by Anuj Dhar
Two days later Chettur responded to the Foreign Secretary: “Whatever INA properties have been handed over by Ramamurti are now in our possession. Details follow.” Those were contained in his 20 October 1951 letter, the last and the centrepiece of Chettur’s correspondence on the issue.
As arranged with Ram Murthy, [First Secretary VC] Trivedi accompanied by the Office Registrar went to the former’s house on the 24th September and took possession of the various packages after opening and weighing them with our own scale in the presence of Ram Murthy and his wife. These packages are in three cloth bundles. In addition, there was a paper package containing gold pieces and ¥ 20,000 in cash handed over by Iyer to Ram Murthy. A copy of the detailed list with weights shown against each package is enclosed.
Two points worth noting in this connection are that the twenty thousand Yen handed over by Ram Murthy are in current notes of ¥ 1,000 each, and not in note which were current in 1945 nor their equivalent in actual value on account of the changes in Yen currency values. Secondly, the gold lumps given by Iyer, which are obviously pieces from melted ornaments are bright and completely untarnished. You will no doubt consult whether gold will remain entirely untarnished after nearly six years.
In the final para, Chettur summed up his damning findings on Ayer and Ramamurti with the aid of startling inputs obtained informally from the Japanese government:
I may add that we have since been able to secure on a personal and private basis a confidential report from the Japanese Foreign Ministry on the question of Netaji’s “treasure”. It appears that Netaji had with him in Saigon substantial quantity of gold ornaments and precious stones, but that he was allowed to carry only two suit-cases on the ill-fated flight. These two suit-cases must have carried very much more than has now been handed over to us, and even if allowances are made for the loss of part of the treasures when the plane crashed, it seems obvious that what was retrieved was substantially very much more than has now been in our possession. What is still more important is that the bulk of the treasures was left in Saigon and it is significant from the information that is available that on the 26th January, 1945, Netaji’s collection weighed more than himself.
In this context you will notice that Iyer came to Tokyo subsequently from Saigon and that his statement of that time was that: “ The gold is intact as I have brought it from Saigon. The cash is the balance after changing Piastras into Yens and meeting my expenses during my stay in Japan since August 22nd 1945”.
There is a party here who has seen the boxes in Iyer’s rooms and who was also to buy off the contents of these two boxes. What happened to these boxes subsequently is a mystery as all that we have got from Iyer is 300 gms of gold and about 260 rupees worth of cash. You will, no doubt, draw your own conclusion from all this, but to me it would appear uncommonly as if Iyer, apprehensive of the early conclusion of the Peace treaty came to Tokyo to divide the loot and to salve his and Murthy’s conscience by handing over a small quantity to Government in the hope that by doing so he would also succeed in drawing a red herring across the trail. How far he has been successful, time will show.
On 1 November 1955 a Top Secret report on the issue was made in the Ministry of External Affairs for the perusal of the Prime Minister. Titled “INA treasure and their handling by Messrs Ayer and Ramamurti”, it was authored by RD Sathe—who became the Foreign Secretary later and whose son-in-law is National Security Adviser Shivshankar Menon. Sathe drew mainly from Chettur’s report and agreed that “Mr Iyer’s activities in Japan have been rather suspicious”. Sathe also added this damning detail:
Suspicion regarding the improper disposal of the treasure is thickened by the comparative affluence in 1946 of Mr Ramamurti when all other Indian nationals in Tokyo were suffering the greatest hardships. Another fact which suggests that the treasures were improperly disposed of is a sudden blossoming out into an Oriental [word unclear] expert of Col Figges, the Military Attaché of the British mission in Tokyo, and the reported invitation extended by the colonel to Ramamurti to settle down in UK.
The note carried the PM’s signature with date 5 November 1951 and the noting of the Foreign Secretary that “the PM has seen this note”.
Almost eleven months later, on 4 October 1952, BN Kaul of the Prime Minister’s Secretariat wrote a letter to the new Foreign Secretary RK Nehru, the Prime Minister’s cousin.
