by Plato
152. made tall by something short: There is the assumption here that where X and Y are opposites, something possessing the property Y could not be the cause of anything coming to have the property X. The assumption would be typical of Greek medicine: if the doctor wants to bring about a moister or warmer body he does not give it dry, very cold nourishment, for that will make it drier and colder still. Plato assumes that the principle has a wider application; for another relevant passage see Theaetetus d199, where it seems absurd that one’s knowledge can make one ignorant.
153. If anyone should question: There is a problem in the text at this point. The verb translated ‘hold fast to’ is repeated from above. Various emendations are proposed. ‘Refuse to answer’ suggests that this should have been the verb for asking a question, with the addition of a preposition.
154. more basic hypothesis: Literally ‘higher’ hypothesis; it is difficult to explain the phrase without reference to the hierarchy of ‘hypotheses’ leading up to the Idea of the Good as ‘unhypothesized principle’ in Republic 6, 510–11. Plato also speaks of a hypothetical method which he has taken over from the mathematicians at Meno 86c–87b, another passage which ought hopefully to be related to this present one. That passage used the term ‘hypothesis’ for a condition which if it obtained would make something else to be so. Here Socrates has been suggesting that any given property (F) will be true of x if there is an F-ness which x participates in. If the truth of the ‘hypothesis’ were questioned, one would have to produce another condition which, if it applied, would make the original hypothesis true. Thus ‘hypothesis’ is being used for a logical reason (a sufficient condition), as opposed to the mechanical reasons and motivational reasons that have been earlier discussed.
155. one of these masters of contradictions: One thinks naturally of Euthydemus and Dionysodorus in Plato’s Euthydemus, as well as the persons accused at 90c of abusing argument. The error described, however, is not a known technique of such sophists.
156. Forms: Ideas; the terminology is deliberately varied.
157. an accurate reflection of the facts: This claim is generally regarded as excessive. It would, however, be perfectly justified if Socrates were here employing a quasi-Protagorean theory of sensation, whereby the various non-essential predicates of a thing are not strictly embodied ‘in’ a thing at all, but result rather from the way the perceiver views that thing (and in some cases in relation to what he views it), only coming to be ‘in’ it as a result of that interaction between viewer and object, as at Theaetetus 156.
158. “in”: I have enclosed the preposition in inverted commas because its significance has been a matter of controversy. While it is clear that Plato is referring to a quality as it is associated with humans, etc., ‘in’ is the standard way of referring to a property which belongs to something, and it may not have any metaphysical significance. Hence whether Plato is operating with three metaphysical levels, so that he has not only tall things and a transcendent Idea of Tallness but also tallness immanent in us, is not entirely clear. Above all it is not clear whether ‘tallness in us’ implies more than the tallness that human beings envisage as being in us.
159. earlier in the discussion: See the Argument from Opposites, beginning at 70a.
160. the opposite itself: Plato does not here mean the Idea of the Opposite, but the Idea of any quality which has another quality opposite to it.
161. Nature: By ‘that which is in Nature’ Plato again means the Idea. Similar language is also found in Republic 10 (b597–a598) and the Cratylus (a389–d). The expression ought to remind one of how far Plato intends his theory to offer an alternative to Presocratic physics. The Ideas are somehow more ‘natural’ than particulars in so far as they always follow their own nature.
162. the qualities themselves… names: The theory that particulars derive their name from the Idea. This relates to Simmias ‘coming to be described as’ small or large (102c) and to 78e, and is a regular part of Platonic theory. Of course Plato does not attempt to say that (e.g.) white things are ‘white’ in the same way as the Idea of White is ‘white’.
163. the same as snow and fire: There has been considerable debate here as to whether Plato is now talking about Ideas of Snow and Fire, immanent forms, or just the fire and snow with which we are all familiar. In the absence of any trace of language which might identify them as Ideas, it is best to assume that Plato was content to have us think of ordinary fire and snow. The reason why ordinary snow must never be hot is that it must be accompanied by the immanent form ‘cold’ (thus participating in the Idea of Cold), not because it is itself immanent in some subject.
