by Prit Buttar
Hoepner’s panzer group had been ordered to advance to Lake Peipus, and after securing the land corridor between the northern shore of the lake and the Baltic, to press on with the bulk of the panzer group from the southern end of the lake towards Leningrad; this order was then amended to stop the panzers at Pskov until the infantry could catch up. While Busch’s 16th Army continued to spread out to cover the western flank of the army group, Küchler’s 18th Army would advance into Estonia. After struggling through the mud for two days, Reinhardt’s panzer corps reached Ostrov on 4 July. Early the same day, 8th Panzer Division rapidly advanced from Rēzekne to Kārsava, and from here was ordered to turn more to the east, to cover the right flank of the German advance. Further progress was hindered by a combination of poor roads and large numbers of abandoned Soviet vehicles, and then brought to a halt when the retreating Red Army blew the bridge at Golisevo, on the Soviet border; the withdrawing Soviet 227th Rifle Division had lost too many personnel and equipment in the hard fighting of the preceding days to be able to put up much resistance. The weather improved in the coming days, but the boggy ground around the Velikaia valley proved a considerable obstacle. Still, although much hard fighting lay ahead for the two panzer corps, they were now onto Russian territory.
Had 8th Panzer Division been allowed to advance immediately after the capture of Daugavpils, what might have been the outcome? Given the chaos and dislocation throughout the Soviet chain of command, it seems most unlikely that sufficient forces could have been concentrated to hold up the German division. The weather throughout the days that Brandenberger was left to fret on the north-east bank of the Daugava was sunny, unlike the rain that arrived almost as soon as the German advance was resumed, and at the very least, 8th Panzer Division would have enjoyed better conditions – in terms of a disorganised enemy and weather – than it endured during its advance to Kārsava. Had elements of Manstein’s corps reached northern Latvia within a day or two of seizing Daugavpils, most of the Soviet forces attempting to escape from Riga and Courland would have been encircled and destroyed, thus facilitating a rapid German advance across Estonia. The wait at Daugavpils therefore probably resulted in even greater delays later in the campaign. In 1940, during the German drive towards the English Channel, the panzer divisions were halted for an entire day due to nervousness in Berlin and at Higher Command levels about the possible isolation of the German armour, and this short delay probably gave the British just enough time to retreat to Dunkirk. Similarly, the short delay at Daugavpils allowed the Red Army to escape from Riga and the surrounding area, and wasted several days of excellent campaigning weather. Whilst the blame for the hold-up lies with Leeb, he was not alone in showing such caution – similar considerations resulted in an even more wasteful pause in the German Army Group Centre’s drive towards Moscow. It is debatable whether the ultimate outcome of the campaign might have been different; some have argued that the delay effectively cost the Germans their best opportunity to capture Leningrad at an early stage of the campaign.31
Further west, the German 18th Army advanced rapidly across northern Latvia. Rather than risk a further series of battles that would fragment the front line, the Soviet 8th Army, now commanded by Lieutenant General Fedor Sergeevich Ivanov, tried to pull back its front line in a coherent manner. The Soviet 10th Rifle Corps was closest to the coast, with three rifle divisions, while 11th Rifle Corps was further inland, with an additional three rifle divisions, together with what remained of the various mechanised corps that had been thrown into the battle. In practice, these rifle divisions – significantly below strength at the start of the campaign – were now in many places reduced to barely 2,000 men. By 9 July, Ivanov had pulled back into Estonia, and was attempting to defend a line from the coast at Pärnu to Lake Võrtsjärv, and thence to Lake Peipus, with one corps either side of Lake Võrtsjärv. At this stage of the campaign, several factors began to work in favour of the defenders. Firstly, reinforcements had begun to arrive, though many of these were poorly equipped and even more poorly trained. Secondly, the lengthening German lines of supply were beginning to impose checks on their rate of advance. Thirdly, the diverging German forces were no longer able to support each other so effectively, either directly or indirectly – breakthroughs by 4th Panzer Group earlier in the campaign had destabilised the Soviet forces along the entire front, but now the German armour was much further away from the Baltic coast, and in any event the presence of Lake Peipus effectively separated its area of operation from that of 18th Army. Also, the Luftwaffe was struggling to provide adequate air support over such a huge battlefield. Forward airfields, either captured from the retreating Soviets or improvised on open ground, were liable to turn to mud whenever it rained, and there simply weren’t enough planes, with adequate supplies, to maintain support wherever the Wehrmacht demanded it.
