by Prit Buttar
To the rear of the front line, the Germans found that partisan activity in Latvia was, for the first time, a serious matter. Many divisions were required to form company- or battalion-sized groups that were sent into the hinterland to fight the increasingly active partisans. The make-up of these partisan bands was diverse. Their core was formed of Soviet soldiers, often specially parachuted into the area; many were members of the NKVD. Around this leadership there gathered a variety of men and a small number of women. These included deserters from both the Red Army and the Wehrmacht, and also Soviet soldiers who had been German prisoners of war. Some of this last group had succeeded in escaping captivity, but most were men who had volunteered to serve with the Germans as Hiwis (Hilfwilliger, or volunteers) in order to avoid continued detention in the terrible conditions that prevailed in prison camps for Red Army soldiers. In their role as Hiwis, they performed a variety of tasks, such as driving, cooking, and other rear area activities, but many also served as combatants. Now that it was clear that the Wehrmacht was headed for defeat, many Hiwis slipped away from the ranks and joined the partisans.23
As 1945 began, the outcome of the war was scarcely in doubt. But in order to ensure the success of the coming great offensive, the Red Army remained anxious to prevent any of the Courland divisions from returning to Germany, where they might strengthen the German defences on the Eastern Front. Even had a rapid transfer of all the Courland divisions been possible, it seems likely that the release of the Soviet forces from the Baltic would have offset any strengthening effect, so it is worth considering why Stalin was so keen to ensure a quick victory over Germany. The answer probably lies in his own past behaviour, and how he interpreted the possible intentions of others. During his rise to power, he was very adept at siding with more conservatively inclined members of the Communist Party in order to isolate and destroy radicals such as Trotsky; then, once the threat from the ‘left’ had been dealt with, he adopted the policies of the left and turned against his conservative allies from the ‘right’. As he negotiated the shape of post-war Europe with the Western Allies, Stalin must have wondered whether Britain and the United States might at some point in the near future turn against him, just as he had turned against his former allies. Consequently, although Soviet occupation of much of Germany had been agreed at Tehran in November–December 1943 – and subsequently clarified in meetings of officials in Moscow in 1944 – Stalin was keen to get his troops physically into position before the Western Allies moved against him. As part of this strategy, the German forces in Courland were to be kept under attack, and ideally destroyed where they were; Stalin was determined to ensure that a restoration of pre-war frontiers was interpreted as a return to the status quo of 1941, at which time the Baltic States were part of the Soviet Union. Complete occupation of the three countries before the end of the war would ensure that there was no question of any other outcome.
Chapter 11
ENDGAME
The beginning of 1945 in Courland saw a continuation of the fighting that had smouldered on as the third battle of Courland passed its peak. Gruppe Bodenhausen, consisting of 12th Panzer Division on the eastern flank and 4th Panzer Division on the western flank, deployed to the west of Džūkste, and on 5 January attacked towards the south, with 12th Luftwaffe Field Division and 19th SS Waffen-Grenadier Division to their east and west respectively. Once again, Betzel was with the leading elements of his division. The objective of the attack was to secure a new, shorter front line, by advancing about two miles. The leading armoured elements achieved this on the first day of the operation, with infantry gradually following, clearing the pockets of woodland of Soviet defenders as they came. 4th Panzer Division now turned to the west in order to close up with the Latvians of 19th SS Waffen-Grenadier Division, attacking just after midnight. By first light, the assault formations had broadly achieved their objectives, but found themselves in an area overseen by Soviet defences further south. Fighting continued through 6 January, with Soviet counter-attacks from the south being beaten off. As darkness fell, 4th Panzer Division’s combat engineers hauled away a large amount of Soviet materiel that the division had captured the previous night, including several T34 tanks.1
Although German combat losses in this latest operation were not severe, they reduced the strength of 4th Panzer Division to what the division commander described as ‘barely supportable’, with most of its Pz.IVs out of action; although several of the division’s tanks, including three Panthers, had been knocked out in Gruppe Bodenhausen’s attack, most of the vehicles that were no longer available were disabled due to mechanical problems. Nevertheless, the German estimates of Soviet losses were considerable. Betzel’s staff reckoned that since the start of the third battle of Courland, the division had accounted for half the tank strength of a tank brigade, almost half a regiment of assault guns, the anti-tank gun complement of a tank corps and a rifle division, and half the artillery complement of a rifle division. A further five Soviet infantry battalions were accounted for in terms of dead, with an unknown number of wounded.2 In a similar manner, 19th SS Waffen-Grenadier Division calculated that it had destroyed or severely degraded ten rifle divisions and an armoured corps during the fighting of December and early January.3 Whilst such claims have always been regarded as being prone to exaggeration, the German attack does seem to have caught the Red Army by surprise, resulting in many tanks and guns being captured as their crews fled. It should also be remembered that in almost every battle on the Eastern Front, Soviet losses were higher than German losses; but the ability of Soviet armaments production to replace these losses was also far greater than German industrial output. In earlier years, Soviet resources of manpower had also seemed bottomless, but by 1945, this had changed. The huge losses of earlier years had left much of the Soviet Union denuded of men, and the advancing Red Army was forced to recruit replacements, often forcibly, from the areas that it ‘liberated’. The training and discipline of these replacements was poor, and as a result, may have contributed to the ease with which operations such as the attack by Gruppe Bodenhausen put the Soviet troops to flight.