164. Oddness: Following what seems to be a physical example, we now come to a mathematical one, as if it made no difference to Plato what sorts of thing are able to have these essential properties and so resist the opposite properties.Insome ways this isanadvantage because it excuses him from first discussing in great detail what sort of thing the soul in particular is. The number three, however, is here treated rather as an immanent form, able to belong to (e.g.) three pencils and requiring them to participate in the Idea ‘Odd’.
165. while it is still three: One might profitably consider what happens to the ‘three’inthree pencils when a fourth pencilis added to make them even in number. Clearly we cannot have a case of three any longer.
166. approach: The term translated ‘approach’ suggests also hostility, as if the approach were that of an advancing enemy. Note that the term ‘Forms’ is now, and in some cases hereafter, unlikely to apply specifically to the transcendent Platonic Idea, which is fixed and immobile. It is the heat in something which would approach the cold in something else.
167. they are things which compel… opposite: There is uncertainty here. One might also translate ‘which are compelled by whatever gets a hold on them… ’. Translation here is often thought to be crucial for the interpretation of the whole passage, and as I translate it there is thought to be an implication that these things, in so far as they get a hold on others, must be Ideas themselves. I think it would be truer to say that they must be either Ideas or immanent forms, and there is a strong weighting towards the latter: wherever an immanent form ‘fire’ or ‘three’ enters upon a block of wood or a family of geese, then there will be hot wood (excluding ‘cold’) or three geese (excluding ‘even’).
168. the character: A third word (morphe) for a ‘Form’ or ‘Idea’ now appears, though we seem now to be focusing on the immanent presence of the Idea.
169. Un-dying: This does not yet mean immortal, but ‘unable to receive death or the state of being dead’.
170. we are told: Socrates reverts once again to ‘Orphic’ tales of the after-life.
171. the office of escorting souls from this world to the other: This was one of the traditional roles of Hermes, though it would be uncharacteristic of Plato to be concerned with the name.
172. the ceremonies and observances of this world: Plato often gives myth-like material an aetiological role, making it explain features here in the life that is familiar to us. The translation ‘ceremonies’ is uncertain; most manuscripts have the unnecessarily specific ‘sacrifices’.
173. so I’m led to believe: Myth-like material is frequently treated by Plato as a matter of belief rather than knowledge; cf. Gorgias a524, Republic c621. Note that although it is here implied that Socrates has been convinced by somebody, Simmias’s response shows that the reader is not intended to find this theory at all familiar.
174. Glaucus: Not to be identified with certainty, but references to the skill of Glaucus were proverbial, and variously explained in antiquity.
175. sufficient to support it: Socrates’ response to the Presocratic theories satirized at 99b–c.
176. the river Phasis: On the east side of the Black Sea, and the eastern boundary of the world as known to the Greeks.
177. the pillars of Hercules: The Strait of Gibraltar at the western end of the Mediterranean.
178. if
his nature were strong enough to keep looking: As eyes are not able to withstand watching the eclipsing sun (99d–e), so only the philosophic mind is thought of as able to withstand the intellectual light of the upper regions.
179. there is nothing worth mentioning that grows there: Plato is probably thinking of the absence of flowering and fruiting plants, not of a lack of vegetation generally.
180. a story: A mythos, or ‘myth’; however, the Greek term is not quite as technical as its English equivalent. That Socrates feels that the ‘story’ is only now beginning indicates a slight difference in status between the preliminary description of the earth (based perhaps on Socrates’ conviction of how things ought to be if the world is organized for the best) and the more fanciful details which are to follow.
181. made of twelve pieces of skin: Balls made in the shape of a regular dodecahedron, with twelve surfaces each of which is a regular pentagon. Plato’s Demiurge used this shape for the cosmos as a whole at Timaeus c55.
182. round the air, as we live round the sea: The ‘humans’ referred to here live in a ‘golden age’ type of environment; another way in which Plato’s ‘myth’ draws on typical themes of Greek mythology.
183. face to face: i.e. they do not rely on the mediacy of a priest, priestess or seer for information about the future, nor upon dreams rather than waking visions.
