Jallianwala Bagh, 1919

  It is notable that there was no attack on any European, though a CID inspector was assaulted at a meeting that took place in King Edward’s Park. He, too, must have been an Indian as there are no details to be found about him.

  Since the authorities and the leaders of the Satyagraha Movement (unnamed in the HC Report and also in the INC Report) were in conversation, it was felt that the hartal could be lifted. On 17 April (by which time it is likely that news would have trickled in from Punjab despite censorship and the ban on travel), there was one more attempt to enforce the hartal. Clashes ensued when the crowd managed to go around the police pickets to close the shops which were being opened. An arrest led to another assault on a head constable. There was an attack on a police picket at Ballimaran Street in Chandni Chowk. In the police firing that followed (in ‘self protection’), eighteen people were reported wounded, while two others were killed.

  In total, even though there had not been any organised violence on the part of the crowd, up to ten people were killed, and perhaps two or three dozen more wounded. Of these individuals we know nothing beyond the tentative numbers.

  By 19 April, the hartal was over and shops reopened. Nevertheless, around 17 April, the Chief Commissioner asked for martial law to be imposed in Delhi. The request was inexplicable as the city was entirely peaceful.

  Perhaps the authorities thought the trouble in Punjab might infect Delhi. Or was there fear that in case a ‘hartal’ was called again and the ‘lower orders found themselves with nothing to do’, there might be violence again?24

  Even though martial law was not imposed, some of the punishments that were doled out in Punjab were introduced in Delhi too; for instance, the practice of enrolling leading citizens as ‘special constables’. There was an attempt to issue uniforms and have them report at the police station. The move was ‘strongly resented’ by those to whom this stricture was applied.

  However, the handling of the situation in Delhi was vastly different from that in Amritsar or Lahore. The fact that there was a dialogue between the officers and the protestors, at least in some instances, meant that a few potentially dangerous situations were defused. The Chief Commissioner of Delhi, Barron, came in for praise from the Hunter Committee (both the Majority and Minority Reports) for this.

  In Ahmedabad, a city with a population of nearly 400,000, things were not to be so quickly managed. The 49-year-old Gandhi had already achieved a near-spiritual status there. As a member of the Gujarat Sabha said, ‘Mr Gandhi has honoured Ahmedabad by making it his headquarters, and while he is loved and respected as a spiritual and political leader in the whole of India, the feelings of love and reverence cherished for him in this city are extraordinary.’ 25

  The Gujarat Sabha worked as a District Congress Committee for the District of Ahmedabad. It was in Ahmedabad that the satyagraha oath was formulated, an outcome of a meeting of the Home Rule League at Gandhi’s ashram, on 24 February 1919. It was attended by representative ‘Home Rulers’ from Ahmedabad and Bombay, and a decision was taken to ‘start a passive resistance campaign against the proposed Rowlatt resolution’. Gandhi signed the oath, as did Anasuya Sarabhai and other Home Rulers, including a number of barristers and pleaders. Many meetings were held all over Gujarat and posters were deployed as well. These posters, as quoted in the Disorders Report, stated that civil disobedience had to be used side by side with passive resistance.

  While passive resistance would have meant literally ‘resisting’ laws, civil disobedience was rather more active. This was the dichotomy that many found difficult to understand. Perhaps this was why the first round of satyagraha ended in some form of violence in most places, especially when crowds began to enforce the hartal and the authorities tried to stop them. But there was an agreement on all sides, that these clashes could have been controlled had the leaders, especially Gandhi, not been arrested.

  The posters also advocated disobedience, such as not paying taxes. (Gandhi would later refine this further, but at this point, there were general pointers towards the kind of action ordinary people could take to show their opposition to the Rowlatt Acts.)

  One of the posters said:

  How can the atrocities of the Rowlatt Bill be stopped?

  There is no atrocity if a thousand men refuse to pay taxes; but to pay taxes to a Government which commits atrocities is to support such a rule and thus encourage atrocities.

