However, a number of other design features of the AK47 rendered it less salubrious than many allied soldiers thought it to be. On firing a burst, the muzzle tended to climb, causing some of the bullets to pass harmlessly over the target. Later models (such as the AK74) were fitted with a muzzle compensator to counter this tendency. The M16, however, having a ‘straight line butt’ – in which the axis of the barrel passed in a straight line through the firer’s shoulder – and also having less recoil, was far less affected by this tendency. The result was that it was much easier to keep an M16 pointed at the target than it was with the AK47. Although it was heavier, the muzzle velocity of a bullet from an AK47 was also substantially lower than that of the M16, so that while the AK47 bullet could penetrate light foliage and scrub without deflection, the weapon’s effective range was shorter than that of the M16. In the give and take of these technical differences, the weapons came out about even.
The most significant disadvantage of the AK47 over the M16, however, was its greater weight. The AK47, fitted with a 30-round magazine, weighed in at 5.22 kilograms; the M16 weighed about 3.30 kilograms when similarly loaded. (For comparison, the Self Loading Rifle or SLR also carried by Australian infantrymen tipped the scale at 4.54 kilograms.) The result was that a man armed with an M16 could carry nearly 2 kilograms more ammunition (or over 120 cartridges) than a man carrying the same weight but equipped with an AK47. Multiply this by the number of men in an Australian platoon equipped with M16s – between 7 and 11 – and the result begins to add up to a substantial advantage in firepower. The typical combat of Vietnam, where contacts were very brief but intense and targets were rarely seen, commonly generated high volumes of fire. Giving away all that extra ammunition was a distinct disadvantage to the AK47, but one that few authors have ever noted.
Of course, not every Australian soldier carried an M16, but neither did every one of their enemies carry an AK47. Insofar as the weapons captured in combat by Australians in Phuoc Tuy represent an accurate sample of the weapons used by the enemy in contact, then AK47s were carried by a little more than 50 per cent of enemy soldiers.22 However, the proportion of AK47s to other weapons changed over the course of the war, with AK47s being captured in greater proportions in the final years of Australian operations. Thus, although the AK47 was a highly effective weapon, it did not have an overwhelming influence on the battlefield.
The other small arms in enemy use were the SKS carbine, and a range of World War II vintage weapons, rocket-propelled grenades, and modern machine guns. With the exception of the rocket-propelled grenade launcher, especially the RPG7, all of these weapons were somewhat inferior to similar small arms used by the Australians.23 Some enemy soldiers were also equipped with captured M16s, which suggests that they did not regard that weapon as overly inferior.
A proof of the effectiveness of a small arm is how long it remains in combat service. The AK47 – or its variants – is still to be found on battlefields around the world today, signifying that its design was, and remains, excellent. But the M16 and its variants are also still found on contemporary soldiers. Since both were originally fielded forty-odd years ago, the numerous armies that equip their soldiers with these weapons or their more modern variants have been unable to find better weapons. This is a sure sign that both weapons were well designed for their intended purpose.
In any case, many Australian infantrymen preferred the SLR. It was heavier than the M16, longer, only capable of semi-automatic fire – one shot each time the trigger was pulled – and fired a heavy bullet with high muzzle velocity which produced a substantial ‘kick’. On the face of it, it seemed a poor weapon by comparison to the AK47 or the M16. But it was robust and reliable. In the jungle engagements typical of combat in Vietnam, the SLR had very high penetrative power. Its bullet might pass through several small trees without deflection, before finding its target. It was popular with Australian soldiers because of its high ‘stopping power’ – the ability to render an enemy incapable of further resistance with a single shot.24
If the AK47 and the M16 could be said to be about equal in their battlefield impact, it is difficult to say this about other notable infantry weapons of the Vietnam War. For example, the enemy’s main light machine gun was the Russian-designed RPD. It had a simple and robust design that rarely malfunctioned, and it could stand a considerable amount of operational abuse. In contrast, the Australians used the US-designed M60 machine gun. This was designated a ‘general purpose machine gun’ and was intended to fill the roles of a sustained fire weapon and that of a light machine gun. The sustained fire role required a belt-fed, heavy-barrelled machine gun capable of being mounted on a tripod for use in fixed positions, such as the defence of the Nui Dat base. The light machine gun role, however, required a light, bipod-mounted weapon for use by soldiers on foot patrols. The two intended uses were fundamentally at odds. The result of trying to reconcile them led to a weapon that was notoriously prone to jamming and malfunctioning. The M60’s belt-feed system, for example, tended to draw extraneous matter such as mud and vegetation into the weapon, leading to stoppages. The M60 also suffered stoppages for a range of other reasons and with no gas regulator, its working parts could become slowed by accumulated dirt, oil and dust, with the result that the gun would stop functioning.25 Finally, the M60 was far from being a ‘soldier-proof ’ design and could be re-assembled incorrectly resulting in a malfunction.