Certain items of INA treasure consisting of gold and other valuables were taken over by the Indian Liaison Mission, Tokyo, some time ago and were in deposit with them. Prime Minister would like to know what is the position about this treasure and what are its contents. He would also like to know whether these articles themselves or whether their equivalent in money can now be brought over to India. Some time ago, there was some difficulty about transferring the treasure from Japan to India. I shall be obliged if a note on this subject is sent to me, at an early date, for the Prime Minister’s information.
The “difficulty” in transferring the treasure to India pertained to the “state of war” which had existed between Japan and the Allied nations. Most of these nations signed the Treaty of San Francisco with Japan in September 1951 and India signed a separate, more humane Treaty of Peace with Japan in June 1952.
Whatever note the Foreign Secretary prepared is not available in the relevant file because it was probably destroyed. But what the file does contain is an October 16 Top Secret letter from MEA Deputy Secretary Leilamani Naidu to the first Indian Ambassador in Tokyo, Dr Mohammed Rauf. The PM wanted the treasure to be brought to India.
In response, Rauf sent a telegram proposing to send the treasure. He saw no need to inform the Japanese government.
This “treasure” was eventually brought to India in utmost secrecy in 1952 by KR Damle, then a Joint Secretary in Ministry of Food and Agriculture and later the Governor of Goa in 1960s. According the MEA records, on his arrival to New Delhi Damle handed over the valuables to Harishwar Dayal, then Joint Secretary (Administration). As per the official estimate, the valuables were considered to be worth about Rs 90,000. “This is presumably based on a message from the mission in Tokyo before despatch of the goods that they might be insured for Rs 90,000,” a note explained.
The officials who saw the “treasure” in New Delhi described it as a “miscellaneous collection of broken fragments of jewellery, ornaments etc. some twisted metal, presumably from an aeroplane and some dust and ashes”. They suggested that the “best way of dealing with treasure may perhaps be to hand it over to Shri Bose’s family. They may exhibit it in the Subhas museum which is proposed to be set up in Cuttack”.
This secret official memo was seen by Minister Abul Kalam Azad who favoured that the “treasure” be “handed over to the family of Shri Subhas Chandra Bose”.
The Prime Minister disagreed: “These articles cannot be sent to Shri Subhas Chandra Bose’s family. They have shown no interest in them and they are not even now prepared to admit that Shri Subhas Chandra Bose died in this accident.” He personally inspected the so-called INA treasure on 9 January 1953. He observed that it “made a poor show”. “Apart from some gold pieces, it consisted of charred remains of some rather cheap jewellery chiefly some silver and gold articles, all broken up. I think that this should be kept as it is. Apart from everything else, it is some evidence of the aircraft accident and subsequent fire.”
With that the case was closed. Ayer was never asked any of the questions Chakravarty said he would be. In fact, Ayer received a warm welcome by the Prime Minister when he met him in New Delhi on his return. Secret records show the MEA finding fault with Chettur for questioning Ayer’s integrity and not collecting the treasure in time. Ayer’s report that Subhas Bose had died in Taipei, which he had prepared on the basis of his inquiries in Japan, was read out by the Prime Minister in Parliament. On 2 March 1952 Nehru wrote to Bengal CM Dr BC Roy, “I have no reason to doubt the correctness of the report [of Ayer] and I think I must accept the final conclusion also.” [6].
&n
bsp; Knowing the antecedents of Ayer, the Prime Minister should have them aplenty. But those did not stop him from giving Ayer a promotion. In 1953, he appointed him as an adviser for the publicity of his flagship Five Years Plan.
For a while, Ramamurti prospered in Japan. His brother’s marriage was a memorable family event. Col Figges was an honoured guest. J Murti’s Japanese bride wore Indian jewellery some people alleged had come from the INA treasure. Then in late 1952 Ramamurti and his Japanese wife were caught up in case of tax evasion and were forced to shift to India.
J Murti went on to open a restaurant of Indian cuisine in Tokyo. Today, it is a hot spot for the diners. Figges became famous as well, just as RD Sathe had noted in his Top Secret note. He is now remembered in the UK as late Sir John Figges—a leading authority on oriental porcelain.
