by Anuj Dhar
Naidu conveyed the PM’s views to Ambassador MA Rauf in December 1953 with this instruction:
In the priest’s letter, some reference is made to his not receiving any help privately or officially. The Prime Minister would therefore like you to help him in any way you think proper, including financially in so far as any money might be required for the purpose.
In the absence of Rauf, embassy staffer Ranbir Singh read the letter and carried out the instruction. On 14 January 1954, he informed Naidu that “though repeatedly pressed to accept financial assistance, the priest made it very clear that he had kept ashes, voluntarily, because of his high regard for Subhas babu, which, in itself, made it impossible for, him to accept any money”.
As Singh put it, the issue was highly emotive. Mochizuki had told him that guardianship of the ashes was “a source of worry to him” and he was hurt by the irreverence displayed by some visiting Indians. He demanded that the embassy should make a public announcement that Bose’s ashes were kept at his temple. This wasn’t possible for the embassy. “Any official statement”, Singh reasoned, “would raise a storm of protest among some of our more obstinate fellow-citizens here.”
Mochizuki, a likeable old man, agreed to continue to maintain the status quo. He left a good impression on Singh, who nevertheless, added one rider which was not true so far as the Japanese policy on India in pre-1945 days was concerned.
Post-Shah Nawaz inquiry, Mochizuki became restless. In July 1957 he wrote to Nehru “whether the Government of India would now, in view of the inquiry committee report, like to consider the question of bringing the ashes back”. He was this time told by the embassy officials that the controversy “had not yet ended” for several Bose family members and so the ashes could not be taken to India.
In November 1957 the aging priest again wrote to the Prime Minister, saying “Netaji’s soul is anxious to return to his fatherland as soon as possible”. He was backed by the Japanese government. The Indian embassy was told that it was “not the custom In Japan for ashes to be kept continuously in temples”. The embassy official spoke of the fix the Indian government was caught in:
There has been no request from either Mr Bose’s family in Austria or his relatives in India and they may be embarrassed by having these ashes in India since, among Hindus, the ashes are cast into a river or otherwise scattered.
A decade later, octogenarian Mochizuki renewed his request, expressing his “inability to take care of the ashes adequately in view of his age and the possibility of his retiring from the temple”.
Handling the situation on the ground this time was First Secretary JN Dixit. In a Top Secret letter dated 26 September 1966 addressed to KR Narayanan, Director (East Asia), MEA, the would-be Foreign Secretary and National Security Adviser remarked:
This is not the first time that the matter has been raised with the ministry. In the late fifties…a similar request was made by this embassy and at that time the late Prime Minister, Mr Nehru, had ruled that taking back the ashes would not be practical because Netaji’s family was not convinced of his death and were not ready to acknowledge the genuineness of the ashes. He had desired that the present arrangement with the Renkoji temple should continue.
Nearly nine years have passed since then and still we have not taken any step to do something about these ashes, nor have we given any subsidy or grant to the temple of the priest in Tokyo for keeping the ashes properly. I would be grateful if you could have this matter examined by the concerned authorities and suggest some tangible solution to the problem that we now face because of the Japanese priest’s request.
The predicament was thrashed out by senior Ministry of External Affairs officers, especially Narayanan—the President of India from 1997 to 2002. Narayanan made the following observation on 21 November 1966:
The question of the disposal of the ashes of Netaji now kept in Tokyo temple is a very complicated one. As far as the Government is concerned, they have accepted the findings of the Shaw [sic] Nawaz Khan Committee and have no difficulty in treating the ashes as those of Netaji. It is, however, a different matter for the family of Netaji who still believe that he is alive.
I, therefore, doubt very much whether the family will accept the idea of the ashes being kept in the Netaji museum in Calcutta. …Far from agreeing to the ashes being brought to India, and exhibited in the museum, the relatives, family as well as politicians might raise an agitation against the Government for trying to assert that Netaji is dead. Therefore, unless the family gives its consent, it would not be appropriate to try to bring the ashes to India now.
Thinking of a win-win formula, Narayanan mooted: “It seems to me that the only thing we can do at present is to give financial assistance to the priest who is now looking after the ashes in the temple. I shall be grateful if FS will see this and give his advice.”
The Foreign Secretary was agreeable. Writing back to Dixit on 24 December 1966, AK Damodaran, then a Deputy Secretary, summarised the ministry’s plan to tackle the problem:
It seems to us therefore that the only thing we can do at present is to give some financial assistance to the Tokyo temple. We were thinking in terms of a grant of Rs 5,000 per year which could be handed over in the form of a grant to the temple and the priest in appreciation of their loyalty towards India and Netaji. If the grant is offered in this manner and not as consideration for looking after the urn itself, there is just a chance that the temple authorities might agree to continue to look after the ashes. We have not yet approached the Finance Ministry about this but have reasons to think that their response might be favourable. We would, therefore, not like you to make an offer now but would be grateful for your comments on the proposal.
Dixit, now signing in his nickname “Mani”, wrote to “Damu” in his Top Secret No. 1(33)SS/64 dated 25 January 1967 that the priest was agreeable to receiving the grant “in the form we suggest” and that this would “temporarily solve the problem”.
