by Prit Buttar
With Soviet troops still pressing the German defences to the south-west of Narva, a withdrawal was now urgent, but Benner signalled that he could not leave Narva at the designated time. Unsure about the safety of the road running through Olgino and Peeterristi, Benner ordered his men to withdraw along the railway line, to the south of the road. Rebane’s Estonians and the De Ruyter battalion safely withdrew along the road, while Seyffard slowly retreated along the railway line, leaving Narva at midnight and reaching Soldino, barely three miles to the west, at 0500hrs on 26 July. Further to the west, the railway ran through woodland, and rather than continue along this course, Benner decided to strike north-west to try to reach the road route. Moving slowly across marshy terrain, Seyffard was spotted by Soviet aircraft and came under near-continuous artillery and aerial attack.
By 0800hrs, the Dutch regiment was only a mile from Laagna, where German assault guns tried in vain to break through to the encircled rearguard. Unable to make any headway, Benner turned south, and shortly before he ordered his radio vehicles destroyed, learned that Repniku was still occupied by German forces, and decided to try to break through. At 1730hrs, Seyffard launched its last attack, unaware that the Germans had in any event been driven back from Repniku. Benner was killed in the opening moments of the attack, and within 30 minutes the regiment had been completely scattered. Many were killed, others taken prisoner. Only a small group of men led by Untersturmführer Nieuwendijk-Hoek escaped, reaching the Tannenberg Line a week later.21
On 26 July, Soviet troops moved into the deserted city of Narva, which had been reduced to ruins, mainly as a result of Soviet aerial and artillery bombardment, partly through deliberate demolitions by the retreating Germans. It is estimated that only 2 per cent of the city’s buildings were still standing.22 Although the Red Army was now across the Narva and firmly established in Estonia, and despite the destruction of Seyffard, the operation had not been a major success from the Soviet perspective. Most of Army Detachment Narva had succeeded in pulling back to the Tannenberg Line, and casualties had been heavy – German losses totalled about 2,500, compared with over 23,000 Soviet casualties.23
SS-General Felix Steiner’s III SS Panzer Corps began to dig in along the Tannenberg Line with SS-Nederland on the northern flank, SS Waffen-Grenadier Division (1st Estonian) in the centre, and SS-Nordland to the south. 11th Infantry Division lay to the south of Steiner’s corps, still blocking the Soviet 8th Army. The main Tannenberg positions were amongst the three Sinnemäed Hills, which formed a rough east-to-west line, and gave the defenders a good field of vision across the plain to the Narva; Fediuninsky’s 2nd Shock Army’s line of approach was therefore clearly visible to the Germans. Govorov shifted reinforcements to Fediuninsky’s army in an attempt to make good the losses it had suffered forcing the Narva, and to allow it to continue its advance. Fediuninsky now had 109th Rifle Corps, 122nd Rifle Corps, and 124th Rifle Corps, as well as two independent rifle divisions. To his south, Starikov’s 8th Army had 112th and 117th Rifle Corps and two independent rifle divisions, as well as a force of brand-new ‘Josef Stalin’ II tanks. These heavyweight vehicles had first seen action in the fighting near Kursk the previous year, and at 46 tons were substantially heavier than the ubiquitous T34s. However, their 122mm gun was hampered by a relatively low muzzle velocity, reducing its penetrative power. The ammunition for the gun came in separate parts, with the shell and propellant being loaded separately, giving it a low rate of fire, and in any case, with only 28 rounds of ammunition in the tank, its ability to engage in sustained warfare was limited. In total, the two Soviet armies had over 54,000 men, compared to barely 22,000 Germans. Obergruppenführer Anton Grasser, commander of Army Detachment Narva, advised higher commands that without reinforcements, he was unlikely to be able to hold on for long.
