I
THE ACCOUNT OF OUR DECLINE
In the immediate aftermath of the war we continued to rank as one of the great powers, admittedly a long way behind the United States and the Soviet Union but nevertheless at the same table as them. A quarter of the world’s population did after all still belong to the British Commonwealth and Empire. I myself was able to observe Churchill, Attlee and Bevin dealing on equal terms with Stalin and Truman at the Potsdam conference when no German or Frenchman was present. With the eclipse of Empire, and the emergence of America and Russia, it was inevitable that we would lose comparative power and influence … But in the mid-1950s we were still the strongest European power militarily and economically. We were also well ahead of all continental countries in the development of atomic energy.
It is our decline since then in relation to our European partners that has been so marked, so that today we are not only no longer a world power, but we are not in the first rank even as a European one. Income per head in Britain is now, for the first time for over 300 years, below that in France. We are scarcely in the same economic league as the Germans or French. We talk of ourselves without shame as being one of the less prosperous countries of Europe. The prognosis for the foreseeable future is discouraging. If present trends continue we shall be overtaken in GDP per head by Italy and Spain well before the end of the century …
You only have to move about Western Europe nowadays to realise how poor and unproud the British have become in relation to their neighbours. It shows in the look of our towns, in our airports, in our hospitals and in local amenities; it is painfully apparent in much of our railway system, which until a generation ago was superior to the continental one. In France, for instance, it is evident in spending on household equipment and in the growth of second homes …
II
INTER-RELATION BETWEEN THE ECONOMY AND FOREIGN POLICY
… For more than a decade after 1945 we held back from joining in schemes of greater European unity; we were confident of our superior strength in relation to our European neighbours, and we did not think that anything would succeed without us. Then when the others showed that they were determined to go ahead on their own we found that we were unable to prevent them doing so or to shape what emerged in the way we wanted. For long we underestimated the economic prospects of our European neighbours and for even longer we overestimated our own strength and influence in relation to them.
The recent intensification in the Paris/Bonn relationship owes a good deal to our economic weakness, as to our a-European diplomacy. President Giscard is not really very interested in us at the moment and gives the impression that Anglo/French relations only feature in his mind when the annual summit comes along. It is sometimes said in London that if only we pursued our interests in Europe as ruthlessly as the French did we would have a scoring rate as high as theirs. This is another example of how we overestimate our influence and our nuisance value: we do not count in Europe like the French; the other countries of the community know that they can get along quite well – some say better – without us as they have done for years …
I should also interject here that British representatives abroad naturally do their best to prevent too pessimistic a picture of our economy from gaining ground; and, indeed, there are important tasks of correction and proportion to be carried out. But the facts of our decline are too well known for us to be able to persuade foreign observers that there is really little wrong with our industrial scene. Indeed we harp on our poverty to justify our plea for budgetary changes in the community. In France we have come nowadays to be identified with malaise as closely as in the old days we were associated with success. In many public statements Britain is mentioned as a model not to follow if economic disaster is to be avoided. It is striking how, at French functions where a British representative is present and there is a need for some obliging observation about us to be made, speakers seem unable to find anything to refer to that has happened since 1940–45, a period which still indeed affords us a good deal of capital. The French press is full of articles about Britain’s plight, not least depressing for their patronising search for favourable elements such as our language and our humour.
Foreign policy decisions
We had every Western European government ready to eat out of our hand in the immediate aftermath of war. For several years our prestige and influence were paramount and we could have stamped Europe as we wished. Jean Monnet and others on the continent had originally hoped to build a European economic union around the nucleus of a Franco/British union. It was the failure of the British to respond to this idea that led them to explore alternative approaches, in particular the idea of a coal and steel community based upon a Franco/German rather than a Franco/British axis. This was a turning-point in postwar history. The French were not very tactful in the way they confronted the British government with the proposals for the Schuman plan. But Monnet knew by 1950 that the British government was not prepared to make the leap necessary to join the sort of organisation that he was thinking of, one that would achieve lasting Franco/German reconciliation and set Europe on a new course. He sensed that London did not really believe that the idea would come off, and that in any case their fears of supranationality would deter them. He was correct in his analysis.