Chettur was forgotten for he did not live long. He signed the historic peace treaty with Japan on India’s behalf and moved to Brussels as India’s Ambassador to Belgium. There, he collapsed while playing golf. His young daughter—former Samajwadi Party president Jaya Jaitely—never learnt of her father’s glorious role in almost pinning down the looters of the INA treasure.
II: The strange case of Taipei air crash
17 August 1945, 5.00pm: Subhas Bose and Habibur Rahman board a bomber in Saigon
What was the need for Bose to get into a cramped bomber when his personal 12-seater twin-engine with the INA insignia was available? In his October 1945 report, PES Finney noted that “apparently Bose’s plane was not allowed to go beyond Saigon for reasons which are not quite clear”. [1] By March 1946, the doubts had turned to suspicions. “It would appear more likely that a person of Bose’s importance even though he may have been discredited, would still be allowed to travel in his own special aircraft.” [2]
GD Khosla’s report said the “Americans had laid a strict embargo on all flights by the Japanese”. [3] But ruling this out was Matsuyama aerodrome ground engineer Capt Nakamura’s statement to the Shah Nawaz Committee that “the flight of Japanese aircraft was restricted only after the 25th of August, i.e. eight days after Netaji’s departure from Saigon”. [4] The committee report commented that “perhaps, it was not so difficult to arrange for seven seats in an air transport”. [5]
Suresh Bose in his Dissentient report cited Pritam Singh’s evidence that “the Japanese were talking among themselves at Saigon aerodrome that it would be difficult to conceal such a big party, which, however, consisted of only seven persons and so they decided to take away Netaji alone”. [6] That brings us to the 17 October 1945 intelligence report from Director of Military Intelligence in China referring to the interception of a secret Japanese message advising Bose “to be separated from his fellow travelers”. [7]
2.00pm: Bomber lands in Taipei but there’s no one to receive Bose and Shidei
The authorities in Taipei did know that Subhas Bose and Gen Shidei were supposed to land and yet not a single high-ranking official cared to receive the dignitaries. War veteran Shah Nawaz Khan could understand that something was amiss and that it could not be attributed merely to the breathless aftermath of the Japanese decision to surrender to the Allies.
General Harukei Isamaya, chief of general staff of the Formosan Army, appeared before the committee and failed to provide any logical reason as to why Shidei and Bose were not received at the airport.
Shah Nawaz was annoyed to learn that barely a week later, Lt Gen Shinichi Tanaka, chief of general staff, Burma Army landed at Matsuyama aerodrome with Dr Ba Maw, Japan-backed President of Burma, on their way to Tokyo. This time the dignitaries were accorded an official welcome by Isamaya and his boss General Rikichi Ando, commander of the Formosan Army and Governor-General of Formosa.
If there was general disorder in Taipei on August 18 and Bose was but a “puppet” of the Japanese—the thrust of Khosla’s and the Government of India’s argument—would the situation be normal a week later? General Ando observed the protocol even though he had been wrecked by the outcome of the war and was to commit harakiri a little later. Then how was that the same Ando, as per Isayama’s testimony to Shah Nawaz, “shut himself up in his house and did not come out” [8] when Bose and Shidei reportedly arrived in Taipei?
The tantalizing possibility that Bose and Shidei never landed in Taipei on 18 August 1945 cannot be ruled out, actually.
2.30pm: Bomber takes off only to go down
It is not very uncommon for the witnesses of plane crash to give out somewhat divergent versions. But then, the people who lived through the air crash in question were war-hardened soldiers with plenty of flying experience. Three of them were air force officers. Maj Kono knew how to fly and both he and Nonogaki could fix up aircraft glitches. Due importance had to be given to such men’s words.
Rahman's statement to the Shah Nawaz Committee was that the plane went down after it had been airborne for "five or six minutes" [9]. Some ten years later, he repeated to Tatsuo Hayashida that the plane was in the air for 10 minutes. Mitsubishi-Ki-21's climb rate was 19,685 feet in 13.2 minutes, so it must have gone a few thousand feet high. Kono, in fact, told the Khosla Commission that the rate was "about seven metres per second." He added: "To reach the height of 700 metres, it might have taken 100 seconds." [10]. Capt Arai, Suresh Bose wrote in his Dissentient report, estimated that “in a few minutes after taking off, the plane attained a height of about 500 metres, equivalent to about 1,600 feet”. [11]
In striking contrast, the Shah Nawaz report conceded that the “witnesses inside the plane have given different estimates of the heights but most of them say that maximum height gained was about 30 metres.” [12] Anyhow, the plane then nosedived, leading to the death of Bose, Shidei and pilots—the people heading to Russia—with the rest miraculously surviving the impact.
