by Jared Cohen
CHAPTER 7
THE ALL-NIGHT “PARTY OF GOD”
LEBANON, 2005
Even the members of one of the world’s most extreme groups were not immune to Lebanon’s charms. I ate with Hezbollah at McDonald’s, Pizza Hut, and various other fast-food joints. I sometimes saw the same Hezbollah guys at nightclubs, dancing, trying their luck with the ladies, and even sometimes drinking. These self-proclaimed pious Shi’a mixed with groups that were their sworn enemies by day, chatting with whomever they fancied. Their affiliation with the terrorist group Hezbollah was unrecognizable when they were out; instead, they blended in and constituted another handful of youth in the nightclub dancing to that summer’s hottest music.
The Hezbollah I met in the summer of 2005 were what many believed was representative of Hezbollah after 2000. It seemed that they had abandoned all military objectives beyond controlling the disputed Shaba Farms territory in the Golan Heights; they seemed more committed to Lebanon than loyal to Iran; and they seemed to be moving in the direction of political integration rather than violence. But the Hezbollah that the world saw attack Israel in 2006 was a dark reminder that all the while Al-Qaeda had been projecting itself into the terrorist spotlight, the older, more established, and likely more sophisticated “Party of God” had only been hibernating. Shocking the world and perhaps even its own members, in 2006 Hezbollah burst back onto the scene with a blast of rocket fire.
Hezbollah was first conceived after the Israeli invasion of Lebanon in 1982. As Israel entered southern Lebanon, it was primarily the Shi’a villages that suffered the worst of the combat. At this same time, the clerics in Iran were spouting rhetoric of exporting their Shi’a Islamic Revolution. From the Iranian perspective, this was the perfect opportunity to make inroads into Lebanon, while at the same time winning favor in the Arab world by establishing Iran’s credentials against Israel. Lebanon was a perfect target for Iranian intervention: The Shi’a were the largest group in the country and the population had become radicalized as a result of the Israeli invasion. As a result, the clerics in Iran seized the moment, dispatching two thousand of their elite Islamic Revolutionary Guards to eastern Lebanon’s Bekaa Valley.
Hezbollah was created with three purposes. First, the paramilitary organization was to use guerrilla tactics to rebuff the Israeli invasion and push the Israeli Defense Forces out of Lebanon. Second, Hezbollah was to be an arm of Iran that would work toward exporting the Iranian Revolution. The most pious and capable Lebanese Shi’a were recruited as operatives committed to bringing about an Islamic Republic of Lebanon that would mirror Iran’s theocracy. Third, Hezbollah committed itself to the destruction of the State of Israel and the return of Palestine to the Palestinian people.
Hezbollah has never been an organization that acts with autonomy. It has been developed and sustained by logistical, material, and financial support from both Iran and Syria. Hezbollah’s allegiance with Iran began with the Shi’a loyalty commanded by Ayatollah Khomeini, but it has been estimated in the international media that Iran provides around $100 million in aid to Hezbollah annually. This aid comes in the form of weapons, training, cash, explosive devices, and funding for the social and philanthropic activities that Hezbollah uses to garner support for the organization. The Bonyad-e Shahid, or Martyrs Foundation, is largely responsible for Iran’s generous pledges of aid to Hezbollah.
Despite the Shi’a connection, Hezbollah’s relationship with Iran is based less on religious loyalty than on the benefits such an alliance provides for each side. Secular strategic considerations are likewise the backbone of Hezbollah’s relations with Syria. While the leadership in Syria is Shi’a and Allawite, Bashar al-Assad’s generally secular approach to governing is actually rather different from the approach Hezbollah advocates. Though not its own creation, Syria has historically used Hezbollah as a way of projecting its influence; for Syria, Hezbollah is a profitable investment vehicle, with returns coming in the form of regional influence. After Syria withdrew from Lebanon, the country’s investment in Hezbollah became even more important. Without a military presence in Lebanon, Bashar al-Assad relied on the Hezbollah paramilitary to fill the vacuum left by the withdrawal of Syrian troops from the Bekaa Valley. Hezbollah claimed influence over the Lebanese government, and Syria claimed influence over Hezbollah and, by extension, Lebanon.
