by Prit Buttar
One of the problems that Germany would have faced was that of providing sufficient settlers to realise these grandiose dreams. The Heim ins Reich policy resulted in over 120,000 Baltic Germans moving to Germany, and after including ethnic Germans from other parts of Europe the total came to over 850,000. Most were settled in the western parts of Poland; for example, the German population of Poznań increased from 6,000 in 1939 to over 93,000.15 But despite these measures, there were not enough settlers to Germanise Poland, let alone the vast territories further north and east. It was expected that the German population would grow steadily, not least due to the ban on abortions and lack of provision of birth control. These future generations, it was hoped, would provide the bulk of the settlers. Other, more extreme views were also considered. Goering and the head of the RHSA, Reinhard Heydrich, advocated extermination of the entire male population of the Ukraine, after which the SS would be given free rein to impregnate as many racially acceptable women as possible.
The overall military plans for Barbarossa, the German invasion of the Soviet Union, are beyond the scope of this book. The main military command in the Baltic area was Army Group North, commanded by Generalfeldmarschall Wilhelm Ritter von Leeb. Born in Bavaria in 1876, he saw service in China during the Boxer Rebellion, and served on both the Western and Eastern Fronts in the First World War. He remained in the Reichswehr in the inter-war years, playing a major part in suppressing Hitler’s Beer Hall Putsch in 1923. Hitler was suspicious of him due to his well-known anti-Nazi opinions, and matters were not helped when Leeb was the only senior German officer to object to the plans to defeat Britain and France by attacking through Belgium. For the second time in the century, he maintained, the world would condemn Germany for attacking Belgium while it was a neutral country.16 He was promoted to Generalfeldmarschall after his troops broke through the Maginot Line during the Battle of France, and now found himself commanding a powerful force on the northern flank of the German deployment. Despite his experiences in the west, he remained a cautious man, and in some respects failed to grasp the huge significance of the combination of armoured warfare and German tactical and operational doctrine, and how well suited one was to the other.
Leeb commanded two infantry armies and a panzer group – the appellation ‘panzer army’ was created after the onset of Barbarossa. 18th Army, under the Prussian Generaloberst Georg von Küchler, was on the left flank. Like all his generation, Küchler had seen service in the First World War, and had also fought in Latvia in the Freikorps, serving for a time as a staff officer to the German commander in the Baltic, Rüdiger von der Goltz. He had led his 18th Army across the Netherlands in 1940 and on to Paris, and now he and his men prepared to invade Lithuania. He had at his disposal I Corps, with five infantry divisions, and XXVI Corps, with four divisions. On his right flank was 16th Army, commanded by General Ernst Busch, a veteran of the Western Front in the First World War, who had commanded the army during the fighting in Belgium and France in 1940. His force consisted of II Corps with two divisions, and X Corps with five divisions.
The strike power of Leeb’s army group was in Generaloberst Erich Hoepner’s 4th Panzer Group. Widely known in the army as Der alte Reiter (‘the old cavalryman’), Hoepner had been an early enthusiast for panzer warfare, and was assigned to the command of XVI Panzer Corps in 1938. After successful campaigns in Poland and France, he now found himself promoted to Generaloberst. His panzer group consisted of two motorised corps, with SS Division Totenkopf in reserve. XLI Panzer Corps, with two panzer divisions, a motorised infantry division, and a regular infantry division, was commanded by General Georg-Hans Reinhardt, who had led 4th Panzer Division to Warsaw in 1939. Alongside him was LVI Panzer Corps, with one panzer division, one motorised infantry division, and a regular infantry division. Its commander was Erich von Manstein, who during the inter-war years had been the first to propose the creation of the Sturmgeschütz assault gun for close infantry support, as well as being one of the main architects of the successful German campaign through the Ardennes in 1940. He had commanded XXXVIII Corps during the Battle of France, and his men were the first to reach and cross the Seine. Now, he would have a chance to show what he could achieve with a panzer corps.