But what is amazing looking back is the way in which the British government reached so important a decision. The full British cabinet never dealt with the question. Neither the prime minister, nor the foreign secretary (Mr Bevin was in hospital), nor the chancellor of the exchequer, nor the lord chancellor, were present at the ministerial meeting which took the decision against British participation in the European Coal and Steel Community (ECSC) … In 1950 the National Executive Committee of the Labour party declared: ‘In every respect, except distance, we in Britain are closer to our kinsmen in Australia and New Zealand on the far side of the world than we are to Europe.’ … [The Conservatives] fought just as shy of supranationality as did the Labour party. Referring to the ideal of European integration, Mr Anthony Eden said in January, 1952, ‘This is something which we know, in our bones, we cannot do … For Britain’s story and her interests lie beyond the Continent of Europe. Our thoughts move across the seas …’ At the start of the European Coal and Steel Community the Financial Times described it as a ‘cross between a frustrated cartel and a pipe dream’ … When, after de Gaulle’s vetoes and further knocking at the door we were eventually admitted to the community, our policy towards it did not smack of wholehearted commitment even after the overwhelming referendum …
III
THE FUTURE
Even the most pessimistic account of our decline contains grounds for hope. The fact that France and the Federal Republic of Germany have managed to achieve such progress in so relatively short a time shows what can be done if there is the necessary will and leadership. Anybody who remembers the state of affairs in those countries in the decade following the war and compares it with the present day must conclude that nothing in a country’s future is inevitable and that everything depends upon the national purpose. So far as we are concerned, if the fault that we are underlings lies ‘not in our stars but in ourselves’, we are surely capable, unless our national character has undergone some profound metamorphosis, of resuming mastery of our fate. But a considerable jolt is going to be needed if a lasting attenuation of civic purpose and courage is to be averted. North Sea oil should provide the material impulse, just as coal did two centuries ago. There are human elements that favour us compared with others: our political stability and the absence of that tendency to explosion that could always afflict France.
It would be outside the scope of this valedictory despatch to try to chart the course that we might follow to turn around our present situation. Obviously there are no simple solutions and the difficulties are to be found as much in attitudes as in institutions. At the risk of oversimplification I should like to end with three conclusions based on the years I have spent at t
he end of my career in France and Germany and comparing their present situations with ours.
First, if we are to defend our interests in Europe there must be a change in the style of our policy towards it. This does not mean giving things up or failing to assert our rights and requirements. It does mean, however, behaving as though we were fully and irrevocably committed to Europe. We should be able to put at the service of the community the imagination, tolerance and commonsense that have formed our own national institutions. We could have ideas to contribute …
Secondly, viewed from abroad, it looks as though the facts of our present circumstances are not universally recognised in Britain. The British people do not give the impression that they are fully aware of how far Britain’s economy has fallen behind that of our European neighbours or of the consequences of this upon living standards. Naturally people are conscious that they are better off now than 25 years ago but they may not know to what extent others in Europe have done much better or of the effects needed to reverse the trend. As Isaac Newton wrote, the important thing is ‘to learn not to teach’. It may be our turn to learn from others, having been teachers for so long …
Finally, and as a corollary to this process of enlightenment, there would appear to be a need at the present time to do something to stimulate a sense of national purpose, of something akin to what has inspired the French and Germans over the past 25 years. No doubt the sort of patriotic language and flag waving of former times is inappropriate for us today. The revival of Germany has not owed anything to that kind of stimulus. But nevertheless the Germans have felt motivated by the dire need to rise from the ashes in 1945, and they have had to recover from their past politically too. Hence the dogged devotion to democracy that the Germans have shown since the war and the obligation that every one of them feels to make a contribution to economic, as well as political, recovery. Reaching out from their traditional Bismarckian policy of trying to balance East and West, the Germans have now identified their cause with commitment to the West.
The French on the other hand have found their national revival in a more traditional appeal to patriotism. They started at the bottom of the pit but it has not only been de Gaulle who has played on the need to overcome the country’s sense of defeat and national humiliation. Giscard is no less ready to play on chauvinistic chords. In a speech that he made recently that lasted only eight minutes he used the word ‘France’ over 23 times and the word ‘win’ seven times. Yet, to those who have known the French people in earlier days, it is impossible to believe that they are necessarily readier to make sacrifices or to respond to patriotic appeals than their British counterparts.
Conclusion
These then are the words with which I would like to end my official career, and if it is said that they go beyond the limits of an Ambassador’s normal responsibilities I would say that the fulfilment of these responsibilities is not possible in Western Europe in the present uncertain state of our economy and of our European policy.
A representative abroad has a duty to draw the attention of the authorities at home to the realities of how we look, just as he has an obligation to try to persuade the government and people of the country to which he is accredited that present difficulties must be kept in perspective. The tailored reporting from Berlin in the late ’30s, and the encouragement it gave to the policy of appeasement is a study in scarlet for every postwar diplomat. Viewed from the continent our standing at the present time is low. But this is not for the first time in our history, and we
can recover if the facts are known and faced and if the British people can be fired with a sense of national will such as others have found these past years. For the benefit of ourselves and of Europe let us then show the adaptability that has been the hallmark of our history – and do so now so that the warnings of this despatch may before long sound no more ominous than the recorded alarms of a wartime siren.
I am sending copies of this despatch to Her Majesty’s Ambassadors at European Community Posts and Washington, and to the Permanent Representative on the North Atlantic Council, the UK Permanent Representatives to the European Communities and the UK Permanent Representative to OECD.
I am Sir
Yours faithfully
NICHOLAS HENDERSON.