As a consequence, the German 18th Army faced tougher resistance in its advance across northern Estonia than it had done in the entire campaign to date. As a further hindrance, Army Group North assigned the conquest of what remained of Estonia a relatively low priority: the main emphasis remained the thrust towards Leningrad, initially in an attempt to seize the city, and subsequently to isolate it and to link up with the Finns. In the second half of July, as 6th Panzer Division advanced towards Leningrad, east of Lake Peipus, 58th and 1st Infantry Divisions struggled to move forward in parallel, between the panzer division and the lake. Resistance steadily increased, while the German forces found themselves increasingly stretched to cover the vast expanses of front line.
In Latvia and Lithuania, the Germans had taken advantage of spontaneous uprisings against the Red Army, though they had rarely instigated such rebellions. The Estonians had maintained links with the Finns for many years, dating back to the Estonian war of independence, when Finnish volunteers had come to the aid of the struggling Estonian Army. Even after the pacts imposed by Stalin on the Baltic States in 1939, such contacts continued, though in secret. As a result, when the Soviet Union annexed Estonia in 1940, many Estonian officers and soldiers fled the short distance to Finland – some also travelled to Sweden – and these men were now formed into a volunteer battalion by the Germans. An attempt was made to land part of this battalion on the north Estonian coast on 5 July, but failed due to bad weather. Two days later, about 40 men were put ashore; it had been intended to land a larger group, but some of the transports were intercepted by Soviet warships and forced to turn back. The men who succeeded in returning to Estonia set up makeshift landing strips, where further men and supplies were flown in from Finland. They now provided the Germans with valuable intelligence, as well as harassing Red Army units when the opportunity arose.32
Elsewhere, Estonian guerrillas were operating against the Red Army. The Estonian Omakaitse (‘Home Guard’) was first created during the turbulent period between the departure of the Czar’s armies and the arrival of the Germans in 1917. The following year, it was renamed the Kaitseliit (‘Defence League’) and remained in existence until 1940. Although it was suppressed during the Soviet occupation, many members started up a new underground Omakaitse, and this provided the nucleus for the creation of several large groups of anti-Soviet guerrillas after the onset of Barbarossa. One large group of guerrillas, led by Major Friedrich Kurg, moved to seize the city of Tartu, midway between Lakes Võrtsjärv and Peipus. The group had been planning such an operation for weeks, even before the German invasion began; there had been informal talks with Tartu University Hospital about treating casualties as early as June.
There were three crossings over the River Emajõgi in the town, the ‘liberty bridge’ in the western part of the city, an old stone bridge, and a pontoon bridge. The pontoon bridge was dismantled on 6 July, and two days later, Red Army engineers began preparations to blow up the stone bridge. On 9 July, a demolition charge destroyed the northern end of the bridge. Later the same day, a German reconnaissance patrol attempted to enter the town from the north-west, but was beaten off. The guerrillas
decided to attack the small remaining Soviet garrison the following day.
On 10 July, fighting broke out around the town as the Estonian guerrillas moved to secure key buildings. Another German reconnaissance patrol, led by Hauptmann Kurt von Glasenepp, entered the town, and the German armoured cars provided welcome fire support for the guerrillas. By the end of the day, the western half of the town was under the control of the Estonians, but the German armoured cars now withdrew to refuel and rearm. Aware that they lacked the strength to prevent the Red Army from moving back across the ‘liberty bridge’ into the western parts of the city, the Estonians sent an urgent message to the Germans outside the city asking for help.