Having grown beyond its regional roots, Hezbollah’s global network is tremendous. The group has cells in Latin America, Europe, Africa, Asia, and allegedly in the United States. While the military side of these cells often remains dormant, they are constantly fund-raising, accumulating funds, and recruiting new members. Bombings of Jewish sites in Argentina in 1991 and 1992—including the Israeli Embassy and a Jewish community center—demonstrated to the world that these far-flung sleeper cells can be activated almost overnight with devastating success.
Hezbollah became a household name in the United States in 1983. On April 18 of that year, Hezbollah bombed the United States Embassy in Beirut, killing 17 Americans, and then on October 23, it bombed the Marine barracks in Beirut, killing 241 Marines. The two attacks claimed 258 American lives, including America’s top CIA official on the Middle East, Robert Ames. Prior to September 11, the bombing of the Marine barracks in Beirut was the greatest loss of life experienced by the United States at the hands of terrorists.
When I arrived in Beirut in June of 2005, Hezbollah’s popularity was substantial in Lebanon, hardly what I expected for an organization labeled as a terrorist group. Even Maronites who despised the organization would tell me things like “I hate Hezbollah because they are the enemy, but I am happy they defend Lebanon,” and “Even though they are the enemy, you must admit that Hassan Nasrallah [the leader of Hezbollah] is a very smart and charismatic man.”
Hezbollah had always enjoyed popular support in impoverished Shi’a areas like Dahiye (South Beirut), Baalbak in eastern Lebanon, and much of the South of Lebanon. Hezbollah’s ability to galvanize a strong support base is not surprising, given its virtual media monopoly in Shi’a parts of the country and its role as the dominant provider of basic goods and social services to aggrieved Shi’a populations throughout Lebanon. Hezbollah thrives in Lebanon because it has a large constituency of affiliates, who, while not part of the organization, describe themselves as a “nation that admires, supports, and recognizes Hezbollah.”
Hezbollah, while undoubtedly a factor behind the Israeli withdrawal from Lebanon in 2000, waged a successful propaganda campaign claiming full credit for the return of southern Lebanon. This is a card that Hezbollah has used most effectively on those Shi’a who either live in the South or were forced to flee their homes in the South. For these youth, Hezbollah is viewed as a heroic force. They cast themselves as the principal organization filling the void left by a government unable to meet the country’s socioeconomic challenges. The Shi’a communities are among the poorest in Lebanon, with the contrast of Beirut’s wealth serving as a constant source of humiliation. They have also marginalized their principal rival Shi’a group, Amal. Historically, in particular in the mid-1980s, some support for Hezbollah was hindered by its rivalry with the rival Shi’a Amal Party. The evacuation of Israeli Defense Forces from southern Lebanon in 2000, the subsequent decline in Amal’s popularity within the Shi’a community, and the alliance of Amal and Hezbollah in the 2005 parliamentary elections have brought substantial numbers of Shi’a formerly at odds with Hezbollah into their court. Hezbollah successfully transformed its image in Lebanon to one of an all-inclusive party promoting a concept of socioeconomic enhancement and resistance against foreign occupation. Politically, Hezbollah has managed to reach Shi’a outside of its traditional areas of support, gain popularity among some Sunnis and Druze, and even seduce some support from Christians, historically the group’s staunchest opponents.
The support for Hezbollah that I saw in the summer of 2005 was nothing compared to that which followed the July 2006 war it fought with Israel. Shi’a who had been indifferen
t to politics found themselves passionately in Hezbollah’s camp, and even portions of the Christian and Druze populations threw their support behind Hezbollah. For most youth it didn’t matter what Hezbollah stood for; they simply wanted the bombing to stop. What transpired during the one month of fighting was a startling contrast to the prosperity they had enjoyed over the previous two years.
