sketch-map of the Matsyuyama aerdrome depicted the plane as having gone “20 metres above the ground” before crash landing not one-two
miles away from the boundary walls but just at the end of the runway itself.
Something was terribly wrong with Habib’s statement. This was not a sort of discrepancy which could be glossed over, but it was. The NIC report admitted that “some witnesses, like Lt Col Nonogaki, have stated that the plane crashed on the concrete runway; on the other extreme, Col Habibur Rahman has said that the crash took place one or two miles outside the aerodrome” and then placed its faith in the version of ground engineer Capt Nakamura, who said that “the plane crashed about 100 meters beyond the concrete runway”. [23]
But when the same Capt Nakamura was found to be making a statement about his rescuing Bose while Rahman watched from afar—something that wouldn’t fit in the official narrative of the death story—the report brazened it out that it “may perhaps be put down to confused recollection after such a lapse of time”. [24]
Can a witness be both credible and confused at the same time? So, this was the trick. Shah Nawaz cherry picked the “right” pieces of evidence from a jumble of contradictory statements. That’s why several slips showed in the “made-to-order” NIC report. Sample a few quotes:
* Different witnesses have given the time of halt at Taihoku airfield from half an hour to two hours. [Page 17 of the NIC report]
* Witnesses inside the plane have given different estimates of the heights.... [P 19]
* According to Col Habibur Rahman, the plane split in the front portion, while Capt Nakamura alias Yamamoto is positive that the plane was intact and the body was not broken. [P 19]...the statement of Lt Col Nonogaki [is] that the two split parts went in different direction on the ground. [P 20]
* Maj Takahashi gives a somewhat different version. He says that he saw Netaji getting out from the left front portion of the plane. His clothes were on fire and he was trying to take off his coat. Then he says that he went up to Netaji and made him roll on the ground and managed to put out the fire from his clothes. He says that Col Habibur Rahman was there, but assigns him a passive role. [P 23]
* There is some doubt about the fate of the two pilots and some of the crew who were initially trapped inside the plane. Capt Nakamura alias Yamamoto definitely says that Pilot Takizawa and Co-Pilot Ayoagi perished along with General Shidei, and he helped to bury their entrails and put their ashes in three boxes… The two doctors, Yoshimi and Tsuruta, definitely say that they had treated Co-Pilot Ayoagi who died later in the hospital. [P 23]
* According to Col Habibur Rahman, Netaji was taken to the “operation theatre,” and given a white transfusion which he thought was camphor. The Japanese doctors did not refer to the operation theatre. [P 29]
* Dr Yoshimi has stated that in the case of severe burns of third degree, the blood gets thicker, and there is high pressure on the heart. In order to relieve this pressure, blood is usually let out and new blood given in its place. Approximately 200 cc of Netaji’s blood was let out and a blood transfusion to the extent of 400 cc was given to him. …A more serious discrepancy is the statement of Dr Tsuruta, who attended on Netaji, that no blood transfusion was given. Col Rahman who was also in the same ward room could not remember if any blood transfusion was given to Netaji. There is no way of reconciling these different statements and they must remain as they are. [P 29]
* Col Habibur Rahman has said that Netaji had a cut on his head four inches long which was bleeding. This is a discrepancy. [P 27]
* There is some discrepancy between the witnesses as to who were in the same ward with Netaji. [P 28]
* The evidence of the fellow injured persons does not help to establish the correct hour. ...So, the time of death cannot be established with accuracy; it could be any time between 8pm and midnight on the 18th August 1945. [P 30]
* And although Lt Col Nonogaki has stated that, on informing the headquarters some staff officers came while Netaji was alive, the staff officers themselves, namely, Col Miyata and Maj Nagatomo, say that they arrived after Netaji had died. [P 43]
* Apparently, no particular interest was taken by the local army command as to what happened to Netaji’s body. [P 43]
* One would have at least expected a formal inquiry into the air crash, which is more or less a routine matter. More so, as the plane carried distinguished persons like Netaji Subhas Chandra Bose and Lt Gen Shidei. But no such inquiry was held. [Pp 43-44]
* For reasons not very clear, the Japanese authorities maintained a great deal of secrecy about it. [P 30]
* J Nakamura says that the news about Netaji’s death was kept a secret and known only to high-ranking military officers. [P 31]
The other side of the story was how Suresh Bose saw it. Shah Nawaz’s inquiry had hit a rough patch from the word go. His personal relations with Shah Nawaz aside, Suresh Bose could never reconcile with his occupying the position he thought should have gone to Radha Binod Pal.
