by Prit Buttar
Closer to the Estonian border lay the Panther Line, a defensive position that – in conjunction with the Wotan Line – was intended to run across the entire Eastern Front. Plans for the fortifications had first been drawn up the preceding summer, with the intention of creating a line against which the Red Army would bleed itself dry. Although many of the fortified positions were built as planned, there were also substantial gaps in the line, and Küchler had little confidence in it. He went so far as to avoid mentioning it by name; like others on his staff, he was concerned that the existence of a defensive line to the rear of the troops at the front might encourage them to retreat to its presumed safety rather than fighting in their current positions. In any event, the line had been widely breached further south, with the result that even if Küchler were to be given permission to withdraw to the line, he would find his southern flank exposed, creating the possibility of encirclement.
German assessments of any coming attack were that the Red Army lacked the resources for a sustained effort. Although Küchler was aware of the increased strength of 2nd Shock Army in the Oranienbaum area, he believed that these reinforcements had come from Leningrad itself. With ongoing Soviet attacks near Vitebsk, it seemed unlikely that a major attack would come in the north. This led Küchler to conclude that despite his lack of reserves, his men would be able to hold their positions.4
Govorov had a completely different view. In late 1943, he proposed a major attack by his forces to join the Oranienbaum bridgehead with the front line south of Leningrad, by attacks towards Krasnoye Selo. Once this had been achieved, he would commit 67th Army to the attack and capture Krasnogvardeisk, while the forces that had seized Krasnoye Selo pushed on towards Kingisepp. Meretskov, too, was optimistic that a new offensive could be carried out, and suggested that he attack towards Luga from near Novgorod in order to prevent the German 18th Army from retreating to the west. STAVKA modified these proposals, adding attacks by the 2nd Baltic Front, to the south of Meretskov’s armies; this would tie down the southern flank of the German 16th Army, preventing any transfer of forces to the north.
The main force of the Soviet attack would be delivered by 2nd Shock Army from Oranienbaum and 42nd Army, immediately south of Leningrad. Additional fire support would come from the guns of the Soviet Red Banner Fleet. The attack would be supported by over 650 aircraft – by contrast, it was estimated that Lindemann’s 18th Army had fewer than 150 planes available. In addition, Meretskov’s Front fielded nearly 600 aircraft, opposed by only about 100 protecting the German 16th Army. To make matters worse for the Germans, the passivity of the German defences allowed the Red Army to concentrate its assault formations at key points. Govorov was able to place over 70 per cent of all his infantry, all of his tanks, and nearly 70 per cent of his artillery with his two main assault formations, 2nd Shock Army and 42nd Army.
Although there had been extensive partisan activity between the front line and the Estonian border, often tying up the minimal reserves available to the Germans, there had been no attempt to coordinate this with planned Soviet attacks. On this occasion, the Leningrad Headquarters of the Partisan Movement issued specific instructions, calling for risings in specific areas. The partisans in the region were organised into four brigades, and the tasks they were assigned varied from reconnaissance, through interdiction of rail and road routes, to uprisings with a view to establishing partisan-controlled areas where civilians could be protected.5
At the southern end of Army Group North’s sector, the Soviet 2nd Baltic Front drove 16th Army back from Nevel in December 1943, and on 12 January launched a new attack on the German lines. Bitter fighting resulted in only modest gains for the Red Army, but 16th Army was effectively tied to its positions. 18th Army, further north, could not expect any reinforcements from the south. Indeed, Küchler was forced to send some of his meagre reserves to shore up 16th Army, and the loss of a section of the Leningrad–Nevel railway line to the Red Army significantly hindered lateral movement by German forces.