184. as they really are: Knowledge of the heavenly bodies was seen in early Greek philosophy as the pinnacle of human cognitive effort. Hence it is a fitting climax here.
185. wherever there are hollow regions: There now begins an account of the underworld designed to harmonize both with Socrates’ ‘geography’ and with empirical observations concerning things underground, particularly concerning volcanic activity, tides, and underground rivers. Again Socrates is demonstrating his interest in matters of importance for the Presocratics, though approaching them from a different angle.
186. deepest chasm: Iliad 8.14. Tartarus is mentioned at line 481.
187. Oceanus: The mythical river encircling the world.
188. Acheron: Acheron, Cocytus and Pyriphlegethon are all mythical underworld rivers. So is Styx, which here becomes a lake.
189. Our sea: The Mediterranean.
190. Such is the nature of these things: The basic geography ofSocrates’ world has now been described. We pass on to the journey through it of various kinds of disembodied soul.
191. from whence they emerge no more: There seems to be some inconsistency between this and the Argument from Opposites; the latter demands that all souls which leave this earthly state should eventually return, whereas incurable criminals, and people of excep tional holiness too, will not do so.
192. to enchant ourselves with: A reference to the confidence-inspiring ‘enchantment’ process of 78a.
193. the magistrates’ orders: The orders of the Eleven, whose servant the officer was.
194. bull-like: See the introduction to Phaedo, pp. 100–101.
195. Apollodorus: See 59a above and Apology 34a.
196. we ought to offer a cock to Asclepias: The significance of these words has been much discussed. As Asclepius is god of healing, it ought to suggest that Socrates’ soul has been healed; also there may be a hint of criticism of Pythagoreans such as Simmias and Cebes, who normally reject all maltreatment of animals as their souls may be one’s own ancestors: but Socrates might claim that one is injuring only the body.
Index
Acheron 192–3, 250
Achilles 54, 219, 222, 231
Adimantus 61
Aeacus 69
Aeschines xiii, xxxv, 36, 61, 118, 228
Aeschylus 187
Aesop 119, 120
Agamemnon 222
Ajax 222
Alcibiades xxvii, xxxi, 219
Alcmaeon xxix, 244
Alexamenos xxxv
Allen, R. E. 78, 90, 225
Ameipsias xxviii, xxxvii
Amphipolis 54, 219
Anaxagoras xxix, xxx, 51–2, 112, 136, 170–74, 218, 234, 243, 244, 245
Anaximenes 244
Andocides xxxv, 207–8, 220
Antisthenes xix, 118, 202, 204, 228
Anytus xxxi, 40, 47, 55–7, 61, 64, 208, 213, 219
Apollo xxv–xxvi, 43–6, 53, 117, 119, 155, 207, 216, 229
Apollodorus 61, 66, 118, 198, 228
Archelaus xxix, xxx, 219, 243
Archon, King 9, 207
Arginusae 220, 224
Argives 161, 241
Aristippus 118
Ariston 61
Aristophanes xxviii–xxix, 41–2, 207, 208, 209, 214, 215, 216, 217, 233, 245
Aristophanes of Byzantium xxxv
Aristotle xxxv, 157
Asclepius 198, 251
Athens xxxiv–xxxv, 90–96, 100, 116, 173, 208, 213–14, 219, 225, 226
Atlas 174
Bedu-Addo, J. T. 238
