by Peter Hart
We suffered bad hits, two or three heavy shells striking us during this phase. When a heavy shell hit the armour of our ship, the terrific crash of the explosion was followed by a vibration of the whole ship, affecting even the conning tower. The shells which exploded in the interior of the ship caused rather a dull roar, which was transmitted all over by the countless voice-pipes and telephones. This part of the action, fought against a numerically inferior but more powerfully armed enemy, who kept us under fire at ranges at which we were helpless, was highly depressing, nerve-wracking, and exasperating. Our only means of defence was to leave the line for a short time when we saw that the enemy had our range. As this manoeuvre was imperceptible to the enemy, we extricated ourselves at regular intervals from the hail of fire.8
Commander Georg von Hase, SMS Derfflinger, 1st Scouting Group
Although the thicker armour of the German battlecruisers prevented any catastrophic damage, their fighting ability was being rapidly eroded. All in all, this phase of the battle would prove a deep disappointment for the Germans.
Worse still, unbeknownst to Scheer, every minute he steamed north brought the High Seas Fleet ever closer to Jellicoe’s massed guns. The Grand Fleet was sailing in six tight-knit columns each of four ships, with the 3rd Battlecruiser Squadron forging ahead and the whole ensemble surrounded by screens of light cruisers and destroyers. Jellicoe was naturally desperate for accurate information on the whereabouts of Scheer’s High Seas Fleet, but unfortunately Beatty failed to send any useful reports during this crucial period. As the main fleets closed, the British and German screens clashed in a series of skirmishes which proved disastrous for ships suddenly caught unawares. Jellicoe would soon have to make the final decision on how to deploy his fleet. Tension ratcheted up on the bridge of his flagship the Iron Duke and even when Beatty finally hove into view Jellicoe still did not know exactly where the German dreadnoughts were. Finally, at 18.01, he signalled in desperation, ‘Where is the enemy fleet?’ Beatty replied: ‘Enemy’s battlecruisers bearing South East.’9 This did not answer the question. Where was Scheer and the High Seas Fleet?
Before it is possible for anyone to realise the difficulties which confronted me as Commander in Chief of the Grand Fleet at the Battle of Jutland it is essential for a clear idea to be formed and clearly kept in view of the two main factors to which those difficulties were entirely due. These two factors were: 1) The absence of even approximately correct information from the Battlecruiser Fleet and its attendant light cruisers regarding the position, formation and strength of the High Seas Fleet. 2) The lack of visibility when the Battle Fleet came in sight of a portion of the High Seas Fleet, due largely to mist, and partly to smoke from our own battlecruisers and other vessels.10
Admiral Sir John Jellicoe, HMS Iron Duke, Fourth Battle Squadron
In these circumstances Jellicoe’s priority was to make sure that the Grand Fleet did not lose control of the seas. He was not willing to risk everything for the sake of a short-term victory. At last the news came and he sprang into action at 18.16. He could not deploy on the starboard column as the ships were already too close to the German fleet, so he formed up on the port column, creating a huge line ahead, with all guns bearing on the head of the German line: or ‘crossing the T’, as it was called. This supremely pragmatic decision would set the tone for the next phase of the battle.
Ahead of the Grand Fleet the 1st Cruiser Squadron, commanded by Rear Admiral Sir Robert Arbuthnot aboard the Defence, was suddenly caught under the very guns of the onrushing German fleet. In a few seconds the Defence was sent to the bottom while, behind her, the Warrior was pelted with shells. Below decks Engineer Commander Henry Kitching was going about his duties.