The troops on the front line near Leningrad on the night of 13–14 January 1944 reported heavy snowfall. Despite this, Soviet bombers carried out extensive nocturnal attacks, and at first light, Govorov’s forces unleashed an artillery bombardment that lasted a little over an hour. One estimate suggests that over half a million shells and rockets were fired.6 Fog had replaced the falling snow, making observation of the effects of the barrage difficult, but the Soviet infantry launched its initial attack on schedule at 1000hrs. Three rifle divisions, backed by a tank brigade and two tank regiments, battered their way into the lines of III SS Panzer Corps, where 9th and 10th Luftwaffe Field Divisions held the front. These units were first formed in late 1942 when Hitler ordered surplus Luftwaffe personnel to be reassigned to the army, but rather than release the men, Goering created entirely new divisions, which proved to be almost complete failures when they were deployed that winter. With few personnel experienced in the hardships of ground warfare on the Eastern Front, the divisions were no match for the resurgent Red Army, and though they improved in the following months, they remained inferior to regular infantry divisions. They had only two infantry regiments, but were often assigned to sections of the front line that a full-strength infantry division would have been stretched to hold. In autumn 1943, the Luftwaffe divisions became part of the army, improving their command structures and integration, but they remained weak.
The initial Soviet advance made only modest progress. By the end of the first day, 2nd Shock Army’s leading elements had penetrated less than two miles into the German lines. There was particularly heavy fighting at the village of Gostilitsy, at the centre of the front line around the Oranienbaum bridgehead but, given the terrain and the strength of the German positions, there were grounds for cautious optimism. Intelligence reports suggested that although the German lines were strong, the fortifications facing 2nd Shock Army were not as deep as elsewhere. If the Soviet forces could break through, the frozen ground would hinder the Germans in establishing new positions.
The night brought no respite for III SS Panzer Corps. The Soviet assault forces continued their advance, and the following morning, 42nd Army also began to attack. 10th Luftwaffe Field Division was rapidly approaching the end of its strength, and in an attempt to shore up the front line, the Germans committed their local reserves, which amounted to four battalions. Despite this, 2nd Shock Army continued to make steady progress. Further east, 42nd Army’s assault penetrated nearly three miles in the centre:
Mortar and artillery impacts could not be distinguished from the explosions of bombs, the noise of Stalin Organs, and the guns from the ships at Kronstadt. At 0820, the fire jumped to the rear, and the Russian companies and battalions marched through the trenches, which were flattened by the fire. From 391st Infantry Regiment [part of 170th Infantry Division, deployed east of Ropsha], which was now led by Oberst Arndt, the battalion commanders Hauptmann Moeller and Hauptmann Meyer fell in the battle … the few combat capable soldiers remaining in the main battle line did their best. They held their positions … as the new waves came in upon them, even though the fire of friendly heavy weapons were landing on the friendly main battle line and in the anti-tank ditches behind it.7
Although 170th Infantry Division’s centre was driven back, the flanks of the Soviet assault were held up in bitter fighting with German troops in their dense fortifications.
To the south, the Volkhov Front opened its attack to recapture Novgorod. After a heavy artillery bombardment, 59th Army, commanded by Ivan Terentevich Korovnikov, began to work its way through the defences on the right flank of the German 18th Army. The Germans had prepared their defences well, and the difficult terrain made it hard for the Red Army to make maximum use of its numerical advantage. Progress on the first day was slow, but steady, with some of the best gains coming in the south, where an operational group commanded by Major General Teodor-Verner Andreevich Sviklin crossed the frozen Lake Ilmen and took the defenders by surprise. About 12 m
iles north of Novgorod, Soviet troops advanced and seized an important road junction at the village of Nekhokovo and isolated two German regiments. The Latvian brigade dispatched a battlegroup to restore the situation, and recaptured Nekhokovo on 16 January. Fierce fighting continued in the area through the following day, before the Latvians pulled back a short distance after covering the withdrawal of the two trapped German regiments. For his leadership in the fighting, Standartenführer Voldemars Veiss, who had commanded the Latvian battlegroup, was awarded the Knight’s Cross.8
It was a familiar pattern of fighting that was repeated over and again on the Eastern Front. The initial German positions held up well to the Soviet assault, but with only minimal reserves available, any major Soviet penetration through the defences rapidly became unstoppable. On 16 January, 2nd Shock Army succeeded in penetrating the entire German defensive line along its front, though 42nd Army continued to make slow progress. Although the German defenders continued to counter-attack wherever they could, and inflicted heavy casualties on the Soviet forces, the two pincers of the Red Army’s advance inched ever closer. By the end of 17 January, they were less than 12 miles apart. In the south, the German XXXVIII Corps rushed to shore up the line with its only reserves, a single regiment from 290th Infantry Division and another regiment from SS Division Nord, whereas Korovnikov was able to add another two rifle divisions, an armoured car battalion, two tank brigades and a self-propelled artillery regiment. The German 28th Jäger Division put up the best resistance it could, but was steadily driven back, and by the end of 16 January, the Red Army had opened a 12-mile breach in the German defences.