The Australians in Phuoc Tuy addressed the problems of the M60 by training to manage its unreliability. Detailed routine orders were published to guide soldiers safely through many of these issues.26 Rifle companies introduced rigorous cleaning regimes in an effort to ensure their M60s would function properly when they were needed, and usually the weapon and its ammunition were cleaned twice daily. When on patrol, machine gunners and their ‘number two’ would often give their weapons an external clean every time the platoon or section stopped for a rest. The Australians were thus largely successful in containing the stoppages of the M60, reducing the rate of failure to 2.7 per cent of contacts in which the M60 was fired.27 But this machine gun was the mainstay of a rifle section’s fire output, and a stoppage – even in a small number of contacts – endangered the survival of the section.
Another enemy weapon clearly superior to any Australian or allied equivalent was the rocket-propelled grenade, the RPG7. It fired a fin-and-spin-stabilised shaped-charge warhead with high accuracy to a range of 500 metres against stationary targets and 350 metres against moving targets. The fuse on its warhead allowed it to penetrate light brush without exploding. By comparison, the nearest equivalent carried by the Australians, the M72 light anti-armour weapon, had an effective range of just 200 metres and its warhead had a very sensitive fuse which often detonated ineffectually when it hit twigs or leaves before reaching its target. Some Australians openly wished they had a weapon which could match the RPG7.28
For brutal efficiency in killing and wounding, however, it is difficult to go past the M16 land mine. Although an American weapon issued to its allies, the VC secured a large supply of these mines when the Australians built a barrier minefield between the village of Dat Do and the sea. The minefield was intended to secure the population of Dat Do and other villages against enemy incursions, but it was inadequately defended and the VC lifted many mines and redeployed them against Australian patrols. These M16 mines, together with other landmines of Soviet or Chinese origin and locally manufactured versions, were the enemy’s most successful weapons in Phuoc Tuy. With them they caused large numbers of Australian casualties at very low cost to their own forces. Australian soldiers feared them while their senior commanders fretted over the political repercussions of the casualties they caused.29 The enemy successfully used mostly stolen mines to protect their own base area, the Minh Dam Secret Zone, in the Long Hai hills, from Australian pressure, a feat they were unable to achieve with any other weapon. From this base area the enemy was able to continue the political domination of the people in the vill
ages of Dat Do and Long Dien.30
Another measure of the effectiveness of weapons is the level of fear they engender in their targets. The soldiers of the 8th Battalion, Royal Australian Regiment (8RAR) were probably broadly representative of Australian infantry in Vietnam in their reactions to enemy weapons. Most 8RAR soldiers rated ‘mines, including M16 mines’ as the most feared enemy weapon. Rocket-propelled grenades closely followed, then booby traps and command-detonated mines, each of which were nominated as ‘most feared’ by more 8RAR soldiers than nominated the AK47. The AK47 was in fact rated ‘most feared’ by only a very small number of soldiers, on a par with spiked-pit booby traps. Of the eighteen men of 8RAR who were killed in action in Vietnam, only two were killed by AK47 fire while 11 fell to landmines.31 Although the AK47 was a robust and effective weapon it was not the ‘war winner’ as some see it. Other weapons in the enemy inventory, including one which the enemy took from the Australian minefield, had a far greater impact on the war.