In February 1967 further discussions took place on the subject in the ministry. A February 22 noting by SP Krishnamurthy of the East Asia Division in the MEA repeated Narayanan’s prescient warning that “the grant if made without any stipulation is likely to be taken as permanent by the recipients and it might be difficult to stop the same in future even after the need for making such payments has ceased to exist”. He, therefore, directed to “make it clear to the recipient that the grant is being made for an initial period of three years subject to review later”.
Following this, Damodaran, who died in 2012 as a famed diplomat, elaborated in a note that “we may now initiate action for providing the amount of Rs 5,000 in the discretionary grant allotted to this ministry”. The same was promptly approved by the Ministry of Finance. A few days later, SP Krishnamurthy wrote:
With a view to avoid political and other complications, it has been proposed that the temple priest be given payment of Rs 5,000 per annum for some years, ostensibly for the renovation and preservation of the temple. The payment is not proposed to be directly linked with the priest agreeing to retain the custody of the ashes but to be given in consideration of temple authorities’ loyalty towards India and Netaji for a number of years.
This view of the officials certainly marked a change from the previous one, a replica of the World War II perspective of the Anglo-Americans that had nothing to do with India’s own primary interest to get rid of the colonial rule before anything else. A Secretary from the Indian embassy dropping in at a meeting at Renkoji temple in 1958 “discovered that it was sponsored by a number of war criminals. Among those present were ex Lt Gen Oshima, the last Imperial Japanese Ambassador in Berlin, and ex-Lt Gen Kawabe, who commanded the Imperial Japanese Army in Burma”. Little did the secretary appreciate that if it wasn’t for those “war criminals”, he would not have been occupying that official position at such a young age. He could still be toadying under a white man, probably happily.
The first grant to the Renkoji temple was made on 28 March 19
67. JN Dixit’s Top Secret No 305-FS/67 noted that
the payment was made in cash in the presence of the Administrative Attaché of this mission. …We made the payment conveying that it was only an ad hoc grant in recognition of the services rendered by him to Netaji’s ashes, for upkeep of the temple. Care was taken to avoid conveying the impression that such payments are to be an annual affair. The receipt bearing the signature and seal of the chief priest is being kept on record in the classified file on the subject.
On April 3, the letter trail resumed again with Dixit relaying the ambassador’s view that “we must continue to compensate the temple in this form till we are in a position to accept Netaji’s ashes back in India”.
On April 9 the ministry agreed with the ambassador that “we should certainly review this question early enough every year in consultations with the embassy”. “And if you feel that the grant is necessary, we do not think there will be any difficulty in getting the sanction in view of the unusual political significance of the subject.” Dixit insisted vide his Top Secret No 349-FS/67 of April 17 that “we would see that the present arrangement of giving grant to the Renkoji temple continues by making it an annual feature in our budget estimate”.
After the expiry of the three-year period, a fresh sanction was issued in 1971-72, when the Khosla Commission had been functioning. The next year the Ministry made no such payment and neither did the temple priest raise any questions about it. This situation made the ministry wonder if it was not the time to stop making the payments.
The matter was discussed by Deputy Secretary PK Budhwar in a note dated 6 December 1973. He brought it to his superiors’ as well as Indian embassy’s notice that it should be considered “whether we should continue making such payments in respect of an item whose authenticity would also appear to be in some doubt”. Responding to Budhwar’s contentions, P Johari, Minister, Indian Embassy in Tokyo, made some forceful points in his Top Secret No TOK.461(3)/74 dated 8 May 1974:
Let me say straightaway that we feel very strongly that the payment of Rs 5,000/- per year should continue till such time as we are in a position to take the ashes back. While there is no commitment on our part in this regard, there is a moral obligation to compensate the old and sick priest of the temple for looking after the ashes of Netaji with care and devotion. In reply to your queries, there has been no reaction so far from the priest to the stoppage of payment in 1972-1973. However, you must remember that the priest is almost 90-years-old and in very poor health. This could, perhaps, explain his lack of reaction. There is no guarantee that his successor would also not react if the payment were to be stopped permanently.
Johari reiterated that “we would, therefore, very strongly urge that the sanction for the financial years 1972-73 and 1973-74 be issued without any further delay. You will appreciate that if the Japanese government gets to know that the payments have not been made and if this information is leaked, it could cause acute embarrassment.”
As far as the Japanese are concerned, they would like us to take the ashes back. You will appreciate that it is hardly possible for us to advise you on the political implications at the present juncture in India. This would have to be examined by the Ministry of Home Affairs in the light of the findings of the Khosla Commission. All we can say from here is that the sooner a decision is taken in this regard the better.
The MEA had no options but to resume the payments. Year after year they were made and yet, in a stupendous testimony to the Indian official secrecy, no one in the country, no newspaper whatsoever, ever got a clue.
The arrangement lasted for the rest of 1970s and the entire 1980s. The Janata Party government carried on with its predecessor’s view that “no useful purpose would be served by bringing the ashes back to India at present as this might create unnecessary tensions”.