Despite the threat of encirclement that hung over the German units caught between the attacks in the north, Lindemann remained confident. He had deployed 61st Infantry Division to help shore up 10th Luftwaffe Field Division, and had almost no other reserves available, but reported that the Red Army, too, had committed all its reserves. The following day, Lindemann’s estimate was proven to be hopelessly optimistic. 2nd Shock Army deployed its reserves, immediately penetrating the German lines. When elements of its 168th Rifle Division made contact with the spearheads of 42nd Army, several German formations were surrounded in a small pocket immediately outside Leningrad. On 19 January, Krasnoye Selo fell to the advancing Soviet forces, and the encircled German troops decided to attempt an escape before it was too late:
At 2000, it was observed from Kotselovo that the battle had flared up along the Krasnoye Selo–Kipen road. Several tanks rolled to the west, droning loudly and firing heavily. Tracer rounds lit up their way from the east … and made it clear they had closed the ring … Oberst Fischer (commander of 126th Infantry Division) decided to regroup his division quickly and break out of the encirclement … all who were to break out to Telesi stood ready south of Kotselovo at midnight. 42nd Infantry Regiment was now at the head of the division. On both sides, assault guns supported the attack wedge … tracer rounds and the flames of Telesi illuminated the battlefield. Nobody who experienced this would ever forget it.9
About a thousand men were left behind, together with almost all the heavy weapons of the units that had been encircled.
In the south, Korovnikov widened his assault, preventing both XXVII and XXVIII Corps from freeing any forces to be dispatched to the crisis in the north. His attacks converged on Novgorod, and Lindemann belatedly requested permission for a withdrawal. Although Küchler agreed, Hitler did not. Lindemann ordered his men to abandon Novgorod anyway, even as the city was encircled:
On the night of 19 January, those troops of 28 Jäger Division encircled in Novgorod received the order to break out. The seriously wounded had to be abandoned in the ruins, the medical staff volunteering to remain behind with them, and all who could carry weapons, including the walking wounded, tried to withdraw under cover of darkness … German formations and units became mixed and confused … All suffered from the wet and lack of sleep and food, and unless supply column commanders took most energetic action to maintain contact, replenishment failed. Luftwaffe divisions disintegrated, and in some of the infantry divisions nearly all of the regimental and battalion commanders were killed or wounded. Divisional infantry strengths fell to only 500 men.10
Although the initial breakout succeeded, elements of 28th Jäger Division, 1st Luftwaffe Field Division, and SS-Nord fell victim to a second encirclement immediately to the west of Novgorod when the Soviet 6th Rifle Corps and 372nd Rifle Division met in a second pincer movement. Few escaped. The city of Novgorod, in German hands since August 1941, was recaptured, though little of it remained. Nearly all its buildings were in ruins, and only 50 of its inhabitants had survived the occupation. The rest had been shipped to Germany as forced labour.
