by Plato
SOCRATES: And what’s being led is being led because it gets led, and what’s being seen is being seen because it gets seen?
EUTHYPHRO: Certainly.
SOCRATES: Then it is not the case that because it’s ‘being seen’ it ‘gets seen’, but the opposite – because it ‘gets seen’ it’s ‘being seen’; nor that because a thing’s ‘being led’ it ‘gets led’, but because it ‘gets led’ it’s ‘being led’; nor that because a thing’s ‘being carried’ it ‘gets carried’, but because it ‘gets carried’ it’s ‘being carried’. Isn’t it obvious what I mean, Euthyphro? (c)I mean that if something is coming to be so or is being affected, then it’s not the case that it gets to be so because it’s coming to be so, but that it’s coming to be so because it gets to be so; nor that it gets affected because it’s being affected, but that it’s being affected because it gets affected.37 Or don’t you go along with this?
EUTHYPHRO: I certainly do.
SOCRATES: Then isn’t being approved an example either of coming to be so or of being affected by something?
EUTHYPHRO: Certainly.
SOCRATES: Then this too is comparable with the previous cases: something does not get approved because it’s being approved by those who approve of it, but it’s being approved because it gets approved?
EUTHYPHRO: Necessarily.
SOCRATES: (d)Well then, what is it that we’re saying about the holy, Euthyphro? Surely that it gets approved by all the gods, on your account.
EUTHYPHRO: Yes.
SOCRATES: Is that because it’s holy, or for some other reason?
EUTHYPHRO: No, that’s the reason.
SOCRATES: Then it gets approved because it’s holy: it’s not holy by reason of getting approved?
EUTHYPHRO: Presumably.
SOCRATES: Whereas it’s precisely because it gets approved that it is approved by the gods and ‘divinely approved’.
EUTHYPHRO: Of course.
SOCRATES: Then the ‘divinely approved’ is not holy, Euthyphro, nor is the holy ‘divinely approved’, as you say, but it’s different from this.
EUTHYPHRO: (e)How so, Socrates?
SOCRATES: Because we’ve admitted that the holy gets approved for the reason that it’s holy, but it’s not because it gets approved that it’s holy. Right?
EUTHYPHRO: Yes.
SOCRATES: But then again the ‘divinely approved’, because it gets approved by the gods, is divinely approved by this very act of approval: it is not the case that it gets approved because it’s divinely approved.
EUTHYPHRO: That is true.
SOCRATES: 11(a) But if the ‘divinely approved’ and the holy were really the same thing, Euthyphro my friend, then: (i) if the holy were getting approved because of its being holy, then the ‘divinely approved’ too would be getting approved because of its being ‘divinely approved’; whereas (ii) if the ‘divinely approved’ were ‘divinely approved’ on account of its getting approved by the gods, then the holy would be holy too on account of its getting approved. But as things are you can see that the two are oppositely placed, as being altogether different from each other;38 for the one is ‘such as to get approved’ because it gets approved, while the other gets approved precisely because it’s ‘such as to get approved’. And perhaps, Euthyphro, when asked what the holy is, you don’t want to point out the essence for me, but to tell me of some attribute which attaches to it,39 saying that holiness has the attribute of being approved by all the gods; what it is, you’ve not yet said.
Interlude: wandering arguments.
(b) So if you don’t mind, don’t keep me in the dark, but tell me again from the beginning what on earth the holy is, whether it gets approved by the gods or whatever happens to it (as it’s not over this that we disagree). Don’t hesitate: tell me what the holy and the unholy are.
EUTHYPHRO: But Socrates, I have no way of telling you what I mean; whatever explanation we set down, it always seems to go round in circles somehow, and not to be willing to stay where we positioned it.
SOCRATES: (c)It’s as if your explanations, Euthyphro, were the work of my predecessor Daedalus.40 And if it had been me who was putting forward these ideas and suggestions, you might perhaps be having a joke at my expense – you’d say that I too had inherited from him the tendency for my verbal creations to run off and refuse to stay wherever I’d tried to position them. But as things are, the fundamentals of the explanation are yours – that means a different joke is needed, for it’s you they won’t stay put for,41 as you yourself appreciate.