  Posters like this would have stirred up the people and worried the government. They popped up in Gujarat, Bombay, Delhi and Punjab. The anti-Rowlatt Act movement was basically a franchise and its main contribution would be to create leaders in different parts of the country. Anyone could show their anger towards their foreign ruler and participate in the political movement by shutting shop or fasting or making a poster. This was the first truly unifying movement of the people, led by Gandhi, who was by then a revered, if eccentric, leader.

  Gandhi’s popularity in Ahmedabad also stemmed from the fact that both he and Anasuya Sarabhai were held in special esteem after their intervention in favour of mill workers in 1918. At that point, Ahmedabad had 78 mills, employing around 40,000 workers, so they formed a sizeable part of the population. Thus when the mill workers heard of Gandhi’s exclusion from Punjab on 9 April, they went on a rampage. The situation was to become worse the following day when Anasuya Sarabhai failed to arrive as expected and it was thought that she, too, had been arrested. In the two terrible days that followed, there were two casualties on the British side—an armed constable was thrown from a balcony (he must have been an Indian, as he remained nameless) and a Sergeant Fraser was killed. On the Indian side, the numbers were much higher. According to official reports, at least 28 were killed and 123 wounded. The Hunter Committee Report admitted that there could have been many more casualties, which were not traced. It also referred to ‘one woman and four children wounded by the firing’.26 The woman had been inside her house when she was struck by a stray bullet. We do not know her name.

  Subsequently, the rioting and violence took off on a very large scale.

  When the news of Gandhi’s detention first reached Ahmedabad, it was followed by a circular issued by the Secretary of the Satyagraha Sabha:

  The day before yesterday, Mahatma Gandhi started from Bombay for Delhi, Lahore, Amritsar, etc. On reaching Delhi yesterday night an order under the Defence of India act was served on him requiring him not to go to Delhi, Punjab and other places and restricting him to Bombay. He disregarded the order; he is therefore arrested. He has expressed his desire that that all residing in the Ashram will celebrate this day and will do their work with double zeal and faith. It is requested that the whole public will respect his desire.27

  Instead of calming them down, the circular caused many to become emotional and angry. They stoned the police, damaged a cinema hall and tried to observe hartal once again. Yet, there was no overreaction from the authorities at any stage, nor was martial law imposed in Ahmedabad. The similarity between the manner in which events unfolded in Ahmedabad and Amritsar is evident; the difference lay in the handling of the volatile situation.

  However, some worrying incidents did take place.

  Two European employees of a mill, Sagar and Steeples, were driving through the city when they were forced to alight. (The crowd was forcing everyone to walk as a sign of mourning.) They tried to get a ride on another vehicle but were stoned and chased into a police chowki. They tried to go further and, following another attack, took shelter in Beehive Mill near Prem Gate. Here, too, they were forced to leave, as people inside the mill did not want them to stay. They were accompanied by a small group of policemen, who had previously tried firing over the heads of the protestors.

  Once they left the mill, the policemen fired into the crowd, wounding twelve men. The defending party were then forced into the balcony of a house from which one policeman fell and was beaten up. He was to die later in the day from the injuries he received. Meanwhile, around 24 policemen arrived on the scene, fo
llowed by the District Magistrate and the Superintendent of Police. When they saw the policemen surrounded by a large crowd, the officials sent a driver with a message to Colonel Frazer, the Officer Commanding, requesting a dispatch of troops.

  The 24 policemen managed to keep guard over the dying constable as well as some people they had arrested. The tense situation was managed by the DM and SP until the troops under Colonel Frazer arrived at 6.45 p.m.

  Despite a quiet night, the unrest continued the following morning, when Anasuya Sarabhai did not arrive by the early train as expected. The police and the large, suspicious crowd clashed once again at Prem Gate.