Meanwhile, there had been a further change of personnel at Army Group North. Friessner and his chief of staff, Generalleutnant Eberhard Kinzel, had both been replaced. The new commander was General Ferdinand Schörner. As a junior officer in the First World War, Schörner was highly decorated for repeated bravery. He continued to serve as an officer in the inter-war Reichswehr, and commanded an infantry regiment in Poland and France in the opening campaigns of the war. He led a division on the Finnish front during the opening of Barbarossa, rising to command XIX Mountain Corps before taking command of XL Panzer Corps in the Ukraine in 1943. Here, he established a reputation as a hard, determined commander, who imposed iron discipline on his men. Nevertheless, his corps fought effectively around Nikopol, and in early 1944 he commanded 17th Army in the Crimea, before rising rapidly to take control first of Army Group South Ukraine and now Army Group North.
Schörner was popular with Hitler, as a man who could be trusted to hold a position with the sort of iron resolution that Hitler often complained was missing from many of his generals. A physically intimidating man, he sometimes showed considerable imagination in how to get the best from his troops. During the fighting in Sevastopol in 1944, he issued an order that any soldier of 17th Army who succeeded in destroying a Soviet tank at close quarters would receive a leave pass. Given the parlous plight of the German forces in the Crimea, this represented one of the few ways of getting out alive, and it is likely that it inspired many infantrymen to engage Soviet tanks at considerable risk to themselves. Later in the war, his ruthless use of field courts martial to arrest, try and execute anyone regarded as a deserter often resulted in completely innocent men being needlessly killed. On one occasion, a senior NCO was ordered by his commander to go back from the front line to the division’s repair workshops, and then to return to the front with repaired fighting vehicles. Unfortunately for the NCO, his instructions were verbal, and despite his protestations, he was summarily convicted and executed.24
Like Model, Schörner was able to use the trust placed in him by Hitler to carry out withdrawals that would have attracted the anger of the Führer if any other commander had attempted them. He endorsed Grasser’s opinion that Army Detachment Narva was in a perilous position, but was unable to provide any reinforcements – Hitler had ordered him to assemble forces with which Army Group North could counter-attack towards the south, in an attempt to restore Army Group Centre’s lines. For the moment, Grasser would have to do the best he could.
The Soviet commanders intended to give the Germans as little time as possible to prepare their new positions. They hurried their men forward, trying to take advantage of any weakness in the German line after the destruction of Seyffard, and with considerable aerial and artillery support, the lead formations attacked on 26 July. The newly arrived Flemish 6th SS Volunteer Assault Brigade Langemarck took the brunt of the onslaught, losing many of its officers on its first day in the area. Elements of the Soviet 8th Army’s 117th Rifle Corps pressed home their advantage, attacking into the exposed flank of SS- Nordland. By the end of the day, the east side of the most easterly of the Sinnemäed Hills was in Soviet hands.
During the night, the Germans mounted a counter-attack, led by the anti-tank company of SS-Panzergrenadier-Regiment 24 Danmark. Several tanks belonging to the Soviet 98th Tank Regiment were destroyed, and almost all the German positions were recovered. The following morning, there was a fresh artillery bombardment, and the positions held by Danmark and Langemarck once more came under pressure. The survivors of Langemarck were driven back from their positions to the middle hill of the three hills, though one of their number, Unterscharführer Remi Schrijnen, remained behind at the controls of a 75mm anti-tank gun. Despite being wounded, he continued to beat off Soviet tanks, and together with the infantrymen of Danmark, he accounted for the destruction or immobilisation of about 20 Soviet tanks. Nevertheless, despite a counter-attack by several assault guns from Nordland, led by the division commander, Gruppenführer Fritz von Scholtz, most of the eastern hill was in Soviet hands by midnight.
Late on 27 July, General Schörner arrived at Army Detachment Narva’s headquarters. He stressed the importance of holding the curre
nt positions. The eastern hill was to be recaptured immediately, and the position was then to be held. As he set off to inform his men of their orders, Scholtz was severely wounded by a Soviet artillery bombardment. Although he was evacuated to the west, he died before he reached the military hospital at Rakvere. During the night, the reconnaissance battalion from Nordland, supported by a battalion of Estonian infantry, launched the counter-attack. Fighting continued into the next day, with most of the Estonian battalion being wiped out. The attack failed to make headway, and the Germans fell back to the central hill.
