Wen Jiabao began his career as a geologist and then was an administrator in the northwestern province of Gansu. After he was transferred to the Ministry of Geology in Beijing in the early 1980s, his connections with the reform-minded party general secretary, Hu Yaobang, helped him rise to chief of the General Affairs Office of the Central Party Committee, which oversaw the day-to-day operations of senior party leaders. He survived the purge of Hu Yaobang in 1988 and continued to serve in that position until Hu Yaobang’s successor, Zhao Ziyang, took over.
In 1989, when a million protesters occupied Tiananmen Square, the then party general secretary, Zhao Ziyang, who aimed to take advantage of the anticorruption movement to advance his reform agenda, instructed Wen to send a telegram to Wan Li, head of the National People’s Congress who was visiting the US. Zhao had hoped to team up with Wan Li and stop the conservative faction from imposing martial law. Wen never sent the telegram. Instead, he reported Zhao to the Politburo Standing Committee. Zhao was eventually overthrown by veteran revolutionaries and put under house arrest. On the day of Zhao’s departure, Wen accompanied him on his visit to Tiananmen Square, where he delivered a tearful farewell speech. In the aftermath of what has come to be known as the Tiananmen Massacre, Wen emerged unscathed—his critics called him an opportunist—and went on to serve the next party general secretary, Jiang Zemin. In 2003, with the help of Jiang and the retiring premier Zhu Rongji, Wen ascended to the premier’s post.
Wen came to power at a time when China was facing serious social problems during its unprecedented economic boom. In the 1990s, party leaders had pinned their hopes on high economic growth, believing that a robust economy would justify the legitimacy of the Communist Party. As a consequence, the party’s lopsided economic policy led to the overuse of natural resources and deterioration of the environment. In addition, government figures showed that China’s industrial growth centered mostly in the coastal provinces and cities. The vast inland region—71 percent of China’s total area and home to 30 percent of its population—accounted for just 17 percent of GDP in 2003. Growth on the coast and continued stagnation in the interior meant that development and income gaps between urban and rural areas, and between the wealthy and the poor, widened dramatically.
Globally, many economists use the Gini index to measure the degree of equality with respect to distribution of assets or income. The value index ranges from zero to one—zero expressing total equality and one for maximum inequality. China’s Gini index in 2003 was 0.47, way above that of its neighbor Japan (0.24) and the US (0.4). It was ironic that workers and peasants, who helped underwrite the Communist revolution and were called by Mao Zedong “masters of the country,” had dropped to the bottom rung of society. The party, which held itself up as champion of the workers and peasants, was under pressure.
To address the disparity in development and income distribution, Wen, along with President Hu Jintao, adopted a series of pro-people policies, such as abolishing agricultural tax in 2005, establishing social security systems, and promulgating rules to protect small and medium-size private enterprises. These policies proved to be ineffective and the urban–rural gap further deteriorated. In the face of widespread social discontent, Wen and Hu stepped up high-profile campaigns against corruption, which Wen believed had gravely undermined the people’s trust in the party. In 2003, the party’s anti-corruption bodies launched extensive investigations, putting more than 3,000 government officials behind bars on corruption-related charges. Wen also attempted to push for regulations that would require senior government leaders to divulge family finances. The move encountered strong resistance and was never implemented.
In his second five-year term, as President Hu launched measures to support failing state enterprises to prop up the economy, along with brutal suppression of dissent to maintain social stability, Wen started to slip away from the party line in favor of bold liberal rhetoric on democratic reforms. He frequently gave press conferences to foreign media, impressing reporters with his straightforward answers on previously politically sensitive topics. At the end of the National People’s Congress in 2010, when a French journalist asked Wen about an article he had published in a government magazine regarding democracy in China, Wen replied:
A core value of socialist democracy is to let people be the real masters. This means that we need to guarantee people’s rights to elect their own officials, participate in decision-making, and manage and supervise the government. This means we have to create conditions for people to criticize and supervise the government and offer people the opportunities for them to fully develop and utilize creative and independent thinking.
At the 2012 National People’s Congress, Wen mentioned the word “reform” seventy times. He said that China must “press ahead with both economic structural reforms and political structural reforms, in particular reforms of the leadership system of the party and the country.”
Chinese dissident writer Yu Jie, who had left China after he was detained and repeatedly beaten by police for his writings, called Wen the “King of Showbiz” in a recent book. Yu charged that Wen’s prodemocracy rhetoric was insincere and empty, and that his many shows of visiting poor families in his old down jacket were purely publicity stunts for the Chinese media. Yu Jie was one of the first writers to reveal that Wen’s wife and son had built a vast business empire with their political connections. He charged that Wen had no intention of promoting political reforms, which could jeopardize his own family economic interest.
Wen was also criticized for his dual-faced role in the May 2008 Sichuan earthquake, which killed nearly 70,000 people. Among those killed were 5,335 schoolchildren. A few hours after the earthquake, Premier Wen Jiabao appeared. Despite his own injuries from the debris, he spent days and nights commanding the rescue efforts and tearfully consoling survivors. The unprecedented disaster and the immediate response by the government ignited an unprecedented display of concern. Within days of the earthquake, the public rallied to offer donations and many traveled to Sichuan to help with the excavation. The government granted unprecedented freedom for journalists to cover the disaster, which effectively prevented rumor and speculation that could cause chaos.