I heard a tremendous explosion at the after end, a heavy jar went through the whole fabric and most of the lights went out. Immediately afterwards there was a heavy roar of water and steam and my impression was that we had been torpedoed. Several men came running forward from that end, one of them with blood streaming down his face. In that moment I realised fully what cold drawn funk is like. But I had to make a decision and, advancing towards the after end, I tried to gauge the extent of the damage. The engines still went on running, which seemed to show that the cylinders had not been hit, but in the dim uncertain light I perceived what appeared to be Niagara at the after end of the engine room though whether the sheet of water was rising up from below or pouring down from above I couldn’t be sure at the time. Anyhow, a blast of steam on my face warned me that I hadn’t long to think about it and I soon made up my mind that no pumps could deal with the quantity of water that was coming in, and that the only thing to do was to get the men out as quickly as possible.11
Engineer Commander Henry Kitching, HMS Warrior, 1st Cruiser Squadron
Trapped below decks they had to find their way out from a ship that seemed to be sinking beneath their very feet.
At first the men didn’t know what to do, as the ladders at the after end were inaccessible, but I shouted to them to go up the midships ladder and hustled all towards it in front of me. As soon as it appeared that they had all gone up, I followed them myself, but by that time all the lights had gone out and it was pitch dark. When I got to the top, knowing it was hopeless to go aft, I turned forward and felt my way by the handrails along the platform at the tops of the cylinders towards the door at the fore end, which communicated with the port engine room and with the mess deck. When I got there, however, a stoker told me that we could not get through there, as the mess deck was on fire, and when I tried to do so I was met with a rush of thick smoke and blinding fumes that drove me back. At this moment with this in front and the roar of steam behind me I felt like a trapped rat, for there seemed to be no possibility of lifting the heavy armoured hatches overhead, and a spasm of sheer terror came over me; but just then I realised that the man was calling my attention to a glimmer of light above, and the next minute I found myself climbing out though a torn rent in the deck.12
Engineer Commander Henry Kitching, HMS Warrior, 1st Cruiser Squadron
While the crew of the Warrior awaited the German shells that would surely send them to the bottom, the Germans were distracted by the arrival of the Fifth Battle Squadron manoeuvring to join the main battle line of the Grand Fleet. As they did so the Warspite was hit by numerous shells, suffered damage to her steering and began circling randomly between the fleets. An obvious target, only her magnificent armour protected her from terminal damage and, once control was regained, she was able to make it back to port without undue drama. But she had distracted the German gunners from their hounding of the hapless Warrior, which was also able to limp away.
Amidst Jellicoe’s deployment, the ships of the 3rd Battlecruiser Squadron had taken station at the head of the line. As their guns blazed out, they deluged Hipper’s battlecruisers with shells. The changing light conditions meant that the Germans could not see their tormentors and their response was ineffectual. Then, just for a few moments, the mists parted and the German shells crashed down in retaliation on the Invincible. Fisher’s dictum that ‘speed would be her armour’ was tested to destruction and swiftly found wanting when she blew up with shocking violence at 18.34. Marine Bryan Gasson was acting as a rangefinder inside the ‘Q’ starboard midships turret.
Suddenly our turret manned was struck between the two 12” guns and appeared to me to lift off the top of the turret and another of the same salvo followed. The flashes passed down to both midship magazines containing 50 tons of cordite. The explosion broke the ship in half. I owe my survival, I think, to the fact that I was in a separate compartment at the back of the turret with my head through a hole cut in the top. Some of the initial flash must have got through to my compartment as I was burnt on the hands, arms and head – luckily my eyes escaped, I must have instinctively covered them with my hands. The rangefinder and myself had only a light armour covering. I think this came off and, as the ship sunk, I floated to the surface.13
Marine Bryan Gas
son, HMS Invincible, 3rd Battlecruiser Squadron
Just six survived of the crew of 1,032 men. The ship split in the middle, its two halves resting upright on the seabed in a haunting scene that was etched on the minds of everyone who saw it.
The sinking of the Invincible was a triumph, but it did not change the difficult tactical situation facing the High Seas Fleet. Jellicoe’s dreadnoughts were now arraigned in one long line so that their shells rained down on the exposed vanguard of the German fleet, causing serious damage and threatening annihilation. Scheer had to act quickly.
