by Charles Ross
On 18 July, therefore, the king and the duke led the English army from Calais through Ardres and Guines to St Omer, and thence, on 23 July, to Fauquembergue. Then two nights were spent at the historic site of Agincourt, and by way of St Pol they reached Doullens on 28 July. By now King Louis had divined the English plan, and, leaving a holding force in Normandy, set off with his main army on a route roughly parallel with the English line of advance. By the end of July, with some 6,000 men, he had reached Beauvais. On 1 August Edward and his army resumed their march in a south-easterly direction. Crossing the Somme they encamped on 5 August at Eclusier, a few kilometres from Péronne, with the river at their backs, and on the next day Duke Charles arrived in Péronne. There a messenger came in from the count of St Pol, expressing his continued willingness to deliver up St Quentin. But when an English detachment moved forward to the town, they were surprised to be met with cannon-fire from the walls and an attack from skirmishers. After losing a few men, the English withdrew and marched back through heavy rain to the army’s main camp, which was now (by 12 August) at St Christ-sur-Somme, just south of Peronne. As if this were not enough, there was now ill-feeling between Edward and Charles over the refusal of the duke to admit the English into any of his towns. Even the gates of Péronne, where the duke lay in comfort, were closed to his allies.2
For Edward these irritations probably provided the final touch of disillusionment. His position gave little encouragement to pursue a bold policy. Behind him the French were already devastating Artois and Picardy, and provisions for the English army would soon become a problem. Ahead, Rheims and other French towns were now strongly garrisoned and fortified and on the alert. From a military standpoint, any further advance into France would be dangerous unless Duke Charles could guarantee much more active help. Summer was drawing to a close, but where were the English to find winter quarters if Burgundy denied them entry to his towns? Edward himself, who had little natural taste for campaigning, probably viewed the prospect of wintering in France with little relish. Nor had he the funds to keep his army in the field indefinitely. His captains, who had enjoyed no chance to enrich themselves or their men with plunder, may already have been chafing. The king later told the duke of Burgundy that, although they had been paid for six months, they were complaining that they had been at great expense for a variety of reasons, and were reluctant to serve much longer without a further instalment of wages, especially if they were to organize winter quarters.1
These logistic arguments were reinforced by Edward’s political disappointments. Brittany had made no move. The count of St Pol, as Louis had predicted, had defaulted on his promises. There was no sign of the hoped-for rising of the French feudality. Burgundy himself had failed to carry out his part of their contract. To proceed with the agreed plan involved gambling on the duke’s good faith and his ability to deal with his enemies in distant Lorraine; but they had no means of knowing how long this might take, or whether the now almost bankrupt duke could raise an army to take the field. There seemed to be every prospect that the English might be left to fight the French alone, something which Edward had always wished to avoid. The French were numerically far superior, and the English troops were not the seasoned warriors trained in continental warfare who had been available a generation previously.2 No doubt these were the arguments of discretion rather than valour. Perhaps they would have held less appeal to an Edward III or a Henry V. But to Edward and most of his noble captains they were cogent reasons for making terms with the French as soon as possible. When Duke Charles – rather unwisely, considering the temper of his allies – left Péronne about 12 August to join his own men in Bar, the English lost no time in entering into negotiations with King Louis. Their first approach was a diplomatic finesse worthy of King Louis himself. They released a French prisoner, a valet in the service of one of Louis’s household gentlemen, Jacques de Gracay, and he was given a crown each by Lords Howard and Stanley and told to recommend them to the king of France. Remembering what Garter King of Arms had told him of these two noblemen, Louis interpreted the signs correctly. In reply he sent back a young valet of his household who was briefed by Commynes personally. He was instructed to tell the king of England that Louis had always wished for peace with England, and that any apparently hostile acts he had committed were, in reality, directed against the duke of Burgundy, a prince concerned only with his own interests. He was to say that Louis knew that Edward had been at great expense, and that many of his subjects in England wanted war with France. Nevertheless, if Edward would consider a treaty, then Louis could offer terms which might please both the king and his people. A meeting could be arranged, either for French envoys to visit the English camp, or half-way between the armies with delegates from both sides. After consultation with his advisers, Edward agreed.1
On 13 August he drew up instructions for his delegates, John, Lord Howard, Sir Thomas St Leger, Dr John Morton, master of the rolls, and William Dudley, dean of the chapel royal, and he took care to have them witnessed by his brothers, Clarence and Gloucester, and the other leading members of his company.2 King Louis similarly empowered his own representatives, headed by the admiral of France, Jean, bastard of Bourbon, and the next day the two parties met in a village not far from Amiens. The English proposals were precise and practical. The king of France was to undertake to pay Edward 75,000 crowns (£15,000) within fifteen days, and 50,000 crowns (£10,000) yearly thereafter for as long as they both lived. His heir, the dauphin, was to marry Edward’s first or second daughter, and to provide her with a livelihood of £60,000 yearly in French values. If this were agreed upon, Edward would take his army back to England as soon as possible, leaving behind hostages who should be released as soon as the larger part of the army was safely home. Edward also wanted a ‘private amity’ binding himself and Louis to aid each other in case either was ‘wronged or disobeyed’ by his subjects, and a truce and an ‘intercourse of merchandise’ for seven years.1 Louis, anxious to come to terms before the duke of Burgundy returned, or any other dangers developed, agreed at once to the English offer, and urgent instructions were sent out to his agents to raise the sums necessary to meet the English demands and further monies intended as bribes to win the goodwill of some of the English lords.2 By 18 August the terms of the truce had been decided, and plans made for a meeting between the two sovereigns on the Somme near Amiens. To satisfy the pride of the English soldiers, both armies should march to the rendezvous in battle-array, before the leaders met on a convenient bridge with the river separating the two forces.