However, the unity and positive energy generated by the earthquake relief efforts did not last long. Soon, officials resumed their normal corrupt and bureaucratic practices. Control over the media returned. Many heartbroken parents who had lost their children gathered to urge local officials to investigate the shoddy construction of school buildings. When their requests went unanswered, frustrated residents staged a series of protests. Police were called, arresting and imprisoning many parents and human rights advocates. Wen never intervened. One parent wrote to Wen:
Do you really believe in the accusations lodged by local officials that we harbored evil intentions to subvert the government? President Hu and you used to study engineering in colleges. You know very well that some school buildings had been made with substandard construction. Nonetheless, you turned a blind eye to the issue because you are afraid that we could cause instability.
For political analysts, Wen’s liberal rhetoric resembled Bo’s “Singing Red and Smashing Black” campaign. Both men were, in essence, populists trying to win the hearts of the disgruntled public, and neither believed in what he preached. Premier Wen was said to be a fan of Bo Xilai when the latter was minister of commerce in 2004. They went on several trade missions together and Wen even recommended Bo for the vice premier’s position. However, their relationship grew strained after Bo moved to Chongqing. An official with the Chongqing Municipal Party Committee said Bo started to move closer to other princelings and distanced himself from Wen. On several occasions, he publicly berated Wen. At a local party conference, Bo praised his partner, the mayor of Chongqing, calling him “more competent” than the premier of China. Bo’s remarks put the mayor and many attendees in an awkward position.
In 2011, when Bo’s Chongqing model grabbed national attention as a seemingly e
ffective way to combat rampant corruption and achieve common prosperity, Wen became an outspoken critic. He refused to offer his endorsement. As other senior Chinese leaders traveled to Chongqing and heaped lavish praise on Bo’s Chongqing model, Wen backed Bo’s political rival, the party chief of Guangdong province, who advocated greater market reform and political liberalization. Wen made it clear in published articles that he was a disciple of reformists such as Hu Yaobang and Zhao Ziyang, whereas Bo Xilai unabashedly positioned himself as a descendant of veteran Communist leaders such as Mao and his own father.
So there was a great deal of significance in the fact that in March 2012, it was Wen who became the first senior leader to criticize Bo harshly at a press conference during the National People’s Congress, accusing Bo of trying to restore the practices of Mao’s Cultural Revolution, under which millions of people were persecuted to death. In April, when the Politburo Standing Committee was divided over whether to slap Bo with an internal reprimand or undertake a full-blown legal investigation, Wen, along with former president Jiang Zemin, was reportedly adamant that Bo be tried as a criminal and receive severe punishment.
Wen’s tough stance toward Bo was not all ideologically driven, said a retired official in Beijing. Having heard about Bo’s harsh tactics against his political foes and private businesspeople in Chongqing, “Wen was determined to destroy Bo to protect himself and the interests of his family before his term expires in 2013.” At the same time, Bo felt that Wen attempted to sabotage his chance to join the Politburo Standing Committee and reportedly vowed to imprison Wen’s relatives in the name of corruption after he seized power.
In September 2012, after Bo Xilai was expelled from the party and was facing a criminal trial, many hailed the seventy-two-year-old Premier Wen as the clear winner. However, the New York Times report on the Wen family’s wealth all but wiped out Wen’s political gains from Bo’s downfall. He found himself a target of public anger and ridicule. I wrote in an editorial in Mingjing News:
If proven to be true, the Wen Jiabao corruption is far more damaging to the Communist Party than the scandal surrounding Bo Xilai, which only involved a regional leader and bribe-taking of 20 million yuan. As the second-highest leader, who has ostensibly positioned himself as a man of the people, the Wen scandal will undermine the credibility of the party and directly challenge the party’s legitimacy.
Feng Shengping, a US-based analyst, saw the Wen scandal from a different angle. To Feng, Bo Xilai represented the far Left and Wen the Right. Both of their policies were seen as a threat to the interests of the party establishment. Bo’s weakness was his police chief, who used the US Consulate to launch his attack, and Wen Jiabao’s was having greedy relatives. Two strategies were at work: Bo’s removal would clear an obstacle to a smooth leadership transition at the Party Congress; Wen’s downfall would appease the conservatives who worried about losing the party’s monopoly.
Chen Xiaoping, the US-based scholar, was more acerbic. “Wen chose to punish Bo for his political ambitions and policies with the crimes of corruption and immoral lifestyle, all of which would please the public, which hated corrupt officials. Wen did not realize that the same weapon that gunned down Bo Xilai was aimed at him. Now, Wen’s opponents intend to attack his legacy with similar excuses of corruption. The Wen story added a new twist to the party’s intense power struggle before the Congress.”