On 1 April 1955—day one of the committee’s work—Subhas Bose’s friend and Forward Bloc leader Muthuramalingam Thevar appeared as the witness No 1. His arguments sent Suresh Bose and the Government on a collision course. Thevar charged that the terms of reference of the committee reflected a foregone conclusion. He gave Shah Nawaz a piece of his mind and then held a press conference in Delhi on April 3. Making a most unbelievable claim that he had met Bose in China recently, Thevar told the media that “he would furnish conclusive proof” that Bose was alive if the inquiry committee was reconstituted. Thevar called the committee “an eyewash”, when it had barely started functioning. “Dr Radha Binod Pal should be invited to function as the chairman. The Government must make it known categorically to the public whether Netaji’s name is still in the list of war criminals and if not, when it was removed and how?”
Thevar’s bizarre claims did not have any takers except Suresh Bose. In a letter to the PM on April 2, Suresh wrote: “With due respect to Shri Shah Nawaz Khan, I am of opinion that as this inquiry is more or less of a judicial nature and…it requires mature deliberations and sound judgment. As such, it is my humble opinion that Dr Radha Binod Pal be requested and persuaded to join the committee and lead it.”
The next morning Suresh ran into the Prime Minister and reiterated his litany of complaints and demands. The Prime Minister quietly listened when he should have rebuked Suresh for attaching importance to the war criminal absurdity. By evening, his official reaction had been recorded:
Our effort should be to get as many facts as possible about Netaji Subhas Chandra Bose’s last days—the disappearance or death or whatever it was. Apart from direct evidence which we have thus far received and which may further be obtained, it seems to me almost inconceivable that Netaji should be alive. Over ten years have passed since the aircraft accident. Even if he had escaped then I cannot conceive how he could possibly remain silent during all these years when it was very easy for him to communicate in various ways with India….
Nehru further minuted that he had pointed out to Suresh that Radha Binod Pal’s appointment to the committee “was not suitable because of the part he played in the war criminals’ trial”.
He is, of course, a very eminent criminal jurist and is well known in Japan and elsewhere. But, in the circumstances, his functioning in this committee might not be liked by some foreign countries like the USA....
Digging deeper into secret files reveals that the Prime Minister was imagining things. The part Dr Pal played in the Tokyo trial—where many of the people facing “war crime” charges had aided the Indian freedom struggle—actually made him the best person for the job. The Japanese had come to regard him as a moral giant. A decade after the end of the war, the Americans couldn't have any issue with any inquiry over Bose's death in Japan. In a personal letter dated 8 February 1956, Ambassador BR Sen—the Indian ear on the ground in Japan—in fact rooted for the judge , saying he could “see no objection whatever from this end”.
Radha Binod Pal, as you are aware, enjoys a great reputation in Japan for his dissenting note as a Member of the War Crimes Tribunal and also generally for his s
ympathetic approach to Japanese problems after the war. I have not discussed this matter with anyone here either in the Japanese Government or outside. …If you think inclusion of Radha Binod Pal as a Member of the Committee will help to satisfy public opinion in Bengal, I can see no objection whatever from this end. In fact, I feel…his inclusion may give a certain stability and realism to the work of this Committee, which it may—I have no specific reason to say so—otherwise lack.
The Prime Minister saw the letter and dictated his firm stand to Foreign Secretary Dutt.
After failing to get Justice Pal on board, Suresh Bose tried to turn the spotlight on Shah Nawaz’s conduct. He wrote to the PM: “As the public and the Press have not been allowed to be present during the deliberations of the committee, I was taken aback when I first saw a report of the deliberations of the committee in the newspapers. On asking Sri Shah Nawaz Khan about this publication, he said that some persons enquired of him in the lobby of Parliament and he had told them something about the matter. There have been some other irregularities, and I think your instructions are very necessary for our guidance.”
The PM had them ready the same day. He offered a nugget of advice: Keep media out. “It is desirable that members of the committee should not give any interviews or make any statements to the Press. They should avoid even informal talks on this subject with others who might give the information to the Press.” [25] Then he rapped Shah Nawaz on the knuckles in a letter to him. “Suresh babu also says that something appeared in the Press, apparently because you had had a talk with someone in the lobby. I think this should also be avoided.” [26]