Neither the fury and contempt of Duke Charles, who returned to the English camp from Valenciennes on 19 August, nor the pleadings of St Pol, had any effect upon the resolve of Edward and his captains. Both were told, in effect, that they had forfeited all claim to consideration. Charles was also informed that he could be included in the truce with France if he gave three months’ notice, but he angrily refused the offer and withdrew to Namur.3 On 25 August the French and English armies both appeared near Amiens. Anxious to win the goodwill of the English rank-and-file, Louis provided food and wine in great quantities and instructed the innkeepers of Amiens to issue free drink to any English soldier who cared to ask for it. No English army is, or ever has been, proof against this temptation. For three or four days the English troops drank happily at French expense, and Amiens was full of thousands of sodden men-at-arms and archers. Eventually Edward himself was forced to eject his men from the city and post a guard at the gate.4
Arrangements went ahead, meanwhile, for the meeting of the two kings. At Picquigny, three miles down-river from Amiens, where the Somme was narrow but not fordable, a bridge was built with a screen across the centre, pierced by a trellis through which conversation could be carried on: these precautions were taken to prevent any repetition of the treachery which had cost the life of John, duke of Burgundy, at a similar meeting on the bridge of Montereau in September 1419. For what followed we have the invaluable eye-witness testimony of Phili
ppe de Commynes.5 Impressed by the apparent size of the English army drawn up in order (‘an incredibly large number of horsemen’), the French royal party first took up their position on the bridge, and then, says Commynes:
The king of England came along the causeway which I mentioned and was well attended. He appeared a truly regal figure. With him were his brother, the duke of Clarence, the earl of Northumberland, and several lords including his chamberlain, Lord Hastings, his Chancellor and others. There were only three or four others dressed in cloth of gold like King Edward, who wore a black velvet cap on his head decorated with a large fleur-de-lis of precious stones. He was a very good-looking, tall prince, but he was beginning to get fat and I had seen him on previous occasions looking more handsome. Indeed I do not recall ever having seen such a fine-looking man as he was when my lord of Warwick forced him to flee from England.
When he was within four or five feet of the barrier he raised his hat and bowed to within six inches of the ground. The King, who was already leaning on the barrier, returned his greeting with much politeness. They began to embrace each other through the holes and the king of England made another even deeper bow. The King began the conversation and said to him, ‘My lord, my cousin, you are very welcome. There’s nobody in the world whom I would want to meet more than you. And God be praised that we have met here for this good purpose.’
The king of England replied to this in quite good French.
After an address by the English chancellor, Bishop Rotherham, articles of the treaty were exchanged, and the two kings solemnly swore to observe them. The French king then fell to banter, and jokingly told Edward that
he ought to come to Paris, that he would dine him with the ladies and that he would give my lord the cardinal of Bourbon as confessor, since the latter would very willingly absolve him from sin if he should have committed any, because he knew the cardinal was a jolly good fellow.
The escorts then withdrew and the two monarchs conversed privately for a while. Commynes noted as evidence of Edward’s good memory that, when Louis asked Edward if he remembered Commynes, the latter said he did, and ‘mentioned the places where he had seen me and that previously I had put myself to much trouble in serving him at Calais’. The kings then discussed the position of Burgundy and Brittany, with Edward replying that he did not care what happened to Burgundy if he did not choose to keep the truce, but pleading that Brittany should be included in the truce, saying he did not want to make war on the duke of Brittany, for ‘in his moment of need he had never found such a good friend’. After further polite exchanges, the meeting broke up. Commynes records that Duke Richard of Gloucester and several others were not pleased by the peace, but became reconciled to it, and Gloucester visited Louis at Amiens, and received from him some very fine presents.
The practical outcome of this meeting was a group of diplomatic instruments which have come to be called collectively the Treaty of Picquigny of 29 August 1475. Its terms, which were to govern Anglo-French relations until almost the end of Edward’s reign, may be summarized as follows:
1.A truce between the two kings and their allies to last for seven years, until sundown on 29 August 1482.