EUTHYPHRO: What I appreciate is that what we’ve been saying demands more or less the same jibe – because its property of going round in circles and never staying put was not conferred on it by me. (d) Rather it is you who are the Daedalus; if it were up to me it would stay as it is.
SOCRATES: Perhaps, Euthyphro, I’ve turned out cleverer than him in my craft, in so far as he only made his own products mobile, while I apparently make other people’s mobile as well as my own. And surely this is the most ingenious feature of my art, that I don’t want to be so clever. I should prefer our explanations to stay put and be securely founded rather than have the wealth of Tantalus42 to complement my Daedalan cleverness.
Socrates helps Euthyphro along by suggesting in effect that holiness is a species of justice. Euthyphro agrees, but is then required to say which species of justice.
But enough of this! (e) Seeing that you seem to me to be taking things easy, I’ll try to help you find a way of explaining holiness to me. And don’t you withdraw exhausted before the finish! See whether it doesn’t seem necessary to you that everything holy is just.
EUTHYPHRO: It seems so to me.
SOCRATES: 12(a) Then is all that is just holy? Or is it the case that all that’s holy is just, whereas not all that’s just is holy43 – part of it’s holy and part of it’s different?
EUTHYPHRO: I don’t follow your question, Socrates.
SOCRATES: But surely you’re younger than me no less than you’re wiser! As I say, you’re taking it easy, basking in the wealth of your wisdom. Make a bit of an effort, Euthyphro; it’s actually not hard to grasp what I mean. I am really claiming the opposite of what was said by the poet44 who composed the lines:
(b) But to speak of Zeus, the agent who nurtured45 all this,
You don’t dare; for where is found fear, there is also found shame.
I disagree with this poet. Shall I tell you how?
EUTHYPHRO: Certainly.
SOCRATES: I don’t think it’s true that ‘where is found fear, there is also found shame’, as it seems to me that many people, in fear of disease and poverty and other such things, are fearful but aren’t at all shameful of these things which they fear. Don’t you think so?
EUTHYPHRO: Certainly.
SOCRATES: But where there is shame, at least, there is also fear; for does anybody, feeling shameful at, or ashamed of, some deed, fail to take fright and feel apprehensive of an unsavoury reputation?
(c) EUTHYPHRO: He’s apprehensive, certainly.
SOCRATES: Then it’s not right to say ‘where is found fear, there is also found shame’, but where is found shame, fear also is found, though shame is not found everywhere where fear is. For I imagine fear has a wider distribution than shame, because shame is a division of fear like odd is of number, so that it’s not true that where there is number, there is also found odd, but where there is odd there is also found number. You follow me now, surely?
EUTHYPHRO: Certainly.
SOCRATES: Then this was also the kind of thing I meant in the case of my earlier question. (d)Is it ‘where is a just thing, there is also a holy one’, or ‘where is a holy thing, there is also a just one, but not a holy one everywhere there’s a just one’, the holy being a division of the just? Shall we put it that way, or do you take a different view?
EUTHYPHRO: No, that’s it; your explanation seems correct to me.
SOCRATES: See what comes next, then. If what’s holy is a division o
f the just, it seems that we must then discover the precise kind of division of the just that is holy. If you had asked me a question about what came up just now, for instance what kind of division of number even is – what this type of number actually is – I should have said that it’s number that can be represented as two equal limbs rather than as unequal ones.46 Don’t you think so?
EUTHYPHRO: I do indeed.
SOCRATES: (e)Now it’s your turn – try to give me the same type of explanation of the kind of division of justice what’s holy is; then I can tell Meletus too that he should no longer be unjust to me and prosecute me for impiety, because I’ve already learnt well enough from you what is pious and holy and what is not.
Euthyphro says that holiness is that part of justice which looks after the gods. Socrates worries that this might imply that the gods are improved by holiness. Euthyphro explains ‘looking after’ in terms of serving them. Socrates worries about the purpose to which such a service contributes.
EUTHYPHRO: Well, I believe that this is the part of the just which is pious and holy, the one concerned with looking after the gods, whereas that concerned with looking after men is the remaining part of the just.47
SOCRATES: 13(a) Yes, I think that’s a good answer, Euthyphro; but I still need one little thing to be cleared up – I don’t understand what it is you mean by ‘looking after’. You wouldn’t be meaning that we also look after the gods in the same way as we look after other things. We do speak that way, I suppose; for instance, we say that not everybody knows how to look after horses, only the groom, right?