The panzer divisions had captured the imagination of the world in the opening campaigns of the war, but the bulk of the German army was composed of infantry divisions, which still marched and fought on foot. Their relative immobility compared to the motorised panzer divisions was a source of some concern, and even in the comparatively short Polish and western campaigns, the panzer divisions had often been left isolated while the infantry struggled to keep up. To an extent, panzer divisions had been organised with an awareness of this possibility, and contained sufficient engineering, maintenance and supply formations to allow them to function for extended periods without full contact with the rest of the Wehrmacht. The rapid advance of the panzer divisions and their resultant isolation in the west had not resulted in any significant setbacks, though the British counter-attack against the German armoured spearheads near the English Channel resulted in some anxious moments. In the vast spaces of the Soviet Union, the inability of the infantry to keep up with the panzer divisions would be ruthlessly exposed. The infantry divisions consisted of three infantry regiments, an artillery regiment, and one battalion each of reconnaissance, engineer, and anti-tank troops. The bulk of the artillery was horse-drawn, further limiting their mobility. The panzer divisions at this stage of the war had an infantry brigade, consisting of one or two infantry regiments, and in many cases a battalion of motorcycle-mounted infantry. The armoured element consisted of a panzer brigade, usually of two panzer regiments, with a total of up to four battalions of tanks between them. In addition, the division had reconnaissance, engineer and anti-tank battalions, as well as a regiment of artillery – in contrast to the infantry divisions, most of this artillery was either motorised or towed by half-tracks and trucks. The motorised infantry divisions had two motorised infantry regiments and a motorcycle battalion, an artillery regiment, and engineer and anti-tank battalions.
The tanks of the panzer divisions had led the way across Poland, Belgium and France, but were in many respects inferior to those of Germany’s enemies. Most divisions still had large numbers of Pz.II tanks, which had first entered service in 1936. The 9-ton vehicles were armed with a 20mm gun, and their armour was originally intended to protect the crew only from light infantry weapons. Later versions had armoured enhancements up to 30mm, but this provided minimal protection against anti-tank guns. The Pz.III was numerically the main tank at the outset of Barbarossa. It was the first German tank specifically designed to engage other tanks, and was a substantially larger vehicle than the Pz.II, weighing 23 tons. Its armour was increased from an original specification of 15mm to 30mm, but this was still inadequate for engagement with other tanks. From the outset, the tank had been designed to carry a 50mm gun, but at the time it entered service, the Wehrmacht’s anti-tank battalions were equipped with 37mm guns, and these were fitted to the Pz.III in the interests of standardisation. By the eve of Barbarossa, most Pz.III had been upgraded to 50mm guns, though most had shorter barrels than Hitler had decreed, resulting in lower muzzle velocity and less penetrative power. There were also large numbers of Pz.III chassis in use as assault guns. The Sturmgeschütz III was produced in response to a proposal from Manstein in 1935 for such a vehicle, in order to provide advancing infantry with heavy weapon support that could deal with bunkers and other fortifications. The vehicle could be fitted with a more powerful gun than the Pz.III, as it lacked a turret, and battalions of these vehicles were assigned as armour support for infantry divisions. In 1941, they were armed with a short-barrelled, low-velocity 75mm gun, reflecting their original role as infantry support. Later, they would be rearmed with high-velocity 75mm guns so that they could play an increasing role in anti-tank warfare.
The Pz.IV was Germany’s heaviest tank in 1941, and originally had been intended as an i
nfantry support weapon; however, the inadequacy of the Pz.III in tank-to-tank engagements led to a role reversal, with the Pz.IV being preferred in engagements against enemy armour and the Pz.III being used for infantry support. It weighed 25 tons and had 50mm frontal armour, and was armed with a variety of guns during its long life – it was the only German tank to remain in production throughout the war. In 1941, most Pz.IVs were armed with a short 75mm gun, and the low muzzle velocity of this weapon limited its efficacy in anti-tank combat.
