by Bill Fawcett
Alexander grew up in the capital of Pella and attended a prestigious school. He trained in athletics and learned how to fight and be a leader. He also studied academics as well as philosophy and ethics. Philip provided only the best for Alexander. He even supplied the greatest philosopher of the day, Aristotle, to tutor him. Alexander relished all that Aristotle taught him. He once said, “My father gave me the gift of life, but Aristotle taught me to live well.”
He also learned to love well. In his youth, Alexander befriended a young man named Hephaestion, whom many believed was also his lover. For the rugged King Philip, the idea of having an effeminate son as an heir was an embarrassment. So he had prostitutes brought in for Alexander to “sample.” Although Alexander later became involved with several women and eventually married, he still remained close friends with Hephaestion for most of his life.
Philip may have had doubts about his son’s sexuality, but he had no doubts in his son’s ability as a leader. In 338 BCE, Philip put the eighteen-year-old Alexander in command of the 2,000-man Companion Cavalry. It might have been a risky move, but in the end it paid off. Philip found himself facing the Athenians as well as their Theban allies in a place called Chaeronea in central Greece. When the Athenians moved toward Philip’s forces, they left a gap between their army and that of the Thebans, who stood their ground. Alexander wasted no time. He charged his cavalry in between the two armies, encircled the Thebans, and wiped them out. Not one was left standing. The Athenians in the meantime were outmanned by Philip’s Macedonians and surrendered. The victory at Chaeronea gave Philip control of all of Greece. It should have been the beginning of a great father-son alliance, but Philip did something that threatened Alexander’s succession. He got married . . . again.
This time, Philip married a twenty-year-old Macedonian woman named Cleopatra. (Not to be confused with the famous Egyptian queen of the same name.) If Cleopatra produced a male heir, this Macedonian prince would rule after Philip’s death, while Alexander would be reduced to the rank of general and would have to take orders from his younger brother, the king. Alexander was not about to see that happen, and neither was his power-driven mother, Olympias. Tensions in the family grew high.
On the night of the wedding feast, when all the men were full of spirits, Attalus, the uncle of the bride, proposed a toast that the union would result in a legitimate heir to the Macedonian kingdom. To which Alexander replied, “What do you take me for, a bastard?” He then threw his wine in Attalus’ face. Philip started toward Alexander, tripped, and fell down. Alexander scoffed, “This is the man that wishes to cross from Europe into Asia, yet he cannot even pass from one couch to another.” These words, spoken in anger, severed the father-son relationship. Alexander did not have the chance to reconcile with his father. In 334 BCE, just after the birth of his son to Cleopatra, Philip died, killed by one of his own bodyguards. At the tender age of twenty, Alexander became ruler of a vast Greek empire.
Alexander had one goal upon rising to the throne—and that was to fulfill his father’s dream of conquering Asia and the Persian king Darius. He massed 40,000 troops and transported them across the Dardanelles (the Hellespont), a feat unheard of in his day. Darius did not encounter Alexander at sea. Had he done so, events might have taken a different turn. Darius’ navy was three times as large as Alexander’s. In the end, Darius refused to fight the “Greek boy” head-to-head. Instead he sent his Greek mercenary general, Memnon, to face the young upstart.
Memnon chose the Granicus River as his battleground. When Alexander crossed the Granicus and defeated Memnon’s forces, Darius realized he was facing a man, a man who believed himself to be invincible. Alexander led his armies from the front, wearing plumes in his helm. There was no mistaking his identity. He made himself the target of all who would dare to fight him. Darius would not make the same mistake again. He gathered an army of 600,000 men and made his way toward Issus. Although modern historians believe the number of troops to be closer to 100,000, Alexander’s forces of 30,000 to 40,000 men were still greatly outnumbered. Having far fewer troops, and his supplies cut off in the midst of the engagement, seemed to matter very little to Alexander, who managed to crush Darius’ army. Upon which Darius fled for his life.