There were further changes in higher commands. Generaloberst Hilpert and General Boege remained commanders of 16th and 18th Armies respectively, but it was time for Schörner, the commander of Army Group North, to move on. Whatever the views of his critics, both then and since, many front-line soldiers held him in high regard, as a junior NCO of 4th Panzer Division wrote:
In Courland, apart from our camaraderie, which grew ever stronger, only iron orders to hold out kept us together. General Schörner was an iron commander. He was frequently with the combat troops. It was this man who prevented chaos for thousands of soldiers, by mobilising numerous rear area and administrative units for front line service.4
In recognition of their achievements, all soldiers serving in Army Group North were awarded a ‘Kurland’ badge or armband. For 4th Panzer Division, though, its time in Courland was coming to an end. On 9 January, orders arrived for the division to be withdrawn into a rear area, where it would form a reserve for the entire army group. On 17 January, as the final crisis in East Prussia and Poland began, the division was ordered to proceed to Liepāja, from where its personnel would be transferred by sea to Gdansk. It was to leave its heavy equipment behind, though at a later date, much of this equipment was sent to help re-equip the division. Although the division had sometimes failed to achieve its objectives – particularly during Doppelkopf and Cäsar – its personnel could be proud of their achievements. The total tank losses of the division since the beginning of Doppelkopf were 20 Pz.IVs and 12 Panthers, compared to an estimate of 215 Soviet tanks and assault guns destroyed. These figures include a distortion: they give the number of German tanks lost, i.e. unrecoverable, whilst the Soviet ‘losses’ would include knocked out tanks and assault guns that would subsequently have been recovered, repaired and returned to the front line. Nevertheless, even allowing for this, and for exaggerated claims of enemy losses, it
was a remarkable achievement.
12th Panzer Division continued to be involved in fighting in the front line after the success of the attack near Džūkste. Operations continued until 15 January, with the division claiming the destruction of 81 Soviet tanks, many with close-range Panzerfaust and Panzerschreck weapons. But although the division’s own losses were light, their impact on the thinning ranks of veterans was considerable. The commander of the division’s 5th Panzergrenadier Regiment, Oberstleutnant Bischoff, was seriously wounded and had to hand over his command; he recovered and returned to the front line just a few days before the final surrender.5
The great Soviet offensive against the German defences on the Eastern Front began on 12 January, and spread from the Sandomierz bridgehead in southern Poland to East Prussia over several days. Bagramian’s armies had already been depleted to ensure that the assault formations had the greatest possible advantage, but the forces assembled against the Courland Bridgehead remained formidable. Yeremenko was replaced as commander of 2nd Baltic Front by Leonid Alexandrovich Govorov, whose Leningrad Front had been disbanded. Together, he and Bagramian planned further assaults on Courland, in an attempt to prevent German forces from being withdrawn for use elsewhere. This strategy proved to be of limited efficacy. As has already been seen, 4th Panzer Division was transferred to Gdansk and thence to the Vistula valley, and several infantry divisions followed in the next few weeks.
In his memoirs, Bagramian reflected on whether he and his colleagues might have done more to destroy the Courland Bridgehead. He concluded that the Red Army faced several major difficulties:
The first of these was that the Fascist high command succeeded in withdrawing the main forces of Army Group North from the Riga area into Courland, and deployed them there in compact formations, allowing a successful defence to be carried out in the wooded and swampy terrain with few metalled or non-metalled roads.
Besides, it should be said that before it decided on such a manoeuvre, the Fascist high command was clearly aware of the danger of the final destruction of the personnel of its two operational groupings in Riga and Courland, cut off from East Prussia. The only way to save the troops who had earlier been deployed in the Baltic States was to gather them together in Courland. There, they found the most favourable of conditions for the creation of a stable defence and were able to maintain maritime communications links.
Secondly, one needed substantial strength and resources to destroy such a strong grouping. But at precisely this time, our high command required powerful units in preparation for the final, definitive assault towards the west. Consequently … soon after the liberation of the Latvian capital and again at the end of 1944, substantial forces were withdrawn from the Baltic region.
Thirdly, we had to attack in autumn and winter under difficult weather conditions, which greatly hindered the use of tanks, artillery and other combat equipment. In order to be able to advance, not only did we have to overcome the strong defences and bitter resistance of the enemy, but also literally had to force our way through every metre of overgrown woodland and swamp.
And finally, not only we at the front, but also our high command, believed that the forces in Courland were fully isolated from the main forces of the Wehrmacht. This circumstance, it seemed to us at the time, should have made the destruction of the blockaded divisions much easier.