Contrary to dominant popular public conceptions of Vietnam, influenced to their core by Hollywood imagery and imported American representations, Australia’s war in Phouc Tuy Province was never about large-scale landmark battle such as Long Tan. These were aberrations and of minor relevance when compared to the much more common and significant ‘contacts’ which characterised the face of battle for the men of 1ATF. In addition, prevailing ideas of how completely such battles were ‘won’ by Australian troops need to be rethought in their fuller political context. Nor do prevailing and enduring ideas of VC/PAVN soldiers ‘owning’ the jungle or the night have any real resonance or relevance for the Australians in Vietnam – quite the converse. It was the Australians that dominated their enemies in the ‘bush’ and in the hours of darkness. Last, the powerful idea that Australian and allied soldiers were let down by their personal weapons lacks true substance. The enemy’s AK47 was not the war-winner it is often described. Moreover, if any singular enemy weapon can be said to have had the most impact on the Australians in Phuoc Tuy, then it must be their own landmines, stolen and used against them. Australia’s Vietnam combat experience was not that of the ARVN or the Americans. Nor in many ways was it the war of the silver screen or dominant public memory. It is time to accept it on its own terms.
Further reading
B. Buick, with G. McKay, All Guts and No Glory: The Story of a Long Tan Warrior, Allen & Unwin, Sydney, 2000.
B. Grandin, The Battle of Long Tan as Told by the Commanders to Bob Grandin, Allen & Unwin, Sydney, 2004.
R. Hall, Combat Battalion: The Eighth Battalion in Vietnam, Allen & Unwin, Sydney, 2000.
P. Ham, Vietnam: The Australian War, HarperCollins, Sydney, 2007.
I. Kuring, Redcoats to Cams: A History of Australian Infantry 1788 to 2001, Army History Unit, Department of Defence, Canberra, 2004.
G. Lockhart, The Minefield: An Australian Tragedy in Vietnam, Allen & Unwin, Sydney, 2007.
I. McNeill, To Long Tan: The Australian Army and the Vietnam War 1950– 1966, Allen & Unwin/Australian War Memorial, Sydney/Canberra, 1993.
I. McNeill & A. Ekins, On the Offensive: The Australian Army in the Vietnam War, January 1967–June 1968, Allen & Unwin, Sydney, 2003.
M. O’Brien, Conscripts and Regulars: With the Seventh Battalion in Vietnam, Allen & Unwin/Seventh Battalion, Royal Australian Regiment Association Incorporated, Sydney, 1995.
[10]
THE MYTH THAT AUSTRALIA ‘PUNCHES ABOVE ITS WEIGHT’
Albert Palazzo1
In recent years, those who belong to the Australian Defence Force (ADF) or who follow or study its activities have witnessed the emergence of a new myth, one that asserts the exceptional prowess of the nation’s military on the international stage. Australia is a ‘middle power’ with a small defence force, yet despite its size it has become common for observers to credit Australian military forces with having a disproportionate effect on the battlefield and by implication, the success of operations. The general idea is that, as a result of its superior training, competency, technology and professionalism, the ADF operates better than equivalent or even larger defence forces. The myth is that the ADF ‘punches above its weight’.