2.40pm: Bomber hits the ground
What was the exact impact point? The “eyewitnesses”—people who had seen it all with their own eyes—could not be of one mind in pinpointing the precise location. One said it was towards the south-end of the airport near a temple.
Shah Nawaz’s report stated that “some witnesses, like Lt Col Nonogaki, have stated that the plane crashed on the concrete runway; on the other extreme, Col Habibur Rahman has said that the crash took place one or two miles outside the aerodrome.” [13] Appearing before the Khosla Commission, Nonogaki said that “the plane crashed into a bomb crater...near the end and not beyond the runway;” [14] Kono’s impression was that the plane had “hit from the right wing against the dyke within the compound of the airport” [15] and Takahasi thought the “crash was at sand...within the compound of airport; but beyond the runway”. [16]
Imagine some daredevils inside a plane that’s crashing. It hits the ground and they have no seat belts. Nonogaki, the person incharge of the plane, told the Khosla Commission that he saw Sakai, Arai and Takahashi “rolling like stones”. [17] He told the committee that upon impact, the plane split in two parts and these “went in different directions”. [18]
The survivors were either thrown out or they ran out to safety. And from a distance they looked back at what had become of the plane. Was the plane still intact or broken apart? Arai, Nonogaki, Kono and Sakai told the committee that they saw the plane broken into two but Nakamura was “positive that the plane was intact and the body was not broken”. [19]
Both the committee and commission sought expert opinions as to what had led to the air crash. AMN Shastri, an aircraft accident inspector of the Directorate General of Civil Aviation, was the last witness before the committee. A selected lot of excerpts from the witnesses’ statements, sketches drawn by them and the pictures of the wreck were sent to him in advance, without notifying the committee’s non-official member Suresh Bose.
According to the Dissentient report, Shah Nawaz put a loaded question to Shastri: “In the event of there being discrepancies between the statements of some witnesses, could you say from the statements and other evidence placed before you, which statement or statements you consid
er the most reasonable from your point of view as an air expert?” [20]
Shastri answered that he considered Kono’s and Nakamura’s statements “to be reasonable”. Suresh Bose disapproved of the “funny manner of believing only one portion and disbelieving the remaining portion of the statement of a witness relating entirely to the same simple point” and accused Shah Nawaz of getting “hold of this aircraft accident investigation inspector” from a government department to “explain or reconcile the glaring discrepant statements of all the witnesses regarding the plane crash”.
But even Shastri’s explanation was unsatisfactory. For instance, he admitted that “it is not possible to establish the exact cause as to how the propeller came off from the engine from the details available”. [21]
GD Khosla took the opinion of Air Vice Marshal DAR Nanda, who was at a loss for words: "From the statements [of the witnesses] there is such a lack of essential details that it is humanly impossible for any person to give any sensible assessment of the things even at this stage. …I tried my best to get something [out of the pictures of the plane wreck], but it did not make any sense. No specific details could be obtained from them. [22]
2.43pm: Bose emerges from the burning plane
After the crash, Bose was said to have come out of the plane almost unhurt but was caught in flames. This was supposedly seen from a close range by Japanese officers and Rahman. And yet all of them came out with divergent accounts.
Rahman’s take that Bose’s clothes caught fire the moment he emerged and he had to tear them off was not backed either in part or in full by others.
Rahman also contradicted himself more than once. In 1967, he told Shaharyar Khan, a future Pakistan Foreign Secretary, that he “himself had been thrown clear as the plane plunged into a thicket because he was sitting near the tail of the aircraft”. Then he “ran immediately towards the burning aircraft...[and] he saw the charred body of Subhas Chandra Bose lying beside the aircraft”. [23]