Alexander didn’t wish to be seen as a tyrant. He thought he was the son of Zeus, and gods flourish in praise. He allowed Darius’ family to keep their status and live as they had always done. They kept their servants and were under his protection. Darius wrote Alexander a letter offering friendship, his daughter’s hand in marriage, and all the land west of the Euphrates. He also offered to pay ransom for the Persian prisoners. Alexander responded by telling Darius he should not address him as an equal, but as the king of all Asia. His first move as the new ruler of Asia was to try to conquer the island fortress of Tyre. The Babylonian king, Nebuchadnezzar, tried for thirteen years to break through the walled defenses and failed. Alexander did it in seven months. He built a half-mile-long causeway across the water leading to the fortress. His troops penetrated the wall and killed 8,000 people. The rest were sold into slavery—so much for not looking like a tyrant.
After crossing into Egypt and officially being pronounced a god, Alexander once again came head-to-head with Darius. In what is now known as the Battle of Gaugamela, Alexander defeated the forces of the Persian emperor because Darius III had a flaw that cost him everything (see pages 24-26). After which, the Persian empire really did belong to Alexander. He took over the palace at Persepolis and captured 180,000 talents of gold. Considering that one talent was 57.5 pounds of gold, the amount was almost obscene. It was the greatest treasure ever captured. Alexander was easily the richest man in all of the known world. He celebrated with a night of drunken revelry, during which the palace was burned down and men wreaked havoc inside the city. Many of the soldiers felt like they had achieved their ultimate goal, but Alexander’s lust for conquest was not yet satisfied. He decided to turn his troops toward India.
Alexander had a fascination for unknown lands. These exotic places had a lot to offer a man with a great many lusts. The women were strange, mysterious, and excitingly beautiful. Alexander fell passionately in love with one in particular, Roxanne, the daughter of a Sogdian baron whom he had captured. No doubt it came as a great surprise to Hephaestion and the other men when he decided to marry her. Alexander became completely engulfed in the culture. He donned white robes, and gave the order that his men should kiss his hands and prostrate themselves or kneel before him, for the sake of “appearances.” In Greece, this was an act reserved only for the gods. When Alexander’s historian refused, Alexander had him executed.
Alexander’s lust for battle was challenged to the extreme when he encountered a most formidable foe: elephants. King Porus used the creatures to great advantage and nearly defeated Alexander and his troops. In the end, Alexander managed to overcome Porus, but at enormous cost. His advisers agreed that the best move would be to return to Greece. It was not the advice Alexander had hoped for. He did, however, turn his army back, but not without taking every city in his path. It was during one of these encounters that Alexander received a near-fatal wound. He was shot through the lung with an arrow. He eventually recovered and left India.
Back in Greece, Alexander received an even worse blow than that of the arrow. In July 324 BCE, his beloved companion Hephaestion died from a fever. Alexander threw himself into grief. Many felt this was ultimately the cause of Alexander’s untimely demise. He was never the same. Two years later, Alexander also succumbed to fever. He lingered in his sickness for eleven days. His men worried. Who would take his place? Could anyone take his place? Would any one man be able to hold the vast empire together? At his sickbed, the men leaned over and asked the all-important question, “To whom do you leave your empire?” With his last breath, Alexander uttered words that have since become famous: “To the strongest.”
The empire did not go to the strongest. In just twelve years, it was divided between twenty different ru
lers, each with his own agenda. If Alexander had only known what those words would cost the empire he fought so hard to establish, the world might have been a different place indeed. Assuming he had named an heir and the Greek empire had survived under one government, then much of the conflict over the next thousand years would have been unnecessary. A strong, unified empire, stretching across Europe and Asia, would have existed 500 years before the establishment of the Roman empire. Had Alexander’s multicultural views become the norm, the world could have avoided much darkness.