There is nothing new in the expression of this type of myth. Indeed, since H.V. ‘Doc’ Evatt’s part in the establishment of the United Nations, the Australian government has used the notion to describe the role played by Australia in foreign affairs and the influence that the country supposedly enjoyed in regional and international forums. Subsequently, the idea became linked to Gareth Evans’s time as Minister for Foreign Affairs during the Hawke and Keating governments.2 However, in recent years the expression has also gained increasing currency within the ADF. The Australian military now describes its fighting worth as ‘punching above its weight’ and senior officers have regularly employed the phrase to highlight the ADF’s performance overseas and the reputation for excellence its members have earned. General Peter Cosgrove (as Chief of the Defence Force), for example, drew attention to the force’s achievements in 2004 and to his expectation that the ADF would continue to excel in 2005. Air Marshal Angus Houston (as Chief of Air Force), Lieutenant General Peter Leahy (as Chief of Army), Lieutenant General David Hurley (as Vice Chief of the Defence Force), and Brigadier Craig Orme (as Commander 1st Brigade) among others, have all worked the expression into their addresses.3
Its notion has now filtered down through all levels of the ADF. No task is too insignificant to merit the praise of ‘punching above one’s weight’ and the force’s junior leaders have used it to extol the superior capabilities and achievements of the men and women they command. For example, the 1st Battalion, Royal Australian Regiment’s band, the Royal Australian Navy (RAN)’s minor war vessels, the Army Personnel Agency in Hobart, the Joint Logistic Unit South, the Joint Strike Fighter Industry Team, and the entire Australian Army Pay Corps have all either ‘punched above their weight’ or have been urged to do so.4 The skipper of HMAS Dechaineux went so far as to describe a better than expected result in a sportsday tug-of-war competition as an instance of the vessel ‘punch[ing] above her weight’.5
In a wider context there is nothing novel in the use of this expression. Across Australian society and overseas its usage is commonplace, and even the most casual of searches will reveal numerous references to Australian individuals and organisations claiming to ‘punch above their weight’. Most are benign, some even comical and one should not take too seriously revelations of inexplicable male success with members of the opposite sex, patriotic rants after the nation’s disproportionate receipt of awards at the Cannes Film Festival, the remarkable performance of Rockhampton’s youth softball talent, or even a government report which asserts that the Australian cement industry punches above its weight.6
It would be easy to react to the ADF’s use of this expression with the same incredulity that is used for other areas of Australian society and to dismiss it as comic effect. After all, just how serious was the Dechaineux’s captain? However, myths involving a nation’s military capability are different. They are serious because war matters, not just for the fate of the men and women who are called upon to fight, but also for the future of the nation upon whose military prowess the outcome of a war hangs. Just as Charles Bean inspired the Anzac legend and the cult of the ‘digger’ has exaggerated and distorted the narrative of the Australian soldier, the ‘punches above its weight’ myth misrepresents the ADF’s role and accomplishments in its most recent operations.7 The ADF’s belief that it ‘punches above its weight’ cannot be taken too lightly or be too easily dismissed because in war the stakes are too high. Moreover, the consequences of being seduced by this myth are serious. Unthinking acceptance undermines the ADF’s ability to scrutinise its operations, assess its true strengths and weaknesses, and correctly evaluate the organisation’s current and future worth, and do so with brutal candour. The ADF’s servicemen and women deserve no less, nor does the citizenry which they protect.
There has alre
ady been a serious attempt to assess the validity of Australia’s claim that it ‘punches above its weight’. In 2005, the Australian Strategic Policy Institute published a Strategic Insights paper which questioned whether or not Australia was living up to its position as a middle power.8 Its author, Mark Thomson, compared Australia with other countries across a number of categories including percentage of GDP dedicated to defence, and percentage of population serving in a nation’s full-time armed forces. Australia tended to lie in the bottom half of middle powers according to such categories, but given its relatively secure geopolitical situation at the time this result was unsurprising. More significantly, Thomson drew on data from the US Department of Defense’s Report on Allied Contributions to the Common Defence. This publication provides a comparative analysis of the contribution by NATO and other allied nations to US-supported operations. In categories that covered the allocation of ground troops, naval combat ships, naval supply ships, combat aircraft, transport aircraft and tanker aircraft, this report rated the ADF as offering forces that were generally in balance with the nation’s ability to contribute. Australia was most generous in the provision of naval combat vessels, and least generous in the provision of ground combat forces. Thomson’s conclusion was that the intensity of Australia’s contribution to a range of operations was pretty much what one would expect from a middle power with its population and wealth. While Australia was not shirking its responsibilities, nor was it punching above its weight.
Anzac's Dirty Dozen Page 21