On 28 July, Fediuninsky deployed substantial artillery reinforcements and launched an assault on the northern part of the German defences. Unterscharführer Schrijnen continued to knock out tanks from his lone position in the front line, and the Soviet assault was beaten off. During the afternoon, there was a further savage bombardment of German positions, but in anticipation of this, the survivors of Langemarck had edged forward from their positions, so the bulk of the bombardment fell on empty trenches. When 2nd Shock Army attacked, it was once more beaten off, though Langemarck was almost at the end of its strength. Towards evening, German troops attempted once more to recover the eastern hill, but withdrew after suffering heavy losses. Steiner ordered his corps to abandon its foothold on the eastern hill and pull back to the central hill during the night.
Despite their heavy losses, the German lines were still intact. They were aware that Soviet losses were far greater, but in the context of Soviet numerical superiority, this seemed to make little difference. On 29 July, there was a further heavy artillery and aerial assault against the central hill, followed by an attack by infantry, supported by several JS-2 tanks. While 8th Army’s two corps moved forward against 11th Infantry Division, attacking from the south and the east, 2nd Shock Army’s 109th Rifle Corps attacked Nederland and 3rd Estonian Regiment on the northern side of the German defences. Despite the order to withdraw the previous evening, there were still scattered Danish defenders on the eastern hill, and the Soviet infantry of 117th Rifle Corps suffered heavy losses before the Danes were driven back. Nevertheless, the Red Army made steady progress. The central hill was pressed from three sides, though a cluster of anti-tank and anti-aircraft guns near the crest prevented Soviet armour from overrunning the positions completely. In the north, 2nd Shock Army was able to bypass the weakening German defences and reach the western hill, with a small force pushing forward to enter Vaivara. But just as it seemed as if the German defences might be about to give way, Steiner released his last reserve, a small group of tanks that had been held back for the critical moment. Led by Obersturmbannführer Kausch, the tanks advanced in three troops, driving back the Soviet forces either side of the hills. The limitations of the JS-2 tanks suddenly became critical – with many out of ammunition, they were forced to retreat, and without their support the Soviet infantry too fell back. By the end of the German counter-attack, only a single Panther tank was left operational, but for the moment, a Soviet breakthrough had been prevented. The Estonian Sturmbannführer Paul Maitla scraped together the remnants of several units, with several wounded volunteers from the field dressing stations volunteering to join him, and accompanied the remaining Panther in a further counter-attack with his battalion of 45th Infantry Regiment. By nightfall, the central hill was secure in German hands, despite further Soviet attacks. For his actions, Maitla was later awarded the Knight’s Cross.
There was further heavy fighting the following day. 8th Army succeeded in making some headway south of the German positions, but although Soviet forces managed to penetrate into the German lines, last-minute counter-attacks once more threw them back. On 31 July, the Estonians defending the central hill found themselves almost out of ammunition in the face of yet another massed Soviet assault, and were rescued at the last moment by the arrival of reinforcements from Danmark.
Unterscharführer Scholles, a clerk in the Danmark regiment, carried ammunition forward to the front line:
At the northern slope of Hill 69.9 [the most westerly hill], we dashed to the west slope of Grenadier Hill [the central hill] and paused for a bit. I looked for a suitable way to Grenadier Hill. The communications trenches had been ploughed up. Dead were everywhere. A gruesome picture and a fearful stench under the burning heat of the midday sun. At the north-east slope of Hill 69.9 there were dead Russians and Germans on the communications road across the position. All of the bunkers on the north slope of Hill 69.9 had been shot to pieces and burned out, in spite of their unique position on the slope. The stink of decomposing corpses flowed from the collapsed bunkers. An artillery barrage forced us to take full cover.
After the enemy fire let up, we made it at a dead run across the 250m of open, flat terrain to the west slope of Grenadier Hill. We made our way up the slope with difficulty. I headed for Bachmeier’s command post, which was in a crater-shaped defile. We found Hauptsturmführer Bachmeier [commander of the disparate SS units on the central hill] in a tunnel. He maintained a positive view of the situation.