  The DM, Chatfield, described the events thus: ‘The first incident on the 11th was when the District Superintendent of Police and I went down to the Prem Gate where the riot had occurred on the previous day. We discovered that the platoon which was stationed there was confronted by a crowd and the officer in charge complained to us that his men were annoyed. They were jeered at and it appeared to us that there was some danger and that trouble might arise on this account.’28

  As the DM and the DSP drove around the city, they saw that the situation was spiraling out of control. Large crowds continued to gather, and their car was stoned. The hartal was still on, the mills and the shops were shut. Meanwhile, 300 soldiers under Major Kirkwood had been sent into the city, followed by 200 more. It was clearly a difficult situation as the crowd began to burn down government buildings including the Collector’s office, the record rooms, the Sub Registrar’s office, the City Magistrate’s office, and the City Survey Office over the gate of the Sub-Jail. They were fired upon by the armed police guard and so the Sub-Jail was saved, but they did burn down Mamlatdar’s Court House, the telegraph office, the post office at Delhi Gate and two police chowkies.

  As the attacks continued, a few Europeans were caught up in them, but fortunately, some like Mrs Tuke, the wife of the Civil Surgeon, managed to use a gun (actually, just brandished it about) very judiciously. She was finally rescued by some medical students. The electric power station was attacked next and Brown, who was in charge, was chased, till a worker put the crowd on a false scent. The situation grew worse as people got after Lieutenant MacDonald of the Army Clothing Department; he was saved only after a Parsee student, Laher, went across to the camp and brought back motor lorries. Meanwhile, an entrapped MacDonald managed to keep the crowd at bay on a narrow staircase of the Delhi Chala Chowki for more than an hour, while being pelted with missiles, even a broken bottle. He was saved by the arrival of the troops, thanks to the intrepid Laher.

  From eyewitness accounts found in the Hunter Committee Report, it is clear that while the mill workers were determined to inflict maximum damage to ensure the release of Gandhi (who had not yet arrived in Ahmedabad), many other Indians kept trying to help the Europeans who were trapped.

  By 11 a.m., several government buildings were on fire. The protestors were now playing hide-and-seek with the troops that had arrived under the command of Lieutenant Larkin. They continued to abuse and throw stones at the troops but by noon, troops had been deployed to protect the waterworks, the police headquarter lines and the railway bridge across the Sabarmati river. The defiant crowd continued to attack and even raided two temples from where they apparently procured guns and swords. They also murdered a European police officer. Sergeant Fraser was dragged out of hiding from a shop on Richey Road and killed.

  Two Indian magistrates were attacked and so were some Indian policemen, but the crowd was primarily interested in targeting Europeans and government property. Orders were given to the troops that controlled fire was to be opened, but only if, after a warning, the crowd still came within 25 yards, and if they indulged in incendiarism.

  Kirkwood stated that Lieutenant Larkin was wounded and one of the rioters killed, but he advanced as far as Panch Kor Naka. In the ensuing confrontation, he estimated the total number of casualties to have been six or seven.29 Later, when Lieutenant Fitzpatrick was posted at the Panch Kor Naka, from 11.30 a.m. till the evening, he too had to fire on the crowd that kept advancing closer, despite warnings.

  Interestingly, in Ahmedabad, where the crowd was far more organised than in Amritsar and had even managed to access guns and swords (though this might have been exaggerated by the British officers), the violence was more or less under control and at no point was there any indiscriminate firing. However, it is also apparent that the number of casualties on the Indian side must have been higher than the numbers stated in the HC Report.

  Other officers, such as Lieutenant Morris, who were in charge of the troops, also had to resort to firing. The trouble went on through the night, with some more government buildings being burnt. It was a very difficult situation and the police joined in the firing alongside, as per the testimonies of Sub Inspector Kothawala and Deputy Superintendent Shirgaonkar. However, there was no large-scale attack on Europeans in the mill area (barring the few incidents already mentioned) or the suburbs, and they were given shelter at Shahibagh and the railway station, where they remained under military protection.