In terms of preparation for war, the Wehrmacht in 1941 was in good shape; nearly all of the army officers and NCOs had experience of fighting in Poland and the west. The Luftwaffe, too, had a strong body of experienced men, but had not made good the losses suffered during the Battle of Britain. It now found itself committed to fighting a new war in the east, on a huge scale, while the RAF remained undefeated in the west. Perhaps the biggest weakness of the Wehrmacht was its logistic problems, partly due to a failure to plan for a prolonged war. In most respects, German equipment was not ordered with sufficient spare parts to allow for a sustained effort over a long time; for example, it was standard practice in Britain and the United States to order at least two aero engines per mounting, ensuring plentiful replacement engines and spare parts, whereas in Germany, the ratio was closer to 1:4. Stocks of spare parts had been badly depleted as a result of the fighting in France and the Battle of Britain, and unless the Wehrmacht won a quick victory, it would rapidly run into disabling shortages.
The operational orders for Army Group North called for Hoepner’s panzers to advance along the Tilsit–Daugavpils axis, with 18th Army on the left, between Hoepner and the Baltic, and 16th Army on the right, providing contact with the northern elements of Army Group Centre. Once this initial objective had been achieved, 4th Panzer Group would continue to drive north across Latvia and Estonia to the southern tip of Lake Peipus, at Pskov. 18th Army would complete the conquest of the Baltic States, but it was anticipated that as Army Groups North and Centre advanced on diverging axes, 16th Army would find it increasingly difficult to retain contact with Army Group Centre. The plan therefore required that, having destroyed the bulk of Soviet forces in its path, Army Group Centre would provide aid on its flanks to both Army Group North and Army Group South, prior to a final drive on Moscow. Army Group North would move against its ultimate objective, Leningrad, prior to any drive against the Soviet capital – Hitler’s directive of 18 December 1940, which first laid down the plans for Barbarossa, clearly stated this:
Only after the accomplishment of offensive operations, which must be followed by the capture of Leningrad and Kronstadt [the Soviet naval base just outside Leningrad] are further offensive operations authorised, with the objectives of occupying Moscow, the important communications and armaments manufacturing centre.
Only a surprisingly rapid collapse of the Russian ability to resist can justify an attempt to achieve both objectives simultaneously.17
There were many factors that combined to produce the stunning German victories of the early war years. Perhaps the key to German success was the coincidental development of armoured and mechanised warfare at the same moment that German military doctrine reached a particular stage of evolution, a process that had started in the wake of a crushing defeat in the early 19th century. After the Prussian army was soundly defeated by Napoleon at Jena and Auerstadt in 1806, the Prussians began a detailed analysis of why the French had prevailed. The result was the Prussian – later German – General Staff. This body championed the concept of something that became known as Auftragstaktik, a word perhaps best translated into English as ‘mission-oriented tactics’, although this expression was not explicitly used in German military writing. The intention was to create an army in which a commander would make a subordinate aware of his intentions, and would assign the subordinate a mission. A mixture of forces would be assigned to the subordinate, who was left to make detailed arrangements without interference from above. Maximum emphasis was placed upon subordinates showing initiative in interpreting their orders. In its extreme, Auftragstaktik allowed for the subordinate to ignore the mission that he had been assigned, so long as the actions that he took achieved the overall intentions of his superior. One of the clearest articulations of this concept was made by Helmuth von Moltke:
The situations under which an officer has to act on the basis of his own view of the situation are diverse. It would be wrong if he had to wait for orders at times when no orders can be given. But his actions are most productive when he acts within the framework of his senior commander’s intent.18
The movement began to gain pace after the Franco-Prussian War, and did not meet with universal approval. Indeed, those who preferred more traditional command and control, or Normaltaktik, were the very people who coined the expression Auftragstaktik to describe their opponents’ principles. It was only by detailed management of all aspects of combat, they argued, that the tendency of increasing mobility and range of weapons could be controlled, to prevent complete fragmentation on the battlefield.