That day at McDonald’s when I first told Hezbollah I was Jewish, I admit I was frightened. But I was surprised by an interesting paradox. On the one hand they were religious extremists, committed to the establishment of an Islamic republic, the destruction of Israel, and attacks on America. On the other hand, they were typical Lebanese youth: clubbers, barhoppers, and lovers of American fast food.
During the day, I heard extremist arguments and ominous rhetoric. They wanted to see Israel destroyed, they embraced suicide bombing, and they made no apologies for the long list of terrorist attacks undertaken in the name of Hezbollah. I expected that they went home at night and read extremist teachings and held radical conclaves. Hardly.
I would sometimes see these same young men out at the Beirut hot spots; sometimes they would acknowledge me, while at other times, upset at having their double life revealed, they would avoid me or pretend we had never met. These clubs were hardly religious centers or conservative in their atmosphere. The dance floors in most Beirut nightclubs are very small, catering instead to those who can afford tables and bottle service. The Hezbollah guys I would spot out at night usually crammed themselves into the overpacked dance floors, hardly cringing at the idea of having to pass through crowds of women on their way to the bar. These same Hezbollah partygoers ogled, rather than scowled at, the half-dressed women who danced on top of the bars showing off their latest fashions. Like most Lebanese youth, Hezbollah youth wanted to keep their daytime activities separated from their evening activities, and this meant that they didn’t want people in the nightclubs to recognize them as Hezbollah. I never saw them out at hot spots in the predominantly Muslim West Beirut. I would only see them out in areas heavily populated with Maronite or Sunni party animals.
When I told Lebanese friends of mine that I had seen some of these youths out at the clubs, their responses reflected doubt. They rebutted that these are very religious individuals who do not drink and who do not do anything modern. Others would suggest that these guys couldn’t have been Hezbollah, because true members of this organization would never let you know who they were. But what my friends didn’t seem to understand was that these Hezbollah guys weren’t there to plot a bombing of a Christian nightclub, or to kidnap Westerners; they were there to party, dance, and even in some cases drink. Like everyone else—including other young firebrands from Amal—they were there to be Lebanese. It is hardly a secret that like Al-Qaeda, Hezbollah is also suspected of having sleeper cells in America. With 9/11 just four years in the past, the visual of what I saw in Beirut made me fearful that those thugs were in America “being” Americans at the same nightclubs that I frequent. This puzzling paradox highlighted the conflict extremist youth face between indoctrination and being a teenager.
By the time the Hezbollah youth reach university age, however, they have already received intense ideological training, learned to operate almost every major automatic weapon in Hezbollah’s arsenal, and have been recruiting operatives for several years. For all intents and purposes, they have been working for the organization since they were children.
At age six or seven, a Shi’ite child is selected by either his parents or members of his community to begin indoctrination into the “Party of God.” So, by the time they reach university age, they have been members of the organization for over a decade already. Not all members of Hezbollah will attend university. The ones who do are the future leaders. In the same way that CIA operatives work two jobs when posted abroad—one on the embassy staff and another in their cover position—Hezbollah operatives have the difficult task of acting as both student and operative.
For Hezbollah, dispatching their best and brightest to the universities is a foolproof plan. The students enter the university legally, and as a result, the organization is able to use society’s educational institutions for its own manipulative objectives. Financial support from Iran, along with Hezbollah’s own fund-raising capabilities, enables the organization to provide scholarships and funding to its future political operatives.
Students linked to Hezbollah are highly disciplined and well-trained. They have also completely infiltrated Lebanon’s educational institutions. Even at the American University of Beirut, which is the most progressive and Western of all the universities in Lebanon and which had its president kidnapped by Hezbollah during the 1980s, the organization maintains a strong presence.