The enforced evacuation of civilians for labour duties caused considerable anger, and undoubtedly stimulated many to join the partisan movement. Küchler was determined to evacuate as much of the population to the east of the Panther Line as possible, but as an intelligence report from 18th Army stated during the autumn of 1943, the policy faced considerable difficulties:
Many people are saying that they would prefer to be clubbed to death on the spot rather than take part in this evacuation. Even members of the population who are still pro-German rightly suspect that such a march will cause incredible misery and cause the loss of countless lives. Considering the state of people’s clothing, the lack of food or proper transport and the expected weather, the participants – particularly women and children – will soon be in an indescribable state.11
Outside Leningrad, the German troops still clinging to their defences closest to the city were in desperate danger. Hitler finally relented early on 20 January and authorised their withdrawal. In some cases, the withdrawal threatened to become a rout. The Soviet offensive continued on 21 January with major attacks towards Krasnogvardeisk and Luga. Küchler desperately demanded that he be allowed to pull back to the Panther Line, but Hitler insisted on a fighting withdrawal – otherwise, he argued, the Red Army would arrive at the defensive line with sufficient strength to force its way through.12 In vain, Küchler pointed out that his army, too, would suffer heavy losses in such an attritional withdrawal, and would then lack the strength to hold the Panther Line. Although Army Group North received some welcome armoured reinforcements, in the shape of 12th Panzer Division from Army Group Centre and the 70 Tiger tanks of Schwere Panzer Abteilung 502, it remained in a perilous position.
Under heavy pressure in the north, 9th Luftwaffe Field Division lost its commander, Oberst Ernst Michael, on 22 January, and he was replaced by Oberst Heinrich Geerkens, who had commanded the division’s Jäger Regiment 17. Two days later, he too was killed in action. Both men were posthumously promoted to Generalmajor. Meanwhile, with his forces driven out of their dense defensive positions, Lindemann informed Oberkommando des Heeres (the German Army High Command or OKH) that he intended to retreat further. OKH could either accept his decision, he wrote, or send someone to replace him.13 Although Soviet spearheads continued to reach positions before the retreating Germans, the bulk of the German line fell back intact. The rearguard was made up primarily of infantry commanded by Oberst Paul Wengler of 227th Infantry Division, reinforced by several tanks from Schwere Panzer Abteilung 502. On several occasions, fast-moving Soviet forces cut the road behind them, but the Tiger tanks were practically immune to any light weapons these units could carry, and were able to reopen the line of retreat. Otto Carius, a Tiger tank commander and one of the greatest German tank ‘aces’ of the war, recalled defending a village during a long, cold night:
Soon the village was under extremely heavy fire. The Russians had noticed that it was occupied and wanted to ‘clean up’ the affair before they advanced further to the west. Their methods showed, however, that they certainly didn’t suspect an entire ‘Tiger’ company in the village.
I saw muzzle fire in the woodline. It moved farther to the right from flash to flash. Those had to be tanks moving along the woodline. They wanted to reach the
road at the opposite end of the village. Obefeldwebel Zwetti was in position there.
Behind him was von Schiller’s tank. I radioed to Zwetti. With the help of a flare, I could determine that a T34 was moving no more than 50 metres away from Zwetti. Due to the firing, we couldn’t hear any motor noises. Because of that, the enemy had already made his way to the village. Zwetti shot his neighbour into flames, but we saw in astonishment a second T34 in the middle of the village street, right next to von Schiller.
It often proved fatal to the Russians that they kept completely buttoned up. Because of that, they could scarcely see anything, especially at night. They also had infantrymen riding on the tank, but even they didn’t recognise the situation until too late.
Von Schiller wanted to turn his turret but in the process hit the Russian tank with his cannon. He had to back up first in order to be able to knock it out. I didn’t feel confident enough to shoot. One of the craziest situations I ever experienced!
After Zwetti had finished off another three tanks, the Russians pulled back. Apparently, the losses they suffered were enough. We stayed in radio contact for the rest of the night and could hear the Russians quite well on one channel. That meant they couldn’t be too far from us.
At the break of day, our infantrymen approached the T34 somewhat carelessly. It still stood directly next to von Schiller. Except for a hole in the hull, it was undamaged. Surprisingly, as they went to open the turret hatch completely, it was closed. Immediately thereafter, a hand grenade flew out of the tank and severely wounded three soldiers.