9
SPLIT COMMAND
Tradition
Destroys an Army
216 BCE
One of the worst defeats in Roman military history was due not to just bad generalship but rather to an antiquated command system that begged for disaster and got it. The mistake that lost Rome 50,000 legionnaires in 216 BCE, and almost cost the city of seven hills control of Italy, had its basis in a problem that had occurred ever since there were Greek city-states. In times of war it is necessary to put a great deal of power, such as command of an army, in the hands of one man. This man was known to the Greeks as a “dictator,” a word that has come down in time with amazingly little shift in meaning.
The problem that the Greeks found with dictators was that if you put control of the army, the navy, the administrators, and the treasury in the hands of one man, he may be reluctant to let go of all that power. What do you do with a man who has all the power and won’t let go? The answer was often that there was nothing anyone could do, and trying to get rid of a dictator could have fatal consequences.
So to avoid this trap, the Roman Senate created two equal consuls, who were effectively co-dictators, in the theory that they would counterbalance each other. When not together, the two consuls would separately command the legions with them. The problem and mistake was what happened when you united the entire Roman army into one force, such as was the case at Cannae.
You cannot have two commanders giving orders. But the Senate did not want one commander to become superior because he alone would control all of the legions. Then there was nothing to stop a victorious consul from marching on Rome at the head of his army and taking over. So the solution Rome used was to have the two consuls take turns being in command. One consul would be in charge, and then he turned over control of the entire army to the other consul the next day.
At Cannae, the two consuls were very different men with opposing attitudes and motives. Aemilius Paullus was an experienced soldier, and he was a survivor of the trouncing Hannibal had given the Romans two years earlier in the Battle of Trebia. He was a cautious leader who understood that most of his soldiers were inexperienced and much of Hannibal’s smaller army were blooded veterans. He took a very conservative approach and avoided battle except on terms that greatly favored his army. One of those terms was mandated by the fact the Roman army had plenty of infantry but very little cavalry. Hannibal had four times as many horsemen as the Romans. Most of his cavalry men were both more heavily armored and more experienced than Roman horsemen, and all of them were much better trained and disciplined. In response to this weakness, Paullus kept the Roman army camped in the hills near Hannibal so that if the Carthaginians attacked, his superior cavalry would be of little use.
The other consul was Terentius Varro. He was a member of the Roman Senate and not a soldier. Though shown later to be brave, even resourceful, Varro had an agenda beyond just keeping Hannibal at bay. He was part of a Senate faction that had for two years been frustrated by the tactics used by Fabius, appropriately called “the Delayer,” after the defeat at Trebia. For two years as consul, Fabius had avoided major battles with Hannibal while the Roman army was being rebuilt. But this meant Hannibal had been free to wreak a lot of destruction and destroy a lot of estates all over Italy. His tactics frustrated a good many Senators who constantly demanded more direct action. Varro also needed a victory while he was in command to enhance his prestige in the Senate. So where Paullus wanted to play it safe and fight in the hills, Varro wanted to force a battle where he was sure the superior Roman army (50,000 soldiers versus 40,000 for Carthage) would prevail.
For a few weeks, the two armies camped only a few miles apart. Hannibal was anxious to do something before his supply situation in hostile territory got worse, and Paullus was willing to wait until Hannibal came to him. But here is the rub: Paullus was in command only every other day. For a while he convinced Varro to go along with the waiting. But pressure from Varro’s allies in the Senate and his own ambition made the inexperienced and overconfident consul anxious to have at it.
Finally, on a day he was in command and Paullus could do nothing, Varro moved the entire Roman army out of its strong position in the hills and onto the level ground near what is now called the Ofanto River. When Paullus took over command the next day, the deed was done. They could not retreat without being attacked in the rear by Hannibal’s horsemen. Because of Varro’s impatience, the Romans would be forced to fight where Hannibal’s cavalry had all the advantages. So, being Romans, they attacked.