Bluck, R. S. 236
Blumenthal, H. 220
Boeotia 173
Bostock, D. 89–90, 102, 108, 114, 236, 237, 240, 243, 245
Brickhouse, Thomas C. 36, 38
Burger, R. 114
Burnet, J. 219, 220, 231
Cadmus 169, 243
Callias 42, 215
Cebes 82, Phaedo passim
Chaerephon xxviii–xxix, 43–4, 216
Charicles 217
Charmides xxvii, xxxi, 36–7
Cocytus 193, 250
Connus xxviii
Cratylus 232
Crete 93, 100, 116, 222, 227
Critias xxvii, xxxi, 36–7, 77, 227
Crito 61, 66, 73–96, 118, 195–9, 228
Critobulus 61, 66, 118
Ctesippus 118, 228
Daedalus 5, 23, 29, 210–11
Damon xxviii
Delium 54, 218
Delos 116–17, 222
Demeter 222
Democritus 110
Demodocus 61, 220
Diogenes of Apollonia xxix–xxx
Diogenes Laertius xiii, xxxv, 208, 216, 217
Dionysus 232
Dover xxxvii
Echecrates Phaedo passim
Egypt 239–40
Empedocles xxix, 109, 244
Endymion 136, 234
Epicharmus 230
Epigenes 61, 118, 228
Eryximachus xxxi
Euclides 118, 228
Eudoxus 108
Euripus 163
Evenus 43, 119–20, 215
Gallop, D. 229, 231, 238, 240
Gill, C. 104
Glaucus 188, 249
Gorgias 42, 215
Hackforth, R. 237, 239, 242
Hades 96, Phaedo passim, 227
Harmonia 169, 243
Haslam, M. xiii–xiv
Hector 54
Hephaestus 18, 211–12
Hera 18, 211–12
Heracles 161, 188–9, 216–17, 241
Heraclitus xxix, 210, 234, 241, 242, 244
Hermes 249
Herodotus 239, 241
Hesiod 69, 209, 210, 222
Hippias 42, 215
Homer 62, 69, 106, 169, 210–11, 213, 217, 219, 222, 223, 243, 250
Iolaus 161, 241
Isocrates xxxvi, 202, 215–16
Isthmus 93, 226
Kahn, C. H. 77
Kearney, J. J. 220
Kraut, R. 225, 226
Kronos 18, 209, 210
Ledger, G. 38, 78
Leon of Salamis 59
Leucippus 110
Lyceum 9
Lycon xxxi, 47, 64, 213, 217
Lysias 215
Maximus Tyrius 36
Megara 93, 118, 173, 228
Meletus xxxi, 9–13, 25, 30, 35–6, 37, 41–2, 47–54, 57–8, 61, 63–5, 209, 213, 214, 217, 218, 220, 221
Menexenus 118, 228
Minos 69, 222
Minotaur 100–101, 222
Morgan, M. xxxiv–xxxv
Musaeus 69, 222
Myrto 228
Naxos 12, 208
Oceanus 192
Odysseus 70, 168, 222
Orphics 69, 104, 113, 221–2, 229, 233, 249
Palamedes 222
Panathenaea 14
Parmenides 230
Patroclus 54, 231
Penelope 101
Phaedo Phaedo passim, 100
Phaedondas 118
Phaedrus xxxi
Phasis 188
Philolaus 121
Phlius 109, 113
Plato 66, 118, and passim
Charmides xx, xxvii, 4–5, 6, 7, 8, 219
Cratylus xxxvii, 207, 215, 229, 240, 248
Critias xii
Euthydemus xv, xix, xxi, xxxvi, xxxvii, 3, 77, 207, 218, 219, 228, 232, 247
Gorgias xv–xvi, 3, 74–5, 186, 202–3, 206, 210, 211, 221, 224, 227, 229, 230, 249
Hippias Major xxxvi, xxxvii, 4–5, 203
Hippias Minor xxi
Laches xx, xxviii, 4–5, 6, 7
Lysis xx, xxxvi, 4, 207, 228
Menexemus xii, 34, 228
Meno xx, xxxv, 5, 7–8, 106, 110–12, 145–6, 202–3, 208, 212, 213, 217, 218, 221–2, 230, 232, 233, 235, 238, 247
Parmenides xiv, xxxvii, 204, 246
Phaedrus xii, xiv, 34, 110, 215, 216, 217
Philebus 114
Politicus xxxv, xxxvi, 3, 223
Protagoras xiii, xxi, xxvii, xxxii, xxxvii, 3–4, 208, 212, 224, 229
Republic xi, xiv, xv, xxviii, xxxv, 4–5, 7, 78, 105, 114, 186, 209, 217, 220, 224, 225, 232, 238, 241, 242–3, 245, 247, 248, 249
Sophist xxxv, xxxvi, 3
Symposium xii, xiii, xxi, xxvii, xxxvi, xxxvii, 207, 219, 220, 226, 231