Later that night, the Soviet engineers destroyed the ‘liberty bridge’, but fighting flared up again as the Soviet 16th Rifle Division moved towards the city. At the same time, a German task force, consisting of two reconnaissance battalions and an infantry battalion, commanded by Generalmajor Karl Burdach, was ordered to secure the city, and more guerrillas, including Friedrich Kurg and other former Estonian army officers, also entered Tartu. Fighting continued for several days, with much of the southern part of the city reduced to rubble. Further German reinforcements were fed into the battle, which continued until the end of the month.33
After pausing to regroup, 18th Army resumed its drive into Estonia on 22 July. The reinforced 61st Infantry Division attacked and seized Põltsamaa, north of Lake Võrtsjärv. The following day, as 217th Infantry Division joined the attack at Türi, 61st Infantry Division moved against Jõgeva, in an attempt to isolate the Red Army forces near Tartu. To avoid this, the Soviet 48th and 125th Rifle Divisions, together with the remnants of 16th Rifle Division from Tartu, withdrew a little to the north, but they were too late; on 25 June, 61st Infantry Division reached Lake Peipus near Mustvee, cutting off the Soviet forces. Fighting continued until late July, but repeated Soviet attempts to break out were blocked. Finally, on 27 July, the remaining men – nearly 8,800 – were forced to surrender.
With the newly arrived XLII Corps on the left and XXVI Corps on the right, 18th Army pushed north again on 29 July. XXVI Corps made good progress, striking at the seam between the Soviet 10th and 11th Rifle Corps; 254th Infantry Division reached Tapa on 4 August, and arrived at the Baltic coast at Kunda three days later. The two Soviet rifle corps were separated, with 11th Rifle Corps forced to withdraw towards Narva while 10th Corps fell back on Tallinn. German forces followed swiftly towards Narva, but were held up by gunfire from Soviet destroyers near the coast. It was only with the deployment of a heavy coastal artillery battery on 13 August that the destroyers were driven off. The three divisions of XXVI Corps slowly closed in on Narva, and finally took the city on 16 August. Pursuing the retreating Soviet troops, elements of the German 291st Infantry Division seized bridgeheads across the River Narva:
The old borderlands were reached. From the top of Hermann Castle [a fortress held for many years by the Livonian Knights] the terrain to the east was flat and forested, it was like the beginning of another world. Estonia, with its blue-black-white banners and its friendly people, was behind us; Russia proper, exotic and unknown, lay before the soldiers.34
There remained the Soviet forces in and around Tallinn, and on the large islands off the western coast of Estonia. Outside Tallinn, General Walter Kuntze, the commander of XLII Corps, had three infantry divisions at his disposal. 254th Infantry Division was on the Baltic coast to the east of the Estonian capital, with 61st Infantry Division, freshly arrived from the destruction of Soviet forces south of Mustvee, to the southeast and 217th Infantry Division to the south. The western part of the German encirclement was made up of Kampfgruppe Friedrich, with a single regiment of infantry, and artillery and engineer elements of several formations. The defenders, the Soviet 10th Corps, had what remained of three rifle divisions, together with several battalions of naval infantry – a mixture of marines and sailors.
The battle for Tallinn began on 19 August. The approaches to Tallinn were protected by fortifications built by the Estonians during their war of independence, and subsequently strengthened, and the Germans made slow progress past the seven main strongpoints. Soviet warships operating close to the coast and from within the harbour added their firepower to the defence, but inexorably, the Germans advanced.
Reval [Tallinn] was burning. Tracers flew back and forth at the edge of the city. The towers of the old Hanseatic town were black against the bright night sky. As the morning fog cleared on 27 August, the heavy air and artillery activity resumed. Russian cruisers and destroyers joined in the land battle from the harbour, and the earth trembled under the impact of 180mm shells.35
By the fifth day of the attack, the assault spearheads were within six miles of the city centre, and a day later, the fighting reached the main urban area. With no possible option of a breakout over land along the coast to the east, the Soviet forces began to make arrangements for a seaborne evacuation. The Germans were aware of these preparations, and in combination with Finnish forces, laid extensive minefields on the approaches to Tallinn; despite having considerable naval assets in the area, the Soviet Navy was unable to intervene, partly due to the weather. Luftwaffe air operations against the port area of Tallinn were increased, within the limits of availability of air support.