2.Freedom of mercantile intercourse for the merchants of each realm in the other’s countries, with the abolition of all tolls and charges imposed upon English merchants during the previous twelve years, and similar privileges for Frenchmen trading in English territory.
3.Edward was to depart peacefully from France as soon as he had received the 75,000 crowns, promised by the French king, leaving behind him John, Lord Howard, and Sir John Gheyne as hostages for his speedy return.
4.Any differences between the two countries were to be referred to four arbitrators, Cardinal Bourchier and the duke of Clarence for England, and the archbishop of Lyons and the count of Dunois for France.
5.A treaty of amity and marriage. Neither king should enter into any league with any ally of the other without his knowledge. As soon as they reached marriageable age, the Dauphin Charles should marry Elizabeth of York, with a jointure of £60,000 yearly provided by King Louis, and her sister, Mary, should take her place should Elizabeth die. Further, if either king found himself confronted by armed rebellion, the other must lend support.
6.An undertaking by King Louis to pay Edward 50,000 gold crowns each year in the city of London, by equal instalments at Easter and Michaelmas, and a guarantee for the payment of this pension either in the form of a bond by the Medici bank or a papal bull imposing interdict on his realm if he defaulted.1
Edward lost no time in carrying out his first commitment under the Treaty. Having collected 55,000 crowns of his initial Danegeld, he accepted a bond under the great seal of France for the remainder, and at once the English army began its march to Calais, which it reached without serious incident on 4 September. Its transshipment to England began forthwith. Edward himself lingered in Calais until 18 September, and he did not return to London until 28 September, to be escorted through the city by the mayor and aldermen and 500 members of the guilds. The ‘great enterprise’ was over.1
It was scarcely to be expected that the inglorious outcome of the 1475 expedition would be popular with the mass of Edward’s subjects. His leading captains and councillors had solid inducements to approve their master’s policy. Like Edward, they were quite ready to accept pensions and gifts from the French king. John, Lord Howard, and Sir Thomas Montgomery got pensions of 1,200 crowns (£200), the chancellor, Bishop Rotherham, had 1,000 and John Morton, master of the rolls, 600. According to Commynes, further pensions were paid to the Marquis of Dorset, Sir John Cheyne and Sir Thomas St Leger.2 The largest pension of all went to the most influential of Edward’s councillors, William, Lord Hastings, who now received an annual fee of 2,000 crowns. But Hastings displayed a remarkable independence of mind, and even this large sum did not buy his goodwill, for he afterwards took a notably individual line on the problem of the Burgundian succession.3 Nor was this all. Sparing no expense to win the good offices of influential Englishmen, Louis loaded them with presents of money and plate. Howard is said to have received as much as 24,000 crowns (£4,000) in this fashion within two years; Hastings had 1,000 marks’ worth of plate in a single gift, and many other English captains were among the beneficiaries.4 It would perhaps be too cynical to suggest that these were the only reasons why these royal advisers and servants so readily agreed to the abandonment of the campaign. The Croyland Chronicler, himself a councillor, regarded the treaty as ‘an honourable peace’ and observed that ‘in this light it was regarded by the higher officers of the royal army’.5
But many outside the royal circle took a very different view. Amongst the soldiers of the army there was indignation at what they regarded as their leaders’ tame surrender to the French offers. Some took service with the duke of Burgundy to get the plunder and fighting for which they had come to France.1 A sense of disgrace and injured martial pride is reflected in the bitter words of Louis de Bretelles, a Gascon in the service of Earl Rivers, when he told Commynes that Edward had won nine victories and lost only one battle, the present one; and that the shame of returning to England in these circumstances outweighed the honour he had gained from the other nine. The king of France realized how sensitive were the English on this issue. He had jested incautiously that he had easily driven them from France with venison pasties and fine wines, and then became greatly concerned lest news should leak to the English of this mockery. But there was little he could do to check the jeers of his people. A version of the royal jibe became the theme of a popular French song:2
J’ay vu le roy d’Angleterre
Amener son grand ost
Pour la françois terre
Conquester bref et tost.
Le roy voyant l’affaire
Si bon vin leur donna
Que l’autre sans rien faire
Content s’en retourna.
Similar taunts were thrown at the two hostages, Howard and Cheyne, who, after being r
oyally entertained in Paris, accompanied King Louis to Vervins for the signing of a truce with Burgundy. When one of them commented on the large numbers of men in Charles’s train, the vicomte de Narbonne, who was standing nearby, remarked on the simplicity of the Englishmen in supposing that the duke had no troops at his disposal, but, he went on, ‘you English were so anxious to return home that 600 pipes of wine and a pension which the king gave you sent you post-haste back to England’. The angry Englishman replied that it was tribute-money, not a pension, and threatened that the English army might return. Even the count of St Pol, now desperate between the grindstones of Louis and Duke Charles, both of whom he had betrayed, could call Edward a poor, dishonourable and cowardly king.3