In the Rajiv Gandhi-era, several demands were made to bring the ashes to India. One of Sarat Bose’s son and possibly the first Bose family entrant to the Congress party after 1947, Dr Sisir Bose, openly came out in favour of it in a letter to Prime Minister Gandhi on 20 September 1985. Most of such demands, however, lacked punch, and at times even the basic understanding of the matter. On 2 April 1987, TN Kundra, convener of the Freedom Fighters Relief Committee wrote to the PM that the
controversy regarding the death of Netaji is almost dead now. His family members were not prepared to accept that ashes (believed to be of Netaji) kept in Hikari Kikan [sic] in Japan are of Netaji. …Will it not be desirable that an early action be taken to bring the ashes in India?
The Government did not agree. Responding to a similar letter, then External Affairs Minister Narasimha Rao wrote on 10 May 1989 that “it is worthwhile to await the emergence of a clear national consensus on the question which alone can enable the Government to take a final decision in the matter”. A more elaborate 1990 PMO note stated that “consensus has not yet developed in favour of bringing the ashes back to India and there are strong feelings among a section of the public about the facts surrounding the death of Netaji”.
Five years later a crisis was in the making. The Japanese who had through the years venerated “Bose’s remains”—especially members of the Bose Academy—decided to mark the 50th anniversary of his death as the last. For the first time the Indian government weighed the tough choice situation of taking the ashes out of Renkoji temple. To make things all the more complicated, the Government was planning to mark Bose’s centenary year in 1997. A situation in Tokyo and some pomp and show at home could well have revived the controversy.
The matter was therefore accorded high priority and with the approval of Prime Minister Narasimha Rao placed before the Union Cabinet for a decision on 6 February 1995. The nodal ministry in the Bose case, the Ministry of Home Affairs, factored in view of all concerned, to define the problem in a “statement of implementation schedule” issued by Home Secretary K Padmanabhaiah.
In his note presented to the Cabinet, the Home Secretary detailed that
the Bose Academy members are reportedly thinking of disbanding the academy and having the last memorial service in 1995 on the occasion of the 50th anniversary of Netaji’s death. Because of this and also since the birth centenary of Netaji is due in 1997, the issue of what action is to be taken regarding the mortal remains of Netaji has now acquired some urgency. There has been wide media coverage in Japan focussing the concerns expressed by the war veterans of the academy over the Government of India’s lack of interest in taking the ashes to India. If no decision is taken in 1995, India may be asked by the Bose Academy to take charge of the mortal remains of Netaji. It would not be possible for India to refuse to take possession of the mortal remains. Therefore, a decision is required to be taken well in advance as to what is to be done with these mortal remains.
Taking the lead, the Ministry of External Affairs under the able leadership of Pranab Mukhejee overcame decades of indecisiveness to prepare a grand plan to bring the ashes to India. It opined that there were “widespread sentiments that Netaji’s birth centenary in 1997 should be befittingly commemorated” and there was no better way to do that than to get Ichiro Okura’s ashes to India.
The ministry proposed the following course of preparatory action:
The consensus in the Cabinet during the meeting on February 8 was in favour of the views outlined by the Committee of Secretaries. The CoS had reasoned:
a) The Bose Academy had not issued an ultimatum regarding the handing over of the ashes but merely made a representation on the grounds that its members were rapidly aging and by not be able to discharge their present duties; and
b) The Government of India was paying for the upkeep of the mortal remains in Renkoji temple and the management could be persuaded to continue with this arrangement if the upkeep charges were increased.
Hence, “no particular advantage lay in taking a decision on this at a juncture since the birth anniversary was due only in 1997”.
Therefore, a view could be taken in the matter in
1996-97 and till such time status quo should be maintained. The temple management may be persuaded to continue with the upkeep of the ashes and, if necessary, the maintenance charges being paid to the temple may be suitably increased to meet the increased cost.
The Cabinet eventually decided “that the ashes would not be brought back to India for the present but that the dependability of the arrangement in Japan should be examined” and that India could raise the annual upkeep contribution for the Renkoji temple from ¥ 600,000 to ¥ 1 million.
Accordingly, Foreign Secretary Salman Haidar on 3 April 1995 apprised Ambassador Kuldip Sahdev in Tokyo of the Cabinet’s decision and sought a detailed reply on how the ashes were being maintained in the temple and what could be done if they were to be removed from there. Drawing from the ambassador’s response, Haidar sent a four page Top Secret response to Padmanabhaiah.
Discussions with the priest, Rev Mochizuki show that he is quite happy to carry on the work of looking after the ashes. The presence of the ashes gives his temple some additional importance and some additional income by way of the Yen 600,000 that we donate annually for its upkeep. It might be desirable to increase this contribution, perhaps to Yen one million (Rs. 3,67,782 at this month’s official exchange rate. Last year, Rev Mochizuki told our Embassy that he has absolutely no problem in continuing this work. He also said that his father received the ashes with the blessings of the governments of Japan and India and that he has no intention of doing anything without the full consultation and approval of these two governments.