Auftragstaktik gained support throughout the First World War, and by the time the Germans mounted their final offensive on the Western Front in 1918, it was almost the norm for all German operations. It became commonplace for German officers and even NCOs to spend time with other arms – consequently, German commanders in the Second World War often had experience of working with infantry, artillery and armour. This resulted in excellent use of all components of the ad hoc battlegroups that were created for the fulfilment of missions.
In order for Auftragstaktik to be effective and successful, several factors needed to be combined. Firstly, all elements of the command structure had to understand its nature, and the importance of the overall intention of higher commands, rather than lower-level missions; the missions were merely a means to an end, to be altered or discarded if better means to the same end arose. Secondly, those entrusted with such tactical and operational freedom needed the skills and initiative to be able to react to changing circumstances effectively, so that any unexpected obstacles could be overcome, and any unexpected opportunities could be exploited. Thirdly, the extended command structure around any commander – the rest of the headquarters staff – had to be able to organise logistic and other matters in a flexible manner, allowing the commander himself to concentrate on battlefield developments. Finally, to allow for effective functioning in the event of casualties or other dislocation, every commander needed to be able to function up to two levels above his current command, and had to understand the objectives appropriate to those higher levels.
The advent of mechanised warfare, particularly in the form of the panzer division, occurred at a time when the German General Staff was particularly well adapted to Auftragstaktik. The panzer division, with its integration of tanks, artillery, infantry, and combat engineers, with dedicated support columns, was in many ways the ideal instrument for such a mode of operation. By the beginning of Barbarossa, many – though, as will be seen, not all – German officers had had time and opportunity to understand the new capabilities that such divisions offered, when combined with the prevailing operational doctrine within the Wehrmacht.
Generalplan Ost required its initial phase, the Kleine Planung, to be carried out in the wake of the advancing armies. Partly to achieve this, and partly to ensure the rapid establishment of order, the SS reactivated several Einsatzgruppen (‘task forces’), which would follow in the wake of the Wehrmacht’s three army groups. The precursor for such units was Reinhard Heydrich’s Einsatzkommando, which had secured Austrian government buildings during the Anschluss of 1938. The Einsatzgruppen themselves were first formed during plans for the invasion of Czechoslovakia, but the Munich Agreement made the invasion unnecessary; nevertheless, the Einsatzgruppen repeated the role of securing government offices and documents, and also helped detain Czechoslovak government officials before they could quietly slip away. In preparation for the invasion of Poland, Heydrich once more resurrec
ted his Einsatzgruppen, but on this occasion, their objectives were far more wide-ranging. They were given a free hand to execute anyone regarded as hostile to Germany, and using a special list of ‘undesirable’ Poles they sought out and killed Polish intelligentsia, clerics, and others who might be seen as being leaders of their communities, in addition to any other individuals who attracted their wrath. In many cases, their actions raised protests from the Wehrmacht, which feared that its own reputation would be damaged.19
By the end of October 1939, the Einsatzgruppen, functioning in eight groups, had killed an estimated 20,000 Poles. The groups saw brief service in Western Europe in 1940, reverting to their original role of securing government offices, and in preparation for Barbarossa, they were once more activated. In May 1941, Heydrich visited the German Border Police School, where the leaders of the Einsatzgruppen were undergoing training, and gave clear instructions that the groups were to kill Jews.20 In order to prevent the friction seen during the Polish campaign, Heydrich met General Eduard Wagner, the First Quartermaster of the Wehrmacht, on 28 April 1941 and drew up an agreement for how the Einsatzgruppen would operate. In keeping with this agreement, Generalfeldmarschall Walther von Brauchitsch, commander of the German Army, issued instructions telling all army commanders that their units were to compile lists of Jews in the areas they seized, and that these lists were to be passed to the Einsatzgruppen. Although the orders did not specify what the Einsatzgruppen would do with these lists, there can have been little doubt in the minds of the commanders.