Two hours after the Wen story appeared, a person who identified himself as a friend of the Wen family contacted me from Beijing. He asked if I could interview a wealthy businesswoman, Duan Weihong, who was quoted in the Times story. She wanted to tell Mingjing News that the majority of the assets listed in the Times article were erroneously attributed to Wen family members. I assigned a reporter to conduct the interview.
Then I received another e-mail, from another source close to the Wen family. This second source disclosed that the Wen family had hired lawyers who would issue a statement soon. I was asked to post it on Mingjing News. According to this source, Premier Wen emphasized four key points after reading the Times article.
First, his family has never engaged in any illegal commercial activities. Second, the US $2.7 billion mentioned in the Times article did not exist. Third, all of his family members would disclose their financial dealings and cooperate with any audit or investigation by the relevant government agencies and judicial organs. Last, all of Wen’s family members, friends, and colleagues would stand accountable for their own businesses and actions.
I soon received a statement from Junhe Law Office and Grandall Law Firm, both of which are based in Beijing. The statement echoed similar arguments I had heard from Wen’s friend, except the lawyers added the threat of legal action against the Times. All of this was posted on Mingjing News and later widely reported by the international media. In the period of two days, I received pictures and documents from Wen family members and business associates in vigorous defense of Premier Wen. Legal experts I consulted said the documents were too vague and the arguments too weak to serve as evidence of innocence or guilt.
What was unusual, and perhaps more significant than the scandal itself, was the approach taken to defend Wen. I was accustomed as an editor that each time a negative story about a senior leader had been published, government censors would harass reporters and attempt to block the article through intervention on the Internet, and the Chinese Foreign Ministry would issue a terse statement, accusing the media of “harboring ulterior motives and demonizing Chinese leadership.” There was never any response from individuals named in the article. In June 2012, when Bloomberg ran a story about president-elect Xi Jinping’s family, Xi’s friends took an unusual step by sending me meticulously researched facts to dispute the Bloomberg report, which was not broadcast inside China. In Wen’s case, he effectively promised to face the public and defend himself after the Party Congress. The active interaction with the media was entirely unexpected and spoke volumes about the potential for more media freedom to participate on the political stage.
In addition, Premier Wen’s relatives conveyed a message through Mingjing News that Wen would respond in writing to the New York Times allegations. “No matter what happens, my family and I are ready to take full responsibility, even if it means sacrificing my career and life,” Wen said.
Wen’s decision elicited positive responses online. “If he and his family have violated regulations, he should willingly face the consequences,” posted one resident of Sichuan. “Even if he ends up in jail, he would go down in history as a respected politician, whose honesty and courage would help bring about true political reforms.”
In my editorials on Mingjing News, I reminded Wen’s friends and his supporters of the opportunity that the Times article had presented for China:
For years, Premier Wen has pushed for such financial disclosure regulations. If he is confident that he has nothing to hide, I would recommend that he defend his name by releasing his family financial records to the public, just as politicians do in democratic countries. By divulging such information, he will set a new standard in Chinese politics and an unprecedented example for other senior leaders. Transparency is an effective way to stem corruption and rescue the party from being toppled.
My article also urged senior leaders not to obstruct Wen’s efforts. I predicted that some senior leaders inside the party would prohibit Wen from going public about his defense, thereby setting a dangerous precedent, and some of his own family members might silence him before he damaged their economic interests:
A critical issue here is that if Premier Wen bows to the system, ignores public outcry and sticks to his denials until his retirement, he and other leaders will prove to the world that the party is incurably corrupt and rotten to the core. They would all end up tragically like the other corrupt dictators in the world.
The Chinese leadership takes pride that their country has emerged as an economic and political superpower. However, being a superpower also means that China has to subject itsel
f to scrutiny by the Western media because every political and economic decision made by China has global consequences.
The New York Times story about Wen’s family has led to broader scrutiny of the records of other senior leaders—Bloomberg released an article about the billionaire offspring of revolutionary veterans in December 2012—and spawned a new round of attacks among political opponents who compete to expose each other’s dirt to the overseas media. In a refreshing way, the foreign media, including the Chinese-language media overseas, now plays the civic role of supervision that should belong to the Chinese domestic media. The party will either improve with increased media scrutiny or be toppled by a better-informed public.
In an interview with Fareed Zakaria on CNN’s Global Public Square television program aired in October 2010, Wen made the following statement: “I will like to tell you the following two sentences to reinforce my view. I will not fall in spite of the strong wind and harsh rain, and I will not yield until the last day of my life.”
At the time of this writing, we have not seen any response from Premier Wen. He has either encountered opposition from the new leaders, as I predicted in my editorial, or he has simply realized that he can never clarify the issues raised by the New York Times about his family finances because what has been reported is largely accurate.
HU IS A LOSER: THE PRESIDENT AND HIS CHIEF OF STAFF
DESPITE THE PARTY’S repeated claims that the Bo Xilai scandal would be handled as a legal case, not a political one, the public still sees the party chieftains, such as President Hu Jintao and Premier Wen Jiabao, as the de facto judges, rather than those in the courtroom.
A Death in the Lucky Holiday Hotel Page 28