On 28 August, as the battle for Tallinn reached its peak and German troops pressed into the heart of the city, the Soviet naval evacuation began. Smokescreens were created in an attempt to hide the activity from the Germans, but heavy artillery fire killed perhaps 1,000 people waiting to embark on the ships. The first convoy, led by Captain Bogdanov, consisted of two destroyers, ten minesweepers and minelayers, five transports, and a number of smaller vessels. It left the port just before midday. Two hours later, two smaller convoys followed, with the main Soviet naval force, consisting of the cruiser Kirov, three destroyers, four submarines and an icebreaker, departing in mid-afternoon. German forces were waiting, and a torpedo boat flotilla of five vessels attempted to intercept the convoys. The German boats were driven off by the guns of the Soviet warships, but the minefields and repeated Luftwaffe attacks inflicted heavy losses. The first ship to strike a mine was the steamer Ella. Six destroyers, two submarines, four minelayers, and several transports were sunk, with a total loss of over 12,000 lives, during the two days it took for the Soviet vessels to reach Kronstadt. Nevertheless, some 28,000 people escaped to safety. In Tallinn, nearly 12,000 men had been left behind, and were forced to surrender to the Germans. Despite the intensity of the fighting, German losses were between 3,000 and 4,000 men, a far smaller number than that of the defenders.36
In order to complete their control of the Baltic, the Germans needed to seize the large islands off the Estonian coast, where a substantial Soviet garrison force had established itself. The German operation, codenamed Beowulf, commenced on 8 September, with landings by the reinforced 61st Infantry Division on Vormsi, Saaremaa and Muhu. Fighting continued until 5 October. On 12 October, elements of 61st Infantry Division landed on the last remaining island, Hiiumaa. The defenders fought on until 21 October. The Germans lost a little under 3,000 men; the entire Soviet garrison of over 23,000 men was lost, with nearly 5,000 killed and the rest captured.
The campaign to seize the Baltic States was over. With the exception of the Estonian islands, operations were complete with the fall of Tallinn at the end of August, barely two months after the beginning of hostilities. Stalin had seized the three states partly in order to protect Leningrad; this aim has to be seen as a failure. If Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania had continued as independent nations, it is likely that it would have taken the Wehrmacht at least as long to seize them, whether this were achieved by diplomatic pressure or by force of arms, and the Red Army could have used the intervening weeks to prepare itself better for battle. Instead, the frontier armies were annihilated, and the battered remnants would now have to fight on the outskirts of Leningrad itself. In the Baltic States, as the smoke and dust of battle dispersed,
everyone – Estonians, Latvians, Lithuanians and their German occupiers – looked to see what the future held for the three countries.
Chapter 4
THE BALTIC HOLOCAUST
The nations involved in the Second World War entered the conflict at different points in time. In almost every case, the main emotions that the population felt on their entry into the war were fear or consternation. For many in the Baltic States, though, the initial reaction was very different, as one Lithuanian recorded: ‘It struck Lithuania like a clap of thunder: WAR. What joy, WAR. People met and congratulated each other with tears in their eyes. Everyone felt that the hour of liberation was near.’1
As the Germans marched into Lithuania, they were greeted by jubilant crowds, and thousands of people who threw bunches of flowers to the men they regarded as their saviours from the Bolsheviks. One observer noted that red blooms were conspicuously absent from the bouquets.2 But whilst many Lithuanians celebrated, the reaction of Lithuania’s Jewish community was very different: ‘Although crowds of Lithuanians greeted the Germans with flowers, it was no surprise that we closed our shutters, lowered our curtains, and locked ourselves up in our homes.’3