EUTHYPHRO: Quite so.
SOCRATES: Because the groom’s art is looking after horses.
EUTHYPHRO: Yes.
SOCRATES: Nor indeed does everybody know how to look after dogs; only the kennel-master.
EUTHYPHRO: (b)That’s so.
SOCRATES: Because the kennel-master’s art is looking after dogs.
EUTHYPHRO: Yes.
SOCRATES: Whereas the cattle-farmer’s is looking after cattle?
EUTHYPHRO: Quite.
SOCRATES: But holiness and piety is looking after the gods, Euthyphro? Is that what you claim?
EUTHYPHRO: I certainly do.
SOCRATES: Surely any case of ‘looking after’ has the same effect. I’ll put it like this: it’s for the improvement and benefit of the thing looked after, just as you can see that horses are benefited and improved by grooming. Or don’t you think so?
EUTHYPHRO: I do indeed.
SOCRATES: And dogs presumably are benefited by the kennel-master’s art, cows by the cattle-farmer’s, and so on in all (c) other cases. Or do you think that things are looked after to their detriment?
EUTHYPHRO: No indeed, I don’t.
SOCRATES: For their advantage then?
EUTHYPHRO: Of course.
SOCRATES: Well then, is holiness too, qua ‘looking after’ the gods, of benefit to the gods? Does it make them better? And would you agree to this, that whenever you do something holy you’re improving one of the gods?48
EUTHYPHRO: No indeed, I wouldn’t.
SOCRATES: No, nor do I think you mean that, Euthyphro, far from it; it was for this very reason that I asked you what you (d) meant by ‘looking after’ the gods – because I didn’t believe you meant anything like that.
EUTHYPHRO: And you were quite right, Socrates; I don’t mean anything like that.
SOCRATES: Let’s get to the point: what kind of ‘looking after’ the gods could holiness be?
EUTHYPHRO: It’s like slaves looking after their masters, Socrates.
SOCRATES: I get it – it would be a kind of service to the gods, perhaps?
EUTHYPHRO: Of course.
SOCRATES: Could you then tell me, what goal does ‘service to doctors’ help to achieve? Don’t you think it’s health?
EUTHYPHRO: Certainly.
SOCRATES: (e)What about service to shipbuilders? What goal’s achievement does it serve?
EUTHYPHRO: Obviously a boat’s, Socrates.
SOCRATES: And service to builders, one supposes, helps to achieve a house?
EUTHYPHRO: Yes.
SOCRATES: Tell me then, please, to what goal’s achievement would service to the gods be contributing? It’s obvious that you know, seeing that you claim that no one knows more than you about religion.
EUTHYPHRO: Yes, and I’m telling the truth, Socrates.
SOCRATES: Tell me then, in heaven’s name, what ever is that marvellous work49 which the gods accomplish using us as their servants?
EUTHYPHRO: A multitude of good things, Socrates.
SOCRATES: 14(a) And so do generals, my friend, but all the same you could easily state their principal aim by saying that they achieve victory in war. No?
EUTHYPHRO: Of course they do.
SOCRATES: Then again, farmers also achieve a multitude of good things. But still their principal achievement is food from the earth.
EUTHYPHRO: Certainly.
SOCRATES: What about the multitude of fine things that the gods achieve? What’s the principal aim of their endeavour?
Euthyphro becomes impatient, and explains holiness as knowing how to pray and sacrifice in a way that will please the gods. Socrates reduces this to a knowledge of how to trade with the gods, and continues to press for an explanation of how the gods will benefit.
EUTHYPHRO: (b)Only a while ago I told you, Socrates, that it was too great a task to learn with accuracy what all these things are. However, let me tell you this without further ado: if one knows how to say and do things gratifying to the gods in prayer and in sacrifice, this is what’s holy, and such conduct is the salvation not only of private households but also of the public well-being of cities. And the opposite of what is gratifying is impious, and turns everything upside down, and wrecks it.