I was told by several professors and students that at the American University of Beirut (AUB) there were as many as 150 to 200 operatives from Hezbollah attending the university as students. In a university of seven thousand students, this is a frightening number—especially since Hezbollah’s supporters were likely triple or quadruple that number, and considering the fact that many of the Hezbollah youth who attend AUB express passionate interest in studying engineering, physics, and mathematics in the United States.
Hezbollah students look no different than their peers once in the university. They attend the same classes, dress in the same manner, and are extremely cautious about their identity. Among Hezbollah students, roughly 70 percent enroll in the sciences, while the remaining 30 percent usually study some form of politics. The youth invited to become part of the military wing of Hezbollah are even more likely to blend into the student body: They are forbidden from revealing their affiliation to anybody. Those who are in Hezbollah’s militia keep the secret from their friends, colleagues, and even in some cases their family. In the words of one Hezbollah party member I interviewed at a café in West Beirut, “You can’t know if they are soldiers. He might pretend he is part of a nation and have a social life, but he might in fact be a soldier.”
Among their peers, Hezbollah youth use a sophisticated and structured word-of-mouth network to spread the group’s message. They spend a great deal of time on e-mail, reaching out not just to Shi’a students, but also to Sunni, Druze, and even Maronites. They pay close attention to the comments other students make in class and around campus, looking for any mention of a topic that they can use as an excuse to strike up an e-mail conversation and invite a potential recruit for coffee, lunch, or some other get-together to discuss the issues.
Hezbollah students seamlessly blend into university life. This can change instantly, however, at the order of Hezbollah’s leader, Hassan Nasrallah. When Hezbollah calls on its operatives to join an initiative, its student members are so committed to the organization that they will drop everything to take part. It is sometimes the case, however, that these students can best serve the cause by staying in the university. One Hezbollah member told me on the Lebanese American University campus that if all members were called to jihad, they would have to take part; “taking part,” however, may entail fighting the jihad on the university campus by disseminating information and launching a subtle campaign of propaganda. Hezbollah indoctrination is a cycle, as they try to get potential recruits to transform from sympathizer to supporter to member to possible suicide murderer.
Until that call to action comes, these students will rarely admit to being a member of Hezbollah the organization, instead describing themselves as part of Hezbollah the political party. It is important to distinguish between the two. Membership in the organization is reserved for a specific cadre of operatives: Shi’a men who have undergone necessary theological and military training. Outside of the organization of Hezbollah, the specific roles of these members are ambiguous and often unknown. But these men make up the core of Hezbollah: After all, despite its social, philanthropic, and political wings, Hezbollah is fundamentally a paramilitary organization with a military that dwarfs that of its host government.
One afternoo
n I met with five Shi’a students, only one of whom I had actually met on a prior occasion. His name is Bashar and I encountered him sitting among friends at the upper gate of one of Lebanon’s universities. They were hanging out on a cement ledge, clearly enjoying themselves as their feet dangled just above the asphalt patio. It seemed like a nice summer afternoon for them: lounging, staring at girls, talking about the people walking by, and making jokes. There was a small crowd that gravitated toward them and others who looked their way, some evoking feelings of jealousy and others displaying a sense of envy. These were the cool kids. I timidly approached them and asked if they would fill out a survey.
“Sure, we will have some fun with this,” Bashar said. We started talking, and I learned that they were all Shi’ites and all big supporters of Hezbollah. This wasn’t because they told me but because they answered some of the questions on the survey out loud.
One of them read, “Do you see Hezbollah as a terrorist party?”
In a collective exclamation, they yelled, “Nooooooooooooooo,” as if they were touting it with pride.
The same boy read the next question, “Do you see Hezbollah as an organization that represents you?”
Again, that collective exclamation, “Yessssssssssssss,” this time followed with celebratory jubilation. I explained to them that I was trying to find a way to interview youth in Lebanon, and they were eager to give me their phone numbers to meet up. I guess I didn’t picture members of Hezbollah hanging out on university steps, smoking cigarettes, and dressed in designer clothing. I had only seen images of them with black face masks, headbands with Arabic writing on them, and bands of bullets across their chests.