‘The all pervading snobbishness of English life … the basic idleness of British workers … and lazy managers’
RALPH SELBY, HM AMBASSADOR TO NORWAY, MARCH 1975
Selby wrote two valedictories on leaving Oslo. The passage below comes from his more serious essay on bilateral relations with Norway. Extracts from his more wide-ranging, personal valedictory about life in the Diplomatic Service are on p. 305.
Generally speaking, the goodwill towards Britain, to which I referred in my first impressions despatch, remains intact. There have been periods when I have had occasion to wonder whether it all amounted to anything very much in practice. After being here a while, one meets so many people, particularly in business life, who go through the rigmarole of saying that the Norwegians can never forget all that Britain did for Norway during the war, but then go on to say that while they would dearly love to buy British they cannot afford to do so, because deliveries are always late on account of strikes due principally to the all pervading snobbishness of English life; because the finish of British goods now leaves a lot to be desired owing to the basic idleness of British workers; and because lazy managers, who never get to work until two hours after their employees, cannot even be bothered to let their Norwegian partners know when they are going to be late with deliveries. One yard at Horten, which buys many British products, and is in fact very well satisfied with their quality, has even invented a special clause to be inserted in all contracts with British firms and with British firms only. This clause involves special penalties, not for being late with deliveries – for that is now expected when orders are placed in Britain – but for failing to give the Horten Yard adequate notice of the lateness when it is going to occur. Culprits who have delivered 90 per cent of an order on time seem, it is claimed, disposed to argue that it is a bit unfair for people to grumble about the late delivery of the remaining 10 per cent. They forget that the missing 10 per cent can effectively wreck a complicated production process. But judging from comments from other posts all round the world, this sort of criticism is no monopoly of Norway’s …
‘Someone in the Office once told me I was regarded as an “eccentric” ’
KEITH HAMYLTON JONES, HM AMBASSADOR TO COSTA RICA AND NICARAGUA, FEBRUARY 1979
It is hard to avoid the conclusion that Mr Hamylton Jones had gone quietly bonkers during his sojourn in two Central American backwaters about which he hardly deigns to say anything at all. Instead he seems to have made an attempt to sum up the future of Britain and the meaning of life. That some 500 copies of this valedictory were sent around Whitehall (despite a concern recorded by the clerks that it might ‘ruffle a few ministerial feathers’) is more likely to suggest that everyone wanted to have a good giggle at a known eccentric than that the ambassador’s thoughts were considered important. In the file, a covering note from J. Shakespeare in the Mexico and Caribbean Department reads:
Mr Hamylton Jones, in his valedictory despatch, has lived up to the reputation given him by Personnel Department as an ‘eccentric’. His despatch … gives an account of his philosophy on life, pointing out that the present mercenary and envious attitude in this country is not only an error but does not achieve the happiness which is the aim … It certainly demonstrates that members of the Service are not cast in a stereotyped mould.
The head of department concurred: ‘Marvellous stuff, and some nonsense!’
Shakespeare’s letter of thanks to the ambassador is a masterpiece of the alloying of candour with tact. It reads:
I much enjoyed reading your valedictory despatch as did our Third Room who were waiting expectantly for something a little different from the normal run of the mill report. Our expectations have been completely fulfil
led and I fear life will be a little duller after your departure. I am submitting it up the Office to Ministers. I have no doubt it will be received with a variety of feelings …
FAREWELL TO COSTA RICA, NICARAGUA AND HER MAJESTY’S DIPLOMATIC SERVICE
Her Majesty’s Ambassador at San José to the Secretary of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs
(CONFIDENTIAL) San José
27 February, 1979
Sir,
To draft, or not to draft, a farewell despatch? Indiscretion, whispering ‘yes’, has prevailed over discretion, shouting ‘no!’. After all, if nothing else, parts of it may provide light relief for the overworked Third Room in Mexico and Caribbean Department. And better to send it in time, rather than too late, for a crushing reply.
I shall devote few paragraphs to Costa Rica, which, as a Private Secretary once snootily but accurately observed, is hardly the hub of the universe … Looking back after five years (at least a year too long, in a small tropical post) I am tempted … to describe the ‘average’ city-dwelling Costa Rican as ‘charming, quite intelligent, profoundly self-satisfied, and almost wholly unreliable’ … I asked my Head of Chancery, Jerry Warder, who has spent longer in Nicaragua than I, for a comparative list for the average Nicaraguan, and he suggests ‘warmer, dimmer, more lethargic, more tolerant of oppression from above and even more unreliable’ … The two most obvious sources of difference are race and climate: in Nicaragua 75 per cent have a strong admixture of Indian blood; in Costa Rica (where most Indians were polished off by disease or the sword in the 16th and 17th centuries) 90 per cent are of pure Spanish or off-white mestizo stock; Nicaragua’s capital lies at 180 feet between lake and ocean, but Costa Rica’s at 4000 feet on a mountain plain …
Parting Shots Page 19