I could see nothing of our cruisers, which were still farther forward. Owing to the turning aside that was inevitable in drawing nearer, they found themselves between the fire of both lines. For this reason I decided to turn our line and bring it on to an opposite course. Otherwise an awkward situation would have arisen round the pivot which the enemy line by degrees was passing, as long-distance shots from the enemy would certainly have hit our rear ships. As regards the effectiveness of the artillery, the enemy was more favourably situated, as our ships stood out against the clear western horizon, whereas his own ships were hidden by the smoke and mist of the battle. A running artillery fight on a southerly course would therefore not have been advantageous to us.14
Admiral Reinhard Scheer, SMS Friedrich der Grosse, Third Battle Squadron
Scheer ordered a specially developed battle turn to starboard, a manoeuvre whereby the ship at the rear of the line would put her helm over first, followed by each successive ship in sequence, rippling along the line towards the front. As the German ships disappeared from his vision, Jellicoe had to decide whether to follow them into the mist and hazard everything to complete the victory, or to settle for a more cautious approach. Rather than follow in the German tracks, risking, for all he knew, mines, submarines and destroyers, Jellicoe decided to hold on a little further to the east and then turned south to place himself between the High Seas Fleet and its base at Wilhelmshaven. His manoeuvre was soon justified when, at 18.55, Scheer ordered a second battle turn to bring his ships on to an easterly course. This meant Scheer’s dreadnoughts were heading directly towards the British line. From 19.10 they came under an increasingly devastating fire. Scheer took near-instant action and, at 19.13, he ordered a further battle turn away while the battered battlecruisers and destroyers were ordered forward to cover the retreat. As the shells rained down they suffered terrible damage. No British battlecruiser could have survived this kind of assault, but Scheer’s ships had better armour, superior gunnery safety procedures and were better subdivided below decks into watertight compartments. Meanwhile, the German destroyers were churning their way towards the British line, launching torpedoes, thereby giving the wounded German battlecruisers time to slink back into the mists. Now Jellicoe had to decide whether he would turn towards the Germans, turn away or simply hold course and face the consequences.
The alternatives to a turn away were a turn towards, or holding the course and dodging the torpedoes. A turn towards would have led to great danger if the first attack had been followed by a second and a third, and no one could say that this would not be the case. To hold on and dodge might meet with success if the tracks could be seen. Information had reached me that the Germans had succeeded in making the tracks of their torpedoes more or less invisible. Therefore there was danger in this alternative.15
Admiral Sir John Jellicoe, HMS Iron Duke, Fourth Battle Squadron
His caution has been condemned by populist commentators who believe he should have turned towards the High Seas Fleet, thereby triggering a final decisive action. But Jellicoe’s innate caution was grounded on a realistic assessment of what could and could not be risked to achieve the destruction of the High Seas Fleet. For the moment contact was lost, but his Grand Fleet still remained between Scheer and the sanctuary of the German home ports. Over the next hour brief flurries of action blew up as various detachments of the fleets encountered each other in the rapidly fading light. Unsurprisingly, little of importance was achieved by either side. By 21.00, when the light had completely faded away, it remained to be seen whether Scheer could evade the Grand Fleet during the night and return to port or would he be fended off and forced to fight a decisive fleet action come the dawn.
To Jellicoe the Germans appeared to have several options: to sail back north-east and pass through the Skagerrak into the Baltic; to go via Horns Reef north of the British minefields filling the Heligoland Bight; to take the navigationally tricky passage that went right through the minefields; or try and sail south of the minefields to pass along the north Friesian coast to safety. As several of his battlecruisers were close to sinking, Scheer had little choice but to take the shortest feasible route, which was via Horns Reef. But Jellicoe was in ignorance of this and, given the last reported German position, he decided that the route via the north Friesian coast was the most likely option. He therefore set his battle fleet on a steady southerly course at a speed of 17 knots. His destroyer flotillas would follow some five miles behind the fleet, to cover the Horns Reef channel and the minefield gap options, while at the same time removing them from the possibility of being involved in accidental clashes with the Grand Fleet in the pitch dark. The High Seas Fleet was now sailing on a directly converging course, with Jellicoe’s destroyers at the rear of the line.