The Romans moved against Hannibal in a massive column that slammed into the Carthaginian center. Their plan was to break through the center and then turn on both flanks. With superior numbers, the Romans were confident of success and would pit their numbers against the Carthaginians’ best troops. This simple plan and large formation also was easily within the capabilities of an army made up of mostly inexperienced legionnaires and commanders. It was almost a return to the days of the phalanx. The problem was that Hannibal had not, as was normally the case, put his best troops in his center. In fact he put his worst infantry, the brave but undisciplined Gauls, there. This meant that at first the Roman juggernaut pushed forward over the bodies of dead Gauls, but, at the same time, it left the real strength of the Carthaginians untouched.
The massive column rolled forward and began to push the Gauls back as expected. But elsewhere the plan fell apart. Instead of holding the flanks long enough for the infantry to smash through the enemy center, the Roman horsemen, protecting the troops from the sides, fled almost without a fight. In fact, most ran right past the fortified camp and some didn’t stop until they were back in Rome. This left the light infantry that remained on the flanks exposed and almost defenseless before Hannibal’s horsemen. They too were driven off, exposing both flanks. Still the Romans pushed forward, and the Gauls were close to breaking. Only then, with nothing to slow them, did the Carthaginian commander order his best unit, his Spanish Infantry, to curl around and attack both flanks of the thickly massed Roman infantry.
This was long before the time when the Roman legion was a highly trained and incredibly flexible military machine. The massive Roman column could do nothing but push harder, hoping to literally fight their way out by breaking through the Gauls. But at just the wrong time for it to happen, the Carthaginian armored horsemen returned from chasing off the Roman cavalry and slammed into the back of the thickly packed Romans.
The most experienced Roman soldiers made up the last lines of the attacking column, and they turned about, met the Carthaginian charge, and held it. But to do this they had to stop moving and plant their pikes facing the rear, away from where the Romans were attacking. This brought the entire Roman army to a dead stop, and the operative word there is dead. Packed fifty men deep to ensure they broke the center, this awkward Roman formation, which resembled a phalanx without the spears, meant that most of the Roman soldiers could not fight until the men in front of them had been killed. Since most of the men were now totally surrounded by the Carthaginian army, all they could do was wait to die. And 40,000 did, though Varro, who had caused the battle to be fought, escaped and even distinguished himself when he reorganized the survivors. The Carthaginian losses were in the hundreds, mostly expendable Gauls.
Cannae is often considered one of the most one-sided victories in history. All the more amazing as it came against a Roman army that would go on in the next four centuries to conquer the M
editerranean world. But the battle was really lost because of where it was fought, which gave every advantage to the brilliant Hannibal. A mistake that was forced on Paullus by a system that put an inexperienced politician in command of the entire Roman army at just the wrong time.
10
PRIDE
An Offer They Should
Not Have Refused
204 BCE
In 204 BCE, the war with Rome was not going well for Carthage. The city had lost its final holdings on Sicily and other islands. Spain, the merchant city’s main source of mercenary armies, had fallen. Now Gnaeus Cornelius Scipio, the same Roman commander who had defeated their armies in Spain, had landed a large Roman army near the city itself. Making things worse was that one of the Carthaginians’ closest allies in Africa, Massinissa, had changed sides and had led his experienced cavalry to join the Romans. He brought with him several thousand horsemen, nicely rounding out the Roman order of battle.
Carthage gathered an army and called on its remaining major ally, Syphax, and his army and moved to defeat Scipio. But in a night attack, the smaller Roman army and its ally routed and then slaughtered the camped Carthaginians. There was only one response left for the great merchant city that had been fighting Rome for more than a decade. They recalled Hannibal and the last army they had left from Italy.
Hannibal Barca and about 15,000 of his veterans slipped past the Roman fleet and soon were in Carthage. At this point, Scipio made the city a proposal. He was under pressure from an untrusting and jealous Senate and wanted the war over before they could recall him to Rome. So Scipio made the city a very generous offer that would not only have allowed Carthage to keep its merchant fleet, a major source of the city’s wealth, but would also have left it a large degree of independence and even a small fleet of warships. Carthage would not again be a military threat to Rome, but it could remain an economic powerhouse, wealthy from trade and manufacturing.