Suddenly Soviet artillery opened fire. After 20 minutes it shifted to infantry fire. A breathless messenger ran up and reported an enemy penetration to Bachmeier. Without delay, Bachmeier set out at the front of a strong reserve squad with an immediate counterattack and cleaned up the penetration.25
An exhausted lull descended on both armies. Soviet losses had been shocking, especially given the minimal progress that had been made. Nevertheless, III SS Panzer Corps was also badly weakened, with battalions reduced to barely company strength. On 1 August, Fediuninsky brought forward two divisions to raise the strength of his battered army, and resumed his attacks on 2 August. Once more, each assault was preceded by a powerful artillery bombardment, but although the Soviet troops repeatedly advanced up the slopes of the central hill, they were unable to hold it in the face of German counter-attacks. Finally, on 10 August, Govorov ordered Fediuninsky to stop his attacks.
Soviet casualties had been terrible. Divisions were reduced to a few hundred men, and the Germans claimed to have destroyed over 160 tanks. It is estimated that the Red Army lost perhaps 35,000 dead and 135,000 wounded, compared with total German losses of about 10,000. Fediuninsky and Starikov had little space in which to manoeuvre, with only a narrow strip of open ground between the hills and the coast, and almost impassable swamps to the south; consequently, they were forced to launch a series of costly frontal assaults. Even in these circumstances, their failure to break through the German lines – it is estimated that the balance of power in terms of manpower alone gave the Red Army an advantage of greater than 11 to 1 – is remarkable. One reason for the success of the Germans was their very effective use of artillery. Several batteries that had originally been used to bombard Leningrad had been brought back to Estonia, and Steiner devised intelligent fireplans that allowed the collective weight of all the artillery at his disposal to be brought to bear in a single strike. In addition to Germans, the SS troops who defended the Tannenberg Line included men from Estonia, Denmark, Belgium, the Netherlands and Norway, and the fighting has sometimes been described as the ‘Battle of the European SS’. It should be remembered, though, that many of the troops, and particularly most of the officers, were still Germans.26
Army Group North was now isolated in Estonia and northern Latvia, with most of Lithuania in Soviet hands. The following weeks would see a determined attempt by the Wehrmacht to restore contact, and further Soviet offensive operations in the Baltic States.
Chapter 8
FROM DOPPELKOPF TO CÄSAR
When the tanks of Bagramian’s 1st Baltic Front reached the Gulf of Riga, they effectively represented the high tide mark of the great Soviet offensive that tore the Eastern Front apart during the summer of 1944. For a few days, the German authorities in Latvia, both military and civilian, waited for further blows. The German line to either side of the corridor established by the Soviet 51st Army consisted of the thinnest of screens – for large parts of the front line to the west, the only
defenders consisted of Latvian farmers and local landowners, hastily grouped together into some form of home guard. In northern Courland, close to the coast, was a small group of SS units, assigned the name SS Panzer Brigade Gross; it amounted to perhaps ten tanks and two companies of infantry, created from SS training units in Ventspils. About 25 miles to the south was Gruppe Hierthes, consisting of two battalions of Latvians reinforced by anti-aircraft units, and a similar distance south of Sturmführer Hierthes’ battalions were the remnants of Gruppe Mäder, with two infantry battalions, an artillery battalion, a small group of paratroopers, and a number of Latvian police and paramilitary units, again with anti-aircraft guns in support.1 Between these units, and between Oberst Mäder’s southern flank and 3rd Panzer Army’s IX Corps, there were large stretches of open territory.
The presence of just two or three relatively fresh rifle corps would have resulted in major gains for the Red Army. Much of Courland could have been overrun, and there was also the possibility of a thrust towards Riga from the west. But the lunge to the coast represented the last effort of a force that, despite its huge successes, was approaching exhaustion. The front line had moved over 350 miles since 22 June, and supply lines had been stretched far beyond what was sustainable. Casualties on the German side were severe, with nearly half a million men killed, wounded or taken prisoner – probably sufficient to ensure the eventual defeat of Germany – but Soviet losses, as was almost invariably the case in the great battles of the Eastern Front, were even heavier, at over 770,000. Bagramian’s front alone had lost over 41,000 men killed.2 Soviet armour losses, too, had been enormous, with over 2,900 tanks and assault guns knocked out.3 Many of these would be returned to service in a relatively short time, but the task facing the repair teams, and the logistics units that attempted to keep up with them and bring forward supplies at the same time, was enormous.