A series of confused actions followed as the High Seas Fleet crashed into the destroyer flotillas. Unlike the Germans, the British lacked properly shuttered searchlights, had no star shells and scant knowledge of the techniques required in making night-identification signals. Wary of the black shapes moving towards them, yet terrified of opening fire in error on their own dreadnoughts, the British light forces proved easy meat for the Germans who, by contrast, had been well drilled in night fighting. The clashes began about 21.40. There could be no co-ordinated action. But, worst of all, nobody told Jellicoe some five miles ahead what was happening.
One typical incident occurred when the 4th Flotilla encountered a line of German dreadnoughts led by the Westfalen at about 23.15. In the darkness the British challenged, at which point the dazzling German searchlights blazed on and the 11-inch turrets and secondary 5.9-inch batteries crashed out.
They were so close that I remember the guns seemed to be firing from some appreciable height above us. At about the same instant the Tipperary shook violently from the impact of being hit by shells. I was told afterwards that the first salvo hit the bridge and it must have killed the Captain and everyone there. I opened fire with the after guns as soon as the enemy opened on us. Proper spotting was out of the question, but crouching behind the canvas screen of my control position – I felt much safer with this thin weather screen between me and the enemy guns, though it wouldn’t have kept out a spent rifle bullet – I yelled at the guns to fire. I don’t think they heard me, but they opened fire all right. During this time both our starboard torpedo tubes were fired, but the enemy was so close that I think that the initial dive that torpedoes usually take as they enter the water made them go under the enemy ships. The enemy’s second salvo hit and burst one of our main steam pipes, and the after part of the ship was enveloped in a cloud of steam through which I could see nothing.16
Sub-Lieutenant Newton William-Powlett, HMS Tipperary, 4th Flotilla
From another ship in the flotilla, the Spitfire, it was a terrible sight.
We closed the Tipperary, now a mass of burning wreckage and looking a very sad sight indeed. At a distance her bridge, wheelhouse and charthouse appeared to be one sheet of flame, giving one the impression of a burning house and so bright was the light from this part that it seemed to obliterate one’s vision of the remainder of the ship and of the sea round about, except that part close to her which was all lit up, reflecting the flames.17
Lieutenant Athelstan Bush, HMS Spitfire, 4th Flotilla
Again and again the British officers saw their enemies and had a brief opportunity to launch deadly concentrated torpedo attacks, but they lacked the cour
age of their convictions to take sufficiently bold action as they sought more confirmation that the blackened shapes slipping by were indeed German dreadnoughts. As they waited, so their chances slipped away. In one last attack the 12th Flotilla managed a direct hit and sank the pre-dreadnought Pommern, exploding her magazine and killing all 844 of her crew. Yet the bulk of the High Seas Fleet swept past without further damage.
At the same time the crippled German battlecruisers were limping their way through the British columns of dreadnoughts. They were sighted at various times by British officers, but in the inspiring words of Captain James Fergusson of the Thunderer, ‘It was considered inadvisable to show up battle fleet unless obvious attack was intended.’18 And so the battered Moltke, which he had had squarely in his sights, escaped to fight another day. The Seydlitz was another beneficiary of this incredible laxness.
In this situation, the aft look-out reported: ‘Several large ships, darkened, approaching from astern.’ Our night glasses showed four huge ships, British, no more than 2,000 yards away. Blast! They must have seen us and would therefore open fire at any moment. Should we try to ram? But their guns were still trained fore and aft! Our ship was too heavily damaged to attack, and I gave the orders: ‘Hard a-starboard, full speed ahead, engine room make as much smoke as possible – give British recognition signal.’ A yeoman flashed the latter, ‘J’, the leading ship promptly answered, ‘O’. That was the only light they showed for they had an excellently darkened ship. In a minute we got up so much smoke that they disappeared from view.19