SOCRATES: You could have told me the principal thing I asked for in far fewer words, Euthyphro. (c) The trouble is, you’re not really trying to teach me – it’s obvious. Even now you turned aside when you were on the point of giving the answer, by which I could have learnt well enough from you what holiness is. So now, because a lover can’t help following where his beloved’s whim leads, what is it again that you are calling ‘holy’ and ‘holiness’ ? A kind of science of sacrifice and prayer, isn’t it?
EUTHYPHRO: That’s my view.
SOCRATES: Surely sacrifice is making a donation to the gods, while prayer is requesting something from them.
EUTHYPHRO: (d)Yes indeed, Socrates.
SOCRATES: Then holiness, on this account, would be the science of requests and donations to the gods.
EUTHYPHRO: You’ve understood well what I meant, Socrates.
SOCRATES: That’s because I’m a zealot, Euthyphro, zealous for your wisdom, and I’m keeping a close eye upon it, so that what you say does not fall unfettered to the ground. So tell me, what is this service to the gods? You claim that it’s asking from them and giving to them?
EUTHYPHRO: I do.
SOCRATES: Then wouldn’t the correct kind of asking be to ask them for those things that we need?
EUTHYPHRO: (e)Of course.
SOCRATES: And again, the correct kind of giving would be to bestow upon them in return what they happen to need from us? It wouldn’t be a case of skilled giving, I assume, to give somebody things of which that person has no need.
EUTHYPHRO: Quite true, Socrates.
SOCRATES: Then holiness would be a kind of skill in trading between gods and men.
EUTHYPHRO: A trading-skill, if it makes you happier to put it like that.
SOCRATES: Well, I’m no happier unless it turns out to be true. Show me what benefit for the gods eventuates from the donations which they receive from us. 15(a) It’s clear to anybody what they contribute, because nothing is good for us except what comes from them;50 but how are they benefited by what they receive from us? Or do we come off so much better than them in this trade, that we get all good things from them, while they get none from us?
Euthyphro affirms
that the gods receive no benefit from our service, only gratification. Socrates recognizes that explaining holiness in terms of the gratification of the gods is similar to explaining it in terms of their approval. The argument has now gone round in a circle. Socrates demands a fresh start, but Euthyphro has had enough.
EUTHYPHRO: Do you really suppose, Socrates, that the gods are benefited as a result of what they get from us?
SOCRATES: Well, whatever could these gifts of ours to the gods be, Euthyphro?
EUTHYPHRO: What else, do you think, but honour and tokens of esteem, and, as I said just now, gratification.
SOCRATES: (b)So it is something the gods have found gratifying, Euthyphro – the holy – but not what’s beneficial or approved by the gods.
EUTHYPHRO: In my view it’s the most approved of all things.
SOCRATES: Then the holy is again, it seems, what’s approved by the gods.
EUTHYPHRO: Absolutely.
SOCRATES: Then will you wonder, when you say this, that your stated views are shown to be shifting rather than staying put, and will you accuse me of being the Daedalus who makes them shift, when you yourself are far more skilled than Daedalus and are making them go round in circles? Or don’t you see that our account has been going round and has arrived back at the same place? (c)Surely you remember that earlier in the discussion the holy and the ‘divinely approved’ did not appear the same to us; they were different from one another. Or don’t you remember?
EUTHYPHRO: I do.
SOCRATES: Well, don’t you realize that you’re now saying that the holy is what’s approved by the gods? Surely that’s what’s ‘divinely approved’, isn’t it?
EUTHYPHRO: Certainly.
SOCRATES: Well, either our conclusion then was wrong, or, if it was right, our present position is not correct.
EUTHYPHRO: Apparently.
SOCRATES: (d)Then we must inquire again from the beginning about what the holy is, as I’ll not be willing to play the coward before I learn. Don’t make light of me, but apply your mind in every way and do your best to tell me the truth. For if any man knows, you do, and, like Proteus,51 you’re not to be let go until you speak. For if you didn’t know clearly what holiness and unholiness are there’s no way that you would have taken it upon yourself to prosecute your father, an elderly man, for a labourer’s murder; but you would have both been worried about the gods and ashamed before men if you took such a risk, in case you should be wrong in doing it. (e) As it is, I know well enough that you think52 you have true knowledge of what’s holy and what’s not. Tell me then, most worthy Euthyphro, and don’t conceal what you think it is.