But in contrast to Paulus’ army [6th Army, which surrendered in Stalingrad in early 1943], which found itself encircled in a ring of iron in the truest sense of the words, it was possible for the troops in Courland, who were protected on three sides by the sea, to concentrate on a defensive sector of only 200km, where the operational demands were a mere 6km per division. In this manner, the enemy was able to create and thoroughly develop deep defences. His second – and in the most vital sectors, third – lines of defence allowed him to mount powerful counterattacks.
The Baltic was the door through which the [enemy] troops received everything required for their operations until the end of the war.6
Bagramian’s closing sentence in this quotation immediately raises another question. Throughout the fighting for the Courland peninsula, the Soviet fleet based in Kronstadt made almost no significant intervention. Indeed, other than a small number of notable successes by its submarines, its ships made a negligible impact throughout the war. The fleet was considerable, both in numbers of ships and in fighting strength. At the outset of the war, it had two ageing battleships, the modern heavy cruiser Kirov, and a host of smaller vessels. Some were lost during the attempted naval evacuation of Tallinn, and others were damaged during the Siege of Leningrad, but the fleet remained a potentially powerful force. However, its surface units limited their voyages to the Gulf of Finland for the duration of the war. There are several possible reasons for this. Firstly, the long siege left many of the ships in a poor state, with a high likelihood of mechanical breakdown should they attempt a prolonged voyage. Secondly, Soviet warships had a poor maintenance record, even in peacetime, and there may have been serious concerns about their seaworthiness. Thirdly, many of their crews had been used as naval infantry during the Siege of Leningrad, and although some of these personnel returned to their ships after the end of the siege, they were short on training in their naval role, which would have further impaired the fighting power of the fleet. Fourthly, the Soviet navy had a poor historical record in surface warfare. During the wars that established the independence of Lithuania, Latvia and Estonia, a small squadron of British cruisers was able to prevent the Soviet fleet based in Kronstadt from making any major intervention, and inflicted repeated humiliations on the Soviet ships; two destroyers, Spartak and Avtroil, were captured by the British squadron and handed over to the Estonians, and the British naval officer Augustus Agar led two daring raids in 1919 on the Soviet naval base in Kronstadt with a group of flimsy coastal motor-boats armed with torpedoes, during which the British vessels succeeded in torpedoing the Soviet cruiser Oleg and – on the second raid – the battleship Andrei Pervozvanny at close range.7 In late 1944 and 1945, faced with the possibility of a surface action against the experienced sailors of the Kriegsmarine, with their powerfully armed and strongly armoured cruisers, it is understandable that Soviet naval authorities were reluctant to risk their surface ships with their relatively inexperienced crews. Bagramian recorded in his memoirs that, as had been the case elsewhere, for example along the Black Sea coast and during the fighting around Lake Peipus, the Soviet High Command had intended to mount seaborne operations, including landings along the Courland coast, but the resources for such an undertaking were not available. Had even limited landings been possible, Army Group North would have been forced to deploy precious resources to protect the coast, which would have made assaults on the main front line much easier for the Red Army.
The fourth battle of Courland commenced on 23 January, and sought to tie down as much of Army Group North as possible. The first bombardment fell upon the ranks of the German 215th Infantry Division, near Saldus, and was followed by a swift Soviet attack, with infantry forces supported by tanks. Immediately, a penetration into the German positions was achieved near the village of Brammani, but despite repeated assaults by the Soviet 42nd Army, determined German counter-attacks consistently restored the front. 12th Panzer Division had been assigned the half-tracks left in Courland by the departing 4th Panzer Division, and used these to re-equip a battalion of its 5th Panzergrenadier Regiment; these troops found themselves deployed in counter-attacks to eliminate the Soviet penetrations.
Sturmgeschütz-Brigade 912 found itself in action near Priekule, where Soviet forces attempted to drive towards Liepāja. As had been the case in earlier battles, the assault guns proved to be formidable opponents, dealing with Soviet tanks and infantry alike. Major Brandner, the brigade commander, was credited with his 57th personal ‘kill’, and his brigade’s overall claimed tally for the war passed the 500 mark. Fighting continued until 3 February, when, as had been the case in earlier Soviet assa
ults, the boggy ground rendered further combat almost impossible. Once more, the front line had barely moved.
By the end of the battle, the German forces in Courland were no longer designated Army Group North. As part of a general reorganisation of the German army groups on the Eastern Front, the former Army Group Centre, in northern Poland and East Prussia, became Army Group North, and 16th and 18th Armies became part of the new Army Group Courland. 215th Infantry Division, which had been so heavily involved in the fighting in the Courland Bridgehead, was withdrawn from the front line and ordered to proceed to Liepāja. From there, it was transported by sea to Gdansk, in an attempt to bring reinforcements to the shattered German 2nd Army. Like other men who served in Courland, many of its personnel had a generally positive view of their former army group commander:
Our supply system functioned well, as did the mail from home. When it came to major fighting, there were always sufficient supplies of ammunition. In the times of greatest danger, tanks or assault guns rolled into our positions and forced the enemy out with their fire.