  Meanwhile, it was felt that the troops, which had been on their feet all day needed to be relieved, but the train bringing British troops from Bombay had been derailed and the telegraph wires connecting Bombay and Ahmedabad had been cut. Sanitation was an issue. The electric power station had been shut down and the drainage pumping system no longer worked. The municipal staff had gone on leave.

  On 12 April, Colonel Frazer, the Officer Commanding, with the concurrence of Chatfield, the District Magistrate, issued a proclamation which stated:

  Any gathering of over 10 individuals collected in one spot will be fired at;

  Any single individual seen outside any house who does not stop and come up when challenged between the hours of 7 p.m. and 6 a.m. will be shot.

  Unlike Amritsar, however, good care was taken to ensure that the orders were properly distributed and understood. The British troops arrived from Bombay and the situation rapidly returned to normal. There were still a few occasions when firing was resorted to as crowds refused to disperse, but by the afternoon of 13 April, everything was peaceful. Following Gandhi’s arrival and a calming speech by him on 14 April, all bans and restrictions were also removed.30

  Meanwhile, some other areas in Ahmedabad district had experienced violence, such as Viramgam, where a Junior Magistrate was murdered by a violent group of protestors on 13 April. MacIlvride, a Traffic Inspector, was brutally attacked at the railway station and escaped only in disguise. Six Indians were said to have been killed and eighteen wounded. The treasury was looted (₹58,499 was the estimate) and 25 under-trial prisoners were released from jail by the rioters.31

  In all these areas, the situation was quickly brought under control. Of course, there were arrests. The number of people placed on trial was 167 in Ahmedabad, 50 in Viramgam, and 82 in Kaira. A total of 123 were convicted and 25 were given transportation for life (this included one death sentence, which was later commuted). Rigorous imprisonment was pronounced for the rest, with sentences varying between 6 weeks and 14 years. A further 140 in Ahmedabad and 41 in Kaira district were released after their arrest as there was no evidence to convict them.32 This again was in sharp contrast to the situation in Punjab where the war against the people carried on for months and evidence continued to be concocted against those who were arrested.

  The unrest continued till Gandhi and Sarabhai arrived back in Ahmedabad, and Gandhi met the Commissioner. Prohibitory orders were later withdrawn and on 14 April, Gandhi addressed a large gathering, which he chastised for violent behavior, urging them all to return to work. With this the Satyagraha Movement was called off and the violence came to an immediate halt, barring an incident at Sarkhej, around six miles from Ahmedabad, where a police post was burnt and the police were stripped and beaten.

  Despite the spread of violence outside Ahmedabad, there was no attempt to make it appear as though a large-scale revolution was taking place. There was no
call to impose martial law, and there were no fancy punishments.

  In Bombay too, the disturbances following the news of Gandhi’s arrest (published in Bombay Chronicle on 10 April) were brought under control fairly quickly, even though the police remained on high alert. Close to midnight on 10 April, a wire was received by the Bombay Commissioner of Police that told of disturbances in Lahore and Amritsar. Even as crowds began to gather, shouting ‘Hindu Mussalman ki jai’ and ‘Mahatma Gandhi ki jai’, and a request was sent for more troops at around 3 p.m., Gandhi arrived in Bombay. The crowds thronged to Chowpatty Beach where he addressed them, and things calmed down again.

  Was this the simple solution that, if implemented by O’Dwyer, could have saved Punjab from cruel repression and the loss of thousands of lives? What if he had allowed Gandhi to address the people, or even allowed freedom for Kitchlew and Satya Pal? On hindsight, was a great mistake made by removing the leaders and leaving the large crowds, who were already restless, rudderless as well?

  The Government of Bombay (unlike the Government of Punjab, which had claimed all kinds of conspiracy theories to justify the large-scale loss of life) told the Hunter Committee that the disturbances ‘were attended by no fatal casualties, or extensive destruction of public or private property. There was no suspension of the normal course of administration or of civil control over law and order. Offences committed in the course of the disturbances were dealt with by the permanent magisterial courts. There was no serious dislocation